Preschoolers' attention and emotion in an achievement and an effect game: A longitudinal study

Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core relational theme and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed.     

Messing with the emotions of the other exploring ambiguous youth-adult relations in a residential care institution

This article provides insights into the lived ambivalence, between support and control that arises in care work. It does so through an analysis of the spatialised entanglements of emotions, age and formal position in intergenerational encounters at a residence for young people suffering from social and mental distress. By identifying the dominant norms associated with the roles of ‘resident’ and ‘professional in the social space of the residence’, Warming explores what may, drawing on Haraway, be termed popular, oppositional and inappropriate practices and the emotions and power relations linked to them. The analysis reveals how the three types of practices – all framed by neoliberal youth policies and psy-knowledge about age, (ab)normal personalities and ‘professionalism’ as spatialised in the institutional organisation of work and the physical space as well as rules, norms, and routines - represent very diverse ways of navigating. Moreover it demonstrates, how ‘messing with other people's emotions' and trying to change their behavior is regarded as manipulation if it challenges norms or power relations rooted in spatially anchored perceptions of appropriate practices, but as empowerment if it chimes with norms that correspond to the roles and intersecting binary constructions of childish/young/insane client – adult professional.     

Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore

Abstract

We respond to four criticisms by Ortony and Clore (1989) of our semantic analysis of English emotion terms (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). We clarify how our theory enables people to speak of certain emotions that they experience without knowing their cause. We explain why emotions are best regarded as mental states with distinctive phenomenal tones—not “just” feelings, and how emotion terms can relate to terms denoting moods. Finally, we discuss an issue that distinguishes our theory from other contemporary cognitive theories: We claim that there is a small number of discriminably different basic emotions, and that the semantics of English emotion terms is comprehensible if these basic states are taken as unanalysable primitives.     

A Model of Infant Mood States and Sandarian Affective Waves

There has been little or no research on the establishment of infant moods or the mechanisms underlying them. One reason may be our difficulty in entertaining the idea that there are affective processes in infants that have long-lasting organizing continuous effects. It is this possibility that is considered in this paper. I attempt to address the questions of how moods are created and what some of their functions are. My model of moods is that infants have long-lasting (e.g., hours, days, and even longer) mood states. Mood states are dynamically changing yet distinct assemblages of affective behaviors. Mood control processes are modified by affective input from others. Thus moods are cocreated by the interplay of active, self-organized, biorhythmic affective control processes in the infant and the effect of the emotions expressed by others on mood control processes. In recognition of the importance of Sander's thinking to this work, I have named one of these processes the Sanderian Affective Wave. Mood states organize behavior and experience over time. Critically, moods serve an anticipatory representational function by providing directionality to an infant's behavior as he “moves” into the future. Thus they provide continuity to infants' experiential life. Furthermore, moods fulfill the Janus principle of bringing the past into the future for the infant, but as a noncognitive/symbolic/linguistic process—that is, as a purely affective–memorial process. Moreover, I believe that consideration of the development of moods opens the way for thinking about dynamic conflictual emotional processes in infants. Lastly, thinking about moods has important implications for understanding the development of pathology and for therapy.     

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.     

Inertia of negative emotions at work: Correlates of inflexible emotion dynamics in the workplace*

Emotional inertia is a central feature of emotion dynamics and it refers to the degree to which emotional states are self-predictive and linger over time, describing their resistance to change. It is related to several indicators of maladjustment, yet there is limited research on its correlates in the workplace, where it may be particularly relevant as emotional experiences deeply influence organizational life. In two experience-sampling studies, we studied temporal dependency of negative emotional states at work in terms of emotional inertia. In a first study (n = 128), we investigated the association between exhaustion, the core dimension of burnout, with inertia of negative emotions. In a second study (n = 116), we aimed to replicate findings from the first study and additionally examined the moderating role of inertia of negative emotions in the relationship between negative emotions at work and counterproductive work behaviour. The findings show that exhaustion is consistently associated with inertia of negative emotions, and that inertia of negative emotions aggravates the relation between negative emotions and workers' counterproductive work behaviour.     

Fidgeting as self-evidencing: A predictive processing account of non-goal-directed action

Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous and related to important cognitive functions. Fidgeting is seemingly one subtype of non-goal-directed action which is ripe for a functional account. What's the point of fidgeting? The predictive processing framework is a parsimonious account of brain function which says the brain aims to minimise the difference between expected and actual states of the world and itself, that is, minimise prediction error. This framework situates action selection in terms of active inference for expected states. However, seemingly aimless, idle actions, such as fidgeting, are a challenge to such theories. When our actions are not obviously goal-achieving, how can a predictive processing framework explain why we regularly do them anyway? Here, we argue that in a predictive processing framework, evidence for the agent's own existence is consolidated by self-stimulation or fidgeting. Endogenous, repetitive actions reduce uncertainty about the system's own states, and thus help continuously maintain expected rates of prediction error minimisation. We extend this explanation to clinically distinctive self-stimulation, such as in Autism Spectrum Conditions, in which effective strategies for self-evidencing may be different to the neurotypical case.     

Textbook Buddhism: introductory books on the Buddhist religion

Textbooks on Buddhism comprise a large, varied genre and have long been used to introduce the religion to students in academic settings. This review essay examines ten textbooks on the subject, noting their distinctive features, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as the types of courses that are well suited to each work. Additional information from a survey on Buddhism textbooks conducted by the author is used to supplement our understanding of which sources are regularly used in Buddhism courses and why. Unresolved tensions over whether to stress the coherence or diversity of Buddhism, and how comprehensive a textbook should be, are noted. Arguing that ‘Textbook Buddhism,' as a product of scholarly imagination, is a distinctive form of the tradition, it behooves specialists to be more reflective about their use of textbooks and to be more intentional in helping students to read them critically.     

Inherent biases in decision support systems: the influence of optimistic and pessimistic DSS on choice,affect, and attitudes

This study investigates the influence of a decision aid on decision makers' model‐based choices, emotions during the use of the model, and attitudes towards the model. A time allocation decision model was biased to purposefully provide optimistic or pessimistic criterion levels, on which subjects based their allocations. The results of our experiment indicate that the degree of “optimism” and “pessimism” inherent in the decision model had a significant impact on the decision maker's choices of criterion values, with optimism leading to higher criterion level choices and pessimism to lower levels. Furthermore, compared to pessimistic models, optimistic models significantly improved the decision makers' emotional states and, to some degree, their attitudes towards the decision aid. The implications of these conscious and sub‐conscious influences on decision makers' choices, emotions, and attitudes are discussed and the need for model‐builders and users to be aware of them is highlighted. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beliefs About Emotion: Links to Emotion Regulation,Well-Being,and Psychological Distress

People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed (entity theorists), whereas others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions (incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating (a) entity beliefs are associated with lower well-being and increased psychological distress, (b) people's beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people's implicit beliefs—particularly about their own emotions—may predispose them toward emotion regulation strategies that have important consequences for psychological health.     

Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions

Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts; or, as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality of the emotions; I argue their account is fundamentally misguided by virtue of being motivated by a misunderstanding of the nature of propositional attitudes. Second, I argue against Peter Goldie's claim that an affective component of an emotion contributes to its intentionality. Third, I offer my own compound account of emotions. I argue (1) emotions are mental states that supervene on other mental states, (2) the mental states that constitute the subvenience base of emotion can have nonconceptual and/or conceptual representational content, and (3) an emotion's intentionality supervenes on (but is often not identical to) the intentionality of only one of its subvening members, specifically, the evaluative representation.     

Students' daily emotions in the classroom: Intra‐individual variability and appraisal correlates

Background. Recent literature on emotions in education has shown that competence‐ and value‐related beliefs are important sources of students' emotions; nevertheless, the role of these antecedents in students' daily functioning in the classroom is not yet well‐known. More importantly, to date we know little about intra‐individual variability in students' daily emotions. Aims. The objectives of the study were (1) to examine within‐student variability in emotional experiences and (2) to investigate how competence and value appraisals are associated with emotions. It was hypothesized that emotions would show substantial within‐student variability and that there would be within‐person associations between competence and value appraisals and the emotions. Sample(s). The sample consisted of 120 grade 7 students (52%, girls) in 5 randomly selected classrooms in a secondary school. Method. A diary method was used to acquire daily process variables of emotions and appraisals. Daily emotions and daily appraisals were assessed using items adapted from existing measures. Results. Multi‐level modelling was used to test the hypotheses. As predicted, the within‐person variability in emotional states accounted for between 41% (for pride) and 70% (for anxiety) of total variability in the emotional states. Also as hypothesized, the appraisals were generally associated with the emotions. Conclusions. The within‐student variability in emotions and appraisals clearly demonstrates the adaptability of students with respect to situational affordances and constraints in their everyday classroom experiences. The significant covariations between the appraisals and emotions suggest that within‐student variability in emotions is systematic.     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”     

GETTING UNDER MY SKIN: WILLIAM JAMES ON THE EMOTIONS, SOCIALITY, AND TRANSCENDENCE

“You are really getting under my skin!” This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to “get under one's skin.” I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence.     

Adults' emotional states and recognition of emotion in young children

This study addressed the degree to which adults' emotional states influence their perception of emotional states in children and their motivation to change such states. Happiness, sadness, anger, or a neutral state was induced in adults, who then viewed slides of 4-year-old children who were actually experiencing various emotional states. Adults' own emotional states had little impact on their accurate recognition of children's emotions or on their motives for social action to change such emotions. However, adults' states did influence the intensity they assigned to children's emotions, with happy adults tending to rate some emotions as more intense for black children (sadness) and for girls (anger and neutrality). The base rates with which adults used different emotion labels also influenced judgments, increasing it for the recognition of happiness and reducing it for anger. The results are discussed in terms of the factors that influence whether or not emotional states affect judgment processes and the role of emotion labels in the effective recognition of ongoing emotional states. Also addressed is the consequence of adults' recognition of emotion in children for the effective socialization of emotion.     

Shared emotions

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about “straightforward sharing” is argued to be of secondary importance.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

Taking emotions seriously: Fun and pride in participatory research

The article focuses on emotions in participatory research with children and young people. We approach emotions as a generative site for exposing assumptions about participation, as well as participation rights more widely. Our reflections emerged out of revisiting two participatory research projects involving young people (aged 14 to 25) and identifying the significant, but under-articulated importance of emotions in this work. Research is often planned and described in emotionally ‘neutral’ terms, although participatory research necessarily relies on building relationships and engaging emotionally in a research process with others. In our own projects we retrospectively identify and trace the circulation of two salient emotions of fun and pride. We identified fun as an explicit emotion often invoked in the research process, but often under-theorised, and treated almost instrumentally, as something necessary to make the research process flow. The project with young queer women drew our attention to questions of pride, and the role of pride as a transformative emotion which draws our attention to what matters in young people's lives, particularly when it is not anticipated. We argue for the analytical value of emotions, not only as a key component of participatory research design, but also as a site for analysis and knowledge production, if we are to explore seriously research that is intended to respect and support children and young people's participation rights.     

Epistemic emotions: Cognitive underpinnings and relations with metacognitive feelings

The aim of this paper is to review research on epistemic emotions in learning. The emphasis is not only on the cognitive states that give rise to epistemic emotions but also on the dynamics of epistemic emotions in complex learning situations. The interrelations between epistemic emotions and their interactions with affective states and metacognitive experiences are also explored. The position put forth is that epistemic emotions are triggered by cognitive states involving discrepancy, or conflict, between active schemas and incoming information, or gap in one's knowledge. However, each of the epistemic emotions has its specific triggering conditions that differentiate it from the others. Changing conditions during a cognitive endeavor impact the intensity as well as the interrelations between epistemic emotions. Also, there are relations between epistemic emotions and metacognitive experiences such as feeling of difficulty or confidence, albeit not so strong. The implications for future research are discussed.