Preschool Assessment: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?

This article reviews trends in the assessment of preschool children. Preschool assessment is compared with the assessment of other populations and early history, current status, recent advances, and future needs are discussed. Preschool assessment is seen as having both similarities with and important differences from other types of assessment. Though the last two decades have seen changes in models, procedures, and theories, it is concluded that much remains to be accomplished.     

Content Analysis of Gender Roles in Media: Where Are We Now and Where Should We Go?

This paper provides a commentary regarding the quantitative content analyses of gender roles in media published in the two special issues of Sex Roles (Rudy et al. 2010a, 2011). A few themes and some overarching lessons emerge from the wide variety of data presented. First, it is clear that women are under-represented across a range of media and settings. Second, when women are portrayed, it is often in a circumscribed and negative manner. Women are often sexualized??typically by showing them in scanty or provocative clothing. Women are also subordinated in various ways, as indicated by their facial expressions, body positions, and other factors. Finally, they are shown in traditionally feminine (i.e., stereotyped) roles. Women are portrayed as nonprofessionals, homemakers, wives or parents, and sexual gatekeepers. Although the studies generally support these conclusions, some interesting moderating factors are identified, such as race. It is suggested that next steps involve the development of theory and a body of empirical evidence regarding the effects of exposure to under-representation of women. Data concerning the effects of exposure to sexualized or stereotypical portrayals on young audiences is also lacking. Finally, content analyses of new media, including those created and distributed by users, are recommended as a next step. It is concluded that, while increasing the representation of women in media may be valuable, it is also critical that the manner in which they are portrayed be simultaneously considered to avoid increasing negative or stereotypical depictions that may be particularly harmful to viewers.     

Aging and Spatial Navigation: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go?

Spatial navigation is a complex cognitive skill that is necessary for everyday functioning in the environment. However, navigational skills are not typically measured in most test batteries assessing cognitive aging. The present paper reviews what we know about behavioral differences between older and younger adults in navigational skill and reviews the putative neural mechanisms that may underlie these behavioral differences. Empirical studies to date clearly identify navigation as an aspect of cognitive function that is vulnerable to the aging process. The few functional and structural neuroimaging studies that speak to neurological correlates of these age-related differences point to the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus (retrosplenial cortex), parietal lobes and pre-frontal cortex as structures critically involved in age effects on navigation. Outstanding issues in the field are addressed and productive avenues of future research are suggested. Among these outstanding issues include the necessity of performing longitudinal studies and differentiating between hippocampal and extra-hippocampal contributions to aging in navigation. The field may also be advanced by empirical assessment of navigational strategies and investigations into the multisensory nature of navigation including assessing the relative contributions of visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive function to age differences in navigational skill.     

Where Have We Been, How Did We Get There, and Where Shall We Go?

Commentators expressed a wide variety of views on my evaluation of the state of assessment center (AC) research and practice. In this response, I first trace the evolution of the construct validity paradox "urban legend." Next, I consider the commentators' comments as they relate to (a) my recommendation to abandon dimension-based ACs in lieu of task- or role-based structures (b) my recommendation to discontinue design fix attempts toward making ACs conform to multitrait–multimethod construct validity criteria, and (c) considerations of construct validity and validation evidence. Finally, I offer some directions for future AC research and practice.     

Predicting and Explaining Intentions and Behavior: How Well Are We Doing?

Meta-analyses of research using the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) show that these models explain on average between 40% and 50% of the variance in intention, and between 19% and 38% of the variance in behavior. This paper evaluates the performance of these models in predicting and explaining intentions and behavior. It discusses the distinction between prediction and explanation, the different standards of comparison against which predictive performance can be judged, the use of percentage of variance explained as a measure of effect size, and presents 9 reasons why the models do not always predict as well as we would like them to do.     

Are We Essentially Animals?

Animalism is the view that we human individuals are animals. And standard animalists claim that if we are animals, we are animals essentially. This is because they believe that if we are animals, we are essentially members of the human kind (e.g., human animal, Homo sapiens), and as a result, we have the criterion of identity by virtue of that kind. The goal of this paper is to reject the claim that our being animals implies our essentially being animals. I begin by reformulating the standard animalist's argument for the claim that we are essentially biological entities of some sort. I then argue that the very same argumentative strategy can be applied against standard animalism. Specifically, the standard animalist's reasoning for the claim that we are contingently psychological beings faces a dilemma that undermines the claim that we are animals essentially. In the remainder of the paper, I reply to various objections to my argument and consider a strategy that animalists can pursue in attempting to block the dilemma.     

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.