In search of realistic optimism. Meaning, knowledge, and warm fuzziness

Is it better to be realistic or optimistic? A realistic outlook improves chances to negotiate the environment successfully, whereas an optimistic outlook places priority on feeling good. But are realistic and optimistic outlooks necessarily in conflict? The author suggests that the fuzzy nature of accuracy typically places only loose boundaries on what it means to be realistic. As a result, there are many forms of optimism that do not, in principle, yield unrealistic assessments. Nevertheless, there remain numerous "optimistic biases" that do involve self-deception, or convincing oneself of desired beliefs without appropriate reality checks. The author describes several ways that realistic and unrealistic optimism can be differentiated and explores the impact of this distinction for current views of optimism. This critique reveals how positive psychology may benefit from a focus on personal meaning and knowledge as they relate to making the most of life.     

Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk1

Two studies examined the accuracy of personal risk estimates, as determined by comparing mean estimates made by college students with population statistics for college-educated individuals. Study 1 suggested that optimistic biases (the tendency for people to think they are less at risk than the average person) arise more because people overestimating the average person's risk than because they underestimate their own risk. In Study 2, subjects rated their risk after being presented with risk statistics that were 150%, 100%, or 50% of the true values. Subjects' estimates decreased with decreases in the comparison statistics, as if subjects attempted to preserve their “below-average” status, but they changed less than did the statistics and were actually pessimistic in comparison to the 50% values. Implications for interventions designed to influence risk perceptions are discussed.     

Comparative optimism and well-being during the COVID-19 pandemic

Past research suggests that being comparatively optimistic about one's risk for disease is associated with benefits to mental health, such as lowered stress and anxiety. However, few studies have longitudinally examined whether comparative optimism has the same protective benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic. The current study examined levels of comparative optimism, changes in comparative optimism over time, and the association between comparative optimism and COVID-related mental and physical health outcomes among a US adult sample during the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants completed online surveys at four timepoints, over the course of four weeks in May and June of 2020. Results from paired-samples t-tests revealed that comparative optimism was present, such that participants estimated their risk for COVID-19 as being significantly lower than that of others their age and sex. Results from linear mixed models suggested that people who were more comparatively optimistic reported lower anxiety, depression, and stress. However, at times when people were more comparatively optimistic, they also reported greater depression and poorer sleep quality. Together, the findings suggest that the relationship between comparative optimism and health may be more complex than previously anticipated and further research is needed to examine the potential pathways through which comparative optimism affects health.     

Perceptions of goal-directed activities of optimists and pessimists: a personal projects analysis

In this research the authors examined the relationship between optimism and personal projects in a community sample. Three hundred twenty-five community volunteers completed the Personal Projects Analysis (PPA; B. R. Little, 1983) and measures of self-reported optimism and sociodemographic information. Participants who reported high levels of optimism rated their idiosyncratic personal goals significantly higher on PPA factors reflecting Positive Identity Fulfillment and Mastery-Control and significantly lower on the factor reflecting Perceived Strain than did participants who reported low levels of optimism. After the impact of age and education on optimism were statistically controlled, the Perceived Strain and Mastery-Control factors made significant contributions to the prediction of self-reported optimism in both initial and cross-validation samples. Findings indicate that highly optimistic individuals can be differentiated from their less optimistic peers on the basis of their perceptions of idiosyncratic goals. From an expectancy valence perspective, such differences have a direct bearing on individuals' behavior and may be associated with outcomes such as learned helplessness and procrastination.     

Perceived Event Frequency and the Optimistic Bias: Evidence for a Two-Process Model of Personal Risk Judgments

People often judge themselves to be at lower risk for various negative life events than are their peers. The two empirical studies presented here show that the magnitude of this optimistic bias can be either negatively or positively related to the perceived frequency of the event, depending on whether people judge their own risk relative to that of an average peer (make comparative risk judgments) or judge their own and an average peer's risk separately (make absolute risk judgments). A new two-process model is presented to account for these results. The model combines a better-than-average heuristic with elements of the singular target-focused and singular- distributional models of Klar and colleagues (Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996). The empirical results and model have many implications for the study of personal risk judgments, the optimistic bias, and risk-taking behavior.     

Accuracy, error, and bias in predictions for real versus hypothetical events

Participants made predictions about performance on tasks that they did or did not expect to complete. In three experiments, participants in task-unexpected conditions were unrealistically optimistic: They overestimated how well they would perform, often by a large margin, and their predictions were not correlated with their performance. By contrast, participants assigned to task-expected conditions made predictions that were not only less optimistic but strikingly accurate. Consistent with predictions from construal level theory, data from a fourth experiment suggest that it is the uncertainty associated with hypothetical tasks, and not a lack of cognitive processing, that frees people to make optimistic prediction errors. Unrealistic optimism, when it occurs, may be truly unrealistic; however, it may be less ubiquitous than has been previously suggested.     

Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.     

My Child Is Better Than Average: The Extension and Restriction of Unrealistic Optimism1

The purpose of the current study was to determine whether parents make unrealistic evaluations of children and what factors predict these evaluations. Parents of 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds rated their child's risk for various positive and negative outcomes, temperament, and health and behavior problems. Parents also completed an adult attachment measure. Parents appeared to give relatively little consideration to realistic constraints when predicting their child's future. Parents scoring higher on attachment avoidance were less optimistic that their child would attain positive outcomes and avoid negative outcomes, consistent with the view that optimism is a motivated phenomenon. Greater child internalizing behaviors also were associated with less parental optimism for positive outcomes. Findings have implications for the delivery of health messages to parents.     

Why it won't happen to me: perceptions of risk factors and susceptibility

Four studies were conducted with college student subjects to examine: (1) perceptions of susceptibility to health and safety risks; (2) factors that subjects see as important in determining their susceptibility; and (3) subjects' actual standing on objective risk factors. Subjects were generally unbiased about hereditary risk factors and were even somewhat pessimistic about environmental risk factors. Their views of their own actions and psychological attributes, however, were excessively optimistic. Few acknowledged actions or psychological attributes that increased their risk. This pattern of findings helps to explain why risks thought to be controllable (i.e., preventable by personal action) are likely to evoke unrealistic optimism about susceptibility. Family histories of health problems were incorporated into judgments of susceptibility, but, except for smoking, correlations between behavioral risk factors and judgments of susceptibility were surprisingly weak. Self-esteem enhancement is suggested as a motive that could explain many of the present findings. Several recommendations are offered for health campaigns that seek to produce more realistic perceptions of susceptibility to health and safety problems.     

Optimism and resources: Effects on each other and on health over 10 years

Dispositional optimism may be associated with growth of social and status resources by virtue of optimists' greater persistence and better performance. Conversely, resource growth may give people a more positive view of their future and increase optimism. Changes in dispositional optimism and resources over 10 years were examined in former law students (N = 61). More optimistic first-year law students made more money 10 years later, but income did not predict later optimism. More optimistic students did not have larger social networks 10 years later, but increases in social network size predicted increased optimism. These changes predicted mental and physical health. Dispositional optimism was less stable than many personality traits (r = .35), potentially because it is responsive to resource change.     

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Confident business forecasters are seen as more credible and competent (“confidence heuristic”). We explored a boundary condition of this effect by examining how individuals react to the trade‐off between confidence and optimism. Using hypothetical scenarios, we examined this trade‐off from the perspectives of judges (i.e., business owners who hired analysts to make sales predictions) and forecasters (i.e., the analysts hired to make predictions). Participants were assigned to the role of either judges or forecasters and were asked to rate 2 potential forecasts. In the “no trade‐off” condition, the 2 forecasts were aligned in optimism and confidence (the more confident forecast was also more optimistic); in the “trade‐off” condition, the more confident forecast was less optimistic. In Experiment 1, judges were more likely to positively evaluate confident forecasters when confident forecasters were the more (vs. less) optimistic ones. Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters were aware of judges' preferences for optimism and strategically relied on methods that resulted in more optimistic (but less reliable) predictions. Experiment 3 directly compared the perspectives of judges and forecasters, revealing that forecasters overestimated judges' preferences for optimism over confidence. The present studies show that forecasters and judges have different views of the trade‐off between confidence and optimism and that forecasters may unnecessarily sacrifice accuracy for optimism.     

Testing the limits of optimistic bias: event and person moderators in a multilevel framework

N. D. Weinstein (1980) established that optimistic bias, the tendency to see others as more vulnerable to risks than the self, varies across types of event. Subsequently, researchers have documented that this phenomenon, also known as comparative optimism, also varies across types of people. The authors integrate hypotheses originally advanced by Weinstein concerning event-characteristic moderators with later arguments that such optimism may be restricted to certain subgroups. Using multilevel modeling over 7 samples (N = 1,436), the authors found that some degree of comparative optimism was present for virtually all individuals and events. Holding other variables constant, higher perceived frequency and severity were associated with less comparative optimism, higher perceived controllability and stereotype salience with more comparative optimism. Frequency, controllability, and severity were associated more with self-risk than with average-other risk, whereas stereotype salience was associated more with average-other risk than with self-risk. Individual differences also mattered: comparative optimism was related negatively to anxiety and positively to defensiveness and self-esteem. Interaction results imply that both individual differences and event characteristics should jointly be considered in understanding optimistic bias (or comparative optimism) and its application to risk communication.     

The Effect of Reducing Opportunities for Downward Comparison on Comparative Optimism

Comparative optimism is a pervasive tendency for people to rate personal future prospects more favorably than those of comparable others. This may be caused by deliberately choosing targets on the basis of vulnerability. Restricting the range of comparison targets reduces the opportunity to make downward comparisons and should reduce comparative optimism. We asked 100 undergraduates to assemble a list of other students known to them. Participants estimated their personal risk of being victim of a road crash and skin cancer, and estimated the risk of 2 targets from the list. The participant selected one target, while the experimenter randomly chose the other target. Comparative optimism was greater in the participant-selected target condition, and this effect was almost exclusive to participants who reported making downward comparisons. We concluded that downward comparison processes could affect comparative optimism when targets are individual people.     

Skin cancer: Assessing perceived risk and behavioural attitudes

Abstract

Measures of attitude concerning exposure to the sun, and judgements of risk and other beliefs concerning skin cancer and four other problems (stomach cancer, deafness, AIDS and sunstroke) were obtained from a questionnaire completed by 176 university students. Subjects also estimated the incidence of each problem using one of three response formats. The highest incidence estimates were obtained when subjects were asked to guess at an absolute number, and the lowest when they used a scale which differentiated between lower frequencies, while grouping higher frequencies into a single response category. The effect of the response scale format, however, did not generalize to other ratings of personal risk. Subjects' ratings of their personal risk, compared with their peers, showed an optimistic bias over the five problems as a whole, particularly for AIDS, but not reliably so in the case of skin cancer. Optimism was inversely related to the amount of thought given to each problem. Men and women did not differ overall in their optimism regarding their own risk of skin cancer. However, differences as a function of gender and optimism were found on various behavioural attitudes. The results are discussed in relation to a tendency of disregard base-rates in subjective risk judgements, unrealistic optimism, and implications for health education.     

Heart attack risk perception biases among hypertension patients: the role of educational level and worry

Risk biases such as comparative optimism (thinking one is better off than similar others) and risk inaccuracy (misestimating one's risk compared to one's calculated risk) for health outcomes are common. Little research has investigated racial or socioeconomic differences in these risk biases. Results from a survey of individuals with poorly controlled hypertension (N=813) indicated that participants showed (1) comparative optimism for heart attack risk by underestimating their heart attack risk compared to similar others, and (2) risk inaccuracy by overestimating their heart attack risk compared to their calculated heart attack risk. More highly educated participants were more comparatively optimistic because they rated their personal risk as lower; education was not related to risk inaccuracy. Neither race nor the federal poverty level was related to risk biases. Worry partially mediated the relationship between education and personal risk. Results are discussed as they relate to the existing literature on risk perception.     

Dispositional optimism among American and Jordanian college students: Are Westerners really more upbeat than Easterners?

The present study aimed at assessing some previous research conclusions, based primarily on comparisons of North Americans and East Asians, that Westerners tend to be optimistic while Easterners tend to be pessimistic. Two samples of European American and Jordanian college students were administered a questionnaire consisting of items measuring dispositional optimism along with items pertaining to risk and self‐protective behaviors (e.g., seatbelt use, vehicular speeding, smoking) and social and demographic factors (e.g., sex, socioeconomic status, religiosity). The findings uncovered dispositional optimism to be stronger for American compared to Jordanian participants. Separate analyses of optimism versus pessimism revealed that Jordanian participants were more pessimistic, but not less optimistic than their American counterparts. No significant correlations were found between dispositional optimism and sex, socioeconomic status, or religiosity. The levels of optimism displayed by Jordanians in this study are inconsistent with previous claims of an optimistic West and a pessimistic East, and suggest that self‐enhancing processes may not be confined to Western or highly individualistic groups. The findings did not uncover an association between dispositional optimism and risk or self‐protective behaviors. Multiple regression analyses showed cultural background and sex to be the best predictors of these behaviors. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Self‐specific Optimism Bias in Belief Updating Is Associated with High Trait Optimism

People learn more from new information when it leads to favorable future outlooks and thus can maintain optimism despite conflicting evidence. In two studies (N = 20 and 26), we investigated whether this optimism bias in belief updating is self‐specific by modifying a recently introduced learning paradigm. In each trial, participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing a negative future event, were then presented with the population base rate of that event, and were subsequently asked for a second, updated estimation. In half of the 88 trials with varying events, estimations were made for oneself, in the other half for a similar other. We tested whether the updates (differences between the first and second estimates) following undesirable base rate were lower than those following desirable base rates, and whether this difference was greater for self relative to other. In both studies, the overall results support the presence of a self‐specific optimism bias in belief updating. However, taking into account trait optimism (TO) as a moderator variable revealed that this was the case only in participants with high TO, whereas those with low TO showed optimistic belief updating for both self and other. In Study 2, we additionally controlled for possible misclassifications of base rate desirability. Taken together, the optimism bias in belief updating was demonstrated by a selective neglect of unfavorable information. A self‐specific influence of this bias in individuals with high TO may ultimately cause the impression of a more positive future outlook relative to others. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimisme comparatif dans le milieu professionnel : l'influence de la fréquence et de la gravité sur la perception des risques d'accident du travail

The aim of this study is to test if people express comparative optimism when they evaluate their risk of being confronted to various work accidents compared to their colleagues. We also test the assumption according to which individuals are as much more optimistic as the event is threatening. Thus, an accident which is serious and probable (and consequently more threatening) should generate a maximum of comparative optimism. Our population is composed by employees of a mirror manufacture company. The latter evaluated their personal risk and that of one of their colleagues to be confronted with a severe /rare, severe/frequent, non severe/rare or non severe/frequent accident. Our results reveal the presence of an optimistic bias and this particularly for the severe and frequent accident. These data are discussed in terms of defensive bias and self esteem maintenance.     

A pessimistic view of optimistic belief updating

Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is characterized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations, and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined participants’ use of new information with reference to the normative, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental difficulties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying human ‘bias’ and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.     

Differential effects of trait anger on optimism and risk behaviour

It has been proposed that angry people exhibit optimistic risk estimates about future events and, consequently, are biased towards making risk-seeking choices. The goal of this study was to directly test the hypothesised effect of trait anger on optimism and risk-taking behaviour. One hundred healthy volunteers completed questionnaires about personality traits, optimism and risk behaviour. In addition their risk tendency was assessed with the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), which provides an online measure of risk behaviour. Our results partly confirmed the relation between trait anger and outcome expectations of future life events, but suggest that this optimism does not necessarily translate into actual risk-seeking behaviour.