Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Accuracy and Bias in Social Perception Research

How do perceivers make accurate social judgments? A substantial amount of evidence suggests that perceivers' judgments are often quite accurate even when they do not have direct access to the truth, in part because they make judgments through biased processes. In the present article, we examine the dynamic relationship between bias and accuracy in social perception research. We outline how bias and accuracy are theoretically and empirically distinct processes and describe the importance (and difficulty) of defining and measuring both truth variables and bias variables in order to make empirical conclusions in accuracy research. Additionally, we examine how both bias variables (e.g., stereotypes, perceivers' own beliefs) and truth variables exert an influence on how perceivers make social judgments, as well as the extent to which judgments are accurate. Lastly, we provide steps that researchers can take in order to examine the relationship between bias and accuracy in their own research.     

Causal uncertainty and correction of judgments

We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one’s judgments motivates correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high-CU individuals who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias. Results are discussed in light of recent models of judgment correction (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997), and the causal uncertainty model (Weary & Edwards, 1996).     

News of Y2K and Experiencing Y2K: Exploring the Relationship Between the Third-Person Effect and Optimistic Bias

This study gauged Americans' beliefs about predicted Y2K problems during the weeks before New Year 2000. It examined the alleged relationship between the third-person effect and the social psychological theory of optimistic bias. The third-person effect predicts that people judge themselves less influenced than others by media messages. To explain the effect, some media researchers have drawn on optimistic bias, which posits that people judge themselves less likely than others to experience negative life events. Few researchers, however, have directly tested the empirical relationship between the two perceptual approaches. As hypothesized, respondents judged themselves less influenced than others by news reports about Y2K (third-person perception) and less likely than others to experience Y2K problems (optimistic bias). But the study did not find the hypothesized relationship between the approaches. Furthermore, third-person perception and optimistic bias were functions of mirror opposite blocks of predictors. The findings indicate that third-person perception is not merely a media case study of optimistic bias. We suggested that people use different criteria to estimate experiencing events and believing media messages about the events.     

Sample size bias in the estimation of means

The present research concerns the hypothesis that intuitive estimates of the arithmetic mean of a sample of numbers tend to increase as a function of the sample size; that is, they reflect a systematic sample size bias. A similar bias has been observed when people judge the average member of a group of people on an inferred quantity (e.g., a disease risk; see Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006). Until now, however, it has been unclear whether it would be observed when the stimuli were numbers, in which case the quantity need not be inferred, and “average” can be precisely defined as the arithmetic mean. In two experiments, participants estimated the arithmetic mean of 12 samples of numbers. In the first experiment, samples of from 5 to 20 numbers were presented simultaneously and participants quickly estimated their mean. In the second experiment, the numbers in each sample were presented sequentially. The results of both experiments confirmed the existence of a systematic sample size bias.     

Direct-comparison judgments: when and why above- and below-average effects reverse

Above-average and below-average effects appear to be common and consistent across a variety of judgment domains. For example, several studies show that individual items from a high- (low-) quality set tend to be rated as better (worse) than the other items in the set (e.g., E. E. Giladi & Y. Klar, 2002). Experiments in this article demonstrate reversals of these effects. A novel account is supported, which describes how the timing of the denotation of the to-be-judged item influences attention and ultimately affects the size or direction of comparative biases. The authors discuss how this timing account is relevant for many types of referent-dependent judgments (e.g., probability judgments, resource allocations) and how it intersects with various accounts of comparative bias (focalism, generalized-group, compromise between local and general standards [LOGE]).     

Blaming the Same-Sex Victim in HIV-Prevention Messages: Further Examination of the Self-Protective Similarity Bias

It has been demonstrated recently that men will judge their own (threat-relevant) personalities and sexual practices as safer than another man's if that man's HIV status is believed positive compared to negative or is unknown (Gump & Kulik, 1995). The present experiment was designed to expand our understanding of the moderators and mediators of this recently documented 'self-protective similarly bias.' College students (N=150) participated in a 2 (Sex of Participant) x 2 (Sex of Model) x 3 (Serostatus: Positive, Negative, Unknown) x 2 (Threat Relevance of Item) factorial design with repeated measures on the last factor. Results indicated that the similarity bias specifically occurs with same-sex models. Analyses of self-ratings and model ratings suggest that the similarity bias was more a functions of 'blaming' or devaluing the victim than of inflated ratings of the participant's own safety characteristics. Finally, although this bias reduced perceived personal susceptibility and was specific to same-sex models, intentions to adopt safer sexual practices were raised by all HIV-positive models regardless of sex concordance.     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

The typical student as an in‐group member: eliminating optimistic bias by reducing social distance

While demonstrations of optimistic bias are plentiful, successful attempts at eliminating the bias (debiasing) are rare. The current study attempted to debias by reducing the perceived social distance between the self and the typical own university student. Using self‐categorisation theory, it was predicted that rating the out‐group target (the typical student at another university) before the in‐group one would reduce the perceived social distance between the self and the latter and lead to a reduction in optimistic bias. Both predictions were supported, with optimistic bias being eliminated for negative events and attenuated for positive events. In the standard optimistic bias condition (in‐group first) optimistic bias was obtained for both negative and positive events. The findings provide support for perceived social distance in determining optimistic bias. The implications for recent arguments that comparisons with an abstract target automatically evoke an ‘I am better than average’ heuristic or necessarily entail the use of distributional judgmental frameworks are explored. Whilst the automatic linking of abstract targets with heuristic or distributional thinking is called into question, a case is made for integrating these ideas with the self‐categorisation approach. Where practitioners aim to reduce optimistic bias, the findings suggest promoting the perception of the target as a fellow in‐group member may help do so. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No source memory for unrecognized items when implicit feedback is avoided

In a recent empirical study, Starns, Hicks, Brown, and Martin (Memory & Cognition, 36, 1–8 2008) collected source judgments for old items that participants had claimed to be new and found residual source discriminability depending on the old-new response bias. The authors interpreted their finding as evidence in favor of the bivariate signal-detection model, but against the two-high-threshold model of item/source memory. According to the latter, new responses only follow from the state of old-new uncertainty for which no source discrimination is possible, and the probability of entering this state is independent of the old-new response bias. However, when missed old items were presented for source discrimination, the participants could infer that the items had been previously studied. To test whether this implicit feedback led to second retrieval attempts and thus to source memory for presumably unrecognized items, we replicated Starns et al.’s (Memory & Cognition, 36, 1–8 2008) finding and compared their procedure to a procedure without such feedback. Our results challenge the conclusion to abandon discrete processing in source memory; source memory for unrecognized items is probably an artifact of the procedure, by which implicit feedback prompts participants to reconsider their recognition judgment when asked to rate the source of old items in the absence of item memory.     

“Remembering” emotional words is based on response bias,not recollection

Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are “remembered” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a recollection process. We challenge this conclusion with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve data from two experiments. In both experiments, subjects studied neutral and emotional words. During the recognition test, subjects made old-new confidence ratings as well as remember-know judgments. Four models of remember-know judgments were fit to individual subjects’ data: two versions of a one-dimensional signaldetection-based model (Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994), and the two-dimensional signal-detection-based model known as STREAK (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). Consistent with the literature, we found that emotion increases subjective reports of “remembering.” However, our ROC analyses and modeling work reveal that the effect is due to response bias differences rather than sensitivity change or use of a high-threshold recollection process.     

Sentencing,severity, and social norms: A rank-based model of contextual influence on judgments of crimes and punishments

Context effects have been shown to bias lay people's evaluations of the severity of crimes and punishments. To investigate the cognitive mechanisms behind these effects, we develop and apply a rank-based social norms approach to judgments of perceived crime seriousness and sentence appropriateness. In Study 1, we find that (a) people believe on average that 84% of people illegally download software more than they do themselves and (b) their judged severity of, and concern about, their own illegal software downloading is predicted not by its amount but by how this amount is believed (typically inaccurately) to rank within a social comparison distribution. Studies 2 and 3 find that the judged appropriateness of a given sentence length is highly dependent on the length of other sentences available in the decision-making context: The same objective sentence was judged as approximately four times stricter when it was the second longest sentence being considered than when it was the fifth longest. It is concluded that the same mechanisms that are used to judge the magnitude of psychophysical stimuli bias judgments about legal matters.     

On Judgments of Approximately Equal

Although precision is often important in quantitative judgment, sometimes, it is valuable to recognize that two quantities are roughly the same. Fuzzy‐trace theory suggests that approximately equal judgments rely on gist representations (i.e., meaningful fuzzy categories of quantity). We conducted three experiments to investigate approximately equal judgments with number pairs presented in different formats, both with and without semantic content (breast cancer statistics). In each study, the ratio of the smaller divided by larger number predicted approximately equal judgments. Experiment 1 also examined how knowledge of breast cancer, presentation format (frequencies vs. percentages), and differences in gist comprehension of breast cancer information influence fuzzy equality judgments. As predicted by the fuzzy‐trace theory concept of denominator neglect, approximately equal judgments were more sensitive, as measured by signal detection theory (SDT) analyses, when presented as percentages. In both experiments with breast cancer statistics, people were more likely to judge number pairs approximately equal when they were embedded in sentences about breast cancer, and breast cancer knowledge predicted increased perception of equality, when appropriately consistent with reliable sources, and increased judgment sensitivity. In Experiment 2, a simple intervention focusing on gist meaning increased source‐consistent approximately equal judgments, increased SDT judgment sensitivity, and decreased SDT response bias. In Experiment 3, using number pairs devoid of semantic context spanning four orders of magnitude, we further examined ratio similarity. Overall, more knowledgeable judges and those who better understood the gist of meaningful numbers were more likely to judge literally different numbers as “approximately equal” rather than make precise discriminations that were meaningless. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the genesis of inflated (and deflated) judgments of responsibility

Prior research has found that people tend to overestimate their relative contribution to joint tasks [e.g., Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,37, 322–336]. The present research investigates one source of this bias, and in doing so, identifies an important moderator of the effect. Three studies demonstrate that when people estimate their relative contribution to collective endeavors they focus on their own contribution and give less consideration to the contribution of their collaborators. This can cause overestimation for tasks in which total contributions are plentiful, but underestimation for tasks in which total contributions are few—despite the fact that both tasks reflect positively on the person who performs them. These results extend Ross and Sicoly’s (1979) original analysis of bias in responsibility judgments, but also suggest that the tendency to overestimate one’s relative contribution to collaborations is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Judgments relative to patterns: how temporal sequence patterns affect judgments and memory

Six experiments studied relative frequency judgment and recall of sequentially presented items drawn from 2 distinct categories (i.e., city and animal). The experiments show that judged frequencies of categories of sequentially encountered stimuli are affected by certain properties of the sequence configuration. We found (a) a first-run effect whereby people overestimated the frequency of a given category when that category was the first repeated category to occur in the sequence and (b) a dissociation between judgments and recall; respondents may judge 1 event more likely than the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Specifically, the distribution of recalled items does not correspond to the frequency estimates for the event categories, indicating that participants do not make frequency judgments by sampling their memory for individual items as implied by other accounts such as the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the availability process model (Hastie & Park, 1986). We interpret these findings as reflecting the operation of a judgment heuristic sensitive to sequential patterns and offer an account for the relationship between memory and judged frequencies of sequentially encountered stimuli.     

Optimistic bias and pessimistic realism in judgments of contingency with aversive or rewarding outcomes

A depressive personality influences judgments of contingency. This is called "depressive realism." The present experiment examined whether optimistic traits, as measured by various scales, are correlated with judgments of contingency. The valences of the target stimuli were aversive or rewarding (noise avoidance or gaining points). Analysis indicated that the optimistic subjects (as measured by explanatory style for negative events) tend to overestimate noncontingent events; however, optimism measured by other scales did not show such an effect. The findings are discussed in terms of a self-defensive attributional bias.     

Overoptimism about future knowledge: Early arrogance?

Abstract

Three studies explored whether young children (5–7 years) have more optimistic views of their future knowledge than older children (8–12 years) and adults. In Study 1, younger children were more likely than older children and adults to expect greater knowledge in both young and mature protagonists. Both groups of children saw knowledge rising at a faster rate into adulthood than adult participants did. All ages judged moral knowledge as much easier to acquire than other types of knowledge, such as artifacts. In Study 2, all children saw their own future knowledge in especially optimistic terms in comparison to ratings by adults, and the older children exhibited a self-enhancement bias. Study 3 found an overall preference for the acquisition of positively valenced future knowledge, particularly for the 8- to 12-year olds and in the domain of morality, suggesting pragmatic underpinnings for these judgments.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

How people make support judgments: individual differences in the traits used to infer supportiveness in others.

Social support and other social judgments are composed of several distinct components, of which relationship effects are an important part. With regard to support judgments, relationship effects refer to the fact that when judging the same targets, people differ systematically in whom they see as supportive. One explanation for this effect is that people differ in how they combine information about targets to judge supportiveness. Participants rated the supportiveness of hypothetical targets and targets from their own social networks. Multilevel modeling identified the traits participants used to make support judgments. There were significant differences in the extent to which participants used different target personality traits to judge supportiveness. In addition, participant neuroticism predicted the extent to which participants used target neuroticism and agreeableness to judge supportiveness.