Repetition, not number of sources, increases both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the accuracy of eyewitnesses

Are claims more credible when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people's judgments. In Experiment 1, people took part in a “misinformation” study: people first watched a video of a crime and later read eyewitness reports attributed to one or three different eyewitnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, people who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. People were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many eyewitnesses made them. We hypothesize that people interpreted the familiarity of repeated claims as markers of accuracy. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.     

The Acceptability and the Tolerability of Societal Risks: A Capabilities-based Approach

In this paper, we present a Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and social resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals' capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals' capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to acceptable risk. The proposed approach focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on what should be our primary concern when judging the acceptability and the tolerability of risks, namely, how risks impact the well-being of individuals in a society. Also, our Capabilities-based Approach offers a transparent, easily communicable way for determining the acceptability and the tolerability of risks.     

Weighing Risks and Benefits

It is almost universally acknowledged that risks have to be weighed against benefits, but there are different ways to perform the weighing. In conventional risk analysis, collectivist risk-weighing is the standard. This means that an option is accepted if the sum of all individual benefits outweighs the sum of all individual risks. In practices originating in clinical medicine, such as ethical appraisals of clinical trials, individualist risk-weighing is the standard. This implies a much stricter criterion for risk acceptance, namely that the risk to which each individual is exposed should be outweighed by benefits for that same individual. The different choices of risk-weighing methods in different policy areas seem to have emerged from traditional thought patterns and social relations, rather than from explicit deliberations on possible justifications for the alternative ways to weigh risks against benefits. It is not obvious how the prevalent differences in risk-weighing practices can be reconstructed in terms of consistent underlying principles of preventive health or social priority-setting.     

Judgments of risk frequencies: tests of possible cognitive mechanisms

How do people judge which of 2 risks claims more lives per year? The authors specified 4 candidate mechanisms and tested them against people's judgments in 3 risk environments. Two mechanisms, availability by recall and regressed frequency, conformed best to people's choices. The same mechanisms also accounted well for the mapping accuracy of estimates of absolute risk frequencies. Their nearly indistinguishable level of performance is remarkable given their different assumptions about the underlying cognitive processes and the fact that they give rise to different expectations regarding the accuracy of people's inferences. The authors discuss this seeming paradox, the lack of impact of financial incentives on judgmental accuracy, and the dominant interpretation of inaccurate inferences in terms of biased information processing.     

Blessed are the peacemakers: Commentary on making peace in gestational conflicts

The purpose of this commentary on James Nelson's article [1] is to advocate introducing the ethics of care into the arena of gestational conflict. Too often the debate gets stalled in a maternal versus fetal rights headlock. Interventionists stress fetal over maternal rights: they believe education, post-birth prosecution or pre-birth seizure of pregnant women may be permissible. In contrast to interventionists, other philosophers stress that favoring fetal rights treats women like ‘fetal containers’. I question whether we should really consider issues of moral/parental obligations to children in terms of rights. Rather, the language of care should guide moral conduct vis-a-vis children/fetuses. The particularity of each woman's story — the particulars of her human relationships — inform her story. An individual's ability to care is largely a function of whether community cares for her. We must care for others to enable them to care for themselves and their loved ones — born or unborn.     

Pregnancy reduction in Jewish law

10% of infertile women who become pregnant with the aid of hormonal stimulation become pregnant with multiple fetuses. 20% of mothers of triplets experience preeclampsia and 35% risk serious postpartum hemorrhage. Risk increases with the number of fetuses for venous stasis, varicose veins, phlebothrombosis, thrombophlebitis, and embolic phenomena. Risk increases proportionally with increased number of fetuses for fetal morbidity and mortality. Selective abortion is often used as a method of reducing risk to both the woman and the fetuses, thus increasing the chance that 1 or 2 fetuses will be born healthy. A related issue is the selective reduction of fetuses in multiple pregnancies that may have a genetic defect like Hurler's syndrome, microcephaly, Tay-Sachs disease, spina bifida, hemophilia A, or thalassemia major. In cases where 1 fetus in a set of twins is so inclined, the reduction of the defective fetus increased the success of the remaining co-twin. Selective reduction should not pose a problem for Jewish women since the procedure does not violate any Jewish legal or moral rules. In Jewish law an unborn fetus is not considered a person until it is born. Until the 40th day of pregnancy it is considered as 'mere fluid.' In order to stress the positive aspect of selective reduction it should be called "enhanced survival of multifetal pregnancies."     

Diagnosis and treatment of depression during pregnancy

Pregnancy has frequently been described as a time of affective well-being. However, a growing literature suggests that women are neither "protected" against new-onset or recurrence of depression during this time. Diagnosis and effective treatment of depression during pregnancy requires a careful weighing of risk of treatment which may include psychotropic medications against the risks associated with failure to adequately manage affective distress and its potential impact of maternal and fetal well-being. Treatment options during pregnancy are reviewed in the context of developing the most appropriate risk/benefit decision for individual patients with past or current depression who either anticipate pregnancy or who become pregnant.     

The perils of protection: vulnerability and women in clinical research

Subpart B of 45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 46 (CFR) identifies the criteria according to which research involving pregnant women, human fetuses, and neonates can be conducted ethically in the United States. As such, pregnant women and fetuses fall into a category requiring “additional protections,” often referred to as “vulnerable populations.” The CFR does not define vulnerability, but merely gives examples of vulnerable groups by pointing to different categories of potential research subjects needing additional protections. In this paper, I assess critically the role of this categorization of pregnant women involved in research as “vulnerable,” both as separate entities and in combination with the fetuses they carry. In particular, I do three things: (1) demonstrate that pregnant women qua pregnancy are either not “vulnerable” according to any meaningful definition of that term or that such vulnerability is irrelevant to her status as a research participant; (2) argue that while a fetus may be vulnerable in terms of dependency, this categorization does not equate to the vulnerability of the pregnant woman; and (3) suggest that any vulnerability that appends to women is precisely the result of federal regulations and dubious public perceptions about pregnant women. I conclude by demonstrating how this erroneous characterization of pregnant women as “vulnerable” and its associated protections have not only impeded vital research for pregnant women and their fetuses, but have also negatively affected the inclusion of all women in clinical research.     

Human Nature and World Politics: Cognition,Identity, and Influence

Many psychologists deem it self‐evident that psychology can make fundamental contributions to our understanding of world politics. Many social scientists, however, argue that policymakers are tightly constrained by macro political and economic forces. This article will advance a systemic approach to world politics that challenges: (a) psychologists by highlighting ways in which macro social structures may transform the character of “basic” intrapsychic processes; (b) anti‐psychological theorists by showing that even the most sweepingly deterministic macro claims—for example, claims about the power of free trade to promote peace—rest on controversial assumptions about human nature. Systemic approaches to world politics are far more consistent with how seasoned diplomats—from Dag Hammarskjöld to Henry Kissinger—have historically approached geopolitical problems than are the traditional but increasingly obsolete micro and macro dualities that have dominated academic analyses.     

How do people judge risks: Availability heuristic, affect heuristic, or both?

How does the public reckon which risks to be concerned about? The availability heuristic and the affect heuristic are key accounts of how laypeople judge risks. Yet, these two accounts have never been systematically tested against each other, nor have their predictive powers been examined across different measures of the public's risk perception. In two studies, we gauged risk perception in student samples by employing three measures (frequency, value of a statistical life, and perceived risk) and by using a homogeneous (cancer) and a classic set of heterogeneous causes of death. Based on these judgments of risk, we tested precise models of the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic and different definitions of availability and affect. Overall, availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people's direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people's responses best. We also found direct experience to carry a high degree of ecological validity (and one that clearly surpasses that of affective information). However, the relative impact of affective information (as compared to availability) proved more pronounced in value-of-a-statistical-life and perceived-risk judgments than in risk-frequency judgments. Encounters with risks in the media, in contrast, played a negligible role in people's judgments. Going beyond the assumption of exclusive reliance on either availability or affect, we also found evidence for mechanisms that combine both, either sequentially or in a composite fashion. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications of our results, including how to foster people's risk calibration and the success of education campaigns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Zika virus and pregnant women: A psychological approach

Zika virus presents risk of physical harm to pregnant women, but the fear of infection is also affecting women around the world. There is a gap in the research on Zika virus in the areas involving the impact on the psychosocial well-being of pregnant women. Therefore, this study is aimed at the investigation of the psychosocial adjustment of pregnant women to the risks of Zika virus infection during pregnancy. We investigated 14 pregnant women who were classified in three different groups: six in the first trimester, five in the second trimester and three in the third trimester, aged from 28 to 40 years (33.43 ± 3.76 years). Content analysis was used to interpret data. Our results show that the psychosocial adjustment of participants was significantly negative and included five aspects: (1) negative feelings, (2) changes in family planning, (3) adopting new customs (avoiding places of risk, use of specific clothes and use of repellent), (4) changed attitudes regarding body image and (5) feeling of external demand regarding prevention. The fear of Zika virus infection and all its associated risks have a negative biopsychosocial impact on the pregnant women in this study.     

The Effect of Genetic Counseling on Knowledge and Perceptions Regarding Risks for Breast Cancer

In 1994, a clinic for cancer risk counseling was opened at Hadassah University Hospital in Jerusalem. Most of the counselees have been women who had breast cancer and/or a relative with breast cancer. In order to evaluate the effect of this counseling on women's knowledge and perceptions regarding the risks for breast cancer, a questionnaire was given before and after the counseling session to 60 healthy women who came to the clinic because they have relatives with breast cancer. According to the genetic counselors' estimations, most of these women had a significantly increased risk (compared to the general population) of developing cancer. Before counseling, the women overestimated the population risk for breast cancer, the contribution of heredity to morbidity of cancer, and their own risks to get cancer. After counseling session, they gave reduced estimates, closer to the real ones. The subjective perceptions regarding these risks were reduced after counseling, except for the perceptions regarding their relativerisks which have not changed after the counseling. About 90% of the women who came to the clinic wanted to be tested for genetic predisposition to cancer. For most of these women, the expectations that the test can rule out a genetic predisposition to cancer became more realistic after the counseling. The option to first test an affected relative was offered to all families, and a test was actually conducted in 75% of the families.     

Perinatal substance abuse and human subjects research: are privacy protections adequate?

Privacy incursions in the clinical care of substance abusing pregnant women have gained lay and professional attention recently as the result of a high-profile Supreme Court finding in Ferguson vs City of Charleston et al. In March, 2001 the Supreme Court determined that nonconsensual drug screening of pregnant women by clinicians in a public hospital violated the women's Fourth Amendment rights to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. Coercive or punitive policy approaches to perinatal substance abuse are often based on mistaken assumptions about the nature of addiction and the outcomes of punitive interventions. Much attention has been given to efforts to criminalize pregnancy for drug using women, and civil laws are also coming under increasing scrutiny. Although no state has passed a law criminalizing pregnancy and drug use, an estimated 250 women in more than 30 states have been prosecuted around the country on theories of "fetal abuse." A growing number of states (eighteen to date) have amended their civil child welfare laws to address specifically the subject of a woman's drug use during pregnancy. No one has examined how these laws and social policies could affect research that includes pregnant and parenting women; women (and their families) who stand to lose a great deal should their drug use be brought to the attention of child welfare or criminal justice authorities. We examine the adequacy of current protective mechanisms, such as federal certificates of confidentiality, in protecting research subjects (and investigators) who may be subject to punitive civil or criminal sanctions. We determine that current protective mechanisms may be insufficient to protect research subjects and that investigators and IRB members are often ignorant of the risks imposed by punitive policy approaches to perinatal substance abuse or fall prey to the same mistaken assumptions that inform punitive policies. We conclude that investigators and IRB members have a moral responsibility to understand local, state and national policies and laws governing perinatal substance abuse. Investigators and IRB members should balance the harms of punitive interventions against the protections that may, or may not be afforded to prospective research subjects as well as the prospective benefits, individual and social, of the research. In situations where criminal or punitive policies are in effect, investigators and IRB members should consider whether adequate protections can be achieved. In the context of inadequate protections, potential risks to prospective research subjects and their families may outweigh the individual or social benefits that accrue from the research. Clinical researchers are professionally obligated to work toward amending laws and policies that are not in the best interests of prospective research subjects.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An axiomatic theory of conjoint,expected risk

This paper presents an axiomatization of subjective risk judgments that leads to a representation of risk in terms of seven free parameters. This is shown to have considerable predictive ability for risk judgments made by 10 subjects. The risk function retains many of the features of the expectation models—e.g., a constant number of parameters independent of the number of outcomes—but it also allows for asymmetric effects of transformations on positive and negative outcomes. This arises by axiomatizing independently the behavior with respect to gambles having entirely positive outcomes and those with entirely negative outcomes. Complex gambles are decomposed into these, and zero outcomes, using the expected risk property. The resulting risk function compares favorable with other functions previously suggested. It is also demonstrated that preference judgments are distinct from risk judgments, and that the theory does not apply as well to the former.     

Informed Consent in Implantable BCI Research: Identifying Risks and Exploring Meaning

Implantable brain–computer interface (BCI) technology is an expanding area of engineering research now moving into clinical application. Ensuring meaningful informed consent in implantable BCI research is an ethical imperative. The emerging and rapidly evolving nature of implantable BCI research makes identification of risks, a critical component of informed consent, a challenge. In this paper, 6 core risk domains relevant to implantable BCI research are identified—short and long term safety, cognitive and communicative impairment, inappropriate expectations, involuntariness, affective impairment, and privacy and security. Work in deep brain stimulation provides a useful starting point for understanding this core set of risks in implantable BCI. Three further risk domains—risks pertaining to identity, agency, and stigma—are identified. These risks are not typically part of formalized consent processes. It is important as informed consent practices are further developed for implantable BCI research that attention be paid not just to disclosing core research risks but exploring the meaning of BCI research with potential participants.     

The role of behavioral experience in judging risks.

This study used conditional risk assessments to examine the role of behavioral experiences in risk judgments. Adolescents and young adults (ages 10-30; N = 577) were surveyed on their risk judgments for natural hazards and behavior-linked risks, including their personal experiences with these events. Results indicated that participants who had experienced a natural disaster or engaged in a particular risk behavior estimated their chance of experiencing a negative outcome resulting from that event or behavior as less likely than individuals without such experience. These findings challenge the notion that risk judgments motivate behavior and instead suggest that risk judgments may be reflective of behavioral experiences. The results have implications for health education and risk communication.     

Neural representations not needed - no more pleas,please

Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism one inch—beyond establishing its mere possibility. We criticize the continual confounding of constitutive and explanatory claims and the lack of recognition of a Hard Problem of having to provide a naturalistic account of content, coupled with an inability to face up to it. We point at the inadequacy of various deflationary moves that end up driving representationalists towards the idea of neural representations with non-standard contents or without content altogether, both of which either render neural representationalism unfit for purpose or vacuous. Referring to possibilities for neural manipulation and control, or to established scientific practice does not help representationalism either.     

CHILDHOOD ANTECEDENTS OF ADULT WOMEN'S MASCULINITY, FEMININITY, AND CAREER ROLE CHOICES

This study explores the relationships among childhood activities, masculine and feminine characteristics, and career choices. Sixty–three career women and 62 homemakers ranging in age from 34 to 48 completed a retrospective survey of their childhood activities, interests, aspirations, and academic pursuits. The toys, games, activities, and aspirations listed by the subjects were then assigned masculinity and femininity scores and were used to predict (1) career choice (homemaker or career woman) and (2) current masculinity and femininity as measured by the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ). Adult masculinity was strongly predicted by childhood masculine interests and activities while adult femininity was only weakly predicted by childhood feminine interests and activities. Masculine interests/activities were more powerful in discriminating career women from homemakers than were feminine interests/activities. The results of this study indicate that childhood participation in sex–typed activities is associated with the adult personality characteristics of masculinity and femininity, and adult role choices. These results are discussed in light of longitudinal evidence that suggests that they reflect consistent life–long patterns.     

Tailoring treatment of depression for women across the reproductive lifecycle: the importance of pregnancy, vasomotor symptoms, and other estrogen-related events in psychopharmacology

Compared with men, women are at increased risk of depression, especially at several reproductive-related lifecycle points. This may be partially due to changing levels of estrogen, a hormone that can affect levels of neurotransmitters and neural proteins. As estrogen levels vary throughout the lifespan, risk of depression in women also varies, and not all treatments are appropriate or effective at all times. In adolescence, onset of depression may be associated with onset of puberty, but treating underage girls with antidepressants can risk suicidality. In females of childbearing age, mood disturbances associated with menstrual cycles signal a risk for later full-blown major depressive disorder. In depressed pregnant and postpartum women, risks of treatment versus risks of nontreatment are intricate and require case-by-case evaluation. In perimenopause, vasomotor symptoms may be harbingers of oncoming depression and also may signal the presence of dysregulated hormones and neurotransmitters. Relieving vasomotor symptoms may be a necessary dimension of treating depression. In postmenopause, response to selected antidepressants may depend on whether the patient is also taking hormone-replacement therapy. To attain optimal outcomes, modern psychopharmacologists must tailor treatment of depression to a woman's reproductive stage of life.