How the brain processes causal inferences in text

Abstract— Theoretical models of text processing, such as the construction-integration framework, pose fundamental questions about causal inference making that are not easily addressed by behavioral studies. In particular, a common result is that causal relatedness has a different effect on text reading times than on memory for the text: Whereas reading times increase linearly as causal relatedness decreases, memory for the text is best for events that are related by a moderate degree of causal relatedness and is poorer for events with low and high relatedness. Our functional magnetic resonance imaging study of the processing of two-sentence passages that varied in their degree of causal relatedness suggests that the inference process can be analyzed into two components, generation and integration, that are subserved by two large-scale cortical networks (a reasoning system in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the right-hemisphere language areas). These two cortical networks, which are distinguishable from the classical left-hemisphere language areas, approximately correspond to the two functional relations observed in the behavioral results.     

Temporal information and children's and adults' causal inferences

Three experiments examined whether children and adults would use temporal information as a cue to the causal structure of a three-variable system, and also whether their judgements about the effects of interventions on the system would be affected by the temporal properties of the event sequence. Participants were shown a system in which two events B and C occurred either simultaneously (synchronous condition) or in a temporal sequence (sequential condition) following an initial event A. The causal judgements of adults and 6–7-year-olds differed between the conditions, but this was not the case for 4-year-olds' judgements. However, unlike those of adults, 6–7-year-olds' intervention judgements were not affected by condition, and causal and intervention judgements were not reliably consistent in this age group. The findings support the claim that temporal information provides an important cue to causal structure, at least in older children. However, they raise important issues about the relationship between causal and intervention judgements.     

The impact of presentation format on causal inferences

The impact of the presentation format of covariation information on causal judgements was examined in a fictitious virus-disease causal induction task. Six different judgement conditions were created by crossing two levels of virus-disease covariation (0, .5) with three levels of disease base rate (.25, .5, .75). The covariation information was presented differently to three groups of participants. In a first group, it was presented in propositional format summarising the frequencies of the four patient types, namely patients with or without the virus who either did have or did not have the disease. In a second group the same information was presented in a 2×2 table with the cell frequencies represented in terms of countable objects (the presence/absence of virus/disease was shown as schematic faces that varied in expression and colour). In a third group the covariation information was presented in terms of a cumulative frequency tree with the two main branches representing the frequencies of patients with and without the disease which further decomposed into subgroups of those with and without the virus. The ability to discriminate between the levels of covariation was poorest in Group 1; it was significantly improved in Group 2, and was best in Group 3. These results suggest that the format with which covariation information is presented to reasoners exerts a significant influence on causal judgements.     

The texture of causal construals: Domain-specific biases shape causal inferences from discourse

We conducted five sets of experiments asking whether psychological and physical events are construed in broadly different manners concerning the underlying textures of their causes. In Experiments 1a–1d, we found a robust tendency to estimate fewer causes (but not effects) for psychological than for physical events; Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of results when participants were asked to generate hypothetical causes and effects; Experiment 3 revealed a greater tendency to ascribe linear chains of causes (but not effects) to physical events; Experiment 4 showed that the expectation of linear chains was related to intuitions about deterministic processes; and Experiment 5 showed that simply framing a given ambiguous event in psychological versus physical terms is sufficient to induce changes in the patterns of causal inferences. Adults therefore consistently show a tendency to think about psychological and physical events as being embedded in different kinds of causal structures.     

Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences

We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.     

Creators' intentions bias judgments of function independently from causal inferences

Participants learned about novel artifacts that were created for function X, but later used for function Y. When asked to rate the extent to which X and Y were a given artifact's function, participants consistently rated X higher than Y. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were also asked to rate artifacts' efficiency to perform X and Y. This allowed us to test if participants' preference for X was mediated by causal inferences. Experiment 1 showed that participants did not infer intentionally created artifacts performed X more efficiently than Y. Experiment 2 showed participants did not infer that only an efficient (but not an inefficient) artifact provided evidence of intentional creation. Causal inferences involving efficiency, did not account for participants' preferences. In Experiment 3, in contrast, when the creator changed her mind about an artifact's function (i.e., from X to Y), the preference for the original function tended to disappear. Creators' intentions were the basis for participants' preference. Results are discussed relative to essentialist theories.     

Associative and causal reasoning accounts of causal induction: Symmetries and asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic inferences

Associative and causal reasoning accounts are probably the two most influential types of accounts of causal reasoning processes. Only causal reasoning accounts predict certain asymmetries between predictive (i.e., reasoning from causes to effects) and diagnostic (i.e., reasoning from effects to causes) inferences regarding cue-interaction phenomena (e.g., the overshadowing effect). In the experiments reported here, we attempted to delimit the conditions under which these asymmetries occur. The results show that unless participants perceived the relevance of causal information to solving the task, predictive and diagnostic inferences were symmetrical. Specifically, Experiments 1A and 1B showed that implicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by having participants review the instructions favored the presence of asymmetries between predictive and diagnostic situations. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that explicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by stating the importance of the causal role of events after the instructions were given also favored the asymmetry.     

Perceiving individuals and groups: expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets.     

At-risk children's causal inferences given emotional feedback and their understanding of the excuse-giving process

Italian male school children, ranging in age from 7 to 10 years, were identified as at-risk children on the basis of self-reports, teacher questionnaires, and peer nominations assessing aggression, emotional instability, and pro-social behaviour. Together with a normal control sample, these children participated in two studies guided by attribtional theory. In Study 1, following teacher emotional feedback of anger or sympathy for failure, attributional inferences regarding low ability or lack of effort as the cause of that failure were rated. In Study 2, controllable and uncontrollable causes of a social transgression were given, and participants rated the anticipated anger of the ‘victim’ and their intention to withhold or reveal the cause. Strong effects for both populations that were consistent with attributional predictions were reported. In addition, differences between the inferences, expectations, and behavioural intentions of the populations were found, with at-risk children being less likely to perceive sympathy as a cue for low ability, and anticipating more anger from others following a transgression, particularly when there was a ‘good’ (i.e. uncontrollable) reason for the broken social agreement. It was contended that the results support the social-cognitive approach to the understanding of mechanisms of risk and deviancy.     

Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.     

Combining group-based trajectory modeling and propensity score matching for causal inferences in nonexperimental longitudinal data

A central theme of research on human development and psychopathology is whether a therapeutic intervention or a turning-point event, such as a family break-up, alters the trajectory of the behavior under study. This article describes and applies a method for using observational longitudinal data to make more transparent causal inferences about the impact of such events on developmental trajectories. The method combines 2 distinct lines of research: work on the use of finite mixture modeling to analyze developmental trajectories and work on propensity score matching. The propensity scores are used to balance observed covariates and the trajectory groups are used to control pretreatment measures of response. The trajectory groups also aid in characterizing classes of subjects for which no good matches are available. The approach is demonstrated with an analysis of the impact of gang membership on violent delinquency based on data from a large longitudinal study conducted in Montréal, Canada.     

Spontaneous trait inferences as self-generated primes: implications for conscious social judgment.

The priming literature has documented the influence of trait terms held outside of conscious awareness on later judgment relevant to the primed trait dimension. The present research demonstrated that spontaneous trait inferences can serve as self-generated primes. In Experiment 1, Ss instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences (thus spontaneously inferring traits outside of consciousness) showed assimilation effects in judgment. Ss instructed to form inferences from these sentences (thus consciously inferring traits) showed contrast effects. Experiment 2 demonstrated that these findings were due to semantic activation rather than to a general evaluative response. When evaluatively inconsistent trait constructs were primed, similar patterns of assimilation and contrast were found. Implications for the ubiquitous occurrence of priming through the process of social categorization are discussed.     

Spontaneous goal versus spontaneous trait inferences: How ideology shapes attributions and explanations

Past research documented liberals’ greater tendency than conservatives to take situational determinants of others’ actions into account when forming causal attributions, and conservatives’ greater tendency to seek consistency. We hypothesize that liberals (vs. conservatives) should be more likely to make spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs). Conservatives, however, should tend to implicitly infer invariant rather than variant characteristics from others’ behaviors, drawing spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) rather than SGIs. Experiment 1 and 2 supported those hypotheses by illustrating differences in the type of implicit inferences formed by liberals and conservatives in a false recognition paradigm common to the STI literature. Experiment 3 revealed similar differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ goal and trait inferences when making open-ended causal explanations for others’ actions.     

People want to see information that will help them make valid inferences in human causal learning

According to higher order reasoning accounts of human causal learning (e.g., Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, and Frohardt, 2003; Waldmann and Walker, 2005) ceiling effects in forward blocking (i.e., smaller blocking effects when the outcome occurs with a maximal intensity on A+ and AX+ trials) are due to the fact that people are uncertain about the causal status of a blocked cue X in a forward blocking design when the outcome is always fully present on A+ and AX+ trials. This should not be the case for a reduced overshadowing cue Y (B- trials followed by BY+ trials). We tested this hypothesis by asking participants which additional information they preferred to see after seeing all learning trials. Results showed (1) that all participants preferred to see the effect of the blocked cue X over seeing the effect of the reduced overshadowing cue Y (Experiment 1), and (2) that more participants preferred to see the blocked cue X on its own when the outcome on A+ and AX+ trials was fully present than when the outcome on those trials had a submaximalintensity (Experiment 2).     

Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers

Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a “blicket detector,” a machine that lit up and played music when certain objects were placed upon it. Children observed patterns of contingency between objects and the machine’s activation that required them to use indirect evidence to make causal inferences. Critically, associative models either made no predictions, or made incorrect predictions about these inferences. In general, children were able to make these inferences, but some developmental differences between 3- and 4-year-olds were found. We suggest that children’s causal inferences are not based on recognizing associations, but rather that children develop a mechanism for Bayesian structure learning. Experiment 3 explicitly tests a prediction of this account. Children were asked to make an inference about ambiguous data based on the base rate of certain events occurring. Four-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds were able to make this inference.