Democracy,Tolerance, Aquinas

Democracy is more than a collection of institutions, laws, and freely contested sources of authority. It is also an ideal. If we think of this ideal in republican terms, in terms of resistance to domination through the practices of mutual accountability, and if we recall that democratic life invariably comes with loss, then those of us who inhabit a democratic political society will need to locate, and then cultivate, responses to loss that do not undermine our commitment to this ideal. Tolerance, one such response, is widely recognized and yet poorly theorized. Thomas Aquinas did not recognize it, but he did praise and endorse its act, toleration, and he does offer resources for bringing the virtue into focus and identifying some of the distinguishing features of its democratic variant.     

Aquinas, the Trinity and the Limits of Understanding

Abstract:   Thomas's trinitarian doctrine is commonly criticized as being abstract and unbiblical; several writers have offered defences against this charge, but these perhaps ignore too much the genuinely reticent and apophatic aspects of Thomas's thought. In three particular places, it is argued, Thomas can be read as deliberately saying things that are unexplained and unexplainable. The areas considered are: the notion of processions in God; the presentation of the persons as subsistent relations; and the relationship between the subsistent relations and the divine essence.     

托马斯伦理学中的柏拉图主义因素--论托马斯对synderesis与conscientia的区分

托马斯伦理学总体上看虽然主要源于亚里士多德,但这并不排除它在个别理论问题上有其他理论渊源.据此笔者认为,托马斯伦理学中也不乏柏拉图主义因素.本文一方面试图厘清托马斯对于synderesis与conscientia所作的区分,另一方面深人审视这种区分的历史渊源,以期从一个侧面把托马斯伦理学中的柏拉图主义因素彰显出来.     

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I‐II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue‐based interpretation.     

Renegotiating Aquinas

While Roman Catholic feminist ethicists typically endorse moral realism and crosscultural standards of justice, they also have been influenced by the postmodern interrogation of abstract reason and moral universalism. As theologians writing after the Second Vatican Council, they are increasingly sensitive to the communal and ecclesial dimensions of morality and of Christian ethics, and to the integral relation of Christian faith and ethics. This essay will consider two approaches to Catholic feminist ethics that differ in the relative weight they give to constructive work for social justice (realist gender justice ethics), or to the grounding of ethics in prayer and mysticism (postmodern gendered faith ethics). Using critical feminist reappropriations of the theology and ethics of Aquinas as examples, this essay will argue that the two approaches are overlapping and interdependent.     

Aquinas and quantifier mistakes

In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively, Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments.     

Aquinas and modern consequentialism

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories.