Minding the gap between positivism and hermeneutics in psychoanalytic research

Two quite different cultures are to be found within psychoanalysis, one more clinical in orientation, more focused on meaning and interpretation, and relying primarily on the traditional case study method, the other more research-oriented, focused on cause-and-effect relationships, and relying primarily on methods borrowed from the natural and social sciences. The history of this divide is reviewed and arguments, pro and con, about the potential contributions of specific types of empirical investigation are discussed. Increasingly, it seems, criticisms concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis are being responded to by empirical research. This has contributed to a growing recognition within the scientific community of the credibility of aspects of psychoanalytic theories and of the effectiveness of psychodynamic treatment. However, some segments of the psychoanalytic community are concerned that this increase in the quantity and quality of empirical research on psychoanalytic concepts risks creating an empirical one-sidedness, while other segments are concerned that not engaging in systematic empirical research can lead to intellectual isolation, fragmentation, stagnation, and orthodoxy. To counter this polarizing tendency, a recommendation is made for methodological pluralism. Adopting this stance could contribute to an enriched understanding of the clinical process and to the development of new research methodologies to investigate complex psychodynamic hypotheses, thus bridging the gap between the two psychoanalytic cultures, as well as the gap between research and clinical practice.     

Minding the gap between neuroscientific and psychoanalytic understanding of autism

This paper offers an integrative approach to the increasingly complex puzzle of autistic spectrum disorders. The author demonstrates how the work of one group of neuroscientists in Parma, on a special class of brain cells called ‘mirror neurons', and the work of researchers at the University of California in San Diego, applying these findings to the problem of autism, intersect with Frances Tustin's discoveries about the nature, function and meaning of psychogenic autism in children and even autistic states in neurotic adults. Included in the author's considerations are the results of some by now well-known studies conducted by a group of biologists at the University of California at Berkeley in the 1960s on the effects of ‘enriched’ versus ‘deprived’ environments upon the development of the brain, and a study of autistic children diagnosed as brain damaged and treated psychoanalytically at the Paediatric Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of the University of Rome in the 1980s. The author concludes with a coherent picture of various dimensions of autistic phenomenon that may constitute more than just the sum of its parts, and points towards new areas for discussion and study.     

Minding the gap between feminist identity and attitudes: the behavioral and ideological divide between feminists and non-labelers

Sexism persists in the contemporary United States and has deleterious effects on women and girls. This suggests that feminism--as a movement, a set of attitudes, or an explicit identity--is still warranted. Although feminist attitudes may buffer against the effects of sexism, notably in health domains, we suggest that there may be an ideological divide between those who hold such attitudes while rejecting the identity (non-labelers) and self-identified feminists. Non-labelers engage in less collective action on behalf of women's rights. On the basis of survey responses of 276 college students, non-labelers appear to be self-interested. We argue that disentangling attitudes from identity is crucial for sharpening predictions about the relation of feminism to other psychological and behavioral variables, and for engaging in broader social change. Furthermore, understanding whether non-labelers' rejection of feminist identity is rooted in fear of stigma associated with the label, neoliberal beliefs, or other explanations is important to those organizing for reform.     

Minding Minding God: A Response to Spezio and Bielfeldt

Abstract. Michael Spezio and Dennis Bielfeldt have each raised important issues with regard to my positions in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. In this article I respond to several of their criticisms, including issues of the nature of theology, my stance on epistemology and realism, and issues of physicalism, freedom, and determinism.     

Minding Animals, Minding Earth: Old Brains, New Bottlenecks

Abstract. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth.     

Minding the Gap in Plato's Republic

Philosophical Studies -     

Minding the Is-Ought Gap

The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.     

Perchance to Sleep: Minding the Unworded Body in Psychoanalysis

In contemporary relational psychoanalysis, influenced by developmental/attachment theories, infant research, and neurobiology, the effectiveness and transformational potential of “the talking cure” can be thought of as, at times, located in areas of nonverbal engagement. It has become increasingly evident that human experience is born in the body and structured in body-based memory that informs us of what we “know in our gut” and contributes to our relating as embodied beings—experiences that as psychoanalysts we cannot or need not necessarily translate directly into declarative discourse. A detailed case presentation from work with a patient suffering from a severe sleep disorder and other forms of bodily dysregulation will be offered to illustrate and explore the affectively meaningful engagement between patient and analyst of somatically encoded, presymbolic memory within the context of a symbolically rich, verbal treatment relationship.     

Compulsive perseveration: empirical criticism on the mood-as-input model

It has been proposed that the "Mood as Input" model provides an explanation of the perseverative nature of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) behaviour (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91). The model implies that task perseveration occurs when individuals (a) experience a bad mood and (b) ask themselves "did I do as much as I can?" In two earlier experiments with healthy participants (MacDonald, B. C., & Davey, G. C. L. (2005). A mood-as-input account of perseverative checking: The relationship between stop rules, mood and confidence in having checked successfully. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43, 69-91) it was found that when the allegedly critical conditions were met (negative mood and "did I as much as I can?" stop rule) perseveration occurred on a complex text-correction task. This finding was held to support a "mood as input" explanation of compulsive perseveration. It is important to note, however, that perseveration in clinical samples occurs for very simple "tasks" (e.g. closing a door or washing ones hands) and perseveration does not increase efficacy of performance. In the present study we compared the effects of the original task to effects of text correction tasks that were simpler and more OCD-like. The original effects were replicated: the combination of negative mood and the "did I do as much as I can" stop rule provoked perseveration. Meanwhile, "perseveration" was highly functional: the more "perseveration" the more text-errors were detected. Secondly, to the degree that tasks became simpler and more OCD-like, less checking occurred and the effects of the "did I do as much as I can?" stop rule on detection of errors became smaller. The findings raise questions about the validity of the paradigm as a model of OC perseveration.     

Brain and Machine: Minding the Transhuman Future

Abstract:  Ethical deliberations about brain‐machine interfaces (BMI) focus on how humanity will be changed in imagined future transhuman landscapes. I review some current developments in BMI and suggest that responsible deliberation about BMI proceed by recognizing the typically implicit central role given to the imagined futures and the humans who inhabit them. As responsible deliberators about BMI, we make choices when we engage in "minding the other" that precede and constrain the choices we then make about BMI. I suggest possibilities for such minding that emerge from a theoanthropology grounded in the analogia relationis and that connect to a growing program of neurophenomenology.     

Minding One's Manners: Revisiting Moral Explanations

Philosophical Studies -     

Drawing perseveration in neglect: Effects of target density

In cancellation tasks, patients with unilateral spatial neglect typically fail to mark targets within the side of the sheet contralateral to the side of the lesion (contralesional). Moreover, they can show a perseverative behaviour, which consists in repeatedly cancelling stimuli, mainly in the side of the display ipsilateral to the side of the lesion (ipsilesional). We investigated in 13 right‐brain‐damaged patients with left spatial neglect and perseverative behaviour whether and how different densities of horizontal targets modulated omission and perseverative errors. We found that the density of targets modulated the patients’ distribution of neglect (area of omission), but not its extent, as indexed by the percentage of omissions. Specifically, the area of omissions tightened when target density increased leftwards. On the other hand, target density did not affect the distribution of perseverative behaviour (area of perseveration), as well as its extent, as indexed by the percentage of perseverations. Correlation analyses showed that both the extent and the distribution of omissions were positively correlated to clinical measures of spatial neglect. Conversely, perseverations did not show such a correlation. These findings support the view that two different pathological mechanisms might be involved in left spatial neglect and in ipsilesional perseverative behaviour.