心理体验及其对象类型--试论迈农的意向性理论

意向性作为现代哲学的核心概念之一,在迈农这里有着与在胡塞尔那里同样重要的决定意义。迈农在布伦塔诺意向性理论的基础上,通过对心理体验及其各自所对应的对象类型的这一深入探讨,不仅将对象概念发展到了极致,而且为价值的存在争取了一个独立的领域,从而也使得价值的意向性构建成为可能。因此,迈农的意向性理论不仅是对象理论意义上的深化,更是价值维度上的深化。     

基本心理能力老化的认知机制

基本心理能力老化机制是认知老化领域研究热点之一。横断研究与追踪研究表明, 感觉功能、加工速度、工作记忆等信息加工资源的衰退导致了基本心理能力的衰退。但由于相关研究不能进行因果推论, 基本心理能力老化的认知机制尚存在争论。因此本项目拟采用实验室研究和干预实验设计, 通过操纵感觉功能(知觉压力水平)、干预加工速度与工作记忆, 考察基本心理能力的年龄差异的变化, 以期为认知老化理论的深化和拓展提供实验依据。     

Implicit Theories of Mental Skills Abilities in Collegiate Athletes

We aimed at studying athletes' mental skills-related implicit beliefs and their susceptibility to changes. Collegiate athletes (n = 68) responded to the Theories of Mental Skills scale to determine their implicit beliefs of mental skills abilities within sport. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two manipulation articles and complete a mental skills task. Following the manipulation, participants' beliefs were reassessed to determine changes from pre- to postmanipulation. The results revealed that implicit beliefs could be manipulated, shedding light on the malleability of implicit beliefs. The findings provide information on the nature of athletes' perceptions of mental skills.     

Classical Intentionality

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.     

Metaemotional Intentionality

This article argues against two theories that obscure our understanding of emotions whose objects are other emotions. The tripartite model of emotional intentionality holds that an emotion's relation to its object is necessarily mediated by an additional representational state; I argue that metaemotions are an exception to this claim. The hierarchical model positions metaemotions as stable, epistemically privileged higher‐order appraisals of lower‐level emotions; I argue that this clashes with various features of complex metaemotional experiences. The article therefore serves dual purposes, offering metaemotions as a counterexample to an intuitive thesis about emotional intentionality, and examining their intentional structure in its own right.     

中美成人基本认知能力的年龄差异

为了研究中关成人基本认知能力的年龄差异,采用西亚图纵向研究模型的方法对中关被试5种基本认知能力进行测量。结果发现,不同文化下5种能力的成绩存在显著的年龄差异。并且这种差异不能完全用教育上的差异来解释。年龄较大被试在所有基本能力测验上成绩较低。男性被试在归纳推理、空间和数字能力上成绩较好,女性被试在语义和词语流畅性测验上成绩较好。研究表明文化环境和历史等因素对成人认知发展具有一定的影响。     

Representing,Running, and Revising Mental Models: A Computational Model

People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber , a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human‐like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low‐cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber ; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.     

Intentionality and Self-Awareness

In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object‐directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self‐Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them.