Two neural correlates of consciousness

Neuroscientists continue to search for "the" neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). In this article, I argue that a framework in which there are at least two distinct NCCs is increasingly making more sense of empirical results than one in which there is a single NCC. I outline the distinction between phenomenal NCC and access NCC, and show how they can be distinguished by experimental approaches, in particular signal-detection theory approaches. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience provide an empirical case for two different NCCs.     

Altered states of consciousness are related to higher sexual responsiveness

Altered states of consciousness lead to profound changes in the sense of self, time and space. We assessed how these changes were related to sexual responsiveness during sex. 116 subjects reported (a) intensity of awareness concerning body, space and time, and (b) satisfaction, desire, arousal, and orgasm occurrence. We differentiated vaginal intercourse orgasm from noncoital orgasm. Female vaginal intercourse orgasm was further differentiated as with or without concurrent clitoral masturbation. Overall, sexual responsiveness was related to greater body awareness and lesser time and space awareness. Satisfaction, desire, and arousal were especially associated with less time awareness in women. Female orgasms during vaginal intercourse were related to greater body awareness and lesser time awareness, but noncoital orgasms were unrelated. Our findings provide empirical support for the hypotheses that altered states of consciousness with attentional absorption are strongly related to sexual responsiveness in women, and to a lesser extent in men.     

Two theories of consciousness: Semantic pointer competition vs. information integration

Consciousness results from three mechanisms: representation by firing patterns in neural populations, binding of representations into more complex representations called semantic pointers, and competition among semantic pointers to capture the most important aspects of an organism’s current state. We contrast the semantic pointer competition (SPC) theory of consciousness with the hypothesis that consciousness is the capacity of a system to integrate information (IIT). We describe computer simulations to show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key aspects of consciousness: qualitative features, onset and cessation, shifts in experiences, differences in kinds across different organisms, unity and diversity, and storage and retrieval.     

Writers and critics: Two types of vocational consciousness in the art system

Vocational interests, personality, work environment, and background of authors and critics, male and female, in children's literature are examined in terms of Holland's theory of vocational types, supplemented with concepts of an art system and styles of consciousness. On SVIB indicator scales, both authors and critics score as artistic types with “consistent” profiles, but authors are more “differentiated.” Critics have stronger social interests and less aversion to conventional activities, appropriate to their position as gate-keepers in the art system. In work style there are again common features, but authors describe themselves as having “alternative” states of consciousness, where critics emphasize their social roles and rationality. Both groups have peaks on Achievement via Independence (CPI), but the critics are more socially ascendant, efficient, and conventional. Most critics have full-time employment under institutional auspices; most writers do not. Difference in occupations of fathers of authors and critics are consistent with interest patterns of the subjects. Several personality and background findings, including interactions between sex and field, are interpreted as supporting the usefulness of supplementing Holland's theory.     

There are higher levels of conspiracy beliefs in more corrupt countries

In four studies, I found evidence that people living in countries with higher levels of corruption have a greater tendency for conspiracy ideation. In Study 1 (21 countries, N = 20,207), participants living in more corrupt countries reported having higher COVID-19 and generic conspiracy beliefs. Study 2 (25 countries, N = 4935), Study 3 (25 countries, N = 24,424), and Study 4 (24 countries, N = 5973) replicated the same finding. Internal meta-analysis suggested that this association remained significant after adjusting for other relevant cross-country differences. Studies 1 and 2, but not 3 and 4, also showed that corruption moderated the association between individuals’ gullibility (i.e., lack of education) and their conspiracy beliefs, and this association was significant only in low-corruption countries. The findings suggest that country-level corruption breeds conspiracy beliefs and moderates the effect of individuals’ gullibility on conspiracy beliefs.     

An assessment of anxiety levels in dyslexic students in higher education

Background. It has long been hypothesized that children with learning disabilities, including dyslexia, may be highly vulnerable to emotional consequences such as anxiety. However, research has centred on school‐aged children. Aims. The present study aimed to clarify these findings with dyslexic students in higher education. Samples. Sixteen students with dyslexia were compared with 16 students with no history of learning difficulties. Methods. Students were asked to complete a written questionnaire concerning trait anxiety levels. They were then told that they would be given a timed reading test and their state anxiety levels were measured using the State‐Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1983 ). Finally, their reading was assessed using the Test of Word Reading Efficiency (TOWRE; Torgesen, Wagner, & Rashotte, 1999 ). Results. Dyslexic students showed slower reading speeds than controls. They also had higher levels of state anxiety and elevated levels of academic and social, but not appearance, anxiety. Conclusions. Dyslexic students in higher education show anxiety levels that are well above what is shown by students without learning difficulties. This anxiety is not limited to academic tasks but extends to many social situations. It is proposed that assessment of emotional well‐being should form part of the assessment of need for dyslexic students entering higher education.     

Degrees of consciousness

Is a human more conscious than an octopus? In the science of consciousness, it's oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees.     

Time for consciousness: intention and introspection

We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action.     

Stained glass as a model for consciousness

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with the following two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one.     

From volitional action to automatized homicide: changing levels of self and consciousness during partial limbic seizures

Refined definitions are proposed for subtle, transient changes primarily of the “sense of self,” as expressed in observable action behavior due to neuro-pathological disturbances, especially during partial seizures' interfering with volition. Two such subtypes are exemplified by temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), typically with clouding of consciousness (with amnesia for the acts), and by the proposed “Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction” (LPTR). During LPTR, consciousness is preserved to the extent that such seizure-stricken patients remember their acts, which are associated with a fleeting de novo psychosis and autonomic arousal. The acts are nonvolitional, unplanned, nonintended, motiveless, purposeless, and out-of-character, ranging from socially bizarrely inappropriate behavior to homicide. Basic “paleo” levels of the sense of self and of consciousness are preserved: Such patients “know” the nature, i.e., the kind of action, while they transiently lose their previously characteristic ability to fully appreciate the “quality” of their acts, their consequences, and implications.     

The disunity of consciousness

Attempts to decode what has become known as the (singular) neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) suppose that consciousness is a single unified entity, a belief that finds expression in the term 'unity of consciousness'. Here, I propose that the quest for the NCC will remain elusive until we acknowledge that consciousness is not a unity, and that there are instead many consciousnesses that are distributed in time and space.     

A theory of consciousness

Consciousness is the subjective awareness of momentary experience interpreted in the context of personal memory and present state. I propose that two brain systems converge to create consciousness. The exogenous system sends information about multimodal external stimuli to basal dendrites in widely dispersed pyramidal cell ensembles in the cortex of the brain; this system produces synchronized fragments of sensations. The endogenous system distributes readout of representations of memories, activated in systems established by associative learning, diffusely to apical dendrites. Convergence of exogenous and endogenous inputs enhances cellular excitability, and fragmented sensations are thereby converted to fragments of perception. Local field potentials periodically modulate all cortical membrane potentials and facilitate synchronous discharge of these excited elements. Feedback between the cortex and the thalamus results in a cortico-thalamo-cortical reverberation, binding the fragments into a unified global percept. Sustained reverberation produces a resonating electromagnetic field of synchronized elements. The momentary content of information in the brain is this distributed coherence, which is negative entropy. Consciousness is a physical property of this field, producing the subjective awareness of this information.     

Altered states of consciousness

This commentary dwells on the intellectual, methodological, and stylistic characteristics that constitute the novelty of Robert Yelle's approach to the semiotics of religion. While praising Yelle's refreshing approach and his ability to combine a semiotic mindset with accurate comparative perspective, deep contextual knowledge, and historical sensibility, the commentary raises the issue of the extent to which semioticians can, and should, acknowledge the transient, historical nature of their point of view. This acknowledgment, it is argued, does not necessarily result in a self-deconstruction of the semiotic method itself but in the somewhat paradoxical awareness of the semiotic ideology underpinning it.