Reasoning Dialogues

When people argue with others in conversation, they make a variety of conversational moves: They make claims, ask for justification of others' claims, attack claims, and attack claims' justifications. The arrangement of these moves gives argumentation its characteristic shape. This article illustrates a proposed format for conversations of this type, and it reviews some findings about the way people understand and evaluate these conversations. The findings suggest that judgments of the arguers' burden depend not only on the content of their claims, but also on the conversation's structure. In addition, judgments of the strength of a justification—an arguer's evidence or explanation—are a function of the argument's setting.     

Dialogues on prediction errors

The recognition that computational ideas from reinforcement learning are relevant to the study of neural circuits has taken the cognitive neuroscience community by storm. A central tenet of these models is that discrepancies between actual and expected outcomes can be used for learning. Neural correlates of such prediction-error signals have been observed now in midbrain dopaminergic neurons, striatum, amygdala and even prefrontal cortex, and models incorporating prediction errors have been invoked to explain complex phenomena such as the transition from goal-directed to habitual behavior. Yet, like any revolution, the fast-paced progress has left an uneven understanding in its wake. Here, we provide answers to ten simple questions about prediction errors, with the aim of exposing both the strengths and the limitations of this active area of neuroscience research.     

Dialogues with the dead

Serious work in history of philosophy requires doing something very difficult: conducting a hypothetical dialogue with dead philosophers. Is it worth devoting to it the time and energy required to do it well? Yes. Quite apart from the intrinsic interest of understanding the past, making progress toward solving philosophical problems requires a good grasp of the range of possible solutions to those problems and of the arguments which motivate alternative positions, a grasp we can only have if we understand well philosophy's past. Philosophers who concentrate too much on the present are apt to assume too simple a view of alternative theories and of important philosophical arguments. Ryle and Austin offer instructive examples of how it is possible to go wrong by ignoring or misrepresenting historical figures.     

Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues

If Socrates is portrayed holding one view in one of Plato's dialogues and a different view in another, should we be puzzled? If (as I suggest) Plato's Socrates is neither the historical Socrates, nor a device for delivering Platonic doctrine, but a tool for the dialectical investigation of a philosophical problem, then we should expect a new Socrates, with relevant commitments, to be devised for each setting. Such a dialectical device – the tailor‐made Socrates – fits with what we know of other contributions to the genre of the Sokratikos Logos, to which Plato was neither the first nor the only contributor.     

Natural piety in the Dialogues

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Seeing the Complexity of Standing to the Side: Instructional Dialogues

In this article, we analyze the complexity of using instructional dialogues in the teaching of mathematics. We trace a 10-lesson unit on functions and their graphs taught by Magdalene Lampert to a 5th-grade classroom. We use this trace to help analyze and systematize the complexity of the classroom discourse. Analysis shows that Lampert's instructional dialogues served 2 purposes: They developed coconstructed instructional explanations of the key mathematical concepts, and they allowed the class to navigate a meaningful path through the relevant mathematics. In creating an instructional explanation, the class as a group flagged the central questions, coordinated and differentiated between the central ideas, and anticipated and made public potential errors. Although misconceptions were often raised as part of the public knowledge space, students individually and collectively resolved these misconceptions publicly through the dialogues. The path through the mathematics was supported through the careful use of agendas, sets of conditions under which an aside was taken from the agendas, and the careful problematizing of the mathematics. Routines, metatalk, and the crafting and maintenance of the intellectual climate played important roles in supporting the instructional dialogues. In the cases of routines and metatalk, we make comparisons to other instances of expert teaching. We also show evidence of student engagement and significant student learning that transcended individual participation patterns. We explore implications for teacher education.