Reference and Imperfective Paradox

Philosophical Studies -     

The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox

The No-No Paradox consists of a pair of statements, each of which ‘says’ the other is false. Roy Sorensen claims that the No-No Paradox provides an example of a true statement that has no truthmaker: Given the relevant instances of the T-schema, one of the two statements comprising the ‘paradox’ must be true (and the other false), but symmetry constraints prevent us from determining which, and thus prevent there being a truthmaker grounding the relevant assignment of truth values. Sorensen's view is mistaken: situated within an appropriate background theory of truth, the statements comprising the No-No Paradox are genuinely paradoxical in the same sense as is the Liar (and thus, on Sorensen's view, must fail to have truth values). This result has consequences beyond Sorensen's semantic framework. In particular, the No-No Paradox, properly understood, is not only a new paradox, but also provides us with a new type of paradox, one which depends upon a general background theory of the truth predicate in a way that the Liar Paradox and similar constructions do not.     

Truthlikeness and the Lottery Paradox via the Preface Paradox

In a 2017 AJP paper, Cevolani and Schurz (C&S) propose a novel solution to the Preface Paradox that appeals to the notion of expected truthlikeness. This discussion note extends and analyses their approach by applying it to the related Lottery Paradox.     

Paradox and health

Abstract

Mounting research suggests that the way we deal with psychophysiological paradoxes or opposites (such as separation vs. attachment, firmness vs. supportiveness, formality vs. informality, masculinity vs. femininity, assertiveness vs. submissive‐ness, or in short, constriction and “drawing back” vs. expansion and “bursting forth") has key implications for our health. Although convincing theoretical treatises have addressed this topic, there has yet to be a concerted review of the pertinent literature. This article is intended to provide such a review.     

Paradox and process

A paradox must be accepted on its own terms, without resolution, and, at the same time, valued as a pointer to a new level of comprehension. Many of the phenomena we encounter in our psychoanalytic work have simultaneously a quality of remarkable similarity and radical, even contradictory, dissimilarity. The apparent paradox is ultimately resolvable by an understanding of the process that underlies and therefore relates the phenomena. The twin dangers that inhere in dealing with paradox and process are, first, the inability to accept the paradox, that is, a premature resolution of it, and, second, a clinging to the paradox so as to avoid articulating the process that would allow one to climb into a new grasp of reality. Among the questions touched on in this paper are: How can there both be and not be a baby inside? How can there be both need and no need at the same time? How can there be both destruction and transcendence in the same moment?     

Endurantism and Paradox

Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses.     

Paradox,truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth

Conclusion The discussion of the semantics of inconsistent truth theories now comes to a pause. The preceding is of course but a sketch; many interesting questions remain to be answered. The second part of this essay, however, will not seek to answer them. Rather, I will turn to the discussion of the proof theory of truth theory: the local and global logic of truth.Under the first heading, I show how to replace the inductive construction of models with an appropriate infinitary proof theory, and relate this on the one hand to the so-called dependence approach to inductive truth theories (Davis, 1979; Yablo, 1982) and on the other to van Fraassen's fact semantics for relevance logic.Under the second heading, I offer formals systems which capture the inferences valid in all approximate models. Not surprisingly, these turn out to be relevant logics.With formalism in hand, I discuss finally the extent to which the gap and/or glut approach can in fact be said to solve the paradoxes; that is, to allow us to say that the very language we are speaking is of the sort described in our theory.     

Paradox and Potential Infinity

We describe a variety of sets internal to models of intuitionistic set theory that (1) manifest some of the crucial behaviors of potentially infinite sets as described in the foundational literature going back to Aristotle, and (2) provide models for systems of predicative arithmetic. We close with a brief discussion of Church’s Thesis for predicative arithmetic.     

道德悖论视阈中的德福悖论

德行与幸福的关系问题是道德哲学的重要问题.德行是否与幸福保持一致直接影响到人们对某种道德理论的判断和评价.运用道德悖论理论可以帮助我们从一种新的视角来分析、理解二者之间的关系.现代德性伦理所追求的提升道德主体的整体德性,对于克服功利主义和单纯义务论对德福关系的简单理解.正确理解德福悖论具有借鉴意义.     

Chain-Arguments and the Sorites Paradox

A finite chain of valid arguments can never lead from truth to falsehood. Call this the concatenation principle, or CP. Some propose to reject CP in response to the sorites paradox. I offer a justification of a restricted version of CP based on intuitively-appealing principles, all of which are already assumed in mathematics. The restricted version excludes soritical cases, but covers intuitively correct applications of CP in mathematics and elsewhere. The upshot is that the cost of rejecting the unrestricted CP is much lower than is often assumed.     

Theoretical Paradox and Practical Dilemma

Emmanuel Levinas sets up alterity as a fundamental ontological category, irreducible to being and nothingess. There are two difficulties in understanding this ontological alterity. On the one hand, Levinas formulates it with negative terms – infinition, abstraction, ab‐solutenes, trace of a past that has never been present. On the other hand, Levinas invokes the notions of the superlative, the Good, and God. These notions are very difficult to separate from the notion of a redoubling of the positivity by which the things of the world are posited in their own subsistent being. The quasi‐concepts with which Levinas has thematized the alterity of the others who face us in an ontological sphere of infinition, absoluteness, and abstractness have determined negatively what he envisions as beyond negativity and positivity. They reduce the determinateness of the wants and needs of another, and reduce the otherness of one other from other others. In addition, the positivism with which Levinas eliminates the imperatives with which the elements summon us and the material imperatives with which the things put demands on us effaces the phenomenality of the other whose want and needs are inscribed on the susceptibility and vulnerability of his surfaces of skin.     

Idealism and Williams's Semantic Paradox

Bernard Williams's essay ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ argues that that the conventionality of language entails the dependence of the truth of sentences and ultimately of corresponding states of affairs as truth‐makers on the existence of thinking subjects. Peter Winch and Colin Lyas try to avoid William's paradox by distinguishing between the existence conditions of a sentence and its assertion. The Winch‐Lyas solution is criticized and a stronger Winch‐Lays resistant version of Williams's paradox is proposed. A more satisfactory countercriticism is given, involving an ineliminable modal fallacy occurring in the paradox inference, that arises because of the argument's invalid combination of categorical and counterfactual assumptions and conclusions.