The recollective experience of cross-modality confusion errors

There are at least two qualitatively different types of subjective experience that can accompany accurate recognition memory. Sometimes recognition is accompanied by conscious recollection of the learning episode (i.e., it isremembered), and in other cases it is not (i.e., it is simplyknown that the item is old). In the present study, we assessed the subjective experience that accompanies crossmodality confusion errors (misidentifying words as pictures) by measuring the extent to which subjects claimed toremember versusknow that the item was presented as a picture. The results of two experiments demonstrate that cross-modality confusion errors are often accompanied by conscious recollection, although not to the same extent as accurate memories. The findings also show that there is considerable overlap in the recollective experience that accompanies accurate and erroneous memories. Finally, the results support the contention that recollective experience cannot be directly inferred from test performance.     

The origins of concepts

Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of genuinely cognitive explanations.

The origins of empathic concern

Recent developments in research cast doubt on early conceptions of young children as primarily egocentric and uncaring of others' needs. Studies reviewed indicate a broad range of social competencies children bring to their interpersonal relationships. As early as 2 years of age, they show (a) the cognitive capacity to interpret, in simple ways, the physical and psychological states of others, (b) the emotional capacity to experience, affectively, the state of others, and (c) the behavioral repertoire that permits the possibility of attempts to alleviate discomfort in others. Both temperament and environment may contribute to individual differences in concern for others. Early socialization experiences that lead to adaptive and maladaptive patterns of responsiveness to others' needs are described. Examples of environmental risk conditions include parental depression, marital discord, parental maltreatment. Implications of this work for broadening existing conceptualizations of empathy and related prosocial orientations are addressed.     

The traumatic origins of representation

The debate regarding representation is haunted by the fact that it takes place within a context of general suspicion whereby everything, it is claimed, is always representation. Such is the hurdle that Foucault identifies and Derrida attempts to elucidate in his debate with Heidegger, in which he takes issue with Heidegger’s critique of the “age of representation.” Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the history of representation leads to a reconstruction that privileges the motifs of dissemination, of envoi (sending or dispatching). In art too, Derrida confronts Heidegger, this time with the aim of re-thinking the relationship between the work and what lies outside and beyond it. By framing the Derrida/Heidegger debate within a consideration of the Lascaux cave drawings, and by examining the positions of Girard, Bataille and Blanchot in relation to the question of the origins of art, it will be possible to re-draw the boundaries of representation insofar as they lie at the intersection between philosophy and art.     

The origins of pictorial competence

Pictorial competence , which refers to the many factors involved in perceiving, interpreting, understanding, and using pictures, develops gradually over the first few years of life. Although experience is not required for accurate perception of pictures, it is necessary for understanding the nature of pictures. Infants initially respond to depicted objects as if they were real objects, and toddlers are remarkably insensitive to picture orientation. Only gradually do young children figure out the nature of pictures and how they are used.     

The origins of Wittgenstein's verificationism

The question is raised of the source of the extreme verificationist views which Wittgenstein put forward immediately after his return to philosophy in 1929. Since these views appear to be radically different from the ideas put forward in theTractatus some explanation of this dramatic new turn in Wittgenstein's thought certainly seems to be called for. Wittgenstein's very low level of interest in philosophy between 1918 and shortly before his return to philosophy is documented. Attention then focuses on the crucial period immediately before Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge, and it is shown that in this period he encountered only two new philosophical influences. These were the ideas of Brouwer and the ideas of the Vienna Circle. Each of these is examined and neither is found capable of providing an explanation of the source of Wittgenstein's verificationism. This leads to a reconsideration of the underlying assumption that Wittgenstein's verificationism does represent the radical departure from the ideas of theTractatus which it appears to. It is argued that the only way we can account for Wittgenstein's evident approval of the reading of theTractatus which he must have encountered in his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle is by concluding that, far from being incompatible with his earlier ideas, some form of verificationism must always have been implicit in theTractatus.     

The origins of modern divorce

High rates of marital dissolution and easy access to divorce are not unprecedented, historically or cross-culturally. But contemporary divorce in North America and Western Europe has different origins and features than divorce in previous cultures. The origins of modern divorce patterns date back more than 200 years, to the invention of the historically unprecedented idea that marriage should be based on love and mutual affection. Ironically, then, the fragility of modern marriage stems from the same values that have elevated the marital relationship above all other personal and familial commitments: the concentration of emotion, passion, personal identity, and self-validation in the couple relationship and the attenuation of emotional attachments and obligations beyond the conjugal unit. The immediate causes of divorce may range from factors as diverse as the personal psychological characteristics of one or both spouses to the stresses of economic hardship and community disintegration. But in a larger perspective, the role of divorce in modern societies and its relatively high occurrence both flow from the same complex of factors that have made good marriages so much more central to people's happiness than through most of the past, and deterioration of a marital relationship so much more traumatic.     

The origins of symbolic racism

The theory of symbolic racism places its origins in a blend of anti-Black affect and conservative values, particularly individualism. We clarify that hypothesis, test it directly, and report several findings consistent with it. Study 1 shows that racial prejudice and general political conservatism fall into 2 separate factors, with symbolic racism loading about equally on both. Study 2 found that the anti-Black affect and individualism significantly explain symbolic racism. The best-fitting model both fuses those 2 elements into a single construct (Black individualism) and includes them separately. The effects of Black individualism on racial policy preferences are mostly mediated by symbolic racism. Study 3 shows that Black individualism is distinctively racial, with effects distinctly different from either an analogous gender individualism or race-neutral individualism.     

Intermingling and confusion

Abstract

An understanding of Descartes’ concept of ‘confusion’ is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes’ notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ‘undone’. This analysis takes its rise from his contrast between ‘confused’ and ‘distinct’ : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ‘bad intellectual habits’ which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ‘nature’ (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ‘really distinct’. Moreover, his ‘disambiguations’ indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ‘philosophical therapy’.     

Inferential confusion in obsessive-compulsive disorder: the inferential confusion questionnaire

The current article represents the further validation of the construct of inferential confusion amongst clinical samples. Inferential confusion is proposed to be a meta-cognitive confusion particularly relevant to obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) that leads a person to confuse an imagined possibility with an actual probability. As such, it conceptualizes OCD as a form of belief disorder similar to a delusion or overvalued idea that is a product of distorted reasoning processes. In contrast, other cognitive models of OCD emphasize a phobic model of development in OCD, and thus consider the exaggerated interpretation of intrusions as an essential element in OCD. The present study administered a revised version of the Inferential Confusion Questionnaire, and the Obsessive Belief Questionnaire (OBQ), to a total of 183 participants in three clinical groups and a non-clinical control group. Results suggest that OCD, at least in part, follows a non-phobic model of development with inferential confusion significantly related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms independently of cognitive domains as measured by the OBQ, and mood states. Further, scores on inferential confusion were particularly high in those with OCD and delusional disorder as compared to anxious and non-clinical controls.     

The origins of fear of snakes

In the present study, a questionnaire about the nature and origin of fear of snakes was administered to 60 Phobic, 82 Low Fear and 35 High Fear college students. Phobic and High Fear subjects reported greater fear on a variety of components of snake fear. There was little evidence supporting the role of direct conditioning experiences in the acquisition of fear of snakes. Rather, the results suggested a variety of observational and instructional learning experiences as related to the acquisition of snake fear. Although preparedness for direct conditioning does not seem relevant, a preparedness for observational and instructional learning is possible.