The learned interpretation of cognitive fluency

The fluency of cognitive processes influences many judgments: Fluently processed statements are judged to be true, fluently processed instances are judged to be frequent, and fluently processed names are judged to be famous. According to a cue-learning approach, these effects of experienced fluency arise because the fluency cue is interpreted differentially in accordance with its learned validity. Two experiments tested this account by manipulating the fluency cue's validity. Fluency was manipulated by color contrast (Experiment 1) and by required mental rotation (Experiment 2). If low fluency was correlated with a required affirmative or "old" response (and high fluency with a negative or "new" response) in a training phase, participants showed a reversal of the classic pattern in the recognition phase: Low-fluency stimuli had a higher probability than high-fluency stimuli to be classified as old. Thus, the interpretation and therefore the impact of fluency depended on the cue's learned validity.     

Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Affective Judgments

According to a two-step account of the mere-exposure effect, repeated exposure leads to the subjective feeling of perceptual fluency, which in turn influences liking. If so, perceptual fluency manipulated by means other than repetition should influence liking. In three experiments, effects of perceptual fluency on affective judgments were examined. In Experiment 1, higher perceptual fluency was achieved by presenting a matching rather than nonmatching prime before showing a target picture. Participants judged targets as prettier if preceded by a matching rather than nonmatching prime. In Experiment 2, perceptual fluency was manipulated by figure-ground contrast. Stimuli were judged as more pretty, and less ugly, the higher the contrast. In Experiment 3, perceptual fluency was manipulated by presentation duration. Stimuli shown for a longer duration were liked more, and disliked less. We concluded (a) that perceptual fluency increases liking and (b) that the experience of fluency is affectively positive, and hence attributed to positive but not to negative features, as reflected in a different impact on positive and negative judgments.     

Contribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments.

Following a shallow (count vowels) or deep (read) study task, old and new words were tested for both fluency of perception and recognition memory. Subjects first identified a test word as it came gradually into view and then judged it as old or new. Old words were identified faster than new words, indicating implicit, perceptual memory for old words. Independently of this effect, words judged old were identified faster than words judged new, especially after shallow study. Eight experiments examined the possible causal relationship between perceptual fluency and recognition judgements. Experiments 1 to 4 showed that fast identifications per se do not promote old judgments. Accelerating the identification of test items by semantically priming them or making them come more quickly into view did not affect recognition judgments. Experiment 5 showed that the usual association of fast identifications with old judgments is not an artifact of item selection because the association disappeared when the identifications and judgements were segregated into different phases of the test task. Experiments 6 and 7 showed tha the likelihood of old judgments increases directly with the pretested perceptibility of test words, but only after shallow study. Experiment 8 showed that the dependency of recognition judgments on perceptual fluency continues to hold when the requirement to identify the words before judging them is eliminated. We conclude that fluency of perception contributes to recognition judgments, but only when the fluency is produced naturally (e.g., through perceptual memory) and explicit memory is minimal.     

Effects of processing fluency on comparative performance judgments

Research has shown that performance predictions are biased by the impact of processing fluency. However, existing data are inconclusive with regard to comparative judgments of performance. In five experiments, participants in an easy condition gave more favorable comparative judgments than participants in a difficult condition. Participants judged their performance more favorably if they named colors of non-color words rather than non-matching color words (Experiment 1), if they had to generate six words of a category rather than 12 words (Experiment 2), if they had to run in place for 15 s rather than 2 min (Experiment 3), but the latter result holds only true if participants were not active in sports (Experiment 4). When 67% of the items in a recognition test were old words, participants thought that their recognition performance was better than when 33% of the items were old words, although recognition performance did not differ between groups (Experiment 5). We discuss this result in the light of recent theories about effects of processing fluency on judgments.     

The Fluency Amplification Model: Fluent stimuli show more intense but not evidently more positive evaluations

Processing fluency plays a large role in forming judgments, as research repeatedly shows. According to the Hedonic Fluency Model, more fluently processed stimuli are rated more affectively positive than less fluently processed stimuli. Most research documenting such findings uses neutral or positive stimuli with low complexity, thus any potential impact of initial stimulus valence cannot be tested. In the present study, 60 IAPS stimuli ranging from very negative to very positive valence were rated on liking by participants. Processing fluency was manipulated through perceptual priming (7 ms). Results of Experiment 1 (N = 35) support the prediction of the Hedonic Fluency Model, but only for stimuli with an initially positive valence. However, when negative stimuli were processed more fluently, they were rated as more negative than when processed less fluently. Experiment 2 (N = 39) showed that enhancing the accessibility of the stimulus content (via prolonging the prime duration to 100 ms) cannot account for the results of Experiment 1, since Experiment 2 failed to replicate the findings obtained in Experiment 1. Potential factors influencing affective evaluation of negative stimuli are discussed. A model is offered for the reinterpretation of processing fluency as an amplifying factor for evaluative judgment.     

The Impact of the Antitobacco Norm on the Selected Mode of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that when behavior violates an antismoking injunctive norm, dissonance is aroused, but the injunctive norm constrains how people reduce their discomfort. In Experiment 1, participants with positive or negative attitudes toward public smoking wrote an essay for or against a ban on public smoking. Whereas attitude change occurred for those whose counter‐attitudinal essay supported the antismoking norm, those whose counter‐attitudinal essay violated the antismoking norm did not change their attitudes to reduce dissonance. In Experiment 2, participants who wrote against the ban on public smoking eschewed attitude change in favor of reducing dissonance through trivialization and act rationalization. The discussion focuses on how maintaining social connections makes cognitions resistant to change when dissonance is aroused.     

Perceptual fluency effects in judgments of creativity and beauty: creative objects are perceived fluently yet they are visually complex

ABSTRACT

Perceptual fluency typically has a positive influence on aesthetic evaluations of beauty, but few studies have examined its influence on creativity evaluations. Creativity has two facets, originality and quality. If creativity judgments involve estimating product originality, such judgments may be associated with perceptual disfluency, while product quality may be associated with perceptual fluency. We examined the relationship between perceptual fluency and judgments of creativity and beauty across seven experiments. Creativity judgments were affected by most perceptual fluencysources. We observed a highly-fluent-is-beautiful-and-creative relation when testing repeated exposure and figure-ground contrast. Prototypicality displayed a high-fluency–is-beautiful relation, with creativity judgments unaffected. Visual complexity displayed a consistent disfluent-is-creative effect, with mixed results for beauty. For creativity (but not beauty) evaluations, increased saliency of visual complexity led to discounting fluent-is-creative effects, supporting the hypothesis that there are at least two fluency pathways to creativity judgments that take both originality and quality into account.     

Verbal fluency and creativity: General and specific contributions of broad retrieval ability (Gr) factors to divergent thinking

The Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model of intelligence views creativity as a first-level factor within the second-level factor of broad retrieval ability (Gr), alongside other first-level abilities such as ideational fluency and word fluency. Traditional methods of measuring creativity, however, confound idea quality with idea quantity, which might exaggerate the relationship between creativity scores and verbal fluency factors. Participants (n = 131 adults) completed two divergent thinking tasks (unusual uses for a rope and a box), which were scored using newer methods that effectively separate creativity (scored via subjective ratings) and fluency (scored as number of responses). They then completed 16 verbal fluency tasks that assessed six lower-order Gr factors: word fluency, associational fluency, associative flexibility, ideational fluency, letter fluency, and dissociative ability. Viewed singly, many of the lower-order factors significantly predicted creative quality and fluency. General Gr had substantial effects on creative quality (standardized β = .443) and fluency (β = .339) in a higher-order model as well as in a bifactor model (quality β = .380, fluency β = .327). Moreover, general Gr was the only significant predictor in the bifactor model, suggesting that it, not the specific factors, was most important. All effects were essentially the same after controlling for typing speed and vocabulary knowledge. The findings thus support the CHC view of creativity/originality as a lower-order component of Gr, illuminate the relationships between creativity and first-level Gr factors, extend the study of creativity and intelligence beyond fluid intelligence, and further indicate that creativity is more closely tied to cognitive abilities than creativity research has yet recognized.     

Shattered Illusions: The Effect of Explicit Memory Mediation on an Indirect Memory Test

Four experiments were conducted to explore the possible involvement of explicit memory in an indirect memory test in which white noise accompanying old sentences was judged to be quieter than white noise accompanying new sentences (Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988). Experiment 1 established that this effect lasted up to 1 week. Experiment 2 found that a group of amnesic patients showed a noise effect that was marginally above chance and not significantly less than that of their matched controls after a delay of one day. Effects of time pressure at test (Experiment 3) and divided attention at study (Experiment 4) suggested that the memory processes mediating the noise effect were not automatic, although the possibility that the processes involve enhanced fluency is also discussed.     

Complexity Effects on Temporal Characteristics of Speech

In light of evidence that multiple-goal messages tend to be characterized by longer speech-onset latencies and higher pause-phonation ratios, Greene, McDaniel, Buksa, and Ravizza have suggested that it is not the pursuit of multiple goals, per se, that results in less fluent speech. Rather, these authors suggest that the slower speech production characteristic of such messages is the result of difficulties in assembling, or integrating, incompatible message features. Recent evidence, however, indicates that this account is incomplete and in need of revision. Toward this end, we advance a complexity account that suggests that there are increased processing-capacity and temporal demands associated with formulating and maintaining more complex message representations. The article then reports four experimental studies of this complexity account. Experiments 1 and 2 operationalize complexity as the amount of information to be communicated in a message. These studies indicate that complexity does affect pause-phonation ratio and average pause duration. Experiments 3 and 4 operationalize complexity as the coherence of the information to be conveyed in a message. The results of Experiment 4, but not Experiment 3, again indicated that complexity influences speech fluency. The results of these studies, then, are taken to provide considerable support for the complexity hypothesis.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Through Literacy to Fluency: Reading in the Religious Studies Classroom

This paper addresses a perennial question of the religious studies and, indeed, of most liberal arts classrooms: How do I get my students to read texts thoroughly and with understanding? After briefly reviewing the National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL) data, I argue that what teachers desire is not just basic literacy, but fluency, which is the capacity to read analytically (and, for me, appreciatively), deploying the strategies of reading in a high process, improvisational mode. I unpack the elements and efficacy of one close reading classroom teaching practice I use, guided annotation, as a strategy for developing fluency. I argue that close analysis of a short, intentionally chosen passage with a guiding question builds towards reading fluency. Annotating short passages, singly and then in relation to other passages, with the author's and disciplinary concerns as the foci, practices the skills that build fluency. Annotation is akin to playing scales in music, repeating a baseline task of reading; working slowly and simply at first, but then with increasing speed and complexity, moving the student towards reading whole texts well.     

Doing It Differently: Unleashing Student Creativity

Student assignments and assessment – is there life beyond the ten‐page essay? Drawing on the theory of multiple intelligences and experience with an assignment in which students were asked to address course content in anything but an essay, the author considers the challenges and virtues of a creative format that does not rely exclusively on linguistic intelligence. The process, presentations, and evaluative approach employed in an assignment that called upon student creativity in a “Women and the Bible” course are described, and pedagogical and practical considerations explored. The analysis of a particularly memorable student submission reveals layers of complexity seldom achieved in a conventional essay format.     

Teachers' judgments of preschoolers' creativity

This study investigated the relationship of objective measures of preschoolers' ideational fluency and intelligence to teachers' ratings of creativity and desirability. The sample of 60 4-yr.-olds and 39 teachers were from six classrooms. Teachers' ratings of creativity were related to measures of intelligence (r = .46, p less than .001) but not to ideational fluency (r = .10). These findings are discussed in relation to possible halo effects and the ability to discriminate adequately cognitive abilities among preschool children.     

Divergent thinking: Strategies and executive involvement in generating novel uses for familiar objects

Although the Alternative Uses divergent thinking task has been widely used in psychometric and experimental studies of creativity, the cognitive processes underlying this task have not been examined in detail before the two studies are reported here. In Experiment 1, a verbal protocol analysis study of the Alternative Uses task was carried out with a Think aloud group (N = 40) and a Silent control group (N = 64). The groups did not differ in fluency or novelty of idea production indicating no verbal overshadowing. Analysis of protocols from the Think aloud group suggested that initial responses were based on a strategy of Retrieval from long‐term memory of pre‐known uses. Later responses tended to be based on a small number of other strategies: property‐use generation, imagined Disassembly of the target object into components and scanning of Broad Use categories for possible uses of the target item. Novelty of uses was particularly associated with the Disassembly strategy. Experiment 2 (N = 103) addressed the role of executive processes in generating new and previously known uses by examining individual differences in category fluency, letter fluency and divergent task performance. After completing the task, participants were asked to indicate which of their responses were new for them. It was predicted and found in regression analyses that letter fluency (an executively loading task) was related to production of ‘new’ uses and category fluency was related to production of ‘old’ uses but not vice versa.     

Reversing the truth effect: learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth

Repeated statements receive higher truth ratings than new statements. Given that repetition leads to greater experienced processing fluency, the author proposes that fluency is used in truth judgments according to its ecological validity. Thus, the truth effect occurs because people learn that fluency and truth tend to be positively correlated. Three experiments tested this notion. Experiment 1 replicated the truth effect by directly manipulating processing fluency; Experiment 2 reversed the effect by manipulating the correlation between fluency and truth in a learning phase. Experiment 3 generalized this reversal by showing a transfer of a negative correlation between perceptual fluency (due to color contrast) and truth to truth judgments when fluency is due to prior exposure (i.e., repetition).