Retracted: Judging the unexpected: Disconfirmation of situation‐specific expectancies

People's interactions with others typically take place in specific situations. Therefore, it is likely that expectancies of others are often situation‐specific. In two studies, we examined when and how this situation‐specificity of expectancies affects judgment.We showed that situation‐specific expectancies ‘“Michael is kind at work”’ lead to surprise and contrast effects when incongruent behavior refers to the same specific situation ‘work’, but not in other situations ‘general or home’, whereas general expectancies ‘“Michael is kind”’ lead to such surprise and contrast effects, regardless of the target situation. These results suggest that people sometimes are “situationalists” and do not always show dispositional biases. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An analysis of the determinants of the feeling of knowing

Research has demonstrated that feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments are affected by the amount of accessible information related to an inaccessible target. Further, studies have demonstrated that, in some situations, FOK judgment magnitude is not only related to the amount (quantity) of accessed features, but also the correctness of those features (Thomas, Bulevich, & Dubois, 2011). The present study examined the conditions under which the correctness of features would influence FOK judgment magnitude. We hypothesized that accuracy of retrieved features would influence FOK judgments, but only in situations where semantically meaningful information was accessible. In three experiments, we manipulated accessibility of semantic information. In all experiments, the quantity, or amount of retrieved partial information had a greater impact on FOK judgments than the accuracy of that information. However, in situations where semantic information was accessible, accuracy of retrieved semantic features also influenced FOK judgment magnitude, and later recognition.     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

STORYTELLING AND WICKED PROBLEMS: MYTHS OF THE ABSOLUTE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

This article examines the emphasis on facts and data in public discourse, and the belief that they provide a certainty necessary for public judgment and collective action. The heart of this belief is what I call the “myth of the Absolute,” which is the belief that by basing our judgment and actions on an Absolute we can avoid errors and mistakes. Myths of the Absolute can help us deal with wicked problems such as climate change, but they also have a downside. This article explores the experience behind these myths, to better understand how they describe and mediate our experiences of uncertainty, then relates these myths to debates about climate change. I conclude by describing how to engage these myths in a way that promotes better public discourse—and thus better public judgment and collective action—by telling these stories in such a way that we poke and prod wherever the story is not.     

国外关于幼儿道德判断的近期研究

简要介绍国外近年来从信息加工和情绪归因的角度对幼儿道德判断进行的研究。这些研究揭示：幼儿道德判断受记忆、理解因素的影响;其发展表现为整合信息能力和根据不同情境分化地使用不同判断标准的能力不断提高;幼儿道德认知与情绪反应有不一致的现象。     

记忆监测是有赖于状态的还是有赖于特质的

记忆监测是有赖于状态的．还是有赖于特质的?实验针对两种预见性监测任务——任务难度的预见(EOL)和学习程度的判断(JOL),选用三种实验材料,对记忆监测的准确性进行了跨任务、跨情境的一致性考察。发现在任务难度的预见与学习程度的判断的准确性之间,存在着跨任务的高度一致性;在不同的三项材料之间．存在着跨情境的高度相关。本研究结果从一个侧面支持了记忆监测的特质说。     

Taste and Acquaintance

The analogy between gustatory taste and critical or aesthetic taste plays a recurring role in the history of aesthetics. Our interest in this article is in a particular way in which gustatory judgments are frequently thought to be analogous to critical judgments. It appears obvious to many that to know how a particular object tastes we must have tasted it for ourselves; the proof of the pudding, we are all told, is in the eating. And it has seemed just as obvious to many philosophers that aesthetic judgment requires first‐person experience. In this article we argue that, despite its initial appeal, the claim that gustatory and critical judgments are analogous in this way is mistaken. The two sorts of judgments are, as a matter of fact, similar in their epistemology, but earlier theorists have got things entirely backward—neither gustatory judgment nor aesthetic judgment requires first‐hand acquaintance with their objects. Our particular focus in this article is on arguing that first‐person experience is not required to know how an item of food or drink tastes. In fact, there are a wide variety of ways in which we can acquire this knowledge.     

The relationship among expressions, labels, and descriptions of contempt

This article reports 4 studies that demonstrate that the contempt expression is reliably associated with situations that elicit contempt and that the inability to label the contempt expression reflects a problem with its label or concept and not with the relationship between its expression and emotion. In Study I, the labeling of contempt in fixed-choice judgment tasks did not occur because of a process of elimination. In Studies 2 and 3, the contempt expression was associated with situations that elicit contempt, but participants did not label the situations in an open-ended response. In Study 3, participants also more reliably labeled the contempt expression with situations rather than with labels and did not generate contempt situations from labels. In Study 4, participants reported using, hearing, and reading about contempt the least among 7 emotions tested.     

Kant's Modalities of Judgment

Abstract: This paper proposes a way to understand Kant's modalities of judgment—problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic—in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference. Other interpretations have tended to understand these modalities of judgment in terms of one or other conventional notion of modality. For example, Mattey (1986) argues that we should take them to be connected to notions of epistemic or doxastic modality. I shall argue that this is wrong, and that these kinds of interpretation of the modality of judgments cannot be reconciled with a key claim made by Kant, namely, that the modality of a judgment does not contribute to its content, and has nothing to do with the matter that is judged. I offer an alternative interpretation based upon Kant's explicating these modalities in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference, whereby the modality of a judgment is determined by the role a judgment plays in a given course of reasoning. If I am right, then Kant in fact presents an intriguing thesis pertaining to the inferential status and potential of all our judgments.     

De-idealization by commentary: the case of financial valuation models

Is there a unique way to de-idealize models? If not, how might the possible ways of reducing the distortion between models and reality differ from each other? Based on an empirical case study conducted in financial markets, this paper discusses how a popular valuation model (the Discounted Cash Flow model) idealizes reality and how the market participants de-idealize it in concrete market situations. In contrast to Cartwright’s view that economic models are generally over-constrained, this paper suggests that valuation models are under-constrained. This serves as the reason why the relaxation of simplifying assumptions and concretization do not work as methods of de-idealization. The paper finds that financial market participants de-idealize models using commentary that takes the form of judgment. As a conclusion, a hypothesis is formulated that proposes that the more underdetermined the model is the bigger role narrative and other pragmatic elements play in the process of model application.     

Dissimilation and differential assimilation in social influence (situations of ‘normalization’)

We have presented two experiments on the processes of normalization (appraisal of an ambiguous stimulus). In the first experiment, pairs of subjects were taken from natural groups whose structure and functioning we had previously studied; the subjects were paired off in terms of (a) sociometric choices which they had put forward and (b) difference in hierarchical position in the ordinary life of the group. In the second experiment a definite image of the other ‘subject’ (an accomplice) was created in the subject such that he appeared very similar or very different to him (in areas in no way connected with the task). Furthermore, in the ‘collective’ phase of the estimation the accomplice replied exactly like the subject or in a way which was remote or very remote from the subject's replies. We did not observe the contrast phenomenon described by some authors, but we were able to show that the patterns of interaction of everyday life, stabilized social relationships or images of the other which are unconnected with the tasks to be performed play a role in the influence that the replies of one subject have on those of another. Apart from differential assimilation we have shown a process of dissimilation, these two phenomena being, in our opinion, rooted in the structures of action of the social agents' lives. Negotiation in influence is rarely something symmetrical, even in situations of normalization where the dissymmetry of everyday life can be transfered. We have shown, too, that in these types of situations the subjects do not always try to minimize conflict since when they are in agreement (there is nothing to negotiate) they can diverge from one another. It can thus be said that subjects are not rational in the usual sense and are quite clearly something different from logicians or statisticians. The explanation which we have outlined shows how notions of social identity, differentiation and otherness are brought into play.     

“The Only Safe Guide is Love”: Models of Engaging Luther's Ethical Hermeneutic for Theological Responses to the Affirmation of Same‐Sex Sexuality

Lutheran theological discussions over the morality of same‐sex sexuality not only raise “ethical” questions, but point to deeper interpretive tensions that arise when resources of the tradition are interpreted in new contexts. Responding to these debates, in this article I propose that Luther's application of the law to challenging ethical situations provides a historically situated hermeneutic that can redirect theological discussions on same‐sex sexuality. Drawing upon feminist Lutheran and queer theological work, I consider how we may reengage with Luther in a way that is both faithful to his commitments, and also takes queer people seriously as moral subjects.     

Comments on Wayne Martin, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Theories of Judgment</Emphasis>

Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)—criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments, which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of “thetic” judgments, whose essential feature is to “posit” something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant’s official definition of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality actually affords Kant’s own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory. Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant’s larger aims in the theory of cognition.

Beyond smile dynamics: mimicry and beliefs in judgments of smiles

The judgment that a smile is based on "true," usually positive, feelings affects social interaction. However, the processes underlying the interpretation of a smile as being more or less genuine are not well understood. The aim of the present research was to test predictions of the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) proposed by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010). In addition to the perceptual features that can guide the judgment of a smile as genuine, the model identifies the conditions that the judgments rely on: (a) the embodiment of the facial expression and its corresponding state, and (b) beliefs about the situations in which genuine smiles are most often expressed. Results of two studies are consistent with the model in that they confirm the hypotheses that facial mimicry provides feedback that is used to judge the meaning of a smile, and that beliefs about the situations in which a smile occurs guides such judgments when mimicry is inhibited.     

聋人与听力正常人拓扑性质差异知觉的比较实验研究

分别选取15名聋人与15名听力正常人被试,在两种刺激图对呈现时间条件下,通过考察其对拓扑性质等价和拓扑性质差异图对的反应,本研究对聋人与听力正常人的拓扑性质差异知觉进行了比较研究。研究结果表明:(1)两种呈现时间条件下,被试对拓扑性质等价图对的反应均优于拓扑性质差异图对。(2)对于拓扑性质等价图对,被试在两种呈现时间条件下的反应不存在显著差异;而对于拓扑性质差异图对,被试则对长时间呈现的反应优于短时间呈现。(3)聋人与听力正常人在两种呈现时间条件下对两类刺激图对的反应均不存在显著差异。(4)对于聋人来说,刺激图对长时间呈现和短时间呈现的反应不存在显著差异;而对于听力正常人来说,刺激图对长时间呈现的反应则优于短时间呈现。     

When Language Gives Out: Conceptualization,and Aspect‐Seeing as a Form of Judgment

This article characterizes aspect‐perception as a distinct form of judgment in Kant's sense: a distinct way in which the mind contacts world and applies concepts. First, aspect‐perception involves a mode of thinking about things apart from any established routine of conceptualizing them. It is thus a form of concept application that is essentially reflection about language. Second, this mode of reflection has an experiential, sometimes perceptual, element: in aspect‐perception, that is, we experience meanings—bodies of norms. Third, aspect‐perception can be “preparatory”: it may help us to decide what linguistic norms to develop and how to conceptualize—make the world thinkable. Fourth, the article discusses the forms of justification for which aspect‐perception allows—the necessity and normativity involved in employing this form of judgment.     

Is Perception the Canonical Route to Aesthetic Judgment?

It is commonplace amongst philosophers of art to make claims that postulate important links between aesthetics and perception. In this paper, I focus on one such claim—that perception is the canonical route to aesthetic judgment. I consider a range of prima facie plausible interpretations of this claim, and argue that each fails to identify any important link between aesthetic judgment and perception. Given this, I conclude that we have good reason to be sceptical of the claim that perception is in any way privileged as a source of aesthetic judgment.     

Threshold adjustment in response to asymmetric loss functions: The case of auditors’ “substantial doubt” thresholds

Thresholds play a critical role in linking judgments and choices. One way they do so is by dividing a continuous judgment variable, such as probability, into two regions that imply different choices and actions, such as operate/do not operate, admit/do not admit, or invest/do not invest. We examine this link by focusing on the tendency of professional decision makers to adjust their thresholds when the risks associated with negative decision outcomes are elevated. We report two studies involving experienced auditors that investigate thresholds in a “going-concern” setting. In this setting, the auditor assesses the probability that a business firm will be unable to continue in existence for the coming year; if that probability exceeds a “substantial doubt” threshold (also assessed by the auditor), the auditor is required to disclose the relevant information in the firm’s annual report to the public. Our studies use two experimental cases based on actual business firms that differ in their objective likelihoods of not continuing as going concerns. We derive the auditors’ substantial doubt thresholds from the relationship between their probability assessments and their disclosure choices, unlike all prior research which has simply asked auditors to state the probability they believe represents substantial doubt. We find that auditors’ derived thresholds are adjusted downward for the more problematic firm, a result that we attribute to the asymmetric loss functions inherent in going-concern settings. The second study has some of the auditors directly provide their substantial doubt thresholds (SDTs). The downward adjustment is again found for derived thresholds but not for elicited thresholds, suggesting that the method of capturing thresholds may be an important issue in understanding judgment and choice.     

Anne‐Thérèse de Lambert on Aging and Self‐Esteem

This article studies Madame de Lambert's early eighteenth‐century views on aging, and especially the aging of women, by contextualizing them in a twofold way: (1) It understands them as a response to La Rochefoucauld's skepticism concerning aging, women, and the aging of women; (2) It understands them as being closely connected to a long series of scattered remarks concerning esteem, self‐esteem, and honnêteté in Lambert's moral essays. Whereas La Rochefoucauld describes aging as a decline of intellectual, emotional, and physical powers and is suspicious of the mechanisms of esteem and self‐esteem, Lambert develops a view of aging as offering the chance to become more independent of the judgment of others, especially the chance for women to become more independent of the judgment of men. As she argues, aging offers women the possibility of cultivating genuinely estimable intellectual and emotional qualities that attract the justified esteem essential for a stable friendship, as well as the opportunity to develop a form of self‐esteem that is based on respect for one's own capacities of judgment.     

时间分解效应及其对跨期决策的影响

本文基于经典的分解效应, 提出并证实了一种影响人们判断与决策中时间知觉的新因素--时间分解效应。共包括两个研究, 分别在“时间够用”判断与跨期决策中检验了该效应的存在性与稳固性。实验结果表明：(1)相比未分解条件, 分解条件下的被试判断给定时间内完成某项任务的时间更够用, 即时间知觉更长。该效应受到任务难度的调节, 在较简单的任务中时间分解效应更显著; (2)在跨期决策中, 分解操纵增大了人们对较大较远的收益(larger & later, LL)选项中时间延迟的知觉, 证实了时间分解效应。此外, 还发现时间分解效应会导致人们在跨期决策中更偏好较小较近的收益(smaller & sooner, SS)选项, 对时间延迟的知觉中介了这一过程。总之, 本研究不仅在理论上提出了一种新的分解效应, 同时对现实生活中的决策(如计划制定等)有重要的应用价值。