Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.     

Theology: Reduction or Autonomy?

Issues of the nature and task of theology remain important to the science-theology dialogue. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the nature of theology in relation to the other sciences. In particular, I argue that the primary question remains one of autonomy and reduction. If theology is a genuine academic discipline, then it should be an autonomous field with its own subject matter and norms. Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is the science of God, but I suggest that theology be more broadly understood as the science of meaning. If we recognize this, the modes of interaction between theology and the other sciences becomes clearer.     

Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.     

Genetics: Can Moral Theology Help?

The article discusses Marc Lappé's use of the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) for justifying Germ Line Gene Therapy as a secondary effect of Somatic Gene Therapy. The author argues that Lappés argumentation is mistaken because it is based on a inadequate interpretation of the PDE's scope and function as a means of moral justification. Through an investigation into the history of PDE in Catholic theology, the author gives arguments that use of PDE relies upon some form of deontological framework which is not present in contemporary bioethics. The author concludes that isolated use of PDE, as Lappé seems to suggest, does therefore not warrant moral justification.     

Lying: Knowledge or belief?

Philosophical Studies - A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon”...     

Can Affect Disengagement Produce Moral Standard Violation?

Bandura has suggested that people can escape the self-regulatory power of internalized moral standards by disengaging the standards, allowing violation. We consider the possibility that disengaging the emotional warning signs of impending self-censure may be sufficient to permit violation. To test this idea, we led some research participants to misattribute to a pill (actually a placebo) any feelings of tension and anxiety evoked by the prospect of violating their standards of fairness. As predicted, participants in the misattribution condition were more likely to self-favor than those in a no-misattribution condition. This effect was mediated by the amount of tension and anxiety attributed to the pill. The role that affect disengagement may play in moral decisions outside the laboratory is discussed.     

What Is the Model of Trust for Multi-agent Systems? Whether or Not E-Trust Applies to Autonomous Agents

A socio-cognitive approach to trust can help us envisage a notion of networked trust for multi-agent systems (MAS) based on different interacting agents. In this framework, the issue is to evaluate whether or not a socio-cognitive analysis of trust can apply to the interactions between human and autonomous agents. Two main arguments support two alternative hypothesis; one suggests that only reliance applies to artificial agents, because predictability of agents’ digital interaction is viewed as an absolute value and human relation is judged to be a necessary requirement for trust. The other suggests that trust may apply to autonomous agents because predictability of agents’ interaction is viewed only as a relative value since the digital normativity that grows out of the communication process between interacting agents in MAS has always deal with some unpredictable outcomes (reduction of uncertainty). Furthermore, human touch is not judged to be a necessary requirement for trust. In this perspective, a diverse notion of trust is elaborated, as trust is no longer conceived only as a relation between interacting agents but, rather, as a relation between cognitive states of control and lack of control (double bind).     

Can Robert Adams Survive Moral Twin Earth?

Richard Boyd and Robert Adams have both developed semantic accounts of moral terms based on Hilary Putnam's causal regulation theory for natural kind terms, according to which the terms in question refer to the properties which predominantly causally regulated the terms. However, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have mounted an objection to Boyd's semantics—their Moral Twin Earth argument. If this argument is successful against Boyd then it might be thought that it should also be successful against Adams, given the similarity between their semantic accounts. I will argue in this essay that Adams's semantics is sufficiently different from Boyd's to enable him to survive Moral Twin Earth, but that he is vulnerable to a modified version of Moral Twin Earth that I describe.     

Autonomy or Dependence – or Both?: Perspectives from Bangladesh

The idea of personal autonomy is central to many accounts of eudaimonic well-being. Yet it is often criticized as a Western concept celebrating individualism and independence over group obligations and interdependence or dependence. This paper rejects this view and argues that coherent accounts of autonomy must always recognize the interdependence of people in groups, and that autonomy can coexist with substantial relationships of dependence. It illustrates this drawing on evidence from Bangladesh, a poor country usually absent from cross-cultural studies and one where personal relationships of hierarchy and dependence are endemic. Argument and evidence are presented showing the coexistence of personal autonomy and dependence, and the relationship between collective action and autonomy. We also address some of the specific problems encountered in researching autonomy in a social context where it is mainly expressed in relational forms. We conclude that autonomy can be directed toward both personal and social goals, and can be enacted individually, or by participation in groups. Autonomy is a universal psychological need but its expression is always contextual. ESRC Research Group on Wellbeing in Developing Countries     

Racism: a Moral or Explanatory Concept?

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -     

Does Moral Virtue Require Knowledge? A Response to Julia Driver

A long-standing tenet of virtue theory is that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way. Julia Driver attacks the traditional assumption that virtue requires knowledge. I argue that the examples of virtues of ignorance Driver offers are not compelling and that the idea that knowledge is required for virtue has been taken to be foundational for virtue theory for good reason. I propose that we understand modesty as involving three conditions: 1) having genuine accomplishments, 2) being aware of the value of these accomplishments, and 3) having a disposition to refrain from putting forward one’s accomplishments. When we understand modesty this way, we can properly identify genuine cases of modesty and see how modesty requires knowledge. Something similar can be said about other alleged virtues of ignorance. With the proposal in place, we have no serious reason to think that moral virtue requires ignorance. Additionally, we have good reasons for thinking that acting virtuously requires having good intentions and that a necessary condition of having a virtue is having knowledge. Although some might take these results to be trivial or obviously true, I think the Julia Driver’s challenge should not be dismissed out of hand. Even though there are some reasons for thinking that some situations suggest that knowledge and virtue can be separated from one another, close analysis reveals this impression is only surface deep.     

Strawson or Straw Man? More on Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community

In a recent article in this journal, I argued against the popular twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. Benjamin De Mesel has offered a number of objections to my argument, including in particular the objection that I mischaracterized Strawson’s view. In this article, I respond to De Mesel’s criticisms.     

Moral Wisdom or Ethical Expertise? (Ⅰ)

在哲学领域,我们应该追求道德智慧,还是追求伦理知识,这是一个颇为重要的问题。“智慧”是哲学的一个组成部分,但它也可能成为“知识炫耀”的根源。正因为如此,哲学探讨有深刻和浅薄之分,有“小聪明”和“大智慧”之别。为了更清楚地说明问题,我们可以到西方哲学的源头——柏拉图和亚里斯多德的著作中去寻求论据。     

Moral Obligations: Actualist,Possibilist, or Hybridist?

Do facts about what an agent would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of her moral obligations? Actualists answer ‘yes’, while possibilists answer ‘no’. We defend two novel hybrid accounts that are alternatives to actualism and possibilism: Dual Obligations Hybridism and Single Obligation Hybridism. By positing two moral ‘oughts’, each account retains the benefits of actualism and possibilism, yet is immune from the prima facie problems that face actualism and possibilism. We conclude by highlighting one substantive difference between our two hybrid accounts.     

Discriminators of Moral Orientation: Gender Role or Personality?

Gender role (i.e., masculinity and femininity), personality traits, age, and level of education were used as discriminators of moral orientation in an examination of their role in the process of moral decision making. Responses of adult participants indicated the justice orientation to be most strongly associated with personality characteristics of judging and intuition; the care orientation was most strongly associated with perceiving and sensing. Masculinity and femininity, however, contributed very little to the analysis. Results indicate moral orientation may be less differentiated by gender role patterns and more by characteristics of the personality, involving perception of information and type of judgment.     

Can Science Be Objective? Longino's Science as Social Knowledge

In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this “contextual empiricism” reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.