Intention and Permissibility: T. M. Scanlon

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person (or refrain from giving him treatment that he needs in order to survive) because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases.     

Interpretative Disputes,Explicatures, and Argumentative Reasoning

The problem of establishing the best interpretation of a speech act is of fundamental importance in argumentation and communication in general. A party in a dialogue can interpret another’s or his own speech acts in the most convenient ways to achieve his dialogical goals. In defamation law this phenomenon becomes particularly important, as the dialogical effects of a communicative move may result in legal consequences. The purpose of this paper is to combine the instruments provided by argumentation theory with the advances in pragmatics in order to propose an argumentative approach to meaning reconstruction. This theoretical proposal will be applied to and tested against defamation cases at common law. Interpretation is represented as based on a hierarchy of interpretative presumptions. On this view, the development of the logical form of an utterance is regarded as the result of an abductive pattern of reasoning in which various types of presumptions are confronted and the weakest ones are excluded. Conflicts of interpretations and equivocation become essentially interwoven with the dialectical problem of fulfilling the burden of defeating a presumption. The interpreter has a burden of explaining why a given presumption is subject to default, assuming that the speaker is reasonable and acting based on a set of shared expectations.     

So Close,Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short

According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so‐called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine‐grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been taken to be paradigmatic instances in which DDE applies to intended harm. In this paper, we consider and reject a number of recent attempts to solve the closeness problem. We argue that the failure of these proposals strongly suggests that the closeness problem is intractable, and that the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm is not morally significant. Further, we argue that there may be a deeper reason why such attempts must fail: the rationale that makes the best fit with DDE, namely, an imperative not to aim at evil, is itself irredeemably flawed. While we believe that these observations should lead us to abandon further attempts to solve the closeness problem for DDE, we also conclude by showing how a related principle that is supported by a distinct rationale and avoids facing the closeness problem altogether nevertheless shares with DDE its most important features, including an intuitive explanation of a number of cases and a commitment to the relevance of intentions.     

Relies to our critics

We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the book, we argued that an epistemically important form of nonaccidental reliability can be understood as a matter of processes being “transglobally reliable under modulational control.” Graham recommends another form of nonaccidental reliability, one rooted in evolutionary etiology. We explain why we think that the reliability of perceptual processes is best understood as turning of the kinds of modulational control that we highlight. We clarify how this approach represents a kind of reasonable epistemic patience—modulational control takes time, as it must turn on agents generating information about their own capacities and foibles. Lyons raises interesting questions regarding how (what we term) morphological content possessed by the agent can do the work that we set for it. We argue that it is necessary in order for agents to accommodate the background information that is relevant to many central problems of belief formation. We clarify how it can be expected to work.     

Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors

Free speech fallacies are errors of meta-argument. One commits a free speech fallacy when one argues that since there are apparent restrictions on one’s rights of free expression, procedural rules of critical exchange have been broken, and consequently, one’s preferred view is dialectically better off than it may otherwise seem. Free speech fallacies are meta-argumentative, since they occur at the level of assessing the dialectical situation in terms of norms of argument and in terms of meta-evidential principles of interpreting how and why people follow (or fail to follow) argumentative rules. Our plan here is to begin with a brief explanation of meta-argument and meta-argumentative fallacy. We will then turn to the variety of forms of the free speech fallacy, which we will explain as meta-argumentatively erroneous.

     

Who are We? Where Did We Come From? How Religious Identity Divides and Damns Us All

Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, now established, is the only workable explanation we have for the remarkable fact of our own existence, the vast diversity of plant and animal life, the compelling illusion of design in nature, and the architecture of the human mind. We are risen apes, not fallen angels. Our different races and ethnicities hide an essential truth: we are all Africans, all siblings, all descendants of a small group of hunter-gatherers who arose in Africa less than 200,000 years ago and conquered the world. There is one universal human nature stemming from our long history as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. We now know why religion appeared, why particular religious ideas emerged, why they are widespread, why they are recurrent features of human minds and human societies, why they are attractive to human minds, and how and why they are related to survival and deadly violence. What makes us human can also make us religious. Religion is a by-product of cognitive mechanisms that evolved, through natural selection, for other adaptive purposes that were crucial for our survival and reproductive success. Religion's power derives from its ability to utilize these mental mechanisms designed for other tasks: our attachment to parental figures, our wish for help in distress, submission to authority, our sensitivity to hierarchies, our love of kin, and our inclination to see human-like intention as the explanation for any unknown. All individuals are vulnerable to religious beliefs and assuming a religious identity. Religious identity is an accident of geographical birth, is certainly one of the most prevalent identities, and the most at odds with the reality of who we are. It remains one of the most destructive identities we can assume. As long as we tolerate the divisive pretensions of religious beliefs and identities, especially those of the three great Abrahamic faiths, we will all remain in the line of fire.     

Understanding Applicant Reactions to Credit Checks: Uncertainty,information effects and individual differences

Credit checks are an increasingly common selection procedure for American jobs, and they are distinct in a number of ways from the selection tests typically studied by researchers. With a credit check, applicants do not actually take a test or answer questions, and most will be uncertain about what information a credit report contains, why one is being requested, and how it will be evaluated. In two experiments we assess the effects of explanations and individual differences. Experiment 1 used a sample of 408 undergraduate business students to examine reaction dimensions relevant to credit checks, and found perceptions to be mainly negative. The type of explanation read, however, interacted with perceived credit report impact to influence reactions. Results of Experiment 2 , with a sample of students from a more non‐traditional population, were similar, but age was associated with greater skepticism of credit report accuracy. Privacy perceptions were the strongest predictor of intention to withdraw from the selection process.     

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content‐determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.     

Knowledge in Action

This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent's beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe you can stop your car by pressing a pedal, then, if your belief is true, you will stop. If it is false, you will not. By considering cases of unintentional actions, actions involving luck and cases of deviant causal chains, I show why knowledge is required. By looking at the notion of causal relevance, I argue that the connection between knowledge and action is causal and not merely conceptual.
"What knowledge adds to belief is not psychologically relevant." ¹ —Stephen Stich     

Cognitive and Emotional Processes in Individuals and Commercial Web sites

This research reports how banner ads are responded to in Web sites that emphasize either emotion or cognition. It also looks at the moderating effects of individuals’ own levels of need for cognition and need for emotion on banner responsiveness in the two kinds of Web sites. Recall and attitude toward banners are consistently better when their context is an emotion-based Web site. Need for cognition, but not need for emotion moderates this effect. For ad recall, it is better to be lower in need for cognition in a cognitive Web site, but higher in need for cognition on an emotional Web site. For attitude toward the banner and purchase intention, however, it is better to be higher in need for cognition in a cognitive Web site, but lower in need for cognition on an emotional Web site. The results are discussed in terms of advertising context theory that has been developed in applications to the traditional media like print and broadcast, but here is shown to be applicable to the Web.     

Emergency behavior

There is a class of actions — reflex actions — which seem not to spring from any intention, but for which we nevertheless wish to take responsibility. It is suggested that these actions are appropriately said to be done intentionally, in spite of our never having an intention to do them. And this grammatical anomaly indicates that the behavior in question requires a special kind of account; one which might be characterized as derivative: parasitic on the more paradigmatic sort of action explanation.     

Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists

In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles.     

Folk-Psychology,Psychopathology, and the Unconscious

Abstract

There is a ‘philosophers’ assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science.     

Reconstructing Metaphorical Meaning

Metaphorical meaning can be analyzed as triggered by an apparent communicative breach, an incongruity that leads to a default of the presumptive interpretation of a vehicle. This breach can be solved through contextual renegotiations of meaning guided by the communicative intention, or rather the presumed purpose of the metaphorical utterance. This paper addresses the problem of analyzing the complex process of reasoning underlying the reconstruction of metaphorical meaning. This process will be described as a type of abductive argument, aimed at explaining how the vehicle can best contribute to the purpose of the utterance. This type of reasoning involves the analysis of the possible predicates that can be and usually are attributed to the vehicle, and the selection of the one (or ones) that can support the implicit conclusion constituting the communicative goal of the metaphorical utterance. Metaphorical meaning, in this perspective, becomes the outcome of a complex process of meaning reconstruction aimed at providing the best explanation of the function of the vehicle within a discourse move.     

Acting rightly: Three dimensions of moral conduct

Philosophical literature in normative ethics has tended to concentrate on (1) what we should do—what acts we should perform—or (2) virtues of character, understood as leading to the right deeds or (3), as most notable in Kant, the importance of motivation appraising agents and actions. All these elements—actions, virtues, and motives—are ethically significant. But there is a dimension of moral responsibility that should be given a place beside obligations to act, virtues of character, and appraisability of actions in relation to their motivation. It is the manner in which actions are performed. This can be right or wrong, an object of intention, and behavior for a reason; and it is important for assessing moral virtue. This paper explores manners of action, shows why they apparently do not reduce to kinds of actions, and proposes an account of their importance. The result is a wider conception of acting rightly than the common understanding on which it simply doing the right thing, a partial account of how acting rightly figures in the content of intention, and a sketch of the moral dimensions of the manners in which we act.     

The problem of relapse in stuttering: Some thoughts on what might cause it and how to deal with it

Bloodstein recently wrote that “the most vital part of science is not accurate measurement or the insistence on empiricism. It is an attitude of inquiry into the how and why of things” [Bloodstein, O. Foreword. In: Maintenance of Fluency (E. Boberg ed.). New York: Elsevier, 1981, p. vii]. In the paper below, I present some unsubstantiated and no doubt controversial thoughts on the how and why of relapse in stuttering. The overall thrust of these thoughts is that stutterers have different propensities to stutter because of the inherent variability in their speech production systems. For this reason, for therapy to have long-range success, stutterers must learn to accept and deal with the inherent variability in their speech production mechanisms.     

Sartre on the Ontological Need for God

Adherents to the relatively new discipline of neurotheology profess that religious faith has a brain neural substrate, with structural, functional, and genetic elements that “hardwire” us to believe in God. It is argued here that a better way to approach the question of why people believe in a transcendent being would be to interrogate the structure of human being, with the intention of uncovering the meanings that underlie the phenomenon of faith. Jean-Paul Sartre may have already provided a necessary and sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. We are, he concluded, ontologically inclined to identify with a supreme being whose essence and existence transcend the limits of our own finite being. It is one thing to arrive at such a conclusion intuitively, but altogether something else to demonstrate, as Sartre does, how this conclusion follows from the structure of human being itself.     

Platitudes against Paradox

We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry’s paradox rests on presuppositions that violate these innocuous constraints. Other versions of Curry’s paradox are shown not to be paradoxical at all once their presuppositions are made explicit. Part of what we say rehearses a proposal originally made by Laurence Goldstein in 1985. Like Goldstein we dispose of certain paradoxes by rejecting some of the premises from which they must be taken to proceed. However, we disagree with his more recent view that the premises to be rejected are neither true nor false.