Object detection and basic-level categorization: Sometimes you know it is there before you know what it is

A tight temporal coupling between object detection (is an object there?) and object categorization (what kind of object is it?) has recently been reported (Grill-Spector &; Kanwisher, 2005), suggesting that image segmentation into different objects and categorization of those objects at the basic level may be the very same mechanism. In the present work, we decoupled the time course of detection and categorization through two task manipulations. First, inverted objects were categorized significantly less accurately than upright objects across a range of image presentation durations, but no significant effect on object detection was observed. Second, systematically degrading stimuli affected categorization significantly more than object detection. The time course of object detection and object categorization can be selectively manipulated. They are not intrinsically linked. As soon as you know an object is there, you do not necessarily know what it is.     

Interpretation and Justification

Whenever understanding is sought we are obliged to justify our interpretations – to demonstrate that they furnish an adequate understanding of the world and its objects. The problem is to know whether this is possible – that what we take to be conclusive justifications do not covertly appeal to other favoured interpretations or systems of explanation, thus obviating the possibility of a neutral justification. By exploring the nature of interpretation, I argue that neutral justifications of interpretations about works of art are indeed possible and that such interpretations can be shown to be true or false.     

Object individuation and object identity in infancy: the role of spatiotemporal information, object property information, and language.

Recent work on object individuation and object identity in infancy indicates that at least three sources of information may be used for object individuation and object identity: spatiotemporal information, object property information, and object kind information. Several experiments have shown that a major developmental change occurs between 10 and 12 months of age (Xu & Carey, 1996; Xu, Carey & Welch, in press; Van de Walle, Prevor & Carey, under review; Xu, Carey & Quint, in preparation): Infants at 10 months and younger readily use spatiotemporal information in object individuation and object identity tasks, but not until about 12 months of age are infants able to use object property or object kind information to do so. This paper proposes a two-part conjecture about the mechanism underlying this change. The first part borrows ideas from object-based attention and the distinction between "what" and "where" information in visual processing. The hypothesis is that (1) young infants encode object motion and location information separately from object property information; and (2) toward the end of the first year, infants integrate these two sources of information. The second part of the conjecture posits an important role for language. Infants may take distinct labels as referring to distinct kinds of objects from the onset of word learning, and infants use this information in solving the problem of object individuation and object identity. Evidence from human adults, infants, and non-human primates is reviewed to provide support for the conjecture.     

Novel popout is an attention-based phenomenon: an ERP analysis

When observers are given a brief glimpse of a display containing one novel object and three repeated objects, they are often better able to report the location of the novel object than the location of any one of the repeated objects. The present study contrasted two interpretations of this "novel popout" effect. The attention-based interpretation suggests that the novel popout is an attentional phenomenon, occurring during the initial processing of the four-object display. The retrieval-based interpretation suggests that novel popout is due to differential processing occurring when observers are subsequently probed for the location of one of the objects in the display. ERP measures recorded while subjects performed the novel popout task revealed differences during the initial processing of the four-object display but not subsequent to the presentation of a localization probe. The findings are most consistent with the attention-based interpretation of novel popout, which suggests that attention is rapidly drawn to the novel object in an otherwise familiar display.     

Clarifying the role of shape in children's taxonomic assumption.

When asked to find a new referent of a novel label children tend to ignore thematic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and its web) and focus instead on taxonomic relations (e.g., the relation between a spider and a snake). The precise nature of children's taxonomic assumption has not been clear, however. One possibility is that the taxonomic assumption reduces to a "similar-shape rule": perhaps children tend to select objects of the same taxonomic kind when asked to extend new labels simply because these objects are more similar in shape than objects which are only thematically related. Sixty children between 3 and 5 years of age participated in three studies which examined children's attention to thematic relations, similarity of shape, and taxonomic relations when extending novel object labels. The findings indicated that shape has some primacy in children's expectations about object label reference, yet when shape is not available as a guide, children also take taxonomic kind into consideration when searching for new referents of novel labels. Thus children make use of a relatively rich and somewhat varied set of expectations to guide their inferences about object label reference.     

Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes

Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object’s kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object’s identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2–4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.     

Location of a missing object and detection of its absence by infants: Contribution of an eye‐tracking system to the understanding of infants' strategies

Previous research has demonstrated infants' capacity to discriminate between situations in which all the objects successively hidden behind a screen are present, or not, after the removal of the screen. Two types of interpretation have been proposed: counting capacity or object memorization capacity. In the usual paradigm, the missing object in the impossible event is usually the last object which is placed behind the screen. Following this, a third interpretation can be offered: infants' exploration is first directed to this object's location, and its presence or absence is noticed. Two experiments using Wynn's (Nature 1992; 358 :749) paradigm were performed to test the third hypothesis. The first experiment involved four objects (teddy bears) placed in four squares. Infants looked longer at the impossible event (3 objects, the last one missing) than at the possible event (4 objects) when the impossible event was presented first. No difference in looking duration was observed for the opposite order. In the second experiment, the four objects were disposed in a line and an eye‐tracking system was used. No difference in the number of looks was observed between the impossible event (3 objects, the second one missing) and the possible event (4 objects). Therefore, it appears that at least in this complex situation (4 objects used instead of 2 usually), the location of the missing object is a key factor for event discrimination. Eye‐tracking also indicated in the second experiment that infants looked less at the second location during an impossible event (object missing) than during the possible event (object present), indicating that the impossibility of the event was not a determining factor for looking durations. Altogether, the data indicate the potential usefulness of eye‐tracking analysis in this type of situation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A novel tool-use mode in animals: New Caledonian crows insert tools to transport objects

New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) rely heavily on a range of tools to extract prey. They manufacture novel tools, save tools for later use, and have morphological features that facilitate tool use. We report six observations, in two individuals, of a novel tool-use mode not previously reported in non-human animals. Insert-and-transport tool use involves inserting a stick into an object and then moving away, thereby transporting both object and tool. All transported objects were non-food objects. One subject used a stick to transport an object that was too large to be handled by beak, which suggests the tool facilitated object control. The function in the other cases is unclear but seems to be an expression of play or exploration. Further studies should investigate whether it is adaptive in the wild and to what extent crows can flexibly apply the behaviour in experimental settings when purposive transportation of objects is advantageous.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

Effects of foveal priming and extrafoveal preview on object identification

The results of three different experiments suggested that the relation between an object in the fovea on fixation n and an object subsequently brought into the fovea on fixation n + 1 affects the time to identify the second object. In Experiment 1 we extended previous work by demonstrating that a previously seen related priming object speeded the time to name a target object even when a saccade intervened between the two objects. In Experiment 2 we replicated this result and further showed that the benefit on naming time was due to facilitation from the related object rather than inhibition from the unrelated object. In addition, naming of the target object was much slower in both experiments when there was not a peripheral preview of the target object on fixation n. However, because the effect of the foveal priming object was greater when the target was not present than when it was present, priming did not appear to make extraction of the extrafoveal information more efficient. In Experiment 3, fixation times were recorded while subjects looked at four objects in order to identify them. Fixation time on an object was shorter when a related object was fixated immediately before it, even though the four objects did not form a scene. The size of the facilitation was roughly comparable to that in several analogous experiments where scenes were used. The results suggest that the effects of a predictive scene context on object identification may be explainable in terms of an object-to-object or "intralevel" priming mechanism.     

How counting represents number: what children must learn and when they learn it

This study compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal-principle-knowers) to those who do not (subset-knowers), in order to better characterize the knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question "how many" with the last word used in counting, despite not understanding how counting works; (2) Only children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of doing so, understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral list whereas subtracting objects mean going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset-knowers do not understand the unit of change.     

The Hospital Room as Uncanny: Psychoanalytic Observations and Recommendations for Pastors and Chaplains

This essay in applied psychoanalysis is written for the field of pastoral psychology, and it also has obvious affinities with the medical humanities. The author uses Freud’s (The uncanny. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 17, pp. 217–256). Vintage, London, 1919/2001) “The Uncanny” to question the concept of homelike hospital rooms. Instead of making patients feel more comfortable, the authors believes that these rooms could, in some cases, actually increase the anxiety of patients. The author uses Helena Michie’s personal story of her experience of touring a birthing suite to support this argument, as well as some poetry by Billy Collins. The author, however, does not stop with identifying a problem, as he also suggests that pastors and chaplains, when they provide care for their patients, should help them identify and use their own transitional and transformational objects. These objects, of course, will be highly idiosyncratic, and it is precisely this kind of attention—attention to the idiosyncrasies of individuals—that pastors and chaplains should be giving to those in their care. While there is a growing literature on D. W. Winnicott, who coined the term “transitional object,” and Christopher Bollas, who gave us the term “transformational object,” in medical and pastoral circles, the author suggests that attention to and the endorsement of the use of transitional and transformational objects should become a part of hospital policy, if only in chaplaincy handbooks, so as to recognize what many individuals are already doing.     

The experience of force: the role of haptic experience of forces in visual perception of object motion and interactions, mental simulation, and motion-related judgments

Forces are experienced in actions on objects. The mechanoreceptor system is stimulated by proximal forces in interactions with objects, and experiences of force occur in a context of information yielded by other sensory modalities, principally vision. These experiences are registered and stored as episodic traces in the brain. These stored representations are involved in generating visual impressions of forces and causality in object motion and interactions. Kinematic information provided by vision is matched to kinematic features of stored representations, and the information about forces and causality in those representations then forms part of the perceptual interpretation. I apply this account to the perception of interactions between objects and to motions of objects that do not have perceived external causes, in which motion tends to be perceptually interpreted as biological or internally caused. I also apply it to internal simulations of events involving mental imagery, such as mental rotation, trajectory extrapolation and judgment, visual memory for the location of moving objects, and the learning of perceptual judgments and motor skills. Simulations support more accurate judgments when they represent the underlying dynamics of the event simulated. Mechanoreception gives us whatever limited ability we have to perceive interactions and object motions in terms of forces and resistances; it supports our practical interventions on objects by enabling us to generate simulations that are guided by inferences about forces and resistances, and it helps us learn novel, visually based judgments about object behavior.     

Kant on Construction,Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization

This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.     

Teilen,Trennen und Vereinen: EPR ohne Holismus

Dividing, Separating and Unifying. EPR Without Holism. In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics parts of composed systems are correlated in a non-causal way, they are ontologically dependent on each other. In this paper I try to defend traditional realism giving a non-holistic interpretation of the EPR-paradox. An analysis of events in the macroscopic world shows that dividing and unifying objects is quite dif-ferent from changing (modifying) objects. In application to quantum mechanics I argue that a measurement at a given single-system changes (modifies) this object, but the EPR-measurement divides the given object. Therefore this given object is an undivided and dividable One and not a composed system. If parts are produced (by EPR-measurement) correlations do not occur.

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Teilen, Trennen und Vereinen: EPR ohne Holismus

     

Wistar rats show episodic-like memory for unique experiences

Human episodic memory refers to the recollection of an unique past experience in terms of its details, its locale, and temporal occurrence. Episodic memory, even in principle, has been difficult to demonstrate in non-verbal mammals. Previously, we provided evidence that mice are able to form an integrated memory for "what," "where," and "when" aspects of single experiences by combining different versions of the novelty-preference paradigm, i.e., object recognition memory, the memory for locations in which objects were explored, and the temporal order memory for objects presented at distinct time points. In the present series of experiments we evaluated whether this paradigm, with minor modifications, also works with rats. We found that rats spent more time exploring an "old familiar" object relative to a "recent familiar" object, suggesting that they recognized objects previously explored during separate trials and remembered their order of presentation. Concurrently, the rats responded differentially to spatial object displacement dependent on whether an "old familiar" or "recent familiar" object was shifted to a location, where it was not encountered previously. These results provide strong evidence that the rats established an integrated memory for "what," "where," and "when." We also found that acute stress impaired the animal's performance in the episodic-like memory task, which, however, could be partially reversed by the N-Methyl-D-aspartate-receptors agonist D-cycloserine.     

Object recognition and object segregation in 4.5-month-old infants

Six experiments investigated how 4.5-month-old infants' perception of a display is affected by an immediate prior experience with an object similar to part of the test display. Prior research (A. Needham & R. Baillargeon, 1998) showed that when infants see an object alone and then see it next to a novel object, this prior experience allows them to determine the location of a boundary between the two objects. The present experiments investigated whether infants would also use an object similar, but not identical, to a test object in the same kind of task. The results indicate that infants' use of a prior experience is disrupted by changes in the features of the object, but not by a change in its spatial orientation. These findings suggest that, like adults, infants may expect that changes in the features of an object are associated with a change in the identity of the object, but do not have the same expectation for changes in spatial orientation.     

ATTENTION AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION TIME

SCHIOLDBORG, P. Attention and visual identification time. Scand. J. Psychol. , 1971, 12 , 289–294.–The identification time of a test object increased when viewed together with other objects, both for central and peripheral identification. When viewed alone, foreknowledge of position facilitated identification in central vision, but not in peripheral vision. A distinction between identification and localization as related to attention is outlined. The results are interpreted in line with a model where focusing and dispersion of attention are regarded as antagonistic processes, implying that the ensuing variation in the momentary attention level for some object affects the amount of information assessed per unit time.     

普世伦理如何可能

本文是我对同一主题探究的继续：关于建构普世伦理的方法论问题。基于一种“弱伦理模式”或低度普世化的立场,我主张通过由多元文化对话到公共理性共识的文化解释一理性推理之二维平行求证方式,寻求道德共识,从而建构一种低限度的可行的普世伦理。我承认并重视多元宗教作为普世伦理之文化价值资源的重要意义,但质疑任何以宗教作为普世伦理之基础的“强伦理模式”,甚至也不相信通过“弱宗教模式”来建立普世伦理的实际可行性。在文化多元、政治多极和经济利益主体多样化的实际条件下,建立一种“弱伦理模式”的普世伦理是惟一可以合理期待的。