The effects of recent exposure on general-knowledge estimation

Recent exposure to general-information facts creates a tendency to claim that the facts had been known prior to their exposure. In Experiment 1, this "illusory knowledge effect" occurred even when participants did not have to demonstrate their knowledge by recalling part of the fact. In Experiment 2, the effect was found for both true and false facts. These findings suggest that the tendency to claim that recently presented facts had been previously known is caused by their enhanced familiarity. Accounts that would attribute this effect entirely to an underestimation of participants' knowledge of the new facts or to participants' intentional inflation of their prior knowledge states are not supported by these results.     

Cognitive templates for religious concepts: cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations

Presents results of free-recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about 'animal' or 'artifact' or 'person') rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain-level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain-level violations is better than for violations of basic-level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain-level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures.     

Some effects of epistemological structure on memory

Graph theoretical models of the epistemological structure imposed upon a set of mathematical concepts by Ss’ definitions of them were constructed. Three graphical characteristics of the models were manipulated in a series of experiments to assess their effects on recall. Experiment I showed that recall and confidence of recall were highest for concept pairs connected by short paths, next highest for those connected by long paths, and lowest for those not connected by paths. Experiment II replicated the result of Experiment I that recall and confidence of recall were greater for concept pairs connected by paths than for those not connected by paths and revealed no differences in recall between concept pairs connected by many paths and those connected by a few paths. Experiment III found no differences in recall of abstract and concrete concepts, The abstractness of a concept was quantified by the mean path length from the concept to primitive (undefined) concepts. The approach of building a model of each S’s epistemological structure was supported by the finding that, while a given. S’s definitions of the concepts remained relatively constant, there were considerable differences in definitions of the concepts between Ss.     

How goals affect the organization and use of domain knowledge

Expert specialists organize their knowledge around information related to their goals. In the experiments presented here, the relation between goal use and knowledge organization was investigated by manipulating participants' goals as they learned about a novel domain. Experiment 1 showed that goal use produces biases toward goal-related information in categorization and induction. Experiment 2 revealed that the bias toward goal relatedness is not absolute; participants use their knowledge flexibly, depending on the context of induction. Experiment 3 showed that using information in the absence of a meaningful goal does not produce significant goal-related biases. Altogether, the effects of goal use are evident across a number of tasks and may depend on goal meaningfulness and the coherence it provides to goal-related knowledge structures.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the "forgot-it-all-along" (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to "recover" their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.     

Using prior knowledge to minimize interference when learning large amounts of information

In three experiments, we examined mediated learning in situations involving learning a large amount of information. Participants learned 144 "facts" during a learning phase and were tested on facts during a test phase. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants learned facts about familiar individuals, unfamiliar individuals, or unfamiliar individuals associated with familiar individuals. Prior knowledge reduced interference, even when it played only a mediating role. In Experiment 3, participants learned facts about unfamiliar individuals or unfamiliar countries, with half the participants in each group associating the unfamiliar items with familiar individuals. Again, use of prior knowledge to mediate learning reduced interference even when the new information was conceptually dissimilar to the previously known information. These results are consistent with the mental model account of long-term memory.     

Expert knowledge as mnemonic cues

It is proposed that expert knowledge can operate as a cognitive cueing structure for the acquisition and retention of new information in memory. Two experiments are reported which demonstrate that expert knowledge about football and clothing can act as mnemonic cues for the recall of information newly associated with that knowledge. In Experiment 1 expert terms from the domains of football and clothing and those neutral nouns paired with them were both better recalled by experts than by non-experts. In Experiment 2 passages containing information contrary to factual knowledge about football and clothing were recalled better by experts than by non-experts, in spite of the fact that information in the passages contradicted what the experts already knew. The results of the two experiments were interpreted as showing that expert knowledge provides mental cues that have desirable mnemonic properties such as constructibility, associability, discriminability and invertibility. Also, the interpretation of expert knowledge as a cognitive cueing structure is compared to Ausubel's ideas regarding advance organizers.     

Language and number: a bilingual training study

Three experiments investigated the role of a specific language in human representations of number. Russian-English bilingual college students were taught new numerical operations (Experiment 1), new arithmetic equations (Experiments 1 and 2), or new geographical or historical facts involving numerical or non-numerical information (Experiment 3). After learning a set of items in each of their two languages, subjects were tested for knowledge of those items, and new items, in both languages. In all the studies, subjects retrieved information about exact numbers more effectively in the language of training, and they solved trained problems more effectively than untrained problems. In contrast, subjects retrieved information about approximate numbers and non-numerical facts with equal efficiency in their two languages, and their training on approximate number facts generalized to new facts of the same type. These findings suggest that a specific, natural language contributes to the representation of large, exact numbers but not to the approximate number representations that humans share with other mammals. Language appears to play a role in learning about exact numbers in a variety of contexts, a finding with implications for practice in bilingual education. The findings prompt more general speculations about the role of language in the development of specifically human cognitive abilities.     

Language comprehension in old age

Three experiments examined the effects of aging on comprehension of spoken language. Integrative and constructive aspects of comprehension showed much more marked age-related deficits than registration of surface meaning. Experiment 1 showed that old subjects had difficulty in making inferences based on presented facts. Experiment 2 revealed a similar deficit in old people's ability to detect anomalies in newly presented information by reference to prior everyday knowledge. And Experiment 3, which tested story recall, showed that old subjects were less well able to extract and retain gist information than younger subjects. These difficulties are interpreted as reflecting a limitation in processing capacity such that the demands of concurrently registering surface meaning and simultaneously carrying out integrative and constructive processes exceed capacity in old age.     

Differences in encoding for free recall vs. recognition

Three experiments examined effects of test expectancy on memory for relatively unrelated words. In Experiment I, where preliminary recall or recognition practice was given, both recall and recognition were superior when the subjects expected and had practiced for recall. Free study led to better recall and recognition than paced presentation, but did not interact with test expectancy. Experiment II demonstrated that recall was better for subjects expecting a recall vs. a recognition test in the absence of preliminary practice. In Experiment III all subjects practiced both recall and recognition prior to presentation of the critical list. Study time also was varied. With longer study, recall was better when a recall test was expected, with no test expectancy effect on recognition. There were no appreciable expectancy effects with the short study period. Self-reports and other data suggested that the critical encoding differences produced by test expectancy manipulation were quantitative in nature.     

Using elaborative interrogation to facilitate acquisition of factual information in cooperative learning settings: One good strategy deserves another

The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether providing 6th-grade students with cooperative elaborative interrogation instruction would facilitate learning relative to providing them with cooperative learning, elaborative interrogation or reading-for-under-standing instructions. All students were presented with 36 factual statements about six animals. Cooperative elaborative interrogation students were instructed to work collaboratively and use their prior knowledge to state why each fact is true. Cooperative learning students were told to work collaboratively to learn target materials, while elaborative interrogation students were instructed to generate answers to the why questions on their own. Reading-control students were also on their own and instructed to read the animal facts for understanding. For immediate free recall and immediate associative matching tests, students in the experimental conditions outperformed those in the control condition. Cooperative elaborative interrogation and elaborative interrogation students maintained this advantage on a 30-day follow-up associative matching test, with elaborative interrogation students maintaining a significant advantage relative to reading controls on a 60-day associative matching follow-up. (There was also a strong trend favouring the cooperative elaborative interrogation condition on this 60-day measure.) The quality of the ‘why’ answer affected learning: Generating and listening to scientifically correct answers that used relevant prior knowledge to clarify target information was associated with better memory for facts than were other types of study responses. Students in this study learned the most when they were explicitly directed to activate relevant prior knowledge that supports and clarifies new information–processing that occurs following either small-group or individual elaborative interrogation instruction.     

When does prior knowledge disproportionately benefit older adults’ memory?

Material consistent with knowledge/experience is generally more memorable than material inconsistent with knowledge/experience – an effect that can be more extreme in older adults. Four experiments investigated knowledge effects on memory with young and older adults. Memory for familiar and unfamiliar proverbs (Experiment 1) and for common and uncommon scenes (Experiment 2) showed similar knowledge effects across age groups. Memory for person-consistent and person-neutral actions (Experiment 3) showed a greater benefit of prior knowledge in older adults. For cued recall of related and unrelated word pairs (Experiment 4), older adults benefited more from prior knowledge only when it provided uniquely useful additional information beyond the episodic association itself. The current data and literature suggest that prior knowledge has the age-dissociable mnemonic properties of (1) improving memory for the episodes themselves (age invariant), and (2) providing conceptual information about the tasks/stimuli extrinsically to the actual episodic memory (particularly aiding older adults).     

Evaluation of hypotheses in concept identification

The aim of this paper is to investigate the nature of hypothesis evaluation in conceptual tasks, especially in the identification of bidimensional concepts. In such tasks, hypothesis testing is seen as being composed of sampling and evaluation stages. With complex problems only one hypothesis seems likely to be sampled on each trial, and it is suggested that this hypothesis is evaluated according to a statistical decision-making process. In Experiment I, Ss were given an initial hypothesis involving one of eight rules and required to test it in an attempt to find a concept. When this given hypothesis was true (i.e., the concept), no difference was found between rules for the number of instances selected to the criterion of solution. Moreover, there was a tendency for Ss to choose instances which were predicted to be positive according to the hypothesis under test. Experiment II examined the role of memory in hypothesis testing. Immediate recall of instances selected revealed no difference between true and false hypotheses. Both primacy and recency effects were evident in recall. The number of instances correctly recalled was more than expected by models of hypothesis sampling and evaluation, and this was attributed to Ss having a low criterion for recall without intrusions. Examination of intrusions suggested that Ss may have retained some, but not all, of the features of the stimuli selected. Some differences were found between rules and between positive and netative instances on recall. These effects were suggested to be due to different amounts of information processing when classifying each type of instance for each rule; the results of Experiment III supported this suggestion.     

Category learning with a goal: how goals constrain conceptual acquisition

A novel task was used to examine the roles that goals play in concept acquisition. In Experiment 1, we varied the type of interaction, and thus the task goal, of participants working in a novel domain. Following those interactions, participant responses showed that they had organized their knowledge in terms of goal-relevant features. Using a variation of the same methodology, Experiment 2 provided evidence that the goal relevance also played a role in how the participants structured their knowledge of the items, specifically what information about the items was associated with differentiating the categories encountered. The results suggest that the goals not only highlighted particular features, they determined the centrality of those features in the conceptual knowledge. We discuss the results in terms of the goal-framework hypothesis; the idea that goals structure information and provide coherence to the acquired concepts. We discuss how this approach informs category learning research.     

Contextualizing counterintuitiveness: how context affects comprehension and memorability of counterintuitive concepts

A number of anthropologists have argued that religious concepts are minimally counterintuitive and that this gives them mnemic advantages. This paper addresses the question of why people have the memory architecture that results in such concepts being more memorable than other types of concepts by pointing out the benefits of a memory structure that leads to better recall for minimally counterintuitive concepts and by showing how such benefits emerge in the real-time processing of comprehending narratives such as folk tales. This model suggests that memorability is not an inherent property of a concept; rather it is a property of the concept, the context in which the concept is presented, and the background knowledge that the comprehendor possesses about the concept. The model predicts how memorability of a concept should change if the context containing the concept were changed. The paper also presents the results of experiments carried out to test these predictions.     

The effect of attribute order on judgment in Chinese and English

The authors found that the order of attribute presentation had a stronger effect on judgment in English than in Chinese. In Experiment 1, with a sample of 102 female and 63 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' memory-based judgments showed a stronger primacy effect in English than in Chinese that was mediated by recall from long-term memory. In contrast, participants' online (immediate) judgments showed a primacy effect in both languages that was unmediated by recall from short-term memory. In Experiment 2, with a sample of 67 female and 53 male bilingual Singaporeans, the authors found that participants' online judgments were more influenced by the attribute order of a previously seen competitive advertisement in English than in Chinese. A cross-cultural field study in Mainland China and the United Kingdom provided external validity for the experimental results.     

Memory for memory

Participants read short passages and 1 day later they answered questions via telephone about the passages (text facts) and about the experimental session (event facts). They were telephoned again 6 weeks later and answered the same questions about text and event facts. They also answered new questions about whether they remembered the answers they had given in the initial telephone interview (recall for prior memory performance). Although participants accurately remembered the majority of past memory successes, they were poor at remembering past memory failures. After being provided with the correct answer and tested again, the participants' performance improved somewhat, especially for memory failures. This suggests that some errors in recalling past forgetting might have been due to correctly remembering the answer previously given, but failing to realize that it had been wrong. These findings have implications for a variety of situations in which people are queried about past memory performance.