The functions of moral philosophy

The conception of man as an economic animal is implied by the view that economic production is the determining “factor” or “sphere” of man or society. Against this conception can be put another, that of man as praxis. This takes account of man as a creative being, capable of realizing his freedom through his own activity. In this article the theory of the determining role of the “economic factor”, and the theory of factors in general have been examined. The economic interpretation of history, a variant of the theory of factors, has been acknowledged as partly true for the self‐alienated man and society, but the theory of factors in any variant has been found inadequate as a general theory of man, or society. The possibility of freedom cannot be reduced to the fact that the determining roles played by “factors”, vary, or to the hope that the economic “factor” can be subordinated to a “better” one. Man's freedom consists in his resolving the conflict of “factors”, and in realizing himself as an integral creative being, no longer split into independent and mutually opposed spheres.     

The history of philosophy in contemporary philosophy: The view from Germany

Conclusion I have frequently mentioned objective problems and topics in the preceding sections. But what exactly is the force of objective here? As my remarks should have made clear I have been using objective to contrast with purely historical. A purely historical approach never gets beyond reproduction, commentary, and interpretation. I call an approach objective when it involves a philosopher who advances his own theses and claims.This minimal understanding of objectivity (in the context of my remarks in this paper) by no means implies that there are problems and topics, systems of concepts, methods, and similar factors that are eternal, completely independent of the contingencies of history (of philosophy, of the sciences), that are not relative to a language, to a logic, to a model, etc. Indeed whether there are problems, etc., in just this absolute, atemporal sense is itself a question for systematic philosophy. It seems clear that the formulation of a problem can only take place against a cognitive background of some sort and within some conceptual scheme.³⁴ Such an assumption is made by most if not all analytic philosophers. But the fact that a philosophical tradition recognizes conceptual schemes does not make it a purely historical, non-objective philosophy, in the sense already introduced and described. A philosopher who explicitly accepts a certain conceptual scheme proceeds in an entirely objective and systematic (and not purely historical) manner when, within this framework, he formulates his own theses.This paper is the text of a talk. the title is due to Barry Smith.     

Theological ethics, moral philosophy, and public moral discourse.

The advent and growth of bioethics in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s precipitated an era of public moral discourse, that is, the deliberate attempt to analyze and formulate moral argument for use in public policy. The language for rational discussion of moral matters evolved from the parent disciplines of moral philosophy and theological ethics, as well as from the idioms of a secular, pluralistic world that was searching for policy answers to difficult bioethical questions. This article explores the basis and content of the unique contributions of both theological and philosophical ethics to the development of public moral discourse.     

The role of examples in moral philosophy

Contemporary moral philosophy for the most part relegates examples to a negative role, as counter-examples. In this essay a view is articulated according to which the example has a much more positive and more fundamental role to play in the argumentation of moral philosophy: according to this view, examples may provide grounding for general moral principles. Some of the philosophical implications or presuppositions of such a view of examples are examined.     

The place of Buddhism in Santayana's moral philosophy

Within the moral philosophy of the Spanish‐American philosopher George San‐tayana (1863–1952), reference to Buddhism becomes an essential feature in his formulation of the notion of post‐rational morality, which is that ‘phase’ of morality which involves an effort to subordinate all precepts to one that points to some single eventual good. Post‐rational morality is synonymous with the spiritual life, an essential feature of which is detachment; and this is why the Buddhists can be said to be the ‘true masters’ of the subject. Santayana's claim that Buddhism “suffers from a fundamental contradiction” can also be seen as an opportunity for us to deepen our own understanding of that philosophy.     

The relationship between moral philosophy and medical ethics reconsidered

Medical ethics often is treated as applied ethics, that is, the application of moral philosophy to ethical issues in medicine. In an earlier paper, we examined instances of moral philosophy's influence on medical ethics. We found the applied ethics model inadequate and sketched an alternative model. On this model, practitioners seeking to change morality "appropriate" concepts and theory fragments from moral philosophy to valorize and justify their innovations. Goldilocks-like, five commentators tasted our offerings. Some found them too cold, since they had already abandoned applied ethics; others too hot, since they still find the applied ethics model to their taste. We reply that the appropriation model offers an empirically testable account of the historical relationship between moral philosophy and medical ethics that explains why practitioners appropriate concepts and fragments from moral philosophy. In contrast, the now fashionable common morality theory neither explains moral change nor why practitioners turn to moral philosophy.     

情感儒学:当代哲学家蒙培元的情感哲学

当代著名哲学家、中国哲学史家蒙培元的情感哲学,学界称之为"情感儒学"。他提出了"人是情感的存在"、"情感是人的基本的存在方式"、"儒家哲学是情感哲学"等一系列重要命题。他的哲学思想有"主体""心灵""超越""境界"与"自然"这几个最重要的关键词,并由"情感"观念贯通起来。他有一个重要命题即"情感可以上下其说":往下说,情感与生理心理相联系,就是主体心灵的感性层面,即是一种形而下的自然经验;往上说,情感与实践理性相联系,乃是主体心灵的超越层面,即是一种形而上的超越体验。情感儒学实可谓两千年来儒家主流哲学之大翻转,即颠覆了以宋明儒学为代表的"性本情末""性体情用"的观念架构,回归孔孟的情感本源观念,由此引发了当代儒家哲学研究的"情感转向"。