Is virtue its own reward? Self-sacrificial decisions for the sake of fairness

We investigate the ways in which concern for fairness influences decision-making. We use a paradigm previously shown to illustrate circumstances under which a decision maker sacrifices some of his or her own potential for financial gain to punish or reward someone who has demonstrated a prior intent to be either unfair or fair to another person. By ruling out alternative hypotheses related to the original finding, we obtain evidence that “virtue is its own reward”: Decision makers make self-sacrificing allocations, despite the absence of short- or long-term benefits for doing so. Extending the generality of this effect, we also identify circumstances under which the desire for virtuous fairness produces decisions that are not self-sacrificial and do reward someone whose motives seemingly include a willingness to exploit others. These special circumstances apparently indicate the decision maker's belief that “two wrongs don't make a right.” Thus, these studies show that the fairness motive and moral concerns can influence decisions that have economic impact. We extend the range of effects in other studies to include condemnation of interactional injustice and we discuss implications of the overall set of studies in terms of three new foci for attention: A focus on the perpetrator, a focus on the victim, and a focus on the offensiveness of the act itself.     

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.     

Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate that that style of answer cannot be right, because we must conceive of believing for a normative reason as constitutively involving a kind of rationality-involving relation that can be instantiated at all only if there is a known fact on the scene, which the agent treats as a normative reason. A secondary objective, achieved along the way, is to demonstrate that in their Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan do not succeed in undermining the factoring picture in general, only a simple-minded version of it.

     

Should reason be fragmented?

Cognitive relativists‐pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core logical strategies, built into reasoning competence. Cognitive research thus supports a moderate rationalism rather than relativism‐pragmatism.     

Did the universe design itself?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Many philosophers and scientists believe that we need an explanation as to why the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are...     

Does Respect for Embryos Entail Respect for Gametes?

Respect for human embryos is often defended on the basis of the potentiality argument: embryos deserve respect because they already possess potentially the features that in adults are fully actualized. Opponents of this argument challenge it by claiming that if embryos should be respected because they are potentially adults, then gametes should be respected because they are potentially embryos. This article rejects this reductio ad absurdum argument by showing that there are two different types of potentiality involved so that the transitivity of potentiality does not hold up in this case. Respect for embryos does not logically entail respect for gametes.     

Does classroom social comparison bias students’ evaluation of their own competence?

Social Psychology of Education - Overestimation and underestimation of students’ own competence result from social comparison in the classroom. There is some evidence that secondary school...     

What counts as an acceptable reason for not communicating emotional support?

This study investigated assessments of the acceptability of and negative relational implications for the reasons given for someone not providing emotional support. A representative sample of U.S. adults (N = 1598) participated in a survey experiment that included thinking of a person from whom they would expect such support, imagining that they did not receive support from this person, and being shown one of 16 reasons to explain the nonsupport. Participants evaluated that reason for its acceptability and its negative relational ramifications. As predicted, some nonsupport reasons were judged as more acceptable than were others, and they generated fewer negative relational ramifications. Participants who experienced nonsupport by a friend viewed their reasons as more acceptable than those experiencing nonsupport from family members. Despite this, greater negative relational ramifications were reported when friends compared to family members did not communicate support. Women's nonsupport was viewed as less acceptable compared to men's; however, there were no gender differences in the negative relational ramifications of nonsupport. When tested in a mediation model, acceptability mediated the relationship between expectations and negative relational ramifications, but there was also an unexpected direct negative effect between expectations and negative relational ramifications.     

‘Philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought’

So much philosophy is so unavoidably guided by intuitions, and such intuitions are so formed by examples, and such examples must of necessity present so cropped and abstract a picture of an instance or event or decision, that, left to its traditional methods, philosophy might be ill-equipped on its own to answer a question about the true content of an historical ideal like ``autonomy', or authenticity or ``leading a free life'. One needs to bring so many factors into play at once that one non-traditional but more promising path might be through reflection on the modern novel—or modern drama or poetry or film or even modern painting.     

Do domestic dogs interpret pointing as a command?

Domestic dogs comprehend human gestural communication flexibly, particularly the pointing gesture. Here, we examine whether dogs interpret pointing informatively, that is, as simply providing information, or rather as a command, for example, ordering them to move to a particular location. In the first study a human pointed toward an empty cup. In one manipulation, the dog either knew or did not know that the designated cup was empty (and that the other cup actually contained the food). In another manipulation, the human (as authority) either did or did not remain in the room after pointing. Dogs ignored the human’s gesture if they had better information, irrespective of the authority’s presence. In the second study, we varied the level of authority of the person pointing. Sometimes this person was an adult, and sometimes a young child. Dogs followed children’s pointing just as frequently as they followed adults’ pointing (and ignored the dishonest pointing of both), suggesting that the level of authority did not affect their behavior. Taken together these studies suggest that dogs do not see pointing as an imperative command ordering them to a particular location. It is still not totally clear, however, if they interpret it as informative or in some other way.     

Does a Turned-Off Light Bulb Lose its Potential to Glow?

Counselors can help discouraged people regain their sense of strength and potential to cope with their problems. Various techniques for doing this are described.     

Does the generation effect occur for pictures?

The generation effect is the finding that self-generated stimuli are recalled and recognized better than read stimuli. The effect has been demonstrated primarily with words. This article examines the effect for pictures in two experiments: Subjects named complete pictures (name condition) and fragmented pictures (generation condition). In Experiment 1, memory was tested in 3 explicit tasks: free recall, yes/no recognition, and a source-monitoring task on whether each picture was complete or fragmented (the complete/incomplete task). The generation effect was found for all 3 tasks. However, in the recognition and source-monitoring tasks, the generation effect was observed only in the generation condition. We hypothesized that absence of the effect in the name condition was due to the sensory or process match effect between study and test pictures and the superior identification of pictures in the name condition. Therefore, stimuli were changed from pictures to their names in Experiment 2. Memory was tested in the recognition task, complete/incomplete task, and second source-monitoring task (success/failure) on whether each picture had been identified successfully. The generation effect was observed for all 3 tasks. These results suggest that memory of structural and semantic characteristics and of success in identification of generated pictures may contribute to the generation effect.     

To reason or not to reason: is autobiographical reasoning always beneficial?

Autobiographical reasoning has been found to be a critical process in identity development; however, the authors suggest that existing research shows that such reasoning may not always be critical to another important outcome: well-being. The authors describe characteristics of people such as personality and age, contexts such as conversations, and experiences such as transgressions, which may hinder adaptive reasoning. They also propose alternatives to autobiographical reasoning for managing challenging events and constructing the life story, which include different kinds of meaning-making than those primarily focused on in the current literature.     

Does test-enhanced learning transfer for triple associates?

Test-enhanced learning and transfer for triple-associate word stimuli was assessed in three experiments. In each experiment, training and final-test trials involved the presentation of two words per triple associate (triplet), with the third word having to be retrieved. In agreement with the prior literature on different stimuli, training through testing with feedback yielded markedly better final-test performance than did restudy. However, in contrast to the positive transfer reported for paired associate stimuli, minimal or no positive transfer was observed, relative to a restudy control, from a trained cue combination (e.g., A, B, ?) to other cue combinations from the same triplet that required a different response (e.g., B, C, ?). That result also held when two unique cue combinations per triplet were tested during training, and for triplets with low and high average associative strengths. Supplementary analyses provided insight into the overall transfer effect: An incorrect response during training appears to yield positive transfer relative to restudy, whereas a correct response appears to yield no, or even negative, transfer. Cross-experiment analyses indicated that test-enhanced learning is not diminished when two or three cue combinations are presented during training. Thus, even though learning through testing is highly specific, testing on all possible stimulus–response combinations remains the most efficient strategy for the learning of triple associates.