BEYOND THE NATURE–CULTURE DUALISM: THE ECOLOGY OF EARTH-HOMELAND

Morin's thoughts on environmental destruction flow from the perspective of a metatheorist of political ecology. His early writings emphasize the interaction of nature and culture; his “acentric” interpretations of systems theory challenge ecological theorists who overemphasize centralized programming as a remedy for destructive patterns of subsystem interaction. Morin also criticizes defenders of “sustainable development” who fail to see system-renewing potential in cultural diversity. As an environmental metatheorist, he offers not rules for a new green ethic, but a way of thinking designed to enhance respect for pluralism, ambiguity, and natural complexity.     

Religious Ethics and the Environment

This essay discusses three recent books which each offer an integrative account of religious ethics and the environment. Religious environmental ethics is an area of inquiry within the larger field of religion and ecology. After a narrative that contextualizes the development of religious environmental ethics in relation to the environmental social movement, I describe the formation of the field including its focus on worldview, the “cosmological turn,” and its engagement with science, the “cosmic turn.” Elizabeth Johnson exemplifies the cosmic turn by developing a Christian theology of life in nature which explicitly accepts Darwin's theory of evolution. Willis Jenkins advocates a prophetic pragmatism and critiques a focus on worldview that is abstracted from practice and defers moral responsibility. Larry Rasmussen joins analysis of worldview with reflection on cross‐cultural resources for “anticipatory communities” of moral formation to catalyze change. I argue with Rasmussen that religious environmental ethics needs multiple approaches and should allow room for methodological pluralism.     

Pragmatic Democracy: Inquiry,Objectivity, and Experience

This essay argues that to understand Dewey's vision of democracy as “epistemic” requires consideration of how experiential and communal aspects of inquiry together produce what is named here “pragmatic objectivity.” Such pragmatic objectivity provides an alternative to absolutism and self‐interested relativism by appealing to certain norms of empirical experimentation. Pragmatic objectivity, it is then argued, can be justified by appeal to Dewey's conception of primary experience. This justification, however, is not without its own complications, which are highlighted with objections regarding “radical pluralism” in political life, and some logical problems that arise due to the supposedly “ineffable” nature of primary experience. The essay concludes by admitting that while Dewey's theory of democracy based on experience cannot answer all of the objections argumentatively, it nevertheless provides potent suggestions for how consensus building can proceed without such philosophical arguments.     

Neo-positivism,religious language,and the problem of evil in Eberhard Herrmann's philosophy of religion

In Religion, Reality and a Good Life (2004) Eberhard Herrmann argues that “religious utterances” are not “statements.” I argue that this thesis, when properly unpacked, directly parallels the logical positivist thesis from the 1930s and 40s that “religious sentences” are not “cognitively meaningful.” I consider a number of indirect objections to Herrmann's thesis which target the verification criterion of meaning used to support the thesis, along with the more direct objection that the thesis is unable to make sense of the problem of evil. My conclusion is that Herrmann's neo-Positivism is deeply problematic.     

On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics

In this paper, I take a critical stance on the emerging field of nanoethics. After an introductory section, “Conceptual Foundations of Nanotechnology” considers the conceptual foundations of nanotechnology, arguing that nanoethics can only be as coherent as nanotechnology itself and then discussing concerns with this latter concept; the conceptual foundations of nanoethics are then explicitly addressed in “Conceptual Foundations of Nanoethics”. “Issues in Nanoethics” considers ethical issues that will be raised through nanotechnology and, in “What’s New?”, it is argued that none of these issues is unique to nanotechnology. In “It’s a Revolution!”, I express skepticism about arguments which hold that, while the issues themselves might not be unique, they nevertheless are instantiated to such a degree that extant moral frameworks will be ill-equipped to handle them. In “What’s Different?”, I draw plausible distinctions between nanoethics and other applied ethics, arguing that these latter might well identify unique moral issues and, as such, distinguish themselves from nanoethics. Finally, in “What Now?”, I explore the conclusions of this result, ultimately arguing that, while nanoethics may fail to identify novel ethical concerns, it is at least the case that nanotechnology is deserving of ethical attention, if not a new associative applied ethic.     

Justice,Care, and Questionable Dichotomies

Throughout the development of an “ethic of care” different from an “ethic of justice,” the relationship between the two has been problematic. Are they theories between which one must choose? Are they complementary? Are they domain-specific? In support of my view that neither is adequate by itself, I here examine the private domain of care of the dying by intimates, and find there important issues both of care and of justice.     

Exemplarist Environmental Ethics

This article argues that environmental ethics can deemphasize environmental problem‐solving in preference for a more exemplarist mode. This mode will renarrate what we admire in those we have long admired, in order to make them resonate with contemporary ethical needs. First, I outline a method problem that arose for me in ethnographic fieldwork, a problem that I call, far too reductively, “solution thinking.” Second, I relate that method problem to movements against “quandary ethics” in ethical theory more broadly. Third, I discuss some interpretive work I am engaged in about Henry David Thoreau and how it bears on the methodological issues my fieldwork raised. I argue that some of the most important icons of right relation to environment, especially Francis of Assisi and Thoreau, should be envisioned as far more politically invested than they usually are. They demonstrate to scholars of religious ethics that an exemplarist ethic focused on character need not neglect politics.     

KIERKEGAARD AND EVANS ON THE PROBLEM OF ABRAHAM

A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard's ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the “modernized” problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Fear and Trembling: the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent's own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. Against a solution to this problem proposed by C. Stephen Evans in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love, I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never actually resulting in a fully responsible agent's performance of some horrendous action on account of her non‐culpable misinterpretation of God's will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin.     

On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility?…?[he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its role – “both of which have helped fan the flame of the luck argument”. In this paper, I respond to Franklin's criticisms, arguing that, so far from making it significantly more difficult to answer objections about luck and control, as he claims, giving indeterminism the location and role I do makes it possible to answer such objections and many other related objections to libertarian free will. A central theme of this paper will emerge in my responses: In order to make sense of freedom of will in general and to do justice to the complex historical debates about it, one must distinguish different kinds of control agents may have over events and correspondingly different kinds of freedom they may possess.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.     

A DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM,MEDITATION, AND FREE WILL: A THEORY OF MENTAL FREEDOM

This is my response to the criticisms of Gregg Caruso, David Cummiskey, and Karin Meyers, in their roles as members of the “Author Meets Critics” panel devoted to my book, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom at the 2019 annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, organized by Christian Coseru. Caruso's main objection is that I am not sufficiently attentive to details of opposing arguments in Western philosophy, and Cummiskey's and Meyers’ objections, similarly, are that I am insufficiently attentive to details of Buddhism. I argue that all such objections, however putatively correct, do not rise to the level of objections that actually undermine my account of mental freedom.     

Democracy and ecological soundness

Though the goals of democracy and ecological soundness are largely believed to be necessarily linked, there is sometimes a lack of adequate argument demonstrating this connection. Defining ecological soundness and democracy and showing weaknesses in some typical attempts to link them, I argue that democracy is in fact necessary for ecological improvement. The undemocratic practices of capitalism, ecological discrimination, and global inequality all play key roles in environmental degradation. Drawing on David Schweickart's (1996) recent argument for “Economic Democracy,” I defend such a model of democratic socialism as the most ecologically sound political and economic form currently possible.     

Back in Style: A New Interpretation of Danto's Style Matrix

A number of objections to the style matrix that Arthur Danto introduced in “The Artworld” seem to have quelled most discussion of it. So telling have these arguments been that Danto himself later recanted the idea entirely. This situation is somewhat unfortunate. It may be that Danto's own interpretation of the style matrix is not tenable, but I believe we can articulate an alternative reading of it that escapes the aforementioned objections. While the interpretation I suggest cannot provide all that Danto initially imagined for his style matrix, it does maintain much that was theoretically beneficial in it.     

Yes,Eliminative Materialism Is Self-Defeating

Eliminative materialism seeks to replace our familiar categories of mentality, “folk psychology,” with those of cognitive science. One of the objections to this project has been that is self-defeating. Any attempt to argue for, defend, present, or even contemplate eliminativism in one's own mind can only get started by employing the very categories it decries. Counterarguments to this objection include that to accuse eliminativism of being self-defeating begs the question (the Churchlands) and that it can be reduced to other objections to eliminativism (Ramsey). I argue that these counterarguments are unsuccessful and that eliminativism is in fact self-defeating.     

NATURAL GOODNESS,RIGHTNESS, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON: REPLY TO ARROYO,CUMMISKEY, MOLAND,AND BIRD‐POLLAN

Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural good previously described. In response to Moland, I explain why I think Hegelian worries about the supposed emptiness of the Kantian self do not apply to my account. And in response to both Moland and Bird‐Pollan, I argue that, contrary to the view of some Hegelians, the intersubjective normativity of reason is not something developed through actual social relations; rather, it is something essential to an individual's relations with himself or herself.     

Caring,Gender Role Orientation,and Volunteering

The current studies were conducted to examine two questions regarding the development of an ethic of care versus an ethic of justice, where the former is associated with being female and the latter is associated with being male. First, does gender role orientation in adolescence predict the ethical orientation one adopts better than gender itself does? Second, does adolescents' ethical orientation predict their volunteering behavior? To answer these questions, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, adolescents completed Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) and Jensen's World View Questionnaire (WVQ) which assesses ethical orientation. Girls and individuals high in femininity were higher on the ethic of care than were boys and individuals high in masculinity. In addition, individuals with a feminine gender orientation received higher care scores than individuals with an androgynous orientation. Regression analyses indicated that gender orientation accounted for more of the variance in the ethic of care than did gender. In Study 2, older adolescents completed Jensen's WVQ and were subsequently asked to volunteer in one of two settings: a personal setting or an impersonal setting. Individuals high in the ethic of care were more likely to volunteer and volunteered for more hours, but volunteered equally often in the two types of settings. Individuals who “apologized” for being unable to volunteer were higher on caring. The results are discussed in the context of Gilligan's theory of socialization to morality.

     

Necessity and Language: The Gap Is Still Very Real

In my previous paper “Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?” I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper “Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism”. This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour‐grammatical propositions, and the relation between rules and modality.     

Forms of Our Life: Wittgenstein and the Later Heidegger

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense‐if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.     

On the nature and order of organizational processing: A reply to Peterson

Several points in the original article by Palmer and Rock (1994) are clarified in light of Peterson’s (1994) commentary. First, we address several issues related to the nature and order of organizational processes in our theory. We argue that many of her objections result from misconceptions about our theory. We attempt to clarify the relevant issues, including the fact that we intended the theory to describe an ordering of processes in cascade rather than as a sequence of classical discrete stages. Second, we discuss Peterson’s objections to our discussion of her findings on the relation between figure-ground processing and object recognition. We argue against her “prefigural recognition” proposal on logical grounds and provide an alternative account of her findings in terms of our theory.     

Can Illness Be Edifying?

Havi Carel has recently argued that one can be ill and happy. An ill person can “positively respond” to illness by cultivating “adaptability” and “creativity”. I propose that Carel's claim can be augmented by connecting it with virtue ethics. The positive responses which Carel describes are best understood as the cultivation of virtues, and this adds a significant moral aspect to coping with illness. I then defend this claim against two sets of objections and conclude that interpreting Carel's phenomenology of illness within a virtue-ethical framework enriches our understanding of how illness can be edifying.