无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

无觉知条件下的客体注意效应

采用双矩形范式变式考察在对客体无觉知的条件下的客体注意效应,共包括两个实验：实验一考察对完整矩形客体无觉知的条件下能否出现客体注意效应,发现在完整矩形客体不可见的情况下依然出现了客体注意效应。实验二考察对虚拟矩形客体无觉知的情况下是否能够出现客体注意效应,发现在虚拟矩形客体不可见的情况下也能够出现客体注意效应。研究结果表明客体注意效应在无觉知条件下依然存在,为注意与觉知在功能上相互分离的观点提供了新的证据。     

No pause for a brief disruption: failures of visual awareness during ongoing events

Past research has repeatedly documented the close relationship between visual attention and awareness. Most recently, research exploring change blindness, inattentional blindness, repetition blindness, and the attentional blink has converged on the conclusion that attention to one aspect of a scene or event may lead to a highly circumscribed awareness of only the specific information attended, while other information, even that which is spatially or temporally nearby can go completely unnoticed. In the present report, we extend these observations to the dynamic allocation of attention during a well-structured meaningful event. In two experiments, subjects viewed brief videos of simple events and were told to pay close attention to them. During the events, an unexpected disruption consisting of a brief low spatial frequency motion field occurred. Despite intensive questioning and opportunities for recognition, the majority of subjects reported no awareness of 200, 400, or 600 ms disruptions. In a second experiment, blank-screen disruptions were added, and these resulted in no increase in detection. We conclude that visual attention may result in far more transitory awareness of visual information than previously appreciated.     

Inhibition of return exaggerates change blindness

Peripheral cues trigger attention shifts, which facilitate perceptual processing and enhance visual awareness. However, this facilitation is superseded by an inhibition of return (IOR) effect, which biases attention away from the cued location. While the link between facilitatory effects of visual attention and awareness is well established, no study has reported negative effects of spatial cueing on visual awareness. This failure is puzzling, given the claim that attention is a necessary precondition for awareness. If attention is necessary for awareness, inhibiting attention should also inhibit awareness. This leads to a slightly counterintuitive prediction: Spatial cueing will inhibit awareness at long cue–target latencies. This study shows that subliminal peripheral cues exaggerate change blindness at long cue–change latencies, demonstrating that IOR can suppress visual awareness of changes and suggesting that IOR can directly affect the contents of consciousness.     

Vision outside the focus of attention

We investigated the relationship between focal attention and a feature-gradient detection that is performed in a parallel manner. We found that a feature gradient can be detected without measurable impairment of performance even while a concurrent form-recognition task is carried out. In spite of the fact that the form-recognition task engages focal attention and thus removes attentive resources from the vicinity of the feature gradient. This outcome suggests strongly that certain perceptions concerning salient boundaries and singularities in a visual scene can be accomplished without the aid of resource-limited processes, such as focal attention, and, by implication, that there may exist two distinct perceptual faculties (one attentive, the other not) that are able to bring complementary kinds of visual information simultaneously to our awareness.     

Modularity and attention: Is the binding problem real?

Abstract

Van der Heijden rejects the feature integration theory of visual attention (Treisman, 1988, 1993; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) and proposes instead a theory relating modularity in the visual system to selection for action. His positive proposals about the relations between visual processing, intention, and selection for action are interesting, but I do not believe they are incompatible with my theory. In this paper I will focus on and question his arguments about the binding problem and the role of attention in visual perception. Van der Heijden attacks two claims that are fundamental to my theory: (1) the idea that modularity gives rise to a “binding problem” (the need to specify which of the features present characterize any particular object), and (2) the more general idea that there are limits to capacity at the level of perceptual processing. I will argue that he is wrong to reject the two claims, that the binding problem is a real one, for his model as for others, and that his account is more similar to mine than he appears to realize.     

The role of selective attention in visual awareness of stimulus features: Electrophysiological studies

Attention and awareness are closely related, but the nature of their relationship is unclear. The present study explores the timing and temporal evolution of their interaction with event-related potentials. The participants attended to specific conjunctions of spatial frequency and orientation in masked (unaware) and unmasked (aware) visual stimuli. A correlate of awareness appeared 100-200 msec from stimulus onset similarly to both attended and unattended features. Selection negativity (SN), a correlate of attentional selection, emerged in response to both masked and unmasked stimuli after 200 msec. This double dissociation between correlates of awareness and SN suggests that the electrophysiological processes associated with feature-based attentional selection and visual awareness of features can be dissociated from each other at early stages of processing. In a passive task, requiring no attention to the stimuli, early electrophysiological responses (before 200 msec) related to awareness were attenuated, suggesting that focal attention modulates visual awareness earlier than does selective feature-based attention.     

Streams and consciousness: visual awareness and the brain

Vision is our most powerful sense and, arguably, it gives us our most vivid sensory and imaginal experiences. It is also one of the best understood systems in contemporary neuroscience. Yet, contrary to both traditional assumptions and our phenomenological intuition, recent research has shown that vision is not a monolithic system that creates a single general-purpose representation in the brain. For example, selective brain damage can compromise visuomotor control while leaving perception intact, and damage elsewhere can compromise visual perception while leaving visuomotor control intact. Thus, it is becoming apparent that we have two (largely) separate visual systems. One of them is dedicated to the rapid and accurate guidance of our movements: it is a complex and powerful system, and yet it lies outside the realm of our conscious visual awareness. The other seems to provide our perceptual phenomenology, although its primary purpose is probably to provide suitably coded visual inputs for storage in and retrieval from memory. According to this conceptualization, both systems can be seen as serving our behaviour, but each does so on a different time scale. Recent studies suggest that neuropsychological research in humans can play a central role in bridging the gap between neurobiological studies of the monkey's visual system and the search to narrow down the brain mechanisms that mediate our visual awareness.     

Do working memory-driven attention shifts speed up visual awareness?

Previous research has shown that content representations in working memory (WM) can bias attention in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. Using a visual prior-entry procedure, we here investigate whether such WM-driven attention shifts can speed up the conscious awareness of memory-matching relative to memory-mismatching stimuli. Participants were asked to hold a color cue in WM and to subsequently perform a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task by reporting either of two different-colored circles (presented to the left and right of fixation with a variable temporal interval) as having the first onset. One of the two TOJ circles could match the memory cue in color. We found that awareness of the temporal order of the circle onsets was not affected by the contents of WM, even when participants were explicitly informed that one of the TOJ circles would always match the WM contents. The null effect of WM on TOJs was not due to an inability of the memory-matching item to capture attention, since response times to the target in a follow-up experiment were improved when it appeared at the location of the memory-matching item. The present findings suggest that WM-driven attention shifts cannot accelerate phenomenal awareness of matching stimuli in the visual field.     

Binocular rivalry and visual awareness: the role of attention

When the right eye and the left eye view dissimilar scenes, the observer does not experience a stable superimposed percept of the images presented to the two eyes, but instead perceives an alternation between the images seen by each eye. A critical question confronting this robust and intriguing phenomenon of binocular rivalry is how the visual system selects the image to be perceived (dominant). The current main-stream literature emphasizes a bottom-up explanation in which the rivalry stimulus with the higher contour strength has the advantage, and becomes dominant in rivalry. Nevertheless, some workers in the past have favored an attention-selection explanation for binocular rivalry. We investigated the role of attention in binocular rivalry by employing novel psychophysical paradigms which capitalized on several established phenomena (e.g. the Cheshire Cat effect, attention cueing, pop-out effect). Our results revealed two major aspects of attention modulation in binocular rivalry. We found that a dominant image is less likely to be suppressed when voluntary attention is directed to it. This suggests the role of voluntary attention in retaining the dominant image in visual awareness. Second, a rivalry stimulus is more likely to become dominant if accompanied by a pop-out cue (in the same eye and proximity). Since a pop-out cue attracts involuntary attention to its location/eye, this result suggests that cue-mediated involuntary attention can promote the ability of a rivalry stimulus to reach visual awareness.     

Changes in search rate but not in the dynamics of exogenous attention in action videogame players

Many previous studies have shown that the speed of processing in attentionally demanding tasks seems enhanced following habitual action videogame play. However, using one of the diagnostic tasks for efficiency of attentional processing, a visual search task, Castel and collaborators (Castel, Pratt, & Drummond, Acta Psychologica 119:217-230, 2005) reported no difference in visual search rates, instead proposing that action gaming may change response execution time rather than the efficiency of visual selective attention per se. Here we used two hard visual search tasks, one measuring reaction time and the other accuracy, to test whether visual search rate may be changed by action videogame play. We found greater search rates in the gamer group than in the nongamer controls, consistent with increased efficiency in visual selective attention. We then asked how general the change in attentional throughput noted so far in gamers might be by testing whether exogenous attentional cues would lead to a disproportional enhancement in throughput in gamers as compared to nongamers. Interestingly, exogenous cues were found to enhance throughput equivalently between gamers and nongamers, suggesting that not all mechanisms known to enhance throughput are similarly enhanced in action videogamers.     

驾驶员视觉注意对危险识别的影响及作用机制

驾驶中, 有效的视觉注意模式是驾驶员搜索与识别潜在道路危险的先决条件。通过分析驾驶员视觉注意对危险识别的影响, 提出情境意识假设与心理负荷假设。情境意识假设认为, 情境意识的质量决定了驾驶员视觉注意模式的灵活性, 进而影响危险识别。心理负荷假设认为, 心理负荷水平提高, 驾驶员视觉注意趋于集中, 不利于危险识别。建议未来研究可以在比较不同驾驶员情境意识的认知兼容性, 应用汽车驾驶自动化技术降低心理负荷以及检测并区分情境意识与心理负荷的影响等方面加以深入。     

The automaticity of visual statistical learning

The visual environment contains massive amounts of information involving the relations between objects in space and time, and recent studies of visual statistical learning (VSL) have suggested that this information can be automatically extracted by the visual system. The experiments reported in this article explore the automaticity of VSL in several ways, using both explicit familiarity and implicit response-time measures. The results demonstrate that (a) the input to VSL is gated by selective attention, (b) VSL is nevertheless an implicit process because it operates during a cover task and without awareness of the underlying statistical patterns, and (c) VSL constructs abstracted representations that are then invariant to changes in extraneous surface features. These results fuel the conclusion that VSL both is and is not automatic: It requires attention to select the relevant population of stimuli, but the resulting learning then occurs without intent or awareness.     

Foreground–background segmentation and attention: A change blindness study

One of the most debated questions in visual attention research is what factors affect the deployment of attention in the visual scene? Segmentation processes are influential factors, providing candidate objects for further attentional selection, and the relevant literature has concentrated on how figure–ground segmentation mechanisms influence visual attention. However, another crucial process, namely foreground–background segmentation, seems to have been neglected. By using a change blindness paradigm, we explored whether attention is preferentially allocated to the foreground elements or to the background ones. The results indicated that unless attention was voluntarily deployed to the background, large changes in the color of its elements remained unnoticed. In contrast, minor changes in the foreground elements were promptly reported. Differences in change blindness between the two regions of the display indicate that attention is, by default, biased toward the foreground elements. This also supports the phenomenal observations made by Gestaltists, who demonstrated the greater salience of the foreground than the background.     

Pop-out without awareness: unseen feature singletons capture attention only when top-down attention is available

Visual pop-out occurs when a unique visual target (e.g., a feature singleton) is present in a set of homogeneous distractors. However, the role of visual awareness in this process remains unclear. In the experiments reported here, we showed that even though subjects were not aware of a suppressed pop-out display, their subsequent performance on an orientation-discrimination task was significantly better at the pop-out location than at a control location. These results indicate that conscious visual awareness of a feature singleton is not necessary for it to attract attention. Furthermore, the subliminal pop-out effect disappeared when subjects diverted their attention toward a rapid sequential visual presentation task while presented with the same subliminal pop-out display. These results suggest that top-down attention is necessary for the subliminal pop-out effect and that the cognitive processes underlying attention and awareness are somewhat independent.     

Perception d’attributs des visages parlants par le nouveau-né humain

A visual preference method is used for studying how human newborns can process internal characteristics on speaking faces in a multimodal context. In a first experiment, two mobile faces associated with a speech sound are opposed: one is clear and the other is blurred. A preference for the clear face is observed. A second experiment contrasts two clear faces, showing lip movements respectively congruent and non-congruent with the associated speech sound. No preference is observed in this situation. These results show that newborns process mobile faces by orienting their attention on more information than that corresponding to very low spatial frequencies. It seems however that they cannot detect the correspondences between the lip movements and the associated sounds.     

Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.     

Subjective experience and the attentional lapse: task engagement and disengagement during sustained attention

Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience (thought probes and questionnaires) to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance (reaction time and errors) and psycho-physiological measures (heart rate and galvanic skin response). This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART, Robertson, Manly, Adrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: (A) task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded disengagement from the task and (B) a pre-occupation with one's task performance that seems to be best conceptualised as a strategic attempt to deploy attentional resources in response to a perception of environmental demands which exceed ones ability to perform the task. The implications of these findings for our understanding of how awareness is maintained on task relevant material during periods of sustained attention are discussed.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

Spatial distortion induced by imperceptible visual stimuli

Previous studies have explored the effects of attention on spatial representation. Specifically, in the attentional repulsion effect, a transient visual cue that captures attention has been shown to alter the perceived position of a target stimulus to the direction away from the cue. The effect is also susceptible to retrospective influence, that attention appears to attract the target when the cue appears afterwards. This study examined the necessity of visual awareness of the cue in these phenomena. We found that when the cues were rendered invisible by backward visual masks, both repulsion and attraction effects were weakened but still observed. The results suggest that the effects possibly depend on processes that are not necessarily associated with conscious visual awareness of the cues. We conjecture that attentional shift produced by the weak, invisible cues may play a role in spatial distortion; but other possible accounts including non-attentional ones are also discussed.