Honderich,Davidson, and the question of mental holism

Honderich's defence of aspects of his correlationist theory against many objections actually or likely to be raised today, in particular from the point of view of Davidson's anomalous monism and psychological holism, is accepted as largely successful. But it is suggested that, even if Davidson's theory is wrong‐headed, another kind of holism, more deeply ontological and less linguistic, regarding the mental seems to be true, and presents difficulties for Honderich's correlationism. Finally, it is contended that a panpsychist kind of identity theory escapes his strictures on identity theories and is probably true; however, the identity is, in virtue of certain synthetic necessities about the course of a stream of consciousness, either only between particular mental and physical events (and thus anomalously monist in Davidson's sense), or if it holds also between types of mental and of brain event then certain quite striking consequences follow as to the character of the fullest possible explanation of what goes on in the brain.     

The death instinct and the mental dimension beyond the pleasure principle in the works of Spielrein and Freud

In ‘Destruction as Cause of Come‐into‐being’, Spielrein argues for the need of postulating the existence of a death instinct in mental functioning. The idea that she thus anticipated the concept of death instinct Freud introduced in 1920 is often found in psychoanalytic literature. But the specific meaning of Spielrein's hypothesis is seldom discussed, as well as the extent to which she anticipated Freud's concept. In fact, there are important differences between their views. Besides, a closer analysis of Spielrein's text reveals other ideas that come close to fundamental aspects of Freud's theories from 1920 onwards, particularly the assumption of a more primordial mental functioning than the one regulated by the pleasure principle. But also here there are important differences between the views sustained by both authors. With this in view, the objective of this paper is firstly to discuss some hypotheses formulated by Spielrein in her 1912 work in order to elucidate her concept of death instinct as well as her hypothesis of the existence of a more primitive mental functioning than the one governed by the pleasure principle. Next, the question of the possible similarities and differences with regard to Freud's concepts is also addressed.     

Seventh Graders' Academic Achievement,Creativity, and Ability to Construct a Cross‐domain Concept Map — A Brain Function Perspective

This study proposes an interactive model of cross‐domain concept mapping with an emphasis on brain functions, and it further investigates the relationships between academic achievement, creative thinking, and cross‐domain concept mapping. Sixty‐nine seventh graders participated in this study which employed two 50–minute instructional sessions. The findings suggest that (a) the seventh graders may lack the awareness or ability to integrate knowledge and make connections between their learning and life experiences; (b) creative thinking, academic learning and concept mapping share similar capacities; and (c) cross‐domain concept mapping, which fosters cross‐domain information integration and connections between learning and life experiences, can be an efficient mental tool in understanding a student's creative thinking and academic learning.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

Mentalization, insightfulness, and therapeutic action The importance of mental organization

Continuing debates over the relative importance of the role of interpretation leading to insight versus the relationship with the analyst as contributing to structural change are based on traditional defi nitions of insight as gaining knowledge of unconscious content. This defi nition inevitably privileges verbal interpretation as self‐knowledge becomes equated with understanding the contents of the mind. It is suggested that a way out of this debate is to redefi ne insight as a process, one that is called insightfulness. This term builds on concepts such as mentalization, or theory of mind, and suggests that patients present with diffi culties being able to fully mentalize. Awareness of repudiated content will usually accompany the attainment of insightfulness. But the point of insightfulness is to regain access to inhibited or repudiated mentalization, not to specifi c content, per se. Emphasizing the process of insightfulness integrates the importance of the relationship with the analyst with the facilitation of insightfulness. A variety of interventions help patients gain the capacity to refl ect upon and become aware of the intricate workings of their minds, of which verbal interpretation is only one. For example, often it seems less important to focus on a particular confl ict than to show interest in our patients’ minds. Furthermore, analysands develop insightfulness by becoming interested in and observing our minds in action. Because the mind originates in bodily experience, mental functioning will always fl uctuate between action modes of experiencing and expressing and verbal, symbolic modes. The analyst's role becomes making the patient aware of regressions to action modes, understanding the reasons for doing so, and subordinating this tendency to the verbal, symbolic mode. All mental functions work better and facilitate greater self‐regulation when they work in abstract, symbolic ways. Psychopathology can be understood as failing to develop or losing the symbolic level of organization, either in circumscribed areas or more ubiquitously. And mutative action occurs through helping our patients attain or regain the symbolic level in regard to all mental functions. Such work is best accomplished in the transference. The concept of transference of defense is expanded to all mental structure, so that transference is seen as the interpersonalization of mental structure. That is, patients transfer their mental structure, including their various levels of mentalizing, into the analytic interaction. The analyst observes all levels of the patient's mental functioning and intervenes to raise them to a symbolic one. At times, this will require action interpretations, allowing oneself to be pulled into an enactment with the patient that is then reprocessed at a verbal, symbolic level. Such actions are not corrective emotional experiences but are interpretations and confrontations of the patient's transferred mental organization at a level affectively and cognitively consistent with the level of communication. Nonetheless, the goal becomes raising the communication to a symbolic level as being able to refl ect symbolically on all aspects of one's mind with a minimum of restriction is the greatest guarantee of mental health.     

Some reflections on the two psychologies of love

The mainstream view of love is that it is a state that arises from people mutually reinforcing each other or providing benefits to each other Yet careful quantitative analyses of imaginative thought patterns of people in love or in a state of affiliative arousal reveal themes of dialogue, commitment, and harmony rather than of mutual benefits It is suggested that asking people about love leads them to give causal explanations for the state which psychologists have elaborated into the theory that love is a response to having one's needs met Imaginative experiences characteristic of the state of being in love on the other hand may be different because they are primarily right brain mediated and do not share in the causal, instrumental type of reasoning characteristic of left brain conscious thinking Such conceivably right brain mediated experiences in TATs are more closely associated than presumably left brain mediated self-reports are with such physiological measures as evoked scalp potentials, neurohormone concentrations, and immune functions A vew of love that takes both self-report (left brain) and fantasy (right brain) measures into account does a better job of predicting affiliative behavior than does a view that relies solely on one or the other of the two types of measures     

Pollock on token physicalism,agent materialism and strong artificial intelligence

An examination of John Pollock's theory of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind raises difficulties for his mechanist concept of person. Token physicalism, agent materialism, and strong artificial intelligence are so related that if the first two propositions are not well‐established, then there is no justification for believing that an artificial consciousness can be designed and built. Pollock's arguments are shown to be inconclusive in upholding a functionalist theory of persons as supervenient but purely physical entities. In part this is the result of Pollock's thin definition of the concept of supervenience, according to which any complex supervenes on its proper parts. The limitations of this account are apparent when contrasted with richer conceptions of supervenience, such as Joseph Margolis’. But on Margolis’ theory, the mind and its expressions supervene on or rise above their material embodiments in the sense that they cannot be fully explained in physical terms, which contradicts Pollock's token physicalism and agent materialism. The consequence for Pollock's project to explain the mind as mechanical, and to manufacture artificial persons, is that these systems can at best aspire to impressive innovations in weak artificial intelligence, but realistically cannot aspire to strong or mentalistic artificial intelligence.     

Traumatic stress,neural self and the spiritual mind

According to recent findings stressful experiences may influence various physiological disturbances and also neuroanatomical changes and some studies also show that psychotherapy and meditation may influence brain functions. Traumatic stress is frequently related to a dissociative response that disintegrates conscious experience. In this context, self-reflection is an essential principle in the process of posttraumatic growth related to spiritual experiences and meditation states that enable mental integration and create the novel integrated self. According to recent findings there is no widely accepted evidence about specific neural mechanisms of processes related to mental integration linked to the spiritual experiences and meditation. Nevertheless there is growing evidence that these integrative experiences are related to various alterations in the brain’s physiology and morphology. These findings provide a new paradigm for understanding of mental disorders and emphasize the fundamental role of mental integration and integrated self in the therapy of psychiatric disorders.     

The evolution of mandler's conceptual primitives (image-schemas) as neural mechanisms for space-time simulation structures

The purpose of this article is to describe parallels between Mandler's theory of conceptual development in infancy, and my theory of the maximum-power principle evolution of the neuro-algorithmic organization of the brain and cultural-level mental models. A maximum power principle prey-predator scenario depicts the dynamic selective origins of neuro-algorithms underlying Mandler's various image-schemas (conceptual primitives). It is proposed that (a) image-schemas are inherited space-time simulation structures that originate in cerebellar state estimating functions which spread to the mapping systems of the cerebrum; (b) image-schemas do not come about as the result of perceptual analytic abstractive processes as Mandler has proposed, but undergo refinement in ontogeny through experience-expectant development involving perceptual analysis; (c) Mandler's image-schemas are “state-primitives” fed forward from the cerebellum to provide tracking routines for perceptual analysis, and rapid simulations constituting representation, prediction, and control; and (d) vicarious trial and error (VTE) can be interpreted as pragmatic vector simulation using image-schematic simulation structures. A scenario connecting image-schemas with Pleistocene era auditory-vocal system evolution which supports Mandler's developmental connection between image-schemas and language is proposed. It is concluded that Mandler's theory of conceptual development is essentially correct. However, it is suggested that the further articulation of Mandler's theory would benefit from parallel statement of the evolution of underlying brain mechanisms.     

BUDDHISM,COMPARATIVE NEUROPHILOSOPHY,AND HUMAN FLOURISHING

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross‐cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being‐in‐the‐world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain.     

Webers Idealtypus Als Methode Zur Bestimmung Des Begriffsinhaltes Theoretischer Begriffe in Den Kulturwissenschaften

Weber's Ideal Type as a Method of Forming the Content of Theoretical Concepts in Social Sciences}. Max Weber introduced the ideal type as the specific method of concept formation in social sciences. But the ideal type is not established in social research. Instead, authors in philosophy of science until today try to reconstruct and interpret what Weber said about ideal types as well as what might be their importance in Weber's social theory. The thesis of the following paper is that the difficulties in understanding Weber's ideal types are linked with Weber's intensional logic of concept formation. The thesis is defended in three steps. The first step deals with Weber's understanding of what is a scientific question in cultural sciences. Secondly Weber's critical arguments against positivism, hegelianism and historism are worked out. Thirdly, Weber's method of concept formation is reconstructed.     

Can we define mental disorder by using the criterion of mental dysfunction?

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.     

New trends in philosophy of psychiatry

The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for example, the heart serves the goal of pumping blood. But can we single out mental functions in the same way? Can we identify mental functions scientifically, for instance, by applying evolutionary theory? Or are models of mental functions necessarily value-laden? I want to identify several philosophical problems regarding the notion of mental function and dysfunction and point out some possible solutions. As long as these questions remain unanswered, definitions of mental disorder that rest upon the concept of mental dysfunction will lack a secure foundation.     

Mental disorders,brain disorders,neurodevelopmental disorders: challenges for the philosophy of psychopathology after DSM-5

The publication of DSM-5 has been accompanied by a fair amount of controversy. Amongst DSM's most vocal ‘insider’ critics has been Thomas Insel, Director of the US National Institute of Mental Health. Insel has publicly criticised DSM's adherence to a symptom-based classification of mental disorder, and used the weight of the NIMH to back a rival research strategy aimed at a more biology-based diagnostic classification. This strategy is part of Insel's vision of a future, more preventative psychiatry in which mental disorders are not only understood as biological disorders of the brain, but also as neurodevelopmental disorders. This paper examines the interest and merit of Insel's views of mental and neurodevelopmental disorder for the philosophy of psychopathology, with a special focus of his neurodevelopmental model of schizophrenia. Pitman's ‘moderate materialism’ will be used both as a philosophical lens through which to examine Insel's position, as well as an example of a philosophical framework that may require updating and revision in the light of moves towards a neurodevelopmental conception of mental disorder.     

Thinking Styles and Academic Achievement Among Filipino Students

The authors' objective in this study was to determine whether the precepts of R. J. Sternberg's (1988, 1997) theory of mental self-government apply to a non-Western culture. They administered R. J. Sternberg and R. K. Wagner's (1992) Thinking Styles Inventory, which is based on the theory of mental self-government, to 429 Filipino university students. The results of item analysis, scale intercorrelations, and factor analysis were consistent with the general provisions of the theory. Correlational analysis between thinking styles and grade point average showed that thinking styles are related to academic achievement. The results are explained with respect to the concepts and practices of Philippine culture and schools and discussed in relation to the developmental assumptions of the theory of mental self-government.     

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence

For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one's mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence‐responsiveness guarantees coherence, so that the rational impermissibility of incoherence will just fall out of the putative requirement to take the attitudes that one's evidence supports, and so that coherence requirements do not need to be theorized in their own right, apart from evidential reasons. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake, since coherence and evidence‐responsiveness can in fact come into conflict. More specifically, I argue that in cases of misleading higher‐order evidence, there can be a conflict between believing what one's evidence supports and satisfying a requirement that I call “inter‐level coherence”. This illustrates why coherence requirements and evidential reasons must be separated and theorized separately.     

How to Help a Thin-Skinned Person: Commentary on Paper by Stephen Seligman

Stephen Seligman's treatment of Harriet illustrates the typical challenges and basic technical principles in working with narcissistically sensitive people. Often, with such patients there are struggles around the frame, especially issues of payment and cancellation policies. Sometimes the therapist must be flexible in negotiations with the patient. In the early phases of therapy interpretations of defense, especially the interpretation of projected aggression, are not helpful. Interventions that recognize the patient's response to something the therapist has done or failed to do are more effective and set the stage for later work focused on the patient's recognition of her self-states. A willingness to respect Harriet's identification with Joan of Arc, and to work in displacement, rather than pathologizing her preoccupation was also essential. Finally, Seligman utilized the concept of mentalization in actively discussing with Harriet the mental processes of other people in her life. All these techniques enabled Harriet to move from being dominated by a sense of grievance to becoming capable of experiencing grief.     

Thalamic fear

This paper suggests that some neuroscience concepts particularly concerned with brain pathways in trauma and fear, as well as the neurobiology of emotion, provide an additional vertex to the psychoanalytic understanding of patients' material. The role of the body has been neglected in psychoanalytic thought and formulations in favour of purely ‘mental’ experience. The paper attempts to show how neuro-psychoanalytic understanding, which is conveyed to patients through interpretation, can increase their depth of understanding. Different types of memory are delineated and the paper describes a simplified schema of emotional processing, drawing on Damasio's distinction between emotion as an instinctual body based experience and its mental representation as feeling. Clinical examples are used to illustrate the usefulness of the distinction. The concept of emotional regulation is discussed as well as showing how its failure is associated with the appearance of persecutory superego structures.