Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism

Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non‐paradoxical) instances of the schema: (DS) It is true that p if and only if p. According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth‐conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non‐negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.     

Repeated interrogations: verbal and non‐verbal cues to deception

The major aim of this study was to investigate to what extent verbal and non‐verbal features of liars' and truth‐tellers' behaviour change during the course of repeated interrogations. After seeing a staged event, 24 suspects (12 liars and 12 truth‐tellers) were interrogated three times over a period of 11 days. In terms of the non‐verbal features, and in line with our prediction, we found that the liars displayed significantly fewer smiles, self‐manipulations, pauses, and less gaze aversion than truth‐tellers. Furthermore, over time the initial differences between liars' and truth‐tellers' non‐verbal behaviour increased for smiles, gaze aversion and pauses. In addition, we found that the cue ‘richness of detail’—the most indicative verbal marker for truth as given in previous research—had no discriminative power at any of the interrogation sessions. Finally, and in contrast to beliefs held by supposed expert lie‐catchers (e.g. judges and police officers), truthful and deceptive statements were found to be equally consistent over time. The psycho‐legal implications of the above findings are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Observers' Language Proficiencies and the Detection of Non‐native Speakers' Deception

We examined whether observers' language proficiencies affected their abilities to detect native and non‐native speakers' deception. Native and non‐native English speakers were videotaped as they either lied or told the truth about having cheated on a test. A total of 284 laypersons—who were either native or non‐native English speakers themselves—viewed these videos and indicated whether they believed that the speakers were being truthful or deceptive. Observers were more accurate when judging native speakers than when judging non‐native speakers, suggesting that perceptual fluency aided deception detection. Although there was no effect of observers' language proficiencies on discrimination, their belief that interviewees were telling the truth increased with proficiency. On the whole, these findings suggest that non‐native speakers may be at greater risk of being incorrectly classified in forensic contexts.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Verbalization and problem solving: Insight and spatial factors

Two groups of participants attempted eight examples of each of four different problem types formed by combining insight versus non‐insight and verbal versus spatial factors. The groups were given different verbalization instructions viz., Silent (N = 40) or Direct Concurrent (N = 40). There were significant differences between insight and non‐insight tasks and between spatial and verbal tasks in terms of solution rates and latencies. Significant interactions between the verbal versus spatial factor and verbalization condition on solution rates and latencies reflected a greater (negative) effect of verbalizing on spatial as against verbal problems. However, no significant interactions of the insight versus non‐insight factor with verbalization condition on solution rates or latencies were found. These results favoured the ‘business as usual’ view of insight problem solving as against the ‘special process’ view which predicted larger effects of verbalization for insight problems as against non‐insight problems.     

Telling and detecting lies in a high‐stake situation: the case of a convicted murderer

All deception studies published to date have been laboratory studies. In such studies people lied only for the sake of the experiment, consequently the stakes were usually low. Although research has shown that most spontaneous lies told in real life are trivial, such studies tell us little about lies where the stakes are high (such as police/suspect interviews). In Study 1, we discuss the behaviour of an actual suspect while he was interviewed by the police in a murder case. Although the man initially denied knowing and killing the victim, substantial evidence obtained by the police showed that he was lying. On the basis of this evidence, the man confessed to killing the victim and was later convicted for murder. To our knowledge there has been no other study published that has analysed the behaviour of a liar in such a high‐stake realistic setting. The analysis revealed several cues to deception. In Study 2, we exposed 65 police officers to six fragments (three truthful and three deceptive) of the interview with the murderer and asked them to indicate after each fragment whether the man was lying or not. The findings revealed that the participants were better at detecting truths (70% accuracy) than lies (57% accuracy). We also found individual differences among observers, with those holding popular stereotypical views on deceptive behaviour, such as ‘liars look away’ and ‘liars fidget’ performing least effectively as lie catchers. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mimicry and Investigative Interviewing: Using Deliberate Mimicry to Elicit Information and Cues to Deceit

We examined the effect of deliberate mimicry on eliciting (accurate) information and cues to deceit. Mimicry is considered to facilitate cooperation and compliance in truth tellers, whereas liars are constrained to provide detail. We therefore expected truth tellers to be more detailed than liars, particularly after being mimicked. A total of 165 participants told the truth or lied about a meeting they attended. During the interview, an interviewer mimicked half of the participants. Truth tellers were more detailed than liars, but only in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Truth tellers also gave more accurate units of information than liars, and the difference was most pronounced in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Mimicry as a tool for eliciting information and cues to deceit fits well with the emerging ‘interviewing to detect deception’ literature, particularly in the ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ approach. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political accountability,public constitution of recent past and the collective memory of socio‐political events: A discursive analysis

This paper presents a discursive analysis of a political news interview as a site for the interactional organization of the public constitution of recent past. In a context of commemoration and finding out the truth about the past, the focus is on how the collective memory of socio‐political events and political accountability is managed and what discursive practices representatives of nation‐states draw upon to understand and construct ideological representations of socio‐political events, namely the Romanian ‘revolution’ of 1989. The analysis shows how the possibility versus the actuality of knowing the truth about the events, (political) accountability and stake for actions are discussed, framed and given significance by constituting the ‘events’ of 1989 as ‘revolution’. The analysis further reveals how this ascribed categorial meaning is used by the interviewee as background for delegitimizing critical voices and sidestepping responsibility for past actions and knowing the truth. Social and community psychologists can learn more about how individuals and communities construct ideological versions of socio‐political events by considering the interplay between questions of political accountability and arguments over the meaning of political categories, and engaging with the accounting practices in which the meaning of socio‐political events is being negotiated by members of society Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

DVD pirating intentions: Angels,devils, chancers and receivers

Digital piracy is perceived as a considerable problem by the film industry, and numerous preventative strategies have been introduced, but so far with limited success. This paper explores DVD piracy in particular, and focuses on identifying different types of pirating behaviour and the antecedents to this behaviour. Four distinct types of ‘pirates’ were identified, based on a cross‐sectional sample of UK adults. These groups were serious pirates (‘Devils’), opportunists (‘Chancers’), receivers (‘Receivers’) and non‐pirates (‘Angels’). A structural equation modelling approach was used to establish the importance of key antecedents for the overall sample and the four sub groups. The base model fitted the overall sample very well as for the sub group ‘Chancers’, but as expected, there were significant differences in model fit and the importance of key variables between the different behaviour types. The construct of ‘perceived harm’ emerged as an important differentiator in all models. The results suggest that targeting anti‐pirating measures specifically at different types of behaviour and their antecedents may increase the effectiveness of such measures and also assist with the efficient allocation of limited resources in this area. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Police officers' beliefs about,and use of,cues to deception

Meta‐analytic findings indicate that people, including police officers, are generally poor at detecting low‐stakes deception. Related to this, investigations of behaviours that people reportedly use to make truth or lie judgements tend to conclude that people rely on incorrect stereotypes. However, consistent findings suggest that police officers are able to detect high‐stakes deception; this implies that, at least in some contexts, police officers utilise reliable cues to deception. The research presented here was an investigation of cues to deception used by police officers (N  = 69), when making veracity decisions about real world, high‐stakes communications. Data were collected on both free report cues, and also prescribed cues that were known (from previous research), to discriminate between liars and truth‐tellers in the communications that the police officers observed. Officers free reported using cues related to verbal content, emotion, body language, eyes, vocal cues, and external cues. Most prescribed cues were self‐reportedly used correctly by large majorities of the officers, suggesting that they may not rely on inaccurate stereotypes. Self‐report use of categories of free report cues, and prescribed cues, was not related to accuracy in detecting deception. As people may not always be aware of the behaviours on which their judgements are based, the relationships between some of the behaviours actually displayed in the communications, and group accuracy in detecting deception in those communications, were also investigated. Group accuracy was related to the presence of subjective, emotion‐related cues in the communications.     

Moral/non‐moral domain shift in young adolescents in relation to delinquent behaviour

Because moral transgressions are considered more serious than non‐moral (i.e. conventional or personal) transgressions, it is less threatening to self‐esteem to interpret one's own delinquent act as a non‐moral transgression rather than a moral transgression. This ‘domain shift’ could be a way of reducing cognitive dissonance. It was expected that adolescents who report a certain category of delinquent behaviour would evaluate hypothetical transgressions in the same category as more non‐moral than would adolescents who did not report that category of delinquent behaviour. A group of 278 students from the first (M(age)=13.1), second (M(age)=14.3) and third (M(age)=15.2) grade of intermediate secondary schools in the Netherlands participated in the research. The results showed a domain shift from the moral towards non‐moral domains in the evaluation of hypothetical situations about delinquent behaviour reported by the adolescent. At the same time, this domain shift did not occur in situations concerning delinquent behaviour not reported by the adolescent, even when delinquent behaviour occurred in the adolescent's peer group. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the domain shift takes place as a consequence of cognitive dissonance. The results also showed that the attitude towards delinquent behaviour and the prevalence of delinquent behaviour in the peer group both predicted a unique part of the variance in reported delinquent behaviour (RDB; 28% and 10%, respectively). The level of moral reasoning (measured by the Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form [SRM‐SF]) did not appear to be a significant predictor of RDB.     

WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY AND THE NORMS OF ASSERTORIC PRACTICE: WHY TRUTH AND WARRANTED ASSERTIBILITY ARE NOT COINCIDENT NORMS

Crispin Wright has argued that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident but non‐co‐extensive norms of assertoric practice and that this fact inflates deflationary theories of truth. Wright's inflationary argument has generated much discussion in the literature. By contrast, relatively little has been said about the coincidence claim that is the focus of this paper. Wright's argument for the claim that truth and warranted assertibility are coincident norms is first presented. It is then suggested that the argument trades on an ambiguity in ‘justified’ and ‘warrantedly assertible’. Finally, it is argued that, once the ambiguity is removed, there is reason to reject the claim that truth and epistemic warrant are coincident norms of assertoric practice. One important result is that no epistemic theory of truth can satisfy what Wright takes to be a key platitude about assertion.     

Defending Exclusivity

‘Exclusivity’ is the claim that when deliberating about whether to believe that p one can only be consciously motivated to reach one's conclusion by considerations one takes to pertain to the truth of p. The pragmatist tradition has long offered inspiration to those who doubt this claim. Recently, a neo‐pragmatist movement (Carl Ginet ( 2001 ), Keith Frankish ( 2007 ), and Conor McHugh ( 2012b )) has given rise to a serious challenge to exclusivity. In this article, I defend exclusivity in the face of this challenge. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the challenge, namely, that one can have evidence sufficient to enable but not compel belief. Secondly, I examine several cases that McHugh in particular offers to call exclusivity into question and argue on independent grounds that these cases do not threaten exclusivity. Whether or not exclusivity holds, in addition to being of intrinsic interest, has a decisive consequence for the contemporary debate over Bernard Williams’ ( 1973 ) claim that “beliefs aim at truth”. If exclusivity is true, as David Owens ( 2003 ) has argued, the deliberator cannot be said to literally aim at truth. So, in defending exclusivity, I thereby show that the notion of ‘aiming’ fails to illuminate the nature of belief.     

KEEPING TRACK OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM

This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth‐maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’     

Teenage Offenders' Ability to Detect Deception in Their Peers

This study investigated the deception detection abilities of teenage offenders and teenage non‐offenders who made veracity judgments about 12 videotaped interviewees and also explored the behavioural characteristics of teenage liars and truth tellers. The findings revealed that teenage offenders were significantly more accurate in their credibility judgments than teenage non‐offenders. However, the offenders' impressive accuracy rates were not as a consequence of using valid cues to deceit. The feedback hypothesis helps to explain why the offenders were more accurate in their decisions: Operating within a criminal environment may mean that teenage offenders frequently lie and are lied to. Consequently, they receive more feedback than non‐offenders regarding the effectiveness of their lies as well as how successful they are at detecting lies. As a result, their lie detection ability improves. The current study suggests moving away from individual deceptive cues as predictors of deceit towards a more intuitive and holistic approach to lie detection, such as the Brunswikian Lens Model.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Truth in the Investigations

According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein’s pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences ‘p’ is true = p and ‘p’ is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, and that his new development of this notion in the Investigations excludes the redundancy-deflationary reading. Wittgenstein’s thoughts about truth are instead compatible with another interpretative option: Wittgenstein remains faithful to his methodological pronouncements, and he merely presents us with (grammatical) platitudes about the notions of “true” and “false”.

     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?

True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: (i) the orthodox definition given in terms of interpretations or models, (ii) a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and (iii) a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference.     

Ambiguous probabilities: when does p=0.3 reflect a possibility,and when does it express a doubt?

Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are usually held to be more vague than numerical probability statements. They are, however, directionally more precise, in the sense that they are either positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, or negative, drawing attention to its non‐occurrence. A numerical probability will, in contrast, sometimes be perceived as positive and sometimes as negative. When asked to complete sentences such as ‘The operation has a 30% chance of success, because’ some people will give reasons for success (‘the doctors are expert surgeons’), whereas others will give reasons for failure (‘it is a difficult operation’). It is shown in two experiments that positive reasons are given more often than negative ones, even for p values below 0.5, especially when the probability is higher than expected, and the target outcome is non‐normal, undesirable, and phrased as a negation. We conclude that the directionality of numerical probabilities (as opposed to verbal phrases) is context‐dependent, but biased towards a positive interpretation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Luck and the Domain of Distributive Justice

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