Out of sight,out of mind? Relations between visual acuity and cognition

Prior research has established significant relations between measures of sensory ability and cognitive function in adults of different ages, and several explanations for this relation have been proposed. One explanation is that sensory abilities restrict cognitive processing, a second is that cognitive abilities influence assessments of sensory ability, and a third is that both sensory function and cognition are affected by a common, potentially age-based, third factor. These explanations were investigated using mediation and moderation analyses, with near visual acuity as the sensory measure and scores on visual speed tests and auditory memory tests as the cognitive measures. Measures of visual acuity, speed, and memory were obtained from three moderately large samples, two cross-sectional (N?=?380, N?=?4,779) and one longitudinal (N?=?2,258), with participants ranging from 18 to 90 years of age. The visual acuity and cognitive measures had different age trajectories, and the visual acuity–cognition relations were similar in each 5-year age band. The results suggest that the age-related differences and changes in near visual acuity are unlikely to contribute to the age-related differences and changes in speed and memory measures.     

In sight but out of mind: do competing views test the limits of perception without awareness?

Over a century's worth of research suggests that "perception" without awareness is a genuine phenomenon. However, relatively little research has explored the question of whether all visually presented information activates representations in long term memory without awareness. Two experiments explored the use of a figure-ground display consisting of competing views in which one view dominates the other such that subjects are (initially) unaware of the non-dominant view. Neither experiment provided evidence that the non-dominant view (an embedded word) activated its representation in long term memory when the subject failed to report being aware of the embedded word in that priming was not seen on a subsequent stem completion task. In contrast, priming was seen when subjects reported being aware of the embedded word. It is suggested that two competing figure-ground relations are not concurrently computed unconsciously.     

Repetition blindness in sentence contexts: Not just an attribution?

Selective "blindness" to repeated words in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) occurs even when omitting these words compromises sentence syntax and meaning. The contributions of lexical and contextual factors to this repetition blindness (RB) phenomenon were evaluated using three tasks that combined RB and ambiguity resolution paradigms. During an RSVP sentence, a repeated word and matched but incongruous control were presented simultaneously, and participants were asked to report the entire sentence, including only the appropriate word. Substantial RB was evident in impaired report of repeated targets, whereas report of nonrepeated targets was enhanced when the distractor was a repeat. Experiment 2 confirmed these results with reduced reporting requirements, and Experiment 3 demonstrated the independence of repetition and sentence congruity effects. Results across all contexts support a lexical account of RB, which assumes that reactivation and identification of rapidly repeated words are impaired due to the refractory nature of lexical representations.     

Out of mind,out of sight? Investigating abnormal face scanning in autism spectrum disorder using gaze‐contingent paradigm

Diminished social motivation is hypothesized to explain abnormal face scanning pattern in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially reduced eye‐looking time in ASDs than typically developing (TD) people. Here, we tested an alternative explanation that children with ASD may use a compensatory strategy to avoid direct eye contact by processing the eyes through peripheral vision. We compared the face scanning patterns of children with and without ASD in two conditions: in the clear condition, the face was completely visible; in the blur condition, by using the gaze‐contingent paradigm, the whole face was blurred except for a small region being fixated at, thus children could not rely on the peripheral information to process the eyes. We found that children with ASD fixated less on the eyes than TD children in both conditions. Temporal‐course analyses further revealed the possible motivation‐based guidance of attention to process the eyes in the TD group but not in the ASD group. Additionally, we found that children with ASD scanned faces more randomly and less strategically than TD children. These results have ruled out the alternative hypothesis that the abnormal face scanning pattern in ASDs was due to their compensatory strategy to process eyes through peripheral vision, furthering our understanding of the mechanisms underlying their abnormal face scanning.     

Inhibitory effects of repeating color and shape: inhibition of return or repetition blindness?

There is a current debate regarding whether attention is influenced by stimulus attributes other than location. The present article replicates and extends previous findings that repeating the nonspatial attribute of color leads to a delay in target detection (M. B. Law, J. Pratt, & R. A. Abrams, 1995). Repetition disadvantage effects were found for the stimulus attributes of both color and shape, as well as for location. However, the nonspatial repetition disadvantage disappeared if the stimuli were presented in peripheral locations (Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4) or the cue was presented for 50 ms (Experiment 6). Moreover, the magnitude of the repetition disadvantage tended to decline as the cue-target stimulus-onset asynchrony increased (Experiments 5a, 5b, and 6). These results suggest that a repetition blindness mechanism may underlie the repetition disadvantage effects of nonspatial features, rather than an inhibition of return mechanism.     

Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human,animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute‐based model of mind perception and the metaphor‐based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor‐based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as “killing machines” and “predators.” Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.     

Theory of mind: is training contagious?

In this study, preschool children were successfully trained in theory of mind tasks, namely false belief inference and appearance–reality distinction. Results show that both types of training had a direct effect, as measured by the improvement of performance on the FB and AR delayed post‐tests. Both types of training also had an indirect effect, as measured by transfer of the benefits of the training to the task that was not in the training. Finally, both types of training were effective even when the children were trained in a task they had already mastered.     

Behavioural problems in deaf children: Theory of mind delay or communication failure?

Some authors have tried to explain the relatively frequent behavioural problems in deaf children by an impaired theory of mind development: a poor appraisal of other people's beliefs and desires. Recent studies suggest that this explanation is too simplistic. When deaf children were asked to explain other people's emotional reactions, Rieffe and Meerum Terwogt (2000 Rieffe, C and Meerum Terwogt, M. 2000. Deaf children's understanding of emotions: desires take precedence. Journal of Child Psychology, Psychiatry and allied Disciplines, 41: 601–608. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) found that they were no worse at giving mental state references than hearing controls. However, the content of these references differed between the two groups: deaf children made more desire attributions and fewer belief attributions than the hearing children. It is important to note that desires are strongly linked with the outcome of a situation, whereas beliefs are often necessary to understand the process that preceded this outcome.

A follow-up study showed, as expected, that when both groups were offered stories about disappointing situations, deaf children reacted primarily with outcome-dependent emotions and explained these emotions accordingly. Their neglect of the preceding process implied also a neglect for the causal factors, unlike their hearing peers, who frequently referred to process-relevant elements. Nearly all deaf children in these studies had hearing parents. It is known that the conversations between hearing parents and their deaf children are impaired due to a language gap: parents often fail to explain their decisions and they only communicate the eventual outcome. Their deaf children seem to react in a similar way: they limit their focus and communication to their own wishes.

If this type of communication pattern becomes common practice, one can easily see why deaf children are frequently labelled as stubborn and obstinate. In time, as we showed in another study, our deaf participants even failed to reproduce the reasons for an undesirable decision that was explicitly explained to them. Inadequate communication, delayed emotional competence and low self-esteem (by losing their grasp on the situation) form a dangerous triad that could easily have long-term effects.     

Masked priming with graphemically related forms: Repetition or partial activation?

Form-priming occurs when a prime that is graphemically similar to the target word facilitates processing of the target. In an activation model (such as Morton's logogen model), such an effect can be interpreted as a partial-activation effect. A prime that shares letters with the target must inevitably produce activation in the detectors for both the prime and the target. Alternatively, form-priming could be seen as a special case of repetition-priming, in which the prime actually accesses the entry for the target. It is shown that masked-priming effects in the lexical decision task can be obtained for graphemically related pairs such as bontrast-CONTRAST, but not for four-letter pairs such as bamp-CAMP. It is suggested that the priming effect is controlled by neighbourhood density, short words usually having many neighbours, long words having very few. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that form-priming does occur for four-letter words if the prime and target are drawn from low-density neighbourhoods. For a partial-activation theory, an inhibitory mechanism that is sensitive to the number of prime-neighbours is required to explain the results. Of the several versions of a repetition account considered, the “best match” hypothesis appears to be the most promising: this assumes that priming is limited to the stimulus that best matches the prime. It is also shown that prime-target pairs that are related in form and meaning (e.g. made-MAKE) produce the same priming effect as identical pairs, as predicted by a repetition account that assumes a common entry underlying both forms.     

(Co-)Constructing a theory of mind: From language or through language?

Synthese - There is a large body of empirical work that has investigated the relationship between parents’ child-directed speech and their children’s Theory of Mind development. That...     

Motivating meta-awareness of mind wandering: A way to catch the mind in flight?

Given the negative effects of mind wandering on performance, it may be profitable to be aware of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) as they occur. The present study investigated whether motivating people to catch TUTs increases meta-awareness. We offered incentives for increased self-catching during reading. To enhance the veracity of these self-reports, we used a “bogus-pipeline” procedure; we convinced participants that their mental states were being covertly monitored using physiological measures. In reality, mind wandering was assessed covertly by a secondary task (“gibberish detection”), and overtly by experience sampling. The results showed that incentives increased the number of self-catches without increasing overall mind wandering. Moreover, both the bogus pipeline and the opportunity for incentives increased the validity of self-reports, evidenced by significantly increased correlations between self-caught and behaviorally assessed mind wandering. We discuss the relevance of this methodological approach for research on mind wandering and research building on introspective reports more generally.     

Personality out of proportion?

The field of personality assessment has evolved the normative practice of centering scores on their means, evaluating associations among measures with Pearson correlations, and using factor analytic methods to reduce redundancy and provide putative explanatory variables. At least some of these explanatory variables, or factors, have become well-known elements in trait theories of personality structure (e.g., the Five-factor model). Hofstee and Ten Berge (2004/this issue) suggest an alternative set of procedures arising from treating the midpoints of bipolar rating scales as true zero points. These procedures lead to a very different view of personality structure in which one factor provides a nearly sufficient summary of personality judgments. I scrutinize the methodological choices implied by these procedures here. This evaluation leads to the conclusion that Hofstee and Ten Berge provide methods and results that cannot serve to replace normative practice and well-known findings but do provide insight into important questions not typically addressed by personality assessors.     

Being ostracized versus out of the loop: Redundant or unique predictors of variance in workplace outcomes?

Based on the existing research, being excluded from information (i.e., being out of the loop) produces similar consequences as being ignored or excluded from activities. Consequently, one might wonder whether it is necessary to measure or study different types of exclusion in the workplace context, rather than just assessing a single type of exclusion. The current research investigated the associations between two types of workplace exclusion (i.e., being ostracized and being left out of the loop) and various workplace outcomes, with the purpose of determining whether these different types of exclusion predict unique or redundant variance in these workplace outcomes. In Study 1, we obtained a better model fit when we assigned items measuring out-of-the-loop experiences at work to a different factor than items assessing experiences with ostracism at work. In Study 2, we observed that measuring employees' experiences with being out of the loop predicted unique variance in workplace outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction), above and beyond experiences with ostracism at work. Relative weight analyses suggested that both ostracism and out-of-the-loop experiences were equally important predictors of these outcomes. Together, these studies indicate that being ostracized and being left out of the loop may be distinct exclusion experiences and better predictions about workplace outcomes can be made by assessing both types of exclusion. On a practical level, measuring different types of exclusion may prove useful, because organizations may need to implement different interventions for addressing distinct types of exclusion.     

Intentionality and meta-awareness of mind wandering: Are they one and the same,or distinct dimensions?

Researchers have recently demonstrated that mind-wandering episodes can vary on numerous dimensions, and it has been suggested that assessing these dimensions will play an important role in our understanding of mind wandering. One dimension that has received considerable attention in recent work is the intentionality of mind wandering. Although it has been claimed that indexing the intentionality of mind wandering will be necessary if researchers are to obtain a coherent understanding of the wandering mind, one concern is that this dimension might be redundant with another, longstanding, dimension: namely, meta-awareness. Thus, the utility of the argument for assessing intentionality rests upon a demonstration that this dimension is distinct from the meta-awareness dimension. To shed light on this issue, across two studies we compared and contrasted these dimensions to determine whether they are redundant or distinct. In both studies, we found support for the view that these dimensions are distinct.     

Breaking barriers or locked out? Class-based perceptions and experiences of postsecondary education

This article provides an overview of objective and subjective class differences in experiences of postsecondary education. Using the metaphor of a funnel, it argues that cumulative disadvantage results when first-generation and low-income college students are disproportionately filtered out at each stage of the postsecondary education process. Subjective class differences largely serve to reproduce existing inequalities, although the potential for transformation exists. This article considers inequalities during childhood and the transition to adulthood, stratification within institutions, and class differences in postsecondary educational enrollment, attendance, college life, work, financial aid, and attainment. Directions for future research and program and policy interventions are outlined.     

The illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?

We reference self-ratings and clinician ratings of childhood anxious symptoms to a third data source well delineated with regard to the pathophysiology of anxiety. A total of 36 children with anxiety disorders and other children were administered yohimbine, an alpha-sub-2-adrenoreceptor antagonist, in response to which anxiety-prone children have blunted output of growth hormone. We assessed neuroendocrine reactions. In general, participants who claimed anxiety that was unconfirmed by clinicians displayed anxiotypic neuroendocrine profiles, whereas those who denied anxiety detected by clinicians did not, suggesting self-report may have had the advantage over clinician ratings in some instances. Nuanced and contextualized conclusions in this area of work are needed. In response to the question "the illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?," we answer "it depends on the sample and the syndrome under study."     

Is logic in the mind or in the world?

The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?