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1.
Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being,
that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should
not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of
it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism
about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t
end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best
way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In
particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly,
there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the
prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising. 相似文献
2.
Dan Haybron 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):99-138
Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and
some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being
relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter
for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival
in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the
common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction
for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform
scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s
values. 相似文献
3.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
相似文献
Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
4.
“Three generations under one roof” is an old Chinese saying used to describe a desired living arrangement. The traditional
concept of happiness for a Chinese elderly person is being able to “play with grandchildren with candy in mouth, enjoy life
with no cares.” In a fast-changing economy like China, how does society, especially the elderly themselves, view these traditional
values? Using the 2005 Chinese General Social Survey, we study the determinants of happiness of the Chinese elderly. We are
particularly interested in whether living with their child and whether living with their grandchild affect the happiness of
the elderly. An important empirical concern is that unobserved permanent income may affect both the living arrangements of
the elderly and their level of happiness. We include property ownership variables as proxies and also adopt an instrument
variable approach to identify the causal relationship between the elderly’s happiness and their living arrangements. We find
that, conditional on living with a grandchild, living with one’s child has a negative effect on the elderly’s happiness. Furthermore,
elderly Chinese who live with grandchildren are associated with a much higher degree of happiness than their counterparts. 相似文献
5.
In Intentionality and other works, John Searle establishes himself as a leading defender of the view that consciousness of what one is doing
is always a component of one’s action. In this paper I focus on problems with Searle’s view to establish that there are actions
in which the agent is not at all aware of what she is doing. I argue that any theory that misses this sort of action keeps
us from important insights into autonomy, self-knowledge and responsibility.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
6.
Bengt Brülde 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):15-49
The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent
on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the
standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the
theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications
of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of
her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether
the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present
and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory. 相似文献
7.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):81-94
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch.
These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death
vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness
appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires
no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. 相似文献
8.
Chrisoula Andreou 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(3):583-606
There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that
a certain move, say M1, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M1. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered
judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer
case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving
up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases.
My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what
action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on
an important source of frustration in collective decision-making. 相似文献
9.
John Brunero 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(1):125-140
Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study,
and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending
to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding
seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less
rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for
the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the
wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can
also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements. 相似文献
10.
Joseph M. Kramp 《Pastoral Psychology》2009,58(4):387-401
I argue that what are typically identified as “calls from God” to an office of sacred power are filled with various degrees
and types of ambivalence. This ambivalence becomes manifest (or not) to the person experiencing a call at various points in
their lifespan and it exists for a number of reasons. I seek to unveil the psychodynamics responsible for these feelings of
ambivalence. I argue that the awareness of feelings of ambivalence can be correlated with the degree of one’s happiness—specifically
in one’s sexual and mental health; this point is marshaled throughout the essay by autobiographical examples of men who experienced
some type of divine calling. In addition to psychoanalytic resources, I apply postmodern autobiographical criticism to this
autobiographical study; my autobiographical notes are written in italics. 相似文献
11.
Vani K. Borooah 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2006,7(4):427-465
Using data on over 3000 individuals in Northern Ireland, this paper conducts an econometric investigation into what makes people happy. It draws a distinction between “objective” (income, marital status) and “subjective” (satisfaction with one’s standard of living (SoL); money worries; experience of poverty) factors determining happiness. In so doing, it takes a broader view of “economic status” than one defined solely by income: occupational class, mortgage status, financial worries, rural/urban residence, poverty experience, and, of course, income coalesce to form this, more complex, concept of economic status. Juxtaposed against this, is the concept of “context-free” and “context-specific” well-being. A particular example of the latter is the degree of satisfaction with one’s SoL and an important point of focus of the paper is the relationship between SoL satisfaction and happiness. A complementary point of focus is an analysis of the determinants of context-free and context-specific well-being. The paper also examines the effects of non-economic factors on happiness in particular on specific aspects of the ill-health of respondents and upon the quality of the areas in which they live. Having analysed these effects, it places a money value on each of the diversity of effects that act upon a person’s level of happiness.The analysis in this paper is based on the Poverty and Social Exclusion in Northern Ireland (PSENI) Project’s data and I am grateful to the Project leaders – Paddy Hillyard, Eithne McLaughlin and Mike Tomlinson – for permission to use these data. Thanks are due to Andrew Oswald, to one of the Editors of JOHS, and to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
12.
Aaron Rizzieri 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):235-242
Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation
between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs
on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced
belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. 相似文献
13.
In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood
as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving
force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that
the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving
and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection
that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood
is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints
generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational. 相似文献
14.
Iain Brassington 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2011,32(2):101-115
Questions about information inform many debates in bioethics. One of the reasons for this is that at least some level of information
is taken by many to be a prerequisite of valid consent. For others, autonomy in the widest sense presupposes information,
because one cannot be in control of one’s life without at least some insight into what it could turn out to contain. Yet not
everyone shares this view, and there is a debate about whether or not there is a right to remain in ignorance of one’s medical,
and especially genetic, information. It is notable, though, that this debate leaves unexamined the assumption that, if a person
wants information, he is entitled to it. This paper examines the assumption, specifically in relation to genetics, where learning
facts about oneself may reveal facts about other people, particularly one’s close relatives. This may be taken as a violation
of their privacy, and since privacy is something that we normally think should be respected, it is worth asking whether one
ought to abjure the opportunity to obtain genetic information for the sake of privacy. In effect, there may be an argument
to be made not just for a right to remain in ignorance, but for a duty to do so. 相似文献
15.
H. S. Asthana 《Psychological studies》2009,54(2):109-113
Quality of life (QOL) is an amorphous concept; it is normative and value laden. Economists’ emphasis on the standard of living
brings into focus the value of growth, expansion and acceleration. Financial status is important but has limited impact on
feelings of happiness. The subjective experiences (e.g. wellbeing, cheerfulness, satisfaction, contentment, empathy, faith,
wisdom and purpose in life) complement the economist’s concept of standard of living. The criteria for determining the QOL
may relate to adaptive mechanisms one employs in everyday life. Dispositions of altruism, sublimation, humor, empathy, optimism,
and wisdom also contribute to the QOL. It appears that QOL is essentially a cultural concept overflowing both economics and
psychology. Non-Western approaches such as Chinese, Buddhist, Hindu thought, have proposed balancing as a key factor in QOL.
The highest quality of life is one in which one transcends dualism in life, namely happiness — sorrow, pleasure — pain, love
— hate, etc and cultivate the capacity to remain unassailed by the dualities, rather than that of balance. We need to attend
to the views of humanistic disciplines and examine the issue of QOL in the context of the world view one holds. 相似文献
16.
We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement
and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over
the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change (within
the framework of other constraints, e.g., beliefs, one has) also maximizes one’s rationality. 相似文献
17.
Gunderson M 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(2):87-102
It is tempting to argue that Kantian moral philosophy justifies prohibiting both human germ-line genetic engineering and non-therapeutic
genetic engineering because they fail to respect human dignity. There are, however, good reasons for resisting this temptation.
In fact, Kant’s moral philosophy provides reasons that support genetic engineering—even germ-line and non-therapeutic. This
is true of Kant’s imperfect duties to seek one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. It is also true of the categorical
imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy does, however, provide limits to justifiable genetic engineering. 相似文献
18.
The relation between spirituality and happiness was assessed in 320 children aged 8–12 from public and private (i.e., faith-based)
schools. Children rated their own spirituality using the Spiritual Well-Being Questionnaire and 11 items selected and modified
from the Brief Multidimensional Measurement of Religiousness/Spirituality which reflected the children’s practices and beliefs.
Children’s happiness was assessed using self-reports based on the Oxford Happiness Scale short form, the Subjective Happiness
Scale, and a single-item measure. Parents also rated their children’s happiness. Children and parents rated the children’s
temperament using the emotionality, activity, and sociability temperament survey. Children’s spirituality, but not their religious
practices (e.g., attending church, praying, and meditating), was strongly linked to their happiness. Children who were more
spiritual were happier. Spirituality accounted for between 3 and 26% of the unique variance in children’s happiness depending
on the measures. Temperament was also a predictor of happiness, but spirituality remained a significant predictor of happiness
even after removing the variance associated with temperament. The personal (i.e., meaning and value in one’s own life) and
communal (quality and depth of inter-personal relationships) domains of spirituality were particularly good predictors of
children’s happiness. These results parallel studies of adult happiness and suggest strategies to enhance happiness in children. 相似文献
19.
20.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):79-86
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long
as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples
fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person
will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is
consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. 相似文献