The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: how irrelevant information can bias judged probability

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment.     

The postdiction superiority effect in metacomprehension of text

Metacomprehension accuracy for texts was greater after, rather than before, answering test questions about the texts-a postdiction superiority effect. Although postdiction superiority was found across successive sets of test questions and across successive texts, there was no improvement in metacomprehension accuracy after participants had taken more tests. Neither prediction nor postdiction gamma correlations with test performance improved with successive tests. Although the results are consistent with retrieval hypotheses, they contradict predictions made by test knowledge hypotheses, which state that increasing knowledge of the nature of the tests should increase metacomprehension accuracy.     

判断与决策中的投射偏差

投射偏差是指个体常常会高估未来偏好与当前偏好的一致性, 从而把当前偏好投射到未来的心理倾向性。本文从情感–认知加工、时间修正和心理模拟等视角对投射偏差的心理机制进行了解释, 并概括出投射偏差的内源性(含内脏感觉、情绪状态和需要)和外源性(含事件相关信息、天气状况和选择情境)影响因素, 还总结归纳出投射偏差的三种应对策略, 最后指出了投射偏差在未来研究的方向。     

The truth and bias model of judgment

We present a new model for the general study of how the truth and biases affect human judgment. In the truth and bias model, judgments about the world are pulled by 2 primary forces, the truth force and the bias force, and these 2 forces are interrelated. The truth and bias model differentiates force and value, where the force is the strength of the attraction and the value is the location toward which the judgment is attracted. The model also makes a formal theoretical distinction between bias and moderator variables. Two major classes of biases are discussed: biases that are measured with variables (e.g., assumed similarity) and directional bias, which refers to the extent to which judgments are pulled toward 1 end of the judgment continuum. Moderator variables are conceptualized as variables that affect the accuracy and bias forces but that do not affect judgments directly. We illustrate the model with 4 examples. We discuss the theoretical, empirical, methodological, measurement, and design implications of the model.     

The pursuit of self-interest: self-interest bias in attitude judgment and persuasion

Self-interest affected the direction of attitudes in 4 studies exploring attitude judgment and persuasion. Experiment 1 showed that both self-interest and symbolic concerns predicted attitudes. The biasing role of self-interest in producing the well-known persuasion effects of personal relevance and argument strength was examined by disentangling the competing effects of personal costs and benefits. Experiment 2 used a standard personal relevance manipulation in the absence of supportive arguments and showed that perceptions of personal costs associated with the advocated policy partially mediated its negative effects on attitudes. Experiments 3 and 4 independently manipulated the onset of personal costs associated with an issue and the onset of issue-related benefits conveyed by supportive arguments. Postmessage attitudes were an additive function of personal costs and argument-specified benefits, and perceived costs and benefits biased information processing in a self-interested manner. A revised conception of personal relevance and argument strength is discussed.     

Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation settings: effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment

Ss received consensus information that was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of persuasive message content. In Experiment 1 Ss believed that their processing task was either important or unimportant whereas in Experiment 2 all Ss believed that their task was unimportant. In accord with the heuristic-systematic model's sufficiency principle, high-task-importance Ss exhibited a great deal of systematic processing regardless of congruency, whereas low-importance Ss processed systematically only when they received incongruent messages; in the congruent conditions heuristic processing dominated. Attitude data generally reflected these processing differences and confirmed the additivity and attenuation assumptions of the model. The utility of the sufficiency principle for understanding motivation for elaborative processing and the relevance of the findings to understanding the processing and judgmental effects of expectancy disconfirmation are discussed.     

The interactive effect of working memory and text difficulty on metacomprehension accuracy

We investigated how working memory capacity (WMC) and text difficulty affect metacomprehension accuracy. Participants completed the operation-span test to measure WMC and ability to read expository texts. Under the easy-text condition, participants read 4 texts with increasing local cohesion, whereas under the difficult-text condition, participants read 4 original texts. Participants assigned a comprehension rating to each text and then completed a comprehension test. The results revealed a significant interactive effect of WMC and text difficulty on metacomprehension accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2. Under the easy-text condition, higher-WMC readers monitored their comprehension less accurately than did lower-WMC readers. In contrast, higher-WMC readers monitored their comprehension more accurately than did lower-WMC readers under the difficult-text condition. These results suggest that text difficulty may affect allocation of attentional resources.     

The spotlight effect in social judgment: an egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust--insufficiently--to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena.     

Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment

Human judgment and decision making is distorted by an array of cognitive, perceptual and motivational biases. Recent evidence suggests that people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment - except when that bias is their own. Aside from the general motive to self-enhance, two primary sources of this 'bias blind spot' have been identified. One involves people's heavy weighting of introspective evidence when assessing their own bias, despite the tendency for bias to occur nonconsciously. The other involves people's conviction that their perceptions directly reflect reality, and that those who see things differently are therefore biased. People's tendency to deny their own bias, even while recognizing bias in others, reveals a profound shortcoming in self-awareness, with important consequences for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.     

The ethical judgment of animal research

One hundred sixty subjects acted as members of a hypothetical Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee and evaluated five proposals in which animals were to be used for research or educational purposes. They were asked to approve or reject the proposals and to indicate what factors were important in reaching their ethical decisions. Gender and differences in personal moral philosophy were related to approval decisions. The reasons given for the decisions fell into three main categories: metacognitive statements, factors related to the animal, and factors related to the design of the experiment.     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias.     

The revelation effect in frequency judgment

In three experiments, we explored the revelation effect in a frequency judgment task. Participants estimated the frequency of words that had been presented one, two, four, or eight times. At test, half the words were revealed by completing word fragments, and half were presented intact. Estimated frequencies were reliably higher for revealed than for intact words, and in two of the three experiments, the revelation effect became larger as actual frequency increased. A revelation effect was obtained whether the revealed word was the same as (Experiment 1) or different from (Experiment 2) the word judged for frequency. Frequency estimates were higher for more distorted test items (Experiment 3).     

The dud-alternative effect in likelihood judgment

The judged likelihood of a focal outcome should generally decrease as the list of alternative possibilities increases. For example, the likelihood that a runner will win a race goes down when 2 new entries are added to the field. However, 6 experiments demonstrate that the presence of implausible alternatives (duds) often increases the judged likelihood of a focal outcome. This dud-alternative effect was detected for judgments involving uncertainty about trivia facts and stochastic events. Nonnumeric likelihood measures and betting measures reliably detected the effect, but numeric likelihood measures did not. Time pressure increased the magnitude of the effect. The results were consistent with a contrast-effect account: The inclusion of duds increases the perceived strength of the evidence for the focal outcome, thereby affecting its judged likelihood.     

The role of target information on manual-aiming bias

Three experiments were conducted to examine the role of target information in manual aiming. The key manipulations in this experiment were the use of two target contexts (the two forms of the Müller-Lyer illusion) and the visual conditions under which subjects moved. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that the inward- and outward-pointing arrows biased manual-aiming movements in a manner consistent with their well-known influence on perceptual judgements. The elimination of visual feedback during the aiming movement (Experiment 2), and visual information about the target-aiming layout prior to the movement (Experiment 3) increased the magnitude of the bias. Together, these results demonstrate the strong effect of target information on manual aiming, and specifically, on the movement-planning processes that precede movement.     

教与学的大脑：人际神经科学助推教育研究

如何从神经生理层面刻画教育活动的人际互动模式和动态性是教育神经科学面临的一个重要挑战。人际神经科学视角为其提供了可能的解决途径; 这一新兴的视角通过记录和分析进行同一认知活动时两人或多人大脑活动之间的关联, 来揭示大脑活动的群体模式。目前, 人际神经科学方法已被应用于教育研究, 例如监控教学过程、预测教学效果和识别教学影响因素, 相应的研究成果对教育活动具有重要启示。未来的研究者可以更多地关注不同学习水平的学生大脑的互动机制及人际神经科学方法应用于技能教学及线上教学评估的巨大潜力。     

Confirmation bias in sequential information search after preliminary decisions: an expansion of dissonance theoretical research on selective exposure to information

Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that, after having made a decision, people prefer supporting over conflicting information. However, in all of these experiments participants were given an overview of all available pieces of information, selected them simultaneously, and did not process the requested information during the selection phase. In the present research the authors show that an even stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially instead of simultaneously (Experiment 1), and they demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information (Experiment 2). The authors provide evidence that the increase in confirmation bias under sequential presentation is caused by heightened commitment due to the participants' increased focusing on their decision (Experiments 3 and 4).     

The effects of domain knowledge on metacomprehension accuracy

In the present research, we examined the relationship between readers’ domain knowledge and their ability to judge their comprehension of novel domain-related material. Participants with varying degrees of baseball knowledge read five texts on baseball-related topics and five texts on non-baseball-related topics, predicted their performance, and completed tests for each text. Baseball knowledge was positively related to absolute accuracy within the baseball domain but was unrelated to relative accuracy within the baseball domain. Also, the readers showed a general underconfidence bias, but the bias was less extreme for higher knowledge readers. The results challenge common assumptions that experts’ metacognitive judgments are less accurate than novices’. Results involving topic familiarity ratings and a no-reading control group suggest that higher knowledge readers are not more likely to ignore text-specific cues in favor of a domain familiarity heuristic, but they do appear to make more effective use of domain familiarity in predicting absolute performance levels.