经济能人·政治权威·道德权威——以HH村为个案的苏南村庄领袖权威获得与延续之实证研究

苏南村庄领袖的权威是一种由基于为村庄共同体带来福利的报偿性权威、基于上级任命获得的法理权威和基于个人人格和道德威望的魅力型权威共同组成的"复合型权威"。这一权威的延续,必须基于村庄领袖作为"经济能人"对村庄发展作出的持续贡献和作为"道德楷模"对村庄福利的慷慨回报。在此基础上,村庄领袖的政治权威可以自然获得并不断巩固。相反,一旦失去这两种权威基础,村庄领袖的双重角色则会自然中断。     

Attesting the Aristotelian Future

Aristotelian relativism about the future (as recently defended by MacFarlane (2003)) claims that a prediction made on Monday, such as ‘It will rain’, can be indeterminate on Monday but determinate on Tuesday. A serious objection to this intuitively appealing view is that it cannot coherently be attested: for if it is attested on Monday, then our blindness to what the future holds precludes attesting that the prediction is determinate on Tuesday, and if it is attested on Tuesday (when, suppose, it rains), then the fact that it rains precludes attesting that the prediction is indeterminate on Monday. In this paper, I focus on Moruzzi and Wright (2009)’s recent development of this objection and argue that it fails. This result removes a major obstacle to defending the Aristotelian view.     

Equality as Comparative Fairness

The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non‐instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non‐instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert.     

Autonomy as Second Nature: On McDowell's Aristotelian Naturalism

The concept of second nature plays a central role in McDowell's project of reconciling thought's external constraint with its spontaneity or autonomy: our conceptual capacities are natural in the sense that they are fully integrated into the natural world, but they are a second nature to us since they are not reducible to elements that are intelligible apart from those conceptual capacities. Rather than offering a theory of second nature and an account of how we acquire one, McDowell suggests that Aristotle's account of ethical character formation as the acquisition of a second nature serves as a model that can reassure us that thought's autonomy does not threaten its naturalness. However, far from providing such reassurance, the Aristotelian model of second nature actually generates an anxiety about how the acquisition of such autonomous conceptual abilities could be possible.     

Authority as a contingency plan

Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of contingency in moral life. In response to these charges, I argue that Humeans misrepresent the challenge of contingency and fail to provide adequate resources to cope with it. In its formalist variety, Humean constructivism fails to make sense of an important category of ethical judgments, which claim universal authority. The substantive varieties of Humean constructivism recognize that some ethical judgments aspire to universality, but fail to fully justify such an aspiration. These versions of constructivism represent a setback in regard to the achievements of Kantian constructivism. In conclusion, I briefly resume the advantages of advocating a Kantian conception of rational authority as a response to contingency.     

Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the...     

Gracious Play: Discipline,Insight, and the Common Good

The article is a theological reflection on the vocation of university teaching that describes the heart of the matter of what faculty do in the classroom. The author draws on personal narrative, social‐psychological analyses of how insight occurs and contexts for insights are constructed, and sociological accounts of shifts that have altered significantly the context of university teaching and learning at the cusp of the millennium to make her case. She argues that the vocation of university teaching involves creating spaces of gracious play that are potentially transformative for students and faculty. Creating such spaces, however, draws faculty into an asceticism that can be understood as a spiritual path. The article is a revision of the author's 1999 St. Elizabeth Seton Lecture at the College of Mount St. Joseph, Cincinnati, Ohio.