Reasons and ideals

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends.     

Technology and Human Becoming

Technology is a mirror that reflects human nature and intentions: (1) we want certain things done and we want tools to do those things; (2) we are finite, frail, and mortal; (3) we create technology in order to bring alternative worlds into being; (4) we do not know why we create or what values should guide us. Imagination is central to technology. Human nature and human freedom are brought into focus when we reflect on the central role of imagination in technology.     

Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions

In order to comprehend the world around us and construct explaining theories for this purpose, we need a conception of physical probability, since we come across many (apparently) probabilistic phenomena in our world. But how should we understand objective probability claims? Since pure frequency approaches of probability are not appropriate, we have to use a single case propensity interpretation. Unfortunately, many philosophers believe that this understanding of probability is burdened with significant difficulties. My main aim is to show that we can treat propensity as a theoretical concept that exhibits many similarities to other theoretical concepts, and its difficulties are not insuperable if we make explicit some general presuppositions of scientific practice and apply them to propensities. At least this is true if we formulate the right bridge principle for propensity and rely on further methodological rules in dealing with propensity assertions to make them empirically testable.     

The self and eating disorders

In our review, we focus on self-related constructs in the context of eating disorders with four aims. First, we examine a variety of self-related constructs that have been theoretically and empirically linked to the development and course of eating disorders. In addition to the more well-researched constructs of self-esteem and self-efficacy, we also report on findings related to selflessness, contingent self-worth, self-objectification, ego-syntonicity, self-concept clarity, self-compassion, social comparison, self-oriented perfectionism/self-criticism, and narcissism. Second, we discuss self-related constructs that may be especially relevant to comorbidities common among those with eating disorders. Third, we review intervention and prevention programs where self-related constructs play a prominent role. Lastly, we share future research directions regarding self-related constructs and eating disorders that we believe will advance a deeper understanding of the role of the self in the eating disorders.     

Luck, Evidence and War

abstract   We seem to have conflicting intuitions regarding luck and war, and we seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either, we deny that a war can be made just or unjust as a result of luck, and we accept that we should not appeal to the outcome when claiming that the war was or was not justified. Or, alternatively, we allow that it is legitimate to base our judgements on the outcome, but as a result we must accept that luck can make a war just or unjust. Traditionally, these have been taken to be the two forks of the dilemma, but, in this paper, I argue that they are not the only options. Rather, we can appeal to the outcome of our actions without claiming that this is, in anyway, an appeal to moral luck. Rather, the outcome provides us with evidence.     

咳嗽与咳嗽治疗

咳嗽是临床上常见的症状之一,其对人们健康的影响是辩证的,咳嗽治疗也是辩证的。有需要止咳的,有需要治疗但不是止咳治疗的,有不需要治疗的,还有要鼓励患者咳嗽的。临床上遇到咳嗽患者时,要用辩证的观点进行治疗,辨证施治,用哲学观来看待问题,最终才能解决问题。     

Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness

The Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confident, at least in some situations, by finding justifiable reasons to think their opponents are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifiable only because they lack information about their opponents.     

The 'Plain' and the 'Positive': Ritual,Experience and Aesthetics in Quakerism and Charismatic Christianity

This paper argues that sharp distinctions between formal ritual action and everyday practice cannot always be sustained. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among British Quakers and Swedish charismatic Protestants, we seek to show that both groups manifest an experiential aesthetic that constructs and is constructed by engagement in daily life. The Quaker aesthetic we call 'the plain', and the charismatic aesthetic we term 'the positive'. In presenting our argument, we adopt Bourdieu's concept of habitus and extend its meaning to take account of material culture in the establishment of religious commitment.     

Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge

How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is possible and what we can coherently imagine. We can often come to knowledge of metaphysical modality a priori.     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.     

信息的实在性与非实在性

If taking information as a philosophical concept, we will find an important philosophical problem: whether or not is it of reality? This problem also produces such a paradox: If we accept its reality, we will eliminate the difference between information and matter, and attribute information to a physical phenomena,or clear up the independent features, value and significance of information. But if we deny the reality of information, we will deny the objectivity of information or existence of any objective in...     

Self-Love and Its Forms

Sarah Buss argues that if we are to rise to the challenge of standing up to justice when doing so is costly, we will have to internalise a sense of our own unimportance. That is, we will have to cultivate an attitude that is ‘the opposite of self-love’. I try to show that what we need is not to eliminate our love of self but to give it a proper and discerning shape, so that it conduces to our goodness rather than to our self-interest narrowly construed.     

Exploration and exploitation during sequential search

When we learn how to throw darts we adjust how we throw based on where the darts stick. Much of skill learning is computationally similar in that we learn using feedback obtained after the completion of individual actions. We can formalize such tasks as a search problem; among the set of all possible actions, find the action that leads to the highest reward. In such cases our actions have two objectives: we want to best utilize what we already know (exploitation), but we also want to learn to be more successful in the future (exploration). Here we tested how participants learn movement trajectories where feedback is provided as a monetary reward that depends on the chosen trajectory. We mathematically derived the optimal search policy for our experiment using decision theory. The search behavior of participants is well predicted by an ideal searcher model that optimally combines exploration and exploitation.     

Culture,emotion suppression and disclosure,and health

Researchers have examined cultural differences in the psychological and physiological health consequences of emotion suppression. The goal of this review is to clarify the state of the science on this growing area of research by summarizing patterns of findings, identifying limitations, and providing recommendations for future research. First, we review the framework that provides the theoretical foundation for explaining cultural differences, and then we present findings on how culture influences the psychological and physiological health consequences of emotion suppression. Next, we review the expressive writing intervention as a culturally sensitive intervention that facilitates emotion disclosure for cultural groups that prioritize emotional restraint. Finally, we end by providing theoretical and methodological recommendations for future research.     

Possible disagreements and defeat

Conciliatory views about disagreement with one’s epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often, when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement.     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities

In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each. Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't follow that we should always toss a coin. In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are different.     

Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy.     

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.     

Conclusions and Future Directions

Abstract

In the preface to this volume, we briefly considered some of the factors that have in recent years helped traumatic stress become a relatively unitary field of its own. We also noted that some circumstances, the nature of which are not completely clear to us, have to some extent impeded this progress. In this final section, we have two goals. First, we reflect upon the breadth and variety of trauma research in both its content and methods and discuss how this breadth relates to the progression of traumatic stress research as a distinct scholarly endeavor. Second, we review what we believe are some of the important future directions in traumatic stress research as the field continues to build upon its present foundations.