Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: a reply to Barrett et al. (2006)

This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.     

The brain makes a distinction between hard and easy stimuli: comments on Beretta et al

The Beretta et al. study tested an invalid prediction concerning connectionist models of inflectional morphology and the study exhibits a confound between type of stimulus (regular, irregular) and processing difficulty (easy, hard) that invalidates their conclusions. Harder stimuli produced greater activation across a broader range of brain areas, as in previous studies, but the data have no bearing on the rules vs. connections debate.     

On the importance of models in interpreting remember-know experiments: comments on Gardiner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis

From a meta-analysis of recognition experiments using the remember-know-guess paradigm, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (2002) reported two findings that they viewed as evidence against the one-dimensional model for that paradigm: (1) Memory strength increased when know responses were added to remember responses, decreasing when guess responses were also included. (2) The accuracy of guess responses was correlated with the location of the old-new criterion in the one-dimensional model for the paradigm, implying that guesses were influenced by decision processes. We question both findings. The first result is contradicted by a signal-detection (SDT) analysis, which shows that both know and guess responses reduced estimated memory strength. The discrepancy results from the properties of A', the measure of accuracy used by Gardiner et al., which we argue is flawed. The second result follows directly from the one-dimensional model, in which accuracy and response criteria are fixed. The authors' reasons for rejecting the one-dimensional model are thus not persuasive, but it can nonetheless be rejected because ROC curves implied by the data are inconsistent with ROCs derived from ratings experiments. A two-dimensional SDT model (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004) accounts for both sets of data. The analysis illustrates the importance of models in interpreting remember--know data.     

"Square-wave stimuli" and neonatal auditory behavior: some comments on Ashton (1971), Hutt el al. (1968) and Lenard et al. (1969)

Recent work reporting neonatal auditory responses to complex tones generated by applying electrical square-wave stimuli to loudspeakers is reviewed with reference to the nature of the acoustic stimulus. Attention is particularly drawn to the harmonic structure of such tones in relation to the nonlinear frequency response of small loudspeakers. A $\text{1}\text{3}\text{-}\text{octave}$ band analysis of some “square-wave tones” is given to illustrate the difficulties of interpreting the results of work using such complex stimuli. The findings of the previous studies are ascribed essentially to differences in the stimulus bandwidth, rather than to differences in audiofrequency, and difficulties apparently generated by using differences in stimulus bandwidth as the sole explanation are at least partially resolved.     

Social Identity, System Justification, and Social Dominance: Commentary on Reicher, Jost et al., and Sidanius et al.

The articles by Reicher (2004 ), Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004 ), and Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin (2004 ) discuss the strengths and weaknesses of social identity theory ( Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ), system justification theory ( Jost & Banaji, 1994 ), and social dominance theory ( Sidanius, 1993 ). The latter two theories grew out of a critique of social identity theory, but this critique relates more to deficiencies in social identity research than to deficiencies in the theory itself. More balanced and comprehensive social identity research is required in order to allow a fair assessment of the theory's limitations. In addition, Reicher (2004 ) and Huddy (2004 ) are correct that only social identity theory offers the potential for explaining social change and social stability.     

Lessons From Markey et al. (2015) and Bushman et al. (2015): Sensationalism and Integrity in Media Research

This article presents a response to the comment by B. J. Bushman, D. Romer, and P. E. Jamieson (2015). This reply addresses 2 issues raised by the commenters. First, they claim they and others have not made sensationalistic statements linking violent media to horrific acts of real‐world violence. In response, we supply numerous examples of sensationalistic statements made by them and others. Second, they claim they did not expect violence in films to be related to violent behavior among adults, but only among youths. However, by examining homicide arrests and homicide gun mortality rates among youths, we found that as films have become increasingly violent over time, both homicide arrests and gun‐related homicides have tended to decrease among this age group.     

Mutual Suppression: Comment on Paulhus et al. (2004)

Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, and Tracy (Multivariate Behavioral Research, 2004 Paulhus, D. L., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H. and Tracy, J. L. 2004. Two replicable suppressor situations in personality research. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39: 303–328. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 39, 305–328) suggested that the three types of two-predictor suppression situations—classical suppression, cooperative suppression, and net suppression—-can all be considered special cases of mutual suppression, in that the magnitude of each of the two standardized partial regression coefficients exceeds the magnitude of its corresponding standardized bivariate regression coefficient. Classical suppression and cooperative suppression can be considered mutual suppression, but net suppression cannot. Hypothetical and empirical examples of net suppression in which the magnitude of the standardized partial regression coefficient for the suppressor variable is greater than, equal to, and less than the magnitude of its standardized bivariate regression coefficient are provided. The empirical examples were drawn from the social psychology literature relating psychological well-being outcomes to life aspirations.