Dorsal and ventral processing under dual-task conditions

It is widely acknowledged that visual input is processed along two anatomically and functionally distinct pathways--a ventral pathway for conscious perception and a dorsal pathway for action control. The present study investigated whether the apparent direct and unmediated processing in the dorsal stream is subject to capacity limitations. Specifically, we tested whether a simple dorsal task of grasping an object is affected by the psychological refractory period (PRP), a well-known indication of capacity limitations. Subjects performed an auditory choice reaction task and then, following varying delays, had to judge an object's width (ventral task) or grasp an object across its width (dorsal task). Although these tasks were differentially affected by irrelevant variation of the objects' length, they were subject to comparable dual-task interference. These results show that despite important differences between ventral and dorsal information processing, both modes of processing are constrained by limited capacities.     

Aging and input processing in dual-task situations

The psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm was used to test whether older participants suffer from input interference in dual-task situations. Young (24 years) and older (57 years) adults gave speeded responses to 2 successively presented stimuli. The results showed increased susceptibility of older participants to input interference. Further experiments revealed that this input interference is related to the salience of the 2nd stimulus and that it is specific to older participants. Our findings indicate that parallel processing at the input stages of dual-task performance requires cognitive control. An age-related decline in the control of input processes should be considered as one source of age effects in dual-task performance.     

Watching diagnoses develop: Eye movements reveal symptom processing during diagnostic reasoning

Finding a probable explanation for observed symptoms is a highly complex task that draws on information retrieval from memory. Recent research suggests that observed symptoms are interpreted in a way that maximizes coherence for a single likely explanation. This becomes particularly clear if symptom sequences support more than one explanation. However, there are no existing process data available that allow coherence maximization to be traced in ambiguous diagnostic situations, where critical information has to be retrieved from memory. In this experiment, we applied memory indexing, an eye-tracking method that affords rich time-course information concerning memory-based cognitive processing during higher order thinking, to reveal symptom processing and the preferred interpretation of symptom sequences. Participants first learned information about causes and symptoms presented in spatial frames. Gaze allocation to emptied spatial frames during symptom processing and during the diagnostic response reflected the subjective status of hypotheses held in memory and the preferred interpretation of ambiguous symptoms. Memory indexing traced how the diagnostic decision developed and revealed instances of hypothesis change and biases in symptom processing. Memory indexing thus provided direct online evidence for coherence maximization in processing ambiguous information.     

Chronometric evidence for memory retrieval in causal conditional reasoning: The case of the association strength effect

According to many models of conditional reasoning, correct responses to the uncertain forms affirmation of consequent (AC) and denial of antecedent (DA) rely on the retrieval of an alternative antecedent from semantic memory. The main prediction issuing from this hypothesis of online retrieval is that the associative strength of the relevant information in long-term memory affects the latency of its retrieval and then of the correct response of uncertainty to AC and DA. This prediction was tested in 64 adults who performed a syllogism evaluation task with familiar causal conditional premises. As predicted, correct responses of uncertainty to AC and DA were not only more frequent but also faster when the antecedent term was weakly rather than strongly associated with the consequent. In line with the semantic framework, we also observed that this strength effect in response times was reversed for incorrect responses of certainty to AC.     

Evidence for processing stages in skill acquisition: a dual-task study

We investigated the changes of resource demand during the acquisition of a sensorimotor skill, namely the tracking of a visual target under reversed visual feedback. This acquisition task was performed alone or concurrently with one of four manual reaction-time tasks as loading tasks, designed to tap different computational resources. As expected, we found tracking performance to deteriorate upon vision reversal and then to gradually improve with practice. We further found that acquisition task and loading task interfered little before vision reversal but substantially afterwards. Most importantly, we observed a different time-course of interference for each of our four loading tasks. The particular pattern led us to conclude that resources related to spatial attention and sensory transformations are in highest demand early during skill acquisition and those pertinent to movement preparation somewhat later. Our findings thus provide experimental support for the theory that motor learning progresses in stages characterized by different resource requirements.     

Motor limitation in dual-task processing with different effectors

According to the extended bottleneck model, dual-task interference does not arise only from a central bottleneck but also from processing limitations at the motor stage. Evidence for this assumption has previously been found only for same-effector tasks but not for different-effector tasks. In order to examine the existence of motor interference with different effectors, we used the psychological refractory period paradigm and employed response sequences of different length in Task 1 (R1 sequence length). Experiment 1 incorporated vocal response sequences in Task 1 and a manual response in Task 2. In Experiment 2, the assignment of the effectors to the two tasks was reversed. In both experiments, the long R1 sequence prolonged reaction time for Task 2 (RT2), and this effect was reduced with decreasing temporal overlap of the two tasks. Thus, the present experiments demonstrate motor interference between different-effector tasks. This interference may be due to on-line programming or to central response monitoring.     

Increased control demand results in serial processing: evidence from dual-task performance

Increased demands on cognitive control trigger changes in processing mode. One such modulation involves a shift from parallel to serial processing. This study assessed the role of control demand in determining whether dual-task processing is performed serially or in parallel. We used two critical indices, based on the response-selection bottleneck model, to show that response selection was serial when a task switch was involved, but partly parallel when the simultaneous performance of the tasks did not involve task switching.     

Motor limitation in dual-task processing under ballistic movement conditions

The standard bottleneck model of the psychological refractory period (PRP) assumes that the selection of the second response is postponed until the first response has been selected. Accordingly, dual-task interference is attributed to a single central-processing bottleneck involving decision and response selection, but not the execution of the response itself. In order to critically examine the assumption that response execution is not part of this bottleneck, we systematically manipulated the temporal demand for executing the first response in a classical PRP paradigm. Contrary to the assumption of the standard bottleneck model, this manipulation affected the reaction time for Task 2. Specifically, reaction time for Task 2 increased with execution time for Task 1. This carryover effect from Task 1 to Task 2 provides evidence for the notion that response execution can be part of the processing bottleneck.     

A dual-task investigation of automaticity in visual word processing

An analysis of activation models of visual word processing suggests that frequency-sensitive forms of lexical processing should proceed normally while unattended. This hypothesis was tested by having participants perform a speeded pitch discrimination task followed by lexical decisions or word naming. As the stimulus onset asynchrony between the tasks was reduced, lexical-decision and naming latencies increased dramatically. Word-frequency effects were additive with the increase, indicating that frequency-sensitive processing was subject to postponement while attention was devoted to the other task. Either (a) the same neural hardware shares responsibility for lexical processing and central stages of choice reaction time task processing and cannot perform both computations simultaneously, or (b) lexical processing is blocked in order to optimize performance on the pitch discrimination task. Either way, word processing is not as automatic as activation models suggest.     

Cognitive control in belief‐laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event‐related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high‐density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from ?400 to ?200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias.     

Verbal asymmetries and levels of processing in an interactive dual-task paradigm

This study examined how the dual-task laterality paradigm produces patterns of cerebral asymmetry different from those obtained in studies of comparable single-laterality tasks. We systematically examined at what level of processing a concurrent verbal memory-load influences accuracy of recognition of laterally presented nouns relative to that in a control condition. Four groups of 20 subjects each were tested in an interactive dual-task paradigm requiring them to compare lateralized nouns directly with one of three nouns concurrently held in memory prior to accuracy of recognition. The groups differed according to the types of comparisons being made: physical identity, phonetic orthographic similarity, phonetic similarity using non-orthographic words, and category membership. Subjects in each group carried out three tasks. They were required to determine if a specified match had occurred between a memory-load word and the lateralized word, identify the lateralized word, and report the memory-load words. Another 20 subjects were assigned to a control laterality condition in which no concurrent memory-load was used. Control subjects were required to respond to a laterally presented word by pressing a reaction-time key to indicate recognition of the word and then to report the word. No significant visual-field differences occurred in accuracy of recognition for either the control or matching-task groups. However, reaction-time latencies and errors increased as a function of the level of processing. The accuracy of recognition did not support the predictions of Kinsbourne's attentional model but the reaction times provided some support for the concept of selective left-hemisphere interference proposed by Hellige. A limited-capacity approach was suggested as a possible alternative explanation of laterality effects.     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.     

Dual processing in reasoning: two systems but one reasoner

Human reasoning has been characterized as an interplay between an automatic belief-based system and a demanding logic-based reasoning system. The present study tested a fundamental claim about the nature of individual differences in reasoning and the processing demands of both systems. Participants varying in working memory capacity performed a reasoning task while their executive resources were burdened with a secondary task. Results were consistent with the dual-process claim: The executive burden hampered correct reasoning when the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, but not when beliefs cued the correct response. However, although participants with high working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans in cases of a conflict, all reasoners showed similar effects of load. The findings support the idea that there are two reasoning systems with differential processing demands, but constitute evidence against qualitative individual differences in the human reasoning machinery.     

Affective processing in overwhelmed individuals: Strategic and task considerations

Previous research suggests that emotionally overwhelmed individuals (high affect intensity, intermediate attention to emotions, low clarity of emotions) attempt to counteract the influence of affective information. In five studies (ns=129, 177, 119, 339, 261), the current research found that task performance in overwhelmed individuals varied by current arousal and by whether affective influence occurred on evaluative versus non-evaluative tasks. Overwhelmed high current arousal participants exhibited decreased affective influence on evaluative tasks but increased affective influence on non-evaluative tasks. These results are consistent with the effects of active suppression of affective information, including ironic effects of monitoring for affective information. In contrast, overwhelmed low current arousal participants exhibited increased affective influence on evaluative tasks but decreased affective influence on non-evaluative tasks. These results are consistent with attentional avoidance of affective information. Overall, these results further suggest that overwhelmed individuals attempt to counteract the influence of affective information. Whether they are successful depends on their current arousal and how affect can influence performance.     

Time courses in visual-information processing: Some theoretical considerations

Summary In the literature two different views with regard to the time course of activation of recognition units —hypothetical entities that represent identity information —are proposed. Both views are derived from a restricted set of phenomena in visual perception. The first view gets its intuitions from phenomena such as those summarized by Bloch's law; these phenomena show integration or summation of activation over time. This grow-and-grow view assumes that recognition units accumulate activation gradually over times The second view finds its inspiration in phenomena such as Mach-bands and simultaneous contrast; these phenomena show inhibition or steady-state suppression over time. This grow-and-shrink view assumes that the activation levels increase fast initially and then start to decrease.The perception literature strongly suggests that it may be light intensity that determines whether mainly integration (and phenomena such as Bloch's law) or inhibition (and phenomena such as Mach-bands) is obtained. So it is also likely that both information-processing views apply only to a limited range of intensity conditions; the grow-and-grow view to conditions of low-flight intensities, and the grow-and-shrink view to conditions of intermediate-and high-light intensities.It is argued that, to arrive at a complete view, a visual phenomenon that applies to the complete range of light intensities should be taken as a background for generating hypotheses about time courses in visual-information processing. The Broca-Sulzer effect is such a phenomenon. Starting from this phenomenon a simple, synthesizing, information-processing model is derived that is compatible with both the grow-and-grow view and the grow-andshrink view. It is shown that, besides the relevant temporal properties, this model also produces the appropriate spatial properties.     

Language-guided visual processing affects reasoning: The role of referential and spatial anchoring

Language is more than a source of information for accessing higher-order conceptual knowledge. Indeed, language may determine how people perceive and interpret visual stimuli. Visual processing in linguistic contexts, for instance, mirrors language processing and happens incrementally, rather than through variously-oriented fixations over a particular scene. The consequences of this atypical visual processing are yet to be determined. Here, we investigated the integration of visual and linguistic input during a reasoning task. Participants listened to sentences containing conjunctions or disjunctions (Nancy examined an ant and/or a cloud) and looked at visual scenes containing two pictures that either matched or mismatched the nouns. Degree of match between nouns and pictures (referential anchoring) and between their expected and actual spatial positions (spatial anchoring) affected fixations as well as judgments. We conclude that language induces incremental processing of visual scenes, which in turn becomes susceptible to reasoning errors during the language-meaning verification process.     

Information processing and reasoning with premises that are empirically false: Interference,working memory,and processing speed

In this study, we looked at the contributions of individual differences in susceptibility to interference and working memory to logical reasoning with premises that were empirically false (i.e., not necessarily true). A total of 97 university students were given a sentence completion task for which a subset of stimuli was designed to generate inappropriate semantic activation that interfered with the correct response, a measure of working memory capacity, and a series of logical reasoning tasks with premises that were not always true. The results indicate that susceptibility to interference, as measured by the error rate on the relevant subset of the sentence completion task, and working memory independently account for variation in reasoning performance. The participants who made more errors in the relevant portion of the sentence completion task also showed more empirical intrusions in the deductive reasoning task, even when the effects of working memory were partialed out. Working memory capacity was more clearly related to processes involved in generating uncertainty responses to inferences for which there was no certain conclusion. A comparison of the results of this study with studies of children's reasoning suggests that adults are capable of more selective executive processes than are children. An analysis of latency measures on the sentence completion task indicated that high working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task used a strategy that involved slower processing speed, as compared with participants with similar levels of working memory who did make errors. In contrast, low working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task had relatively shorter reaction times than did comparable participants who did make errors.     

Evidence that logical reasoning depends on conscious processing

Humans, unlike other animals, are equipped with a powerful brain that permits conscious awareness and reflection. A growing trend in psychological science has questioned the benefits of consciousness, however. Testing a hypothesis advanced by [Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflection and reflexion: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 199-249], four studies suggested that the conscious, reflective processing system is vital for logical reasoning. Substantial decrements in logical reasoning were found when a cognitive load manipulation preoccupied conscious processing, while hampering the nonconscious system with consciously suppressed thoughts failed to impair reasoning (Experiment 1). Nonconscious activation (priming) of the idea of logical reasoning increased the activation of logic-relevant concepts, but failed to improve logical reasoning performance (Experiments 2a-2c) unless the logical conclusions were largely intuitive and thus not reliant on logical reasoning (Experiment 3). Meanwhile, stimulating the conscious goal of reasoning well led to improvements in reasoning performance (Experiment 4). These findings offer evidence that logical reasoning is aided by the conscious, reflective processing system.