A brief history of negation

The history of scholarship on negation tracks and illuminates the major developments in the history of metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle through Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein to contemporary formal theorists. Our perspective focuses on the catalytic role played by the 20th century philosopher of language Paul Grice, whose views on negation serve as a fulcrum for his attempt to bridge the (neo-)Traditionalist and Formalist traditions in logical thought. Grice's remarks on negation and speaker meaning and the elaboration of his ideas by subsequent neo-Griceans are summarized and situated within a broader picture of the role of contradictory and contrary negation in the frameworks of Aristotelians, Medievals, early modern schoolmaster-logicians, 19th and early 20th century neo-Idealists and Formalists, Oxford ordinary-language analytics, practitioners of classical and non-classical logics, and a range of other philosophers and linguists. Particular attention is paid to the relations between negation and the other operators of propositional and predicate calculus. Implications for accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language are also pursued and extensive references to related work are provided.     

A brief history of Russian aphasiology

This paper analyzes early Russian contributions to the study of aphasia, dated between 1789 and 1941. Different approaches to the problem of the organization and localization of verbal functions as well as to the understanding of mechanisms of aphasia and principles of aphasia rehabilitation are discussed. Comparisons with European and North American contributions and with contributions from later Russian writing (e.g., Luria's period) are presented to demonstrate their interconnections in shaping the course of Russian aphasiology.     

Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism

I begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks to demonstrate, on the one hand, that a woman needs to recognize her own identity but, on the other hand, that each subject whether male or female must struggle in relation to the other in order to maintain realism about life and death. No one can avoid the recognition that we are each given life but each of us also dies. In addition, I raise a more general, philosophical problem for analytic philosophers who attempt to read Continental philosophy of religion: how should philosophers interpret deliberately ambiguous assertions? For example, what does Irigaray mean in asserting, ‘Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign’? To find an answer, I turn to the distinctively French readings of the Hegelian struggle for recognition which have preoccupied Continental philosophers especially since the first half of the last century. I explore the struggle for mutual recognition between women and men who must face the reality of life and death in order to avoid the projection of their fear of mortality onto the other sex. This includes a critical look at Irigaray’s account of subjectivity and divinity. I turn to the French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff in order to shift the focus from divinity to intersubjectivity. I conclude that taking seriously the struggle for mutual recognition between subjects forces contemporary philosophers of religion to be realist in their living and dying. With this in mind, the lesson from the Continent for philosophy of religion is that we must not stop yearning for recognition. Indeed, we must even risk our autonomy/divinity in seeking to recognize intersubjectivity.     

Applied behavior analysis at West Virginia University: A brief history

The development of an emphasis on applied behavior analysis in the Department of Psychology at West Virginia University is traced. The emphasis began primarily in the early 1970s, under the leadership of Roger Maley and Jon Krapfl, and has continued to expand and evolve with the participation of numerous behavior analysts and behavior therapists, both inside and outside the department. The development has been facilitated by several factors: establishment of a strong behavioral emphasis in the three Clinical graduate programs; change of the graduate program in Experimental Psychology to a program in basic Behavior Analysis; development of nonclinical applied behavior analysis within the Behavior Analysis program; establishment of a joint graduate program with Educational Psychology; establishment of a Community/Systems graduate program; and organization of numerous conferences. Several factors are described that seem to assure a stable role for behavior analysis in the department: a stable and supportive "culture" within the department; American Psychological Association accreditation of the clinical training; a good reputation both within the university and in psychology; and a broader community of behavior analysts and behavior therapists.     

A brief history of the psychology course in American high schools.

Psychology has been a part of the high school curriculum for the past 170 years in a variety of forms, in classes labeled mental and moral philosophy mental hygiene, personal adjustment, child development, human relations, and psychology. This abbreviated and selective account traces that history, including the considerable role played by the American Psychological Association. This history focuses on the social and educational contexts that led to changes in the nature of high school psychology classes and concludes with comments about the value of precollege psychology classes.     

A dilemma for internal realism

Conclusion Given my dilemma, then, we should think twice before following Putnam away from metaphysical realism. Internal realism can offer only a false sense of philosophical security. And now we may doubt that it can offer even that.     

结构实在论评析

The epistemological version of structural realism, proposed by Cao Tianyu, has great influence in the philosophy of science. Syntheses has published a special volume discussing the topic. Cao criticizes anti-realism, as well as the epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism. From the concepts of structure, ontology, and construction, he analyzes the objectivity of scientific theories as having five aspects: construction, historicity, holism, revision, and revolution. This paper systematically analyzes and comments on Cao's structural realism. The author agrees with his criticism of the under-determination thesis, is neutral to his argument against ontological discontinuity, and questions his universal language argument. Translated by Yu Jinlong from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (11): 34–38     

A defence of informational structural realism

This is the revised version of an invited keynote lecture delivered at the 1st Australian Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP@AU; the Australian National University in Canberra, 31 October–2 November, 2003). The paper is divided into two parts. The first part defends an informational approach to structural realism. It does so in three steps. First, it is shown that, within the debate about structural realism (SR), epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are reconcilable. It follows that a version of OSR is defensible from a structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that a version of OSR is also plausible, because not all relata (structured entities) are logically prior to relations (structures). Third, it is shown that a version of OSR is also applicable to both sub-observable (unobservable and instrumentally-only observable) and observable entities, by developing its ontology of structural objects in terms of informational objects. The outcome is informational structural realism, a version of OSR supporting the ontological commitment to a view of the world as the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. The paper has been discussed by several colleagues and, in the second half, ten objections that have been moved to the proposal are answered in order to clarify it further.