Judging judges: How do children weigh the importance of capability and objectivity for being a good decision maker?

Two studies examined developmental differences in how children weigh capability and objectivity when evaluating potential judges. In Study 1, 84 6‐ to 12‐year‐olds and adults were told stories about pairs of judges that varied in capability (i.e., perceptual capacity) and objectivity (i.e., the relationship to a contestant) and were asked to predict which judge would be more accurate. Participants generally preferred capable over incapable judges. Additionally, 10‐ and 12‐year‐olds adjusted their preferences for the most capable judge based on objectivity information. Seventy 6‐ and 8‐year‐olds participated in Study 2, which was similar to Study 1 except that the judges could both seem incapable unless children understood how different decisions require different kinds of perceptual capabilities. While 8‐year‐olds chose judges based on the relevance of the perceptual capability, 6‐year‐olds struggled, seeming to be distracted by the valence of the judges’ relationships to the contestants. Overall, these results support that there are important shifts in how children evaluate decision makers from early to middle childhood.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Young children perceive less humanness in outgroup faces

We investigated when young children first dehumanize outgroups. Across two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of ambiguous doll‐human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces belonged to their gender in‐ or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based in‐ or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained stable across age. These results demonstrate that children dehumanize outgroup members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has important implications for our understanding of children's perception of humanness and the origins of intergroup bias.     

Understanding pretence and understanding action

Two studies were carried out in an attempt to replicate an earlier but controversial set of findings that suggested that young children are able to understand pretence in a mentalistic sense (Hickling, Wellman, & Gottfried, 1997). In Study 1, 65 three‐year‐olds and 77 four‐year‐olds were asked to either judge the thoughts of an absent teddy bear, who had not witnessed a change in the original pretence stipulation, or were asked to complete a similar, standard false‐belief task. Study 2 repeated the experimental procedures of the first study with 24 three‐year‐olds and 16 four‐year‐olds, with the difference that all children had to complete both tasks in a single session. The results obtained across both studies showed that 3‐year‐olds were unable to correctly judge the discrepant thoughts of the teddy bear, suggesting that young children do not attribute a false belief to another actor during pretend play, and that instead they view pretence in terms of overt action.     

Children's conceptions of mental illness: A naïve theory approach

This paper reports two studies that investigated children's conceptions of mental illness using a naïve theory approach, drawing upon a conceptual framework for analysing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of an illness. The studies utilized semi‐structured interviewing and card selection tasks to assess 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children's conceptions of the causes and consequences (Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal–explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of both mental and physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the children's thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood.     

Social cognition is not reducible to theory of mind: When children use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deontic reasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point to the existence of such non‐mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviour of others. In Study 1, young children (3‐ and 4‐year‐olds) were told different versions of classic false‐belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a rule or a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, the performance of 3‐year‐olds, who fail traditional false‐belief tasks, significantly improved. In Study 2, 3‐year‐olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and to use it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified version of the false‐belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the social cognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involve mind reading.     

The effects of stimulus density on children’s analysis of hierarchical patterns

In three experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 8‐year‐olds and adults were asked to draw hierarchical letter and geometric forms from memory. Across the experiments, the number of elements comprising the hierarchical models was systematically varied. For each drawing of a hierarchical form, the quality of the participant’s reproduction of global and local level information was evaluated separately. Results showed that young children demonstrated significant analytic competence. However, the data also suggested that changes in stimulus density were more disruptive, in specific ways, to 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children’s processing than to that of the older children and adults.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Opening the cuebox: The information children and young adults generate and rely on when making inferences from memory

We used a cue‐generation and a cue‐selection paradigm to investigate the cues children (9‐ to 12‐year‐olds) and young adults (17‐year‐olds) generate and select for a range of inferences from memory. We found that children generated more cues than young adults, who, when asked why they did not generate some particular cues, responded that they did not consider them relevant for the task at hand. On average, the cues generated by children were more perceptual but as informative as the cues generated by young adults. When asked to select the most informative of two cues, both children and young adults tended to choose a hidden (i.e., not perceptual) cue. Our results suggest a developmental change in the cuebox (i.e., the set of cues used to make inferences from memory): New cues are added to the cuebox as more cues are learned, and some old, perceptual cues, although informative, are replaced with hidden cues, which, by both children and young adults, are generally assumed to be more informative than perceptual cues.     

Definitions of bullying: Age differences in understanding of the term,and the role of experience

We report two studies that examine age differences in pupils' and parents' definitions of the term bullying, and possible reasons for these including the role of specific experiences. Study 1 compared definitions of bullying given by participants in four age groups; 4 to 6 years, 8 years, 14 years and adult. Participants were shown/read 17 different cartoon scenarios and were asked if each constituted an episode of bullying or not. Multidimensional scaling indicated that the groups differed in their definition of bullying. 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds and 8‐year‐olds used 1 dimension, a distinction between aggressive and non‐aggressive acts, when differentiating cartoons; 14‐year‐olds and adults gave a 2‐dimensional solution, also distinguishing between physical and non‐physical (social/relational or verbal) acts. Study 2 further investigated definitions of bullying given by 99 children aged 4 to 6 years, and the role of experience. Just over half had some understanding of the term, but tended to be less concerned about power differences and repetition of actions. No significant differences in definitions were found between boys and girls, or between children in involved (aggressor, victim or defender) or not involved (bystander) roles; however, aggressors were more likely than other children to say that 11 of the 13 aggressive behaviours were not bullying. These findings are discussed in relation to age related changes in experiences of bullying and cognitive development. Implications for interventions and research are also raised.     

Developmental changes in children's inductive inferences for biological concepts: implications for the development of essentialist beliefs

We examined developmental changes in children's inductive inferences about biological concepts as a function of knowledge of properties and concepts. Specifically, 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds and 9‐ to 10‐year‐olds were taught either familiar or unfamiliar internal, external, or functional properties about known and unknown target animals. Children were asked to infer whether each of four probes, varying in categorical and perceptual similarity to the target, also shared that property. Overall, children made more inferences for known concepts and familiar properties. Older children were more likely to use categorical than perceptual information when making inferences about internal and functional properties of known concepts; however, younger children, in general, made no distinction for property type, and they weighted categorical and perceptual information similarly. Both age groups utilized appearance when making inferences about external properties. Results are discussed in terms of developmental changes in children's appreciation of essentialism. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On‐line ostracism affects children differently from adolescents and adults

This research examines adults', and for the first time, children's and adolescents' reaction to being ostracized and included, using an on‐line game, ‘Cyberball’ with same and opposite sex players. Ostracism strongly threatened four primary needs (esteem, belonging, meaning, and control) and lowered mood among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds, 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, and adults. However, it did so in different ways. Ostracism threatened self‐esteem needs more among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds than older participants. Among 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, ostracism threatened belonging more than other needs. Belonging was threatened most when ostracism was participants' first experience in the game. Moreover, when participants had been included beforehand, ostracism threatened meaning needs most strongly. Gender of other players had no effect. Practical and developmental implications for social inclusion and on‐line experiences among children and young people are discussed.     

Young children's ability to recognize advertisements in web page designs

Identifying what is, and what is not an advertisement is the first step in realizing that an advertisement is a marketing message. Children can distinguish television advertisements from programmes by about 5 years of age. Although previous researchers have investigated television advertising, little attention has been given to advertisements in other media, even though other media, especially the Internet, have become important channels of marketing to children. We showed children printed copies of invented web pages that included advertisements, half of which had price information, and asked the children to point to whatever they thought was an advertisement. In two experiments we tested a total of 401 children, aged 6, 8, 10 and 12 years of age, from the United Kingdom and Indonesia. Six‐year‐olds recognized a quarter of the advertisements, 8‐year‐olds recognized half the advertisements, and the 10‐ and 12‐year‐olds recognized about three‐quarters. Only the 10‐ and 12‐year‐olds were more likely to identify an advertisement when it included a price. We contrast our findings with previous results about the identification of television advertising, and discuss why children were poorer at recognizing web page advertisements. The performance of the children has implications for theories about how children develop an understanding of advertising.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

How do young children deal with hybrids of living and non‐living things: The case of humanoid robots

In this experiment, we tested children's intuitions about entities that bridge the contrast between living and non‐living things. Three‐ and four‐year‐olds were asked to attribute a range of properties associated with living things and machines to novel category‐defying complex artifacts (humanoid robots), a familiar living thing (a girl), and a familiar complex artifact (a camera). Results demonstrated that 4‐year‐olds tended to treat the category‐defying entities like members of the inanimate group, while 3‐year‐olds showed more variability in their responding. This finding suggests that preschoolers' ability to classify complex artifacts that cross the living–non‐living divide becomes more stable between the ages of 3 and 4 and that children at both ages draw on a range of properties when classifying such entities.     

Children’s attention to sample composition in learning,teaching and discovery

Two studies compared children’s attention to sample composition – whether a sample provides a diverse representation of a category of interest – during teacher‐led and learner‐driven learning contexts. In Study 1 (n = 48), 5‐year‐olds attended to sample composition to make inferences about biological properties only when samples were presented by a knowledgeable teacher. In contrast, adults attended to sample composition in both teacher‐led and learner‐driven contexts. In Study 2 (n = 51), 6‐year‐olds chose to create diverse samples to teach information about biological kinds to another child, but not to discover new information for themselves, whereas adults chose to create diverse samples for both teaching and information discovery. Results suggest that how children approach the interpretation and selection of evidence varies depending on whether learning occurs in a pedagogical or a non‐pedagogical context.     

The role of pattern recognition in children's exact enumeration of small numbers

Enumeration can be accomplished by subitizing, counting, estimation, and combinations of these processes. We investigated whether the dissociation between subitizing and counting can be observed in 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds and studied whether the maximum number of elements that can be subitized changes with age. To detect a dissociation between subitizing and counting, it is tested whether task manipulations have different effects in the subitizing than in the counting range. Task manipulations concerned duration of presentation of elements (limited, unlimited) and configuration of elements (random, line, dice). In Study 1, forty‐nine 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds were tested with a computerized enumeration task. Study 2 concerned data from 4‐, 5‐, and 6‐year‐olds, collected with Math Garden, a computer‐adaptive application to practice math. Both task manipulations affected performance in the counting, but not the subitizing range, supporting the conclusion that children use two distinct enumeration processes in the two ranges. In all age groups, the maximum number of elements that could be subitized was three. The strong effect of configuration of elements suggests that subitizing might be based on a general ability of pattern recognition.     

Personal narratives about states of suffering and wellbeing: Children's conceptualization in terms of physical and psychological domain

The aim was to investigate how children conceptualize personal events of positive and negative valences pertaining to the physical and psychological domains. Five‐ to 9‐year‐olds narrated events referring to suffering states (Study 1, n = 112) and to suffering and wellbeing states (Study 2, n = 118). Analysis of the narratives revealed differences between the two states, with higher focus on events pertaining to a physical domain for suffering and to psychological domain for wellbeing; however, older children were more oriented toward psychological than physical events for both valences. Children showed higher tendency to produce causes compared to consequences, with younger children finding it difficult to introduce physical causes. Psychological suffering narratives revealed a richer psychological lexicon and more instances of domain coexistence. Asymmetry in the representation of different state valences and domains indicates multifaceted and developing conceptualization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Enculturation to musical pitch structure in young children: evidence from behavioral and electrophysiological methods

Children learn the structure of the music of their culture similarly to how they learn the language to which they are exposed in their daily environment. Furthermore, as with language, children acquire this musical knowledge without formal instruction. Two critical aspects of musical pitch structure in Western tonal music are key membership (understanding which notes belong in a key and which do not) and harmony (understanding which notes combine to form chords and which notes and chords tend to follow others). The early developmental trajectory of the acquisition of this knowledge remains unclear, in part because of the difficulty of testing young children. In two experiments, we investigated 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds' enculturation to Western musical pitch using a novel age‐appropriate and engaging behavioral task (Experiment 1) and electroencephalography (EEG; Experiment 2). In Experiment 1 we found behavioral evidence that 5‐year‐olds were sensitive to key membership but not to harmony, and no evidence that 4‐year‐olds were sensitive to either. However, in Experiment 2 we found neurophysiological evidence that 4‐year‐olds were sensitive to both key membership and harmony. Our results suggest that musical enculturation has a long developmental trajectory, and that children may have some knowledge of key membership and harmony before that knowledge can be expressed through explicit behavioral judgments.     

An evaluation and comparison of time-out procedures with and without release contingencies

A common recommendation for implementing time‐out procedures is to include a release contingency such that the individual is not allowed to leave time‐out until no problem behavior has occurred for a specific amount of time (e.g, 30 s). We compared a fixed‐duration time‐out procedure to a release contingency time‐out procedure with 4 young children (3‐ and 4‐year‐olds) using a reversal and multielement design. Results demonstrated that both time‐out procedures were effective at reducing problem behavior outside time‐out, problem behavior occurred in time‐out during both procedures, and problem behavior in time‐out was not predictive of problem behavior outside time‐out.