Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Perceptual‐cognitive expertise in sport and its acquisition: Implications for applied cognitive psychology

We review contemporary research on perceptual‐cognitive expertise in sport and consider implications for those working in the field of applied cognitive psychology. We identify the important perceptual‐cognitive skills that facilitate anticipation in sport and illustrate how these skills interact in a dynamic manner during performance. We also highlight our current understanding of how these skills are acquired and consider the extent to which the underlying processes are specific to a particular domain and role within that domain. Next, we briefly review recent attempts to facilitate the acquisition of perceptual‐cognitive expertise using simulation training coupled with instruction and feedback on task performance. Finally, we discuss how research on elite athletes can help inform applied cognitive psychologists who are interested in capturing and enhancing perceptual‐cognitive expertise across various domains. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.