Selflessness Meets Higher and More Stable Happiness: An Experience Sampling Study of the Joint Dynamics of Selflessness and Happiness

Previous studies have demonstrated the existence of a positive relationship between selflessness and happiness. However, none of these studies yet differentiated the between—and within—person levels of analysis. Moreover, the Selflessness/Selfcenteredness Happiness Model (SSHM) suggests that selflessness might stabilize happiness. In this experience sampling study, we explored the relationships between selflessness and happiness—baseline and stability—at both the within and betweenperson levels. During five consecutive days, participants responded seven times a day to short questions about happiness and selflessness. Our results showed that more selfless individuals were happier and that more selfless moments of an individual were also happier moments. Moreover, more selfless individuals were more stable from one day to the other. Finally, people becoming more selfless experienced more happiness stability at the following assessment moment and the next day. This study brings new evidence of the importance of selflessness for happiness.

     

The seventh servant: The implications of a truth drive in Bions theory of 'O'

Drawing upon Bion's published works on the subjects of truth, dreaming, alpha‐function and transformations in ‘O’, the author independently postulates that there exists a ‘truth instinctual drive’ that subserves a truth principle, the latter of which is associated with the reality principle. Further, he suggests, following Bion's postulation, that ‘alpha‐function’ and dreaming/phantasying constitute unconscious thinking processes and that they mediate the activity of this ‘truth drive’ (quest, pulsion), which the author hypothesizes constitutes another aspect of a larger entity that also includes the epistemophilic component drive. It purportedly seeks and transmits as well as includes what Bion (1965, pp. 147‐9) calls ‘O’, the ‘Absolute Truth, Ultimate Reality, O’ (also associated with infi nity, noumena or things‐in‐themselves, and ‘godhead’) (1970, p. 26). It is further hypothesized that the truth drive functions in collaboration with an ‘unconscious consciousness’ that is associated with the faculty of ‘attention’, which is also known as ‘intuition’. It is responsive to internal psychical reality and constitutes Bion's ‘seventh servant’. O, the ultimate landscape of psychoanalysis, has many dimensions, but the one that seems to interest Bion is that of the emotional experience of the analysand's and the analyst's ‘evolving O’ respectively (1970, p. 52) during the analytic session. The author thus hypothesizes that a sense of truth presents itself to the subject as a quest for truth which has the quality and force of an instinctual drive and constitutes the counterpart to the epistemophilic drive. This ‘truth quest’ or ‘drive’ is hypothesized to be the source of the generation of the emotional truth of one's ongoing experiences, both conscious and unconscious. It is proposed that emotions are beacons of truth in regard to the acceptance of reality. The concepts of an emotional truth drive and a truth principle would help us understand why analysands are able to accept analysts’ interpretations that favor the operation of the reality principle over the pleasure principle—because of what is postulated as their overriding adaptive need for truth. Ultimately, it would seem that Bion's legacy of truth aims at integrating fi nite man with infi nite man.     

Participation by being: Teenage girls' hanging out at the shopping mall as ‘dwelling with’ [the world]

In this paper, I talk about young teenage girls' hanging out at the shopping mall. I approach hanging out as ‘dwelling with’ commercial spaces by thinking of it as 1) a meaningful practical engagement, and as 2) marking and claiming spaces as one's own. Hanging out with friends often goes on without much reflection, but it is deeply affectual. Because hanging out is wonderfully purposeless, space is cleared for the inspiring mood of enchantment. This receptivity can make ‘dwelling with’ possible. Hanging out can be conceptualized as playful being-in-the-world that allows for improvisations with one's surroundings in movement: an event of different rhythm, openness and experiment. By drifting at the mall, ‘actively doing nothing’, girls are open to the new and surprising. Therefore, hanging out can provide a momentary way out from the seriousness of adult life and make space for enchantment. A micro-atmosphere of play is produced when girls engage with the commercial space and artifacts. A kind of counter-politics of affect actuates from the intra-active play between girls and the things that matter to them. While hanging out, girls make temporary ‘hangout homes’ for themselves, and acquire situated rights to spaces by dwelling with them.     

II. The business of anthologies

This article examines Nozick's claim (in Anarchy, State and Utopia) to have shown that a commitment to individual liberties requires acceptance of full capitalist property rights. The main gap in Nozick's argument is that he fails to show how individuals can become entitled to full control over previously unheld resources. Nozick draws on Locke's view that title is acquired by ‘mixing one's labour’. But he excises certain (dubious) premisses on which Locke's theory relies and provides no alternative grounds for thinking that the labourer is entitled to full control over his product.     

Exposure to national flags reduces tax evasion: Evidence from the United States,Australia, and Britain

There have been numerous theories from numerous academic fields explaining why individuals engage in tax evasion. Drawing broadly on Social Identity Theory, we predict that exposure to one's national flag can reduce tax evasion by making salient one's national identity, motivating one to sacrifice one's self-interests for one's country—which would presumably include paying one's fair share of taxes. In three experiments, we found that exposure to American, Australian, and British flags reduced Americans', Australians', and Britons' tax evasion in financially incentivized tasks (Experiments 1, 3) and increased tax-paying attitudes (Experiment 2). The effects arose because flag primes made salient participants' national identities that then motivated them to help their country. We ruled out social norms and trust in authorities as alternative explanations. As such, flag primes might reduce tax evasion and in doing so improve the economic and societal welfare of a country.     

Children's supernatural thinking as a signalling behaviour in early childhood

In this study, we analysed the reaction times of 137 college students when making decisions on pairs of hypothetical children verbalizing different types of vignettes and/or exhibiting different physical appearance (photographs of faces). Vignettes depicted immature and mature versions of both supernatural (e.g., ‘The sun's not out today because it's mad’ vs. ‘The sun's not out today because the clouds are blocking it’) and natural (‘I can remember all 20 cards!’ vs. ‘I can remember 6 or 7 cards’) explanations to ordinary phenomena. Photographs of children's faces were morphed with a physical appearance of approximately 4–7 years old or approximately 8–10 years old. In earlier research, immature supernatural thinking produced positive‐affect reactions from adults and older adolescents (14–18 years old) towards young children, with cognitive cues being more important than physical‐appearance cues in influencing adults’ judgements. Reaction times to make decisions varied for the Supernatural and Natural vignettes and for the immature and mature vignettes/faces, reflecting the differential cognitive effort adults used for making decisions about aspects of children's physical appearance and verbal expressions. The findings were interpreted in terms of the critical role that young children's immature supernatural thinking has on adults’ perception, analogous to the evolved role of immature physical features on adults’ perception of infants.     

The effects of cognitive activity and perceptual details on speech source monitoring

Our purpose in this study was to investigate the effects of cognitive operations and perceptual details on speech source monitoring. In Phase 1, correctly spelled words and anagrams were presented in Expt 1. Words were read aloud by participants, by a same‐sex voice, or by an opposite‐sex voice. Immediately after Phase 1, in Phase 2, participants were asked whether each word had been read aloud by the participants themselves, by a same‐sex voice, or by an opposite‐sex voice. Source discrimination between own speech and that produced by a same‐sex voice was poorer than between own speech and an opposite‐sex voice. In addition, misattribution of the speech of another to one's self increased as the level of cognitive effort required for the task increased. In Expt 2, misattributions to same‐sex voice were assigned ‘know’ responses more frequently and misattributions to one's self were assigned ‘remember’ responses more frequently. These results suggest that qualitative characteristics such as perceptual detail and cognitive operations are differentially influencing misattributions to the self and those to same‐sex voices.     

Group influence and the psychology of cultism within re-evaluation counselling: A critique

Re-evaluation counselling (often known as co-counselling, or simply RC) has recently been described as an ‘innovative’ form of therapy, despite the fact that it has existed for over forty years. It has also been suggested that it is, or is becoming, a psychotherapy ‘cult.’ This paper discusses the key theoretical ideas of re-evaluation counselling (RC) and assesses the extent to which some of these ideas could enable unscrupulous therapists to engineer artificial consent and impose their own belief systems on clients. RC's strong reliance on group based activities is also explored, and the extent to which this facilitates unthinking conformity is considered. Finally, guidelines are discussed which enable therapists and would-be clients to assess more clearly the potentially negative effects of involvement in groups such as RC.     

AGENCY AND AWARENESS

I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X‐ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X‐ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X‐ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X‐ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the exercise of agential control, between acting on a conscious goal (even one the agent is not actively thinking about) and acting on a non‐conscious goal (about which the sincerely ‘clueless’ response ‘I didn't realize I was doing that’ could be provided). After raising some doubts about the target idea, I consider the two most promising lines of defence. I argue that neither is convincing, and that we should reject the suggestion that the idea is properly accepted as a matter of common sense. Even absent any conscious goal related to X‐ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X‐ing, there is room for counting X‐ing as intentional if X‐ing is, or is appropriately related to, a non‐conscious goal.     

Hyper‐affiliation to the Religious In‐group Among British Pakistani Muslim Gay Men

This article examines how British Muslim gay men may safeguard membership in the religious group, which can be threatened as a result of self‐identifying as gay. Twenty British Pakistani Muslim gay men were interviewed. Data were analyze using an interpretative phenomenological analysis through the heuristic lens of identity process theory. The following themes are discussed: (i) ‘gay identity casting doubt upon one's Muslim‐ness’; (ii) ‘Ramadan: a symbolic opportunity to be a “true Muslim”’; and (iii) ‘accepting “Muslim views” and religious authenticity’. Data suggest that threatened Muslim identity can lead to hyper‐affiliation to the religious in‐group, which is achieved through a multitude of substrategies. Practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Radical Interpretation’ and the Assessment of Decision‐Making Capacity

The assessment of patients' decision‐making capacity (DMC) has become an important area of clinical practice, and since it provides the gateway for a consideration of non‐consensual treatment, has major ethical implications. Tests of DMC such as under the Mental Capacity Act (2005) for England and Wales aim at supporting autonomy and reducing unwarranted paternalism by being ‘procedural’, focusing on how the person arrived at a treatment decision. In practice, it is difficult, especially in problematic or borderline cases, to avoid a consideration of beliefs and values; that is, of the substantive content of ideas rather than simple ‘cognitive’ or procedural abilities. However, little attention has been paid to how beliefs and values might be assessed in the clinical context and what kind of ‘objectivity’ is possible. We argue that key aspects of Donald Davidson's ideas of ‘Radical Interpretation’ and the ‘Principle of Charity’ provide useful guidance as to how clinicians might approach the question of whether an apparent disturbance in a person's thinking about beliefs or values undermines their DMC. A case example is provided, and a number of implications for clinical practice are discussed.     

I,me, and mine—how products become consumers' extended selves

• Consumer research literature has recognized the consumers' use of products and brands as props to their self‐identity. While this literature has illuminated that products indeed serve to extend one's sense of self, the concept of ‘self’ itself is under‐identified. In this conceptual essay, we propose a set of components that make up one's sense of self. Then we identify processes through which possessions become associated with one's identity or self‐concept. We suggest the utility of using the proposed framework in practice for consumers' self‐concept profiles, and for linking brands to appropriate components of ‘self.’ Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

     

Accessing the multitude within: A psychoanalytic perspective on the transformation of masculinity at mid‐life1

This paper reflects upon the essential components of male identity that commonly are reworked in middle age. The author argues that healthy masculine gender identity involves an ongoing, plastic process of destabilization and reconstruction at various pivotal developmental stages, particularly during middle adulthood. In essence, a man's mature transformation of his sense of masculinity results when finite concepts of gender identity are superseded by an awareness of the complexity of one's multiple, early and diverse gender identifications. A clinical case provides insight into how psychoanalytic treatment can contribute to a new experience of masculinity. The case illustrates how a maturing man, meeting an altered sense of identity in mid‐life, relies less on gender splitting and more on reuniting previously antithetical intrapsychic elements. Why this more pluralistic, polythreaded masculinity frequently must wait until mid‐life is further clarified. Specific importance is attached to the early development of male gender identity as it is founded on the boy's unique struggles in separating from his mother. The foundation for male gender identity formation is reconsidered as the author questions the ‘dis‐identification’ model while explicating how the boy's striving for narcissistic completion shapes the gendered masculine ego ideal. Classically termed ‘phallicism’ is understood both to facilitate and obstruct a man's adult development, while the concept of ‘genitality’ is augmented by the postclassical notion of ‘interiority’. At mid‐life, ‘phallic’ ego ideals (resting on omnipotence, desires for narcissistic completion and gender splitting) are transformed into more realistic, ‘genital’ ego ideals (synthesizing autonomy and connection). The achievement of a mature, less sharply gendered ‘masculine’ ego ideal (revitalizing the foreclosed dimensions of both the early maternal and paternal imagos) occurs as the balance of forces shifts in the direction of true genitality rather than defensive phallicism.     

A localist solution to the regress of epistemic justification

Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the ‘localist’ idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one only needs to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all at one sitting.     

Orientation,containment and the emergence of symbolic thinking

Orientation is viewed in this paper as an important dimension of containment for the development of thinking. Orientation refers to the particular positioning in space and time of mother and infant so they can find one another and then containment can take place. Bion's container–contained model for the development of thinking is based on the capacity of the mother's mind to function as a ‘home’ for the infant's primitive projections. Containment and orientation are explored in relation to an ancient Greek object called ‘σ?μβολον’ [symbolon], which I use here as a metaphor for the early negotiation between mother and infant to achieve a correct matching to each other's orientation. This is then mobilized and re‐enacted between analyst and patient in the psychoanalytic process. Orientation as part of the container–contained model enables us to view the development of thinking from a new perspective with greater integration of cognitive and emotional aspects. The clinical implication of the concept of orientation is explored in relation to the process of engagement/disengagement between analyst and patient and is illustrated by clinical material.     

Commitment and Reasons – A Comment on Ruth Chang, ‘Three Dogmas of Normativity’

Ruth Chang has argued convincingly that we must recognize that some choices will not involve strict, univocal comparison of options. How, then, can such choices be made well? Chang suggests that commitment is a fundamental way of ‘putting one's very self’ behind a normative consideration, thereby ‘endow[ing] that consideration with the normativity of a reason’. This view challenges what Chang deems to be three dogmas of normativity, and the current comment critically assesses the relation of her view to the first and third of these dogmas. I suggest some alternative ways of thinking about these dogmas, which enable us to see how her work might uncover a fourth dogma, and which can, I believe, lend strength to a position very close to Chang's.     

Jung and Lévy-Bruhl

Abstract: For his knowledge of ‘primitive’ peoples, C. G. Jung relied on the work of Lucien Lévy‐Bruhl (1857–1939), a French philosopher who in mid‐career became an armchair anthropologist. In a series of books from 1910 on, Lévy‐Bruhl asserted that ‘primitive’ peoples had been misunderstood by modern Westerners. Rather than thinking like moderns, just less rigorously, ‘primitives’ harbour a mentality of their own. ‘Primitive’ thinking is both ‘mystical’ and ‘prelogical’. By ‘mystical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ peoples experience the world as identical with themselves. Their relationship to the world, including to fellow human beings, is that of participation mystique. By ‘prelogical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ thinking is indifferent to contradictions. ‘Primitive’ peoples deem all things identical with one another yet somehow still distinct. A human is at once a tree and still a human being. Jung accepted unquestioningly Lévy‐Bruhl's depiction of the ‘primitive’ mind, even when Jung, unlike Lévy‐Bruhl, journeyed to the field to see ‘primitive’ peoples firsthand. But Jung altered Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ mentality in three key ways. First, he psychologized it. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is to be explained sociologically, for Jung it is to be explained psychologically: ‘primitive’ peoples think as they do because they live in a state of unconsciousness. Second, Jung universalized ‘primitive’ mentality. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is ever more being replaced by modern thinking, for Jung ‘primitive’ thinking is the initial psychological state of all human beings. Third, Jung appreciated ‘primitive’ thinking. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is false, for Jung it is true—once it is recognized as an expression not of how the world but of how the unconscious works. I consider, along with the criticisms of Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ thinking by his fellow anthropologists and philosophers, whether Jung in fact grasped all that Lévy‐Bruhl meant by ‘primitive’ thinking.     

IS THERE A TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method.