Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it?

Terrorism has a long history, which continues to unfold, and takes many forms. Notwithstanding these facts, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism. I set forth the definitional issues that underlie the current debate about terrorism. By comparing terrorism with various forms of violence, I argue that it is plausible to construe terrorism as crime and, in support of this, I demonstrate why terrorism cannot be morally justified. Next, I cluster various immediate and long-term approaches intended to prevent terrorism, highlighting psychologically based strategies, such as behavioral profiling, teaching tolerance and citizenship, modifying media images of terrorism, and building peace. In order to understand and respond more effectively to 21st-century terrorism, I advocate adoption of a multidisciplinary, contextually sensitive approach.     

What to do? Upgrade!

The contents of what we transmit in colleges and universities as philosophic traditions need upgrading. But so do the methods of transmission.     

What happens to unplaced internship applicants in psychology?

Placement outcomes of students who did not secure internship offers on Uniform Notification Day 1997 were examined. An initial survey of unplaced students (n = 168) suggested mixed outcomes for students in obtaining sites after notification day, including negative emotional effects as a result of nonplacement. A follow-up survey completed by 77 students (43 who had not been placed during the original survey and 34 who had) suggested generally high satisfaction and optimism with internship and employment outlook despite their experiences with the internship application process. Accreditation concerns, emotional, time, and financial expenditures, and potential courses of action are discussed. Concrete suggestions for improving the selection system are provided.     

What is folk psychology?

Eliminativism has been a major focus of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the last two decades. According to eliminativists, beliefs and other intentional states are the posits of a folk theory of mind standardly called “folk psychology”. That theory, they claim, is radically false and hence beliefs and other intentional states do not exist. We argue that the expression “folk psychology” is ambiguous in an important way. On the one hand, “folk psychology” is used by many philosophers and cognitive scientists to refer to an internally represented theory of human psychology exploited in the prediction of behavior. On the other hand, “folk psychology” is used to refer to the theory of mind implicit in our everyday talk about mental states. We then argue that sorting out the conceptual and terminological confusion surrounding “folk psychology” has major consequences for the eliminativism debate. In particular, if certain models of cognition turn out to be true, then on some readings of “folk psychology” the arguments for eliminativism collapse.     

Incarnational Christian psychology and psychotherapy: What do we believe and what do we do?

The following paper proposes a viewpoint regarding the working assumptions, theology and practice for an “incarnational” psychology or “Christian psychology,” particularly with regard to psychotherapy. This essay is primarily meant to be an affirmation and guide for those Christian psychologists and others working in the allied professions. However, both veteran theorists and newcomers to such inquiry will benefit from this essay. Discussion begins with the dynamic of surrendering and receiving a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The understanding of the unique person as soul: in mind, body, life and spirit is discussed. In addition, the working of the incarnate Holy Spirit is elaborated for both therapist and patient in the regenerative and therapeutic process. Psychopathology is reframed in reference to the Judeo-Christian revelation of sin and evil. In addition, truth, falsity and psychopathology are considered in light of the essentially regenerated man/woman or “new creation” in Christ. Some practical examples for psychotherapeutic intervention are offered, including the unique role of the Christian psychologist and his or her relationship with both patient and Christ. Seven major assumptions of “incarnational” or Christian psychology, which diverge from purely secular (psychological) theory and practice, are presented. Lastly, Christian psychology is distinguished from both “integrated” psychology and theology; and Biblical counseling.

What to do with a forecast?

In the literature one finds two non-equivalent responses to forecasts; deference and updating. Herein it is demonstrated that, under certain conditions, both responses are entirely determined by one’s beliefs as regards the calibration of the forecaster. Further it is argued that the choice as to whether to defer to, or update on, a forecast is determined by the aim of the recipient of that forecast. If the aim of the recipient is to match their credence with the prevailing objective chances, they should defer to the forecast; if it is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast.     

What do parents talk about to infants?

The content of parents' talk is studied here as expressing their conception of their developing infant, from the initial symbiotic fusion to an individual situtated in space, time and society. The topics parents introduce in their speech to their infant reflect the perception and expectations they have of their baby. The social and parental status of fathers and mothers, and the anticipated role and status of the child- and adult-to-be, and in particular the age and gender of the infant, mediate the choice of topics. Parents' spontaneous speech to 3-month- and 9-month-old infants was studied during a diapering episode, before leaving the day-care centre. Five minutes of such a speech was recorded, and each utterance was assigned to a semantic category (e. g. greetings, comments on diapering, on mood). Sex-typing is already noticeable as early as 3 months of age: comments on the present situation and state are more frequent for girls, and comments about absent persons or events more frequent with boys. Both parents contribute to this effect, fathers more than mothers. With age parents become less concerned with immediate problems and more aware of the infant's own performances. First names are used more for boys than for gilrs. As a whole, boys are considered as individuals earlier than girls.     

Homelessness: What is a psychologist to do?

Contrasts person-centered and structural explanations for homelessness. Methodological problems in studies of homeless people tend to exaggerate the role of individual deficits as causes of homelessness. A review of data on the distribution of poverty and of inadequate and unaffordable housing, with special emphasis on families, suggests the importance of structural causes. Data from 700 families requesting shelter and 524 families randomly drawn from the public assistance case load in New York City provide more support for a structural than for an individual deficit model. Individual demographic factors are also important. Implications are drawn for research and action by psychologists.     

Reimagining gender in psychology: What can critical psychology offer?

In this article, I argue that gender is a complex sociocultural construct, yet how gender is accounted for in psychological research is limited. Specifically, psychologists conflate sex with gender, rely on quantifying gender differences and, by implication, conceptualise gender as merely a participant characteristic. To illustrate, I apply this viewpoint to the topic of gender differences in tobacco use/cessation using on a feminist quality appraisal tool. I show how these three issues promote the narrow study of sex/gender differences, despite problems surrounding this inquiry, and reduce insights into the intersection of gender and behaviour. To offer a way forward for psychology, I describe how a critical psychology perspective attends to the complexities of gender and its influence on behaviour. I showcase diverse ways of attending to gender as a sociocultural construct, inviting psychologists to engage with, and reflect on, their gender analyses.     

Placebo and the helsinki declaration — What to do?

The Helsinki Declaration is the ‘gold standard’ — a directive, not a law, on how to conduct controlled studies in humans in conformity with ethical principles. In spite of many discussions about their unsuitability some articles have remained unchanged in the most recent (sixth) revision of the Declaration. The demand to use “the best treatment” excludes use of placebo in the control group and presents an obstacle to the scientific evaluation of a number of drugs and treatments in general. The use of placebo is justified whenever its use does not cause irreversible damage or considerable suffering to the well informed patient. It must be, is, and will be used in the controlled clinical trials of treatments of a great number of diseases especially those which have a tendency to spontaneous improvement, even healing, or have a pronounced psychological component An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 12–13 April, 2003.     

What do philosophers believe?

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual’s views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey also suggest that many of the results of the survey are surprising: philosophers as a whole have quite inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of philosophical views in the profession.     

What does doodling do?

Doodling is a way of passing the time when bored by a lecture or telephone call. Does it improve or hinder attention to the primary task? To answer this question, 40 participants monitored a monotonous mock telephone message for the names of people coming to a party. Half of the group was randomly assigned to a ‘doodling’ condition where they shaded printed shapes while listening to the telephone call. The doodling group performed better on the monitoring task and recalled 29% more information on a surprise memory test. Unlike many dual task situations, doodling while working can be beneficial. Future research could test whether doodling aids cognitive performance by reducing daydreaming. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What do epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other?

Epistemic logic is a multi-faceted theory aimed at targeting notions such as knowledge, belief, information, awareness, memory and other propositional attitudes, by means of logical and semantical tools. These concepts ought to be in the spotlight of cognitive science too, but the two have not yet seriously been explored in cooperation. In this paper, it is shown that a number of possibilities is opened up by attempting to answer the question of what epistemic logic and cognitive science have to do with each other. Among the proposed answers are: (i) new quantified versions of multi-agent epistemic logic capture locutions involving object identification, giving rise to applications in representing knowledge in multi-agent systems and parallel processing. (ii) The framework of game-theoretic semantics for the ensuing logics enjoys increased cognitive plausibility as the true semantics for epistemic notions. (iii) Several recent findings in cognitive neuroscience pertaining to the notions of awareness and explicit versus implicit processing contribute to logical studies. These three connections are explored here from both logical and cognitive perspectives. Reflecting neuroscientific research, new extensions of epistemic logic are defined, increasing formal understanding of unconscious and unaware information processing in the brain, and making the formalism thus amenable to knowledge representation in multi-agent configurations.     

What is a fourdimensionalist to do about temporally extended properties?

Some properties and relations take time to be instantiated. They are not instantiated at a time, but through a temporal interval. Cognitive properties and relations such as understanding and thinking are like this, but also many biological, chemical, and microphysical properties and relations such as absorbing, freezing, radiating, and decaying. In this paper, I make a case for taking seriously such temporally extended properties (TEPs). I argue that they are ubiquitous and that our current theories of persistence would do well to make room for them in their ontology. The focus here is on fourdimensionalism and different ways it can accommodate TEPs. I explore four different ways of dealing with TEPs within a fourdimensionalist framework. These are: (a) to make the objects that bear apparent TEPs temporally more extended or “chunky,” while giving TEPs a reductive or eliminativist treatment in favor of instantaneous properties (IPs); (b) to make a series of objects the bearer of TEP predicates, while, again, holding only to IPs; (c) to endorse TEPs in their own right and take them to be temporally extended in a literal sense; and (d) to hold on to TEPs as atemporal properties and make the exemplification relation temporally extended. I discuss each of these options and highlight the types of problems that a fourdimensionalist faces in attempting to accommodate TEPs. I conclude that fourdimensionalists do not yet have a satisfactory account of TEPs in their hands.