Two boys—one event

The background of this paper is an investigation of child survivors from the Holocaust; in a study of interviews of these survivors, it could be concluded that past traumatic experiences are recovered not as memories (in the usual sense of the word), but as affects invading the present. Accordingly, affects seem to tell the story of the past traumatic experiences. In this paper, the author investigates two accounts (separately told by two survivors) of the same event in the Kielce ghetto. The two accounts present similarities, but also differences, and the author discusses these in relation to the concepts of historical and narrative truth, as well as in relation to construction and reconstruction, concluding that the interviews give a sketch of how the experiences have become idiosyncratically registered in the minds of the interviewees.     

Two in one or one in two? Pushing off from Jung with Wolfgang Giegerich

This paper responds to a recent paper by Wolfgang Giegerich entitled ‘Two Jungs: apropos a paper by Mark Saban’. Giegerich disputes my assertion that the ‘rigorous notion’ at the heart of his psychology ‘finds no source in Jung's psychology, implicit or explicit’. In order to do this he posits the existence of two Jungs, an exoteric Jung and an esoteric Jung. The implications of Giegerich's binary scission of Jung are explored in this paper, and show that the tendency to exalt one Jung while disparaging the other betrays a comprehensive blindness toward the contradictory complexity of Jung's psychology as a whole. It is suggested that this blindness is the consequence of Giegerich's systematic prioritization of a neo‐Hegelian agenda that is in profound conflict with the telos of Jung's psychology.     

Only one or two cultures?

One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature, edited by George Levine, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987, 359 pages, hb $45, pb $12.95     

Evaluating evidence of psychological adaptation: how do we know one when we see one?

Evolutionary psychologists argue that human nature contains many discrete psychological adaptations. Each adaptation is theorized to have been functional in humans' ancestral past, and empirical evidence that an attribute is an adaptation can come from showing it possesses complexity, efficiency, universality, and other features of special design. In this article, we present a tutorial review of the evidentiary forms that evolutionary psychologists commonly use to document the existence of human adaptations. We also present a heuristic framework for integrating and evaluating cross-disciplinary evidence of adaptation. Pregnancy sickness, incest avoidance, men's desires for multiple sex partners, and an easily learned fear of snakes are evaluated as possible human adaptations using this framework. We conclude that future research and teaching in evolutionary psychology would benefit from more fully utilizing cross-disciplinary frameworks to evaluate evidence of human adaptation.     

Two skeptical arguments or only one?

The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution.     

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.     

Does it take one to know one? Endorsement of conspiracy theories is influenced by personal willingness to conspire

We advance a new account of why people endorse conspiracy theories, arguing that individuals use the social-cognitive tool of projection when making social judgements about others. In two studies, we found that individuals were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories if they thought they would be willing, personally, to participate in the alleged conspiracies. Study 1 established an association between conspiracy beliefs and personal willingness to conspire, which fully mediated a relationship between Machiavellianism and conspiracy beliefs. In Study 2, participants primed with their own morality were less inclined than controls to endorse conspiracy theories - a finding fully mediated by personal willingness to conspire. These results suggest that some people think 'they conspired' because they think 'I would conspire'.     

以撒欢笑者laughter、laughing one

以撒是亚伯拄罕和妻撒拉的独子(创17:19),雅各和以扫之父。亚伯拉罕和撒拉一直未生育,直到亚伯拉罕九十九岁时,天使向他们显现,预言神将在次年赐给他一个儿子 (创18:10-14)。次年撒拉果然生了一个儿子,就是以撒,在出生的第八天就给他行了割礼(创21:1-4;徒7: 8)。神要试验亚伯拉罕,就说:你带着你独生的儿子以撒,往摩利亚地去,要在我所指示你的山上,把他献为燔祭(创22:2)。亚伯拉罕就带了以撤和两个仆人,起身往神所指示他的地方去了。第三天他到了摩利亚,亚伯拉罕令他的仆人和驴在山下等候,把燔祭用的柴放在以撤身上,自己手里拿着火与刀,二人就往山上走去。     

Seeking one’s heading through eye movements

A study of eye movements during simulated travel toward a grove of four stationary trees revealed that observers looked most at pairs of trees that converged or decelerated apart. Such pairs specify that one’s direction of travel, calledheading, is to the outside of the near member of the pair. Observers looked at these trees more than those that accelerated apart; such pairs do not offer trustworthy heading information. Observers also looked at gaps between trees less often when they converged or diverged apart, and heading can never be between such pairs. Heading responses were in accord with eye movements. In general, if observers responded accurately, they had looked at trees that converged or decelerated apart; if they were inaccurate, they had not. Results support the notion that observers seek out their heading through eye movements, saccading to and fixating on the most informative locations in the field of view.     

How to know one’s experiences transparently

Philosophical Studies - I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency....     

Organization and predictive power of general and relationship-specific attachment models: one for all, and all for one?

Given recent evidence for multiple attachment models, we examined the organization and predictive power of general and relationship-specific attachment representations in two samples using two distinct measures of attachment models. With regard to associations among relationship-specific models, peer models (romantic partner and friend) and parental models (mother and father) were more similar to each other than to any other models, and anxiety/self-model representations were more consistent across relationships than avoidance/other-model representations. With regard to links between general and specific models, romantic and friend models made the strongest and independent contributions to general models, and romantic relationship involvement moderated the importance of romantic models to general models. With regard to differential predictive power of multiple models, general, romantic partner, and mother attachment made unique contributions to well-being indicators; relationship outcomes, however, were only predicted by individuals' corresponding relationship-specific models. Implications for the measurement and conceptualization of adult attachment are discussed.     

Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

Does previewing one stimulus feature help conjunction search?

We examined the effects of previewing one aspect of a search display, in order to determine what subset of display information is most useful as a prelude to a search task. Observers were asked to indicate the presence or absence of a known target, in a conjunction search where the target was defined by the combination of colour and orientation (a yellow horizontal line presented among yellow vertical and pink horizontal distractors). In the colour preview condition of experiment 1, observers were first shown a 1 s preview of the locations and colours of the search items before the actual search set was presented. That is, search items first appeared as yellow and pink squares for 1 s, which each then turned into yellow and pink oriented lines (in the same locations) which comprised the display to be searched. In the orientation preview condition, observers were first shown a 1 s preview of the locations and orientations of the search items before the actual search display was presented. These two conditions were compared to a control condition consisting of standard conjunction search without any preview display. There was no effect of colour preview; there was a marginal effect of orientation preview, but in the opposite direction from what was expected reaction time increased for orientation preview searches. In experiment 2 these previews were compared to two spatial cueing conditions; in this experiment the colour preview did provide a small amount of help. Finally, in experiment 3 both previews were presented in succession, and increased facilitation was found, in particular when the colour preview preceded the orientation preview. These findings are discussed in relation to the literature, in particular the Guided Search model (Wolfe et al 1989 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 15 419-433; Wolfe 1994 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1 202-238).     

Explaining neurocognitive aging: is one factor enough?

As an introduction to the special issue on neurocognitive factors underlying age effects, we discuss a number of recent developments in the literature on aging. The classic distinction between generalized and process-specific cognitive changes with old age has reappeared in the distinctions between the frontal lobe hypothesis and more differentiated views of neurocognitive aging. We argue that neurological decay in the frontal cortex has important implications for cognitive control, but that the frontal lobe hypothesis does not capture the plethora of changes that characterize aging and incorrectly suggests a unitary effect.     

Can one pay attention to a particular color?

In an array of elements whose colors vary can we selectively choose to process all the items of a particular color preferentially in relation to those of another color? We addressed this question by presenting subjects with arrays containing many elements, and recording reaction times to a luminance change of one of the elements. Half the elements had one color and the other half another color--the spatial distribution being random. In two tasks--a simple detection of this change or a choice reaction time to the polarity of the change--we found that reaction times were independent of the number of items in the array. Cuing the subjects as to the color of the target item had no significant influence on the detection task, but subjects were faster if cued for the discrimination task. A further experiment replicated these findings and examined possible costs and benefits. Our final experiment separated the roles of attentional guidance and postattentional processes by having subjects judge the orientation of the target element and varying the magnitude of the target flash that defined which element was the target. We found that this judgment was also affected by color cuing, and that the size of the effect interacted with the flash strength, suggesting that color cuing has its influence at the stage of attentional guidance. We conclude that subjects can selectively attend to items on the basis of color given the appropriate task and stimulus dynamics.     

The Growing-Block: just one thing after another?

In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that (a) past and present things exist, while future things do not, and (b) the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of these entities are fundamental, since if they were, this would entail the existence of irreducible necessary connections between matters of fact. Instead, these entities supervene on a fundamental, non-nomological ‘Humean mosaic’ of property instances at spacetime points. We will further explain and motivate the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience in Sects. 2 and 3, but first, we turn to our master argument.