Projecting Lower Competence to Maintain Moral Warmth in the Avoidance of Prosocial Requests

When faced with prosocial requests, consumers face a difficult decision between taking on the request's burden or appearing unwarm (unkind, uncaring). We propose that the desire to refuse such requests while protecting a morally warm image leads consumers to under‐represent their competence. Although consumers care strongly about being viewed as competent, five studies showed that they downplayed their competence to sidestep a prosocial request. This effect occurred across both self‐reported and behavioral displays of competence. Further, the downplaying competence effect only occurred when facing an undesirable prosocial request, not a similarly undesirable proself request. The final studies showed that people specifically downplayed competence and not warmth. We further distinguished between social warmth (e.g., humor) and moral warmth (e.g., kindness), showing that when competence, social warmth, and moral warmth were all requisite skills for a prosocial task, people downplayed competence and social warmth more than moral warmth. These findings underscore that although people care strongly about being viewed as competent, they willingly trade off competence evaluations if evaluations of warmth—particularly moral warmth—are at risk.     

Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

Sharing Responsibility and Holding Responsible

Who, in particular, may hold us responsible for our moral failings? Most discussions of moral responsibility bracket this question, despite its obvious practical importance. In this article, I investigate the moral authority involved and how it arises in the context of personal relationships, such as friendship or family relations. My account is based on the idea that parties to a personal relationship not only share responsibility for their relationship, but also — to some degree that is negotiated between them — for one another's lives. In sharing these responsibilities, we grant people a particular authority to respond to us. By highlighting the responsibility that we assume when we hold someone responsible, I also suggest that this analysis contains important lessons for thinking about responsibility in other contexts.     

A Note on Prototypes,Convexity and Fuzzy Sets

The work on prototypes in ontologies pioneered by Rosch [10] and elaborated by Lakoff [8] and Freund [3] is related to vagueness in the sense that the more remote an instance is from a prototype the fewer people agree that it is an example of that prototype. An intuitive example is the prototypical “mother”, and it is observed that more specific instances like ”single mother”, “adoptive mother”, “surrogate mother”, etc., are less and less likely to be classified as “mothers” by experimental subjects. From a different direction Gärdenfors [4] provided a persuasive account of natural predicates to resolve paradoxes of induction like Goodman’s “Grue” predicate [5]. Gärdenfors proposed that “quality dimensions” arising from human cognition and perception impose topologies on concepts such that the ones that appear “natural” to us are convex in these topologies. We show that these two cognitive principles — prototypes and predicate convexity — are equivalent to unimodal (convex) fuzzy characteristic functions for sets. Then we examine the case when the fuzzy set characteristic function is not convex, in particular when it is multi-modal. We argue that this is an indication that the fuzzy concept should really be regarded as a super concept in which the decomposed components are subconcepts in an ontological taxonomy.     

A contrastive account of explanation generation

In this article, we propose a contrastive account of explanation generation. Though researchers have long wrestled with the concepts of explanation and understanding, as well as with the procedures by which we might evaluate explanations, less attention has been paid to the initial generation stages of explanation. Before an explainer can answer a question, he or she must come to some understanding of the explanandum—what the question is asking—and of the explanatory form and content called for by the context. Here candidate explanations are constructed to respond to the particular interpretation of the question, which, according to the pragmatic approach to explanation, is constrained by a contrast class—a set of related but nonoccurring alternatives to the topic that emerge from the surrounding context and the explainer’s prior knowledge. In this article, we suggest that generating an explanation involves two operations: one that homes in on an interpretation of the question, and a second one that locates an answer. We review empirical work that supports this account, consider the implications of these contrastive processes, and identify areas for future study.     

The ‘romance of teams’: Toward an understanding of its psychological underpinnings and implications

Although advocates of teamwork suggest that teams enhance performance, empirical evidence does not consistently, or robustly, support these claims. Still, a belief in the effectiveness of teams—among managers, employees, and the general lay population—seems very strong. What accounts for this ‘romance of teams’? In this paper, we offer a psychological answer to this question. We review evidence regarding the actual effectiveness of teams, in order to show that teams are not as effective as many believe them to be, and we argue that the romance of teams stems from the psychological benefits of group‐based activity. Specifically, we propose that team members experience both social‐emotional, and competence‐related, benefits, and we review an eclectic mix of research in support of this claim. We argue that these psychological benefits of teams lead people to assume that teams are ‘high performance’, thus, causing the romance of teams. Finally, we discuss potential implications of the romance for organizations, researchers, and employees.     

Who helping helps: An event-sampling study of how basic psychological needs moderate the impact of acting prosocially

Growing work suggests that prosociality – actions such as kindness and generosity – boosts the well-being of altruists, yet this effect is not universally true for all individuals. Thus, a major question moving forward is who reaps the largest benefits of acting prosocially. Here, we propose that trait differences in satisfaction of needs (i.e. autonomy, competence, and relatedness) act as key moderators of the effect of prosociality on well-being. We tested two competing hypotheses – deprivation vs. sensitization models – in a 14-day event-sampling study of 383 community participants. We found that people with lower trait autonomy experienced a greater well-being boost after acting prosocially than their higher counterparts. Moreover, this relationship was further mediated by state autonomy. Our findings highlight the special role autonomy, but not competence or relatedness, plays in explaining individual differences in who benefits from acting prosocially – and the mechanism behind this process.     

Emergency behavior

There is a class of actions — reflex actions — which seem not to spring from any intention, but for which we nevertheless wish to take responsibility. It is suggested that these actions are appropriately said to be done intentionally, in spite of our never having an intention to do them. And this grammatical anomaly indicates that the behavior in question requires a special kind of account; one which might be characterized as derivative: parasitic on the more paradigmatic sort of action explanation.     

Three Cheers for the Token Woman!

Concerns about the under‐representation of female academic philosophers and about the stereotype that philosophy is best done by men have recently led to efforts to make academic philosophy a more inclusive discipline. An example is the Gendered Conference Campaign, encouraging event organisers and volume editors to include women amongst invited speakers and authors. Initiatives such as the GCC raise worries about tokenism. Potential invitees may be concerned about unfairness towards whose who would have been invited in their place in the absence of affirmative action and about the way in which affirmative action can (be perceived to) affect the quality of the conference or volume in question. And women philosophers often worry that, if formal rules or significant social pressures towards gender inclusiveness play a role in selection processes, their achievements will be discounted. I argue there is no good reason for these fears: there is no pure meritocracy in academia, nor is the ideal of pure meritocracy either feasible or desirable. There are several legitimate grounds — independent of professional competence — for including people in positions of visibility and prestige; gender is such a legitimate reason.     

Context effects in multi-alternative decision making: empirical data and a Bayesian model

For decisions between many alternatives, the benchmark result is Hick's Law: that response time increases log-linearly with the number of choice alternatives. Even when Hick's Law is observed for response times, divergent results have been observed for error rates-sometimes error rates increase with the number of choice alternatives, and sometimes they are constant. We provide evidence from two experiments that error rates are mostly independent of the number of choice alternatives, unless context effects induce participants to trade speed for accuracy across conditions. Error rate data have previously been used to discriminate between competing theoretical accounts of Hick's Law, and our results question the validity of those conclusions. We show that a previously dismissed optimal observer model might provide a parsimonious account of both response time and error rate data. The model suggests that people approximate Bayesian inference in multi-alternative choice, except for some perceptual limitations.     

Faulty Self‐Assessment: Why Evaluating One's Own Competence Is an Intrinsically Difficult Task

People's perception of their competence often diverges from their true level of competence. We argue that people have such erroneous view of their competence because self‐evaluation is an intrinsically difficult task. People live in an information environment that does not contain all the data they need for accurate self‐evaluation. The information environment is insufficient in two ways. First, when making self‐judgments, people lack crucial categories of information necessary to reach accurate evaluations. Second, although people receive feedback over time that could correct faulty self‐assessments, this feedback is often biased, difficult to recognize, or otherwise flawed. Because of the difficulty in making inferences based on such limited and misleading data, it is unreasonable to expect that people will prove accurate in judgments of their skills.     

Trapped in a tight spot: Scaling effects occur when,according to the action-specific account,they should not,and fail to occur when they should

The action-specific account of perception claims that what we see is perceptually scaled according to our action capacity. However, it has been argued that this account relies on an overly confirmatory research strategy—predicting the presence of, and then finding, an effect (Firestone & Scholl, 2014). A comprehensive approach should also test disconfirmatory predictions, in which no effect is expected. In two experiments, we tested one such prediction based on the action-specific account, namely that scaling effects should occur only when participants intend to act (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005). All participants wore asymmetric gloves in which one glove was padded with extra material, so that one hand was wider than the other. Participants visually estimated the width of apertures. The action-specific account predicts that the apertures should be estimated as being narrower for the wider hand, but only when participants intend to act. We found this scaling effect when it should not have occurred (Exp. 1, for participants who did not intend to act), as well as no effect when it should have occurred (Exp. 2, for participants who intended to act but were given a cover story for the visibility and position of their hands). Thus, the cover story used in Experiment 2 eliminated the scaling effect found in Experiment 1. We suggest that the scaling effect observed in Experiment 1 likely resulted from demand characteristics associated with using a salient, unexplained manipulation (e.g., telling people which hand to use to do the task). Our results suggest that the action-specific account lacks predictive power.     

Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684]. This meta-analysis identified several performance factors influencing success, including manipulations that highlight the salience of the initial belief content (such as asking where Sally will look first for the marble). However, because a proportion of variance in performance remained unexplained even when identified performance factors were controlled for, the authors concluded from the standpoint of a 'theory-theory' account that children's improvement is the result of conceptual change. Further, the meta-analysis showed that manipulations such as 'look first' improve performance only in children who are in the older part of the 3-5 year range, and thus plausibly operating with a 'transitional' theory of mind--just on the point of realizing conceptual change. Here, we present three studies systematically investigating the 'look first' manipulation which showed that: (i) the advantage for the look first question can be demonstrated in children across different cultures, (ii) look first has an effect that is additive to the improvement with age; there is no interaction such that older children gain more benefit from younger children, (iii) performance in younger children can be, but is not always, elevated to levels that are statistically above chance. These results challenge the theory-theory account and are discussed in terms of models of belief-desire reasoning in which both conceptual competence and performance factors play central roles.     

Situationism,Manipulation, and Objective Self-Awareness

Among those taking the implications of situationism seriously, some have suggested exploiting our tendency to be shaped by our environments toward desirable ends. The key insight here is that if experimental studies produce reliable, probabilistic predictions about the effects of situational variables on behavior—for example, how people react to the presence or absence of various sounds, objects, and their placement—then we should deploy those variables that promote prosocial behavior, while avoiding or limiting those that tend toward antisocial behavior. Put another way, some have suggested that we tweak situations to nudge or influence others toward good behavior. A question arises: Isn’t this manipulative? In this paper, I describe some existing proposals in the literature and consider the manipulation worry. Drawing on classical Confucian ethics, I argue that, when all is considered, it is chimerical to think we can refrain from influencing or manipulating others. We must rather accept that influence (whether intended or not) is part of social existence. Once we accept this, the only remaining question is how to influence others. I suggest that this should make us conceive ourselves in an objective fashion.     

Anthropology,Ontology, and the Possibility of Post-Mortem Repentance

Abstract: This essay considers the question of conversion unto repentance, as an act of cognition and volition, by the separated soul in the post-mortem state. It primarily explicates and interrogates Thomas Aquinas's various attempts to rule out this possibility for the damned. Since Thomas's arguments for such impossibility feature his commitment to the radical immateriality of the human soul—and, like it, the angelic spirit—the essay highlights the ontological and moral tensions within that account. The case is thus made for the ontological, logical, and moral inconsistencies of his position, in pursuit of a more holistic anthropology across the soul's various states and a more rationally and coherent eschatology—namely, an affirmation of the irreducible mutability of the created soul on its way towards likeness to God, perhaps, if not certainly, towards universal salvation.     

Enhancing a Sense of Competence at Work by Engaging in Proactive Behavior: The Role of Proactive Personality

To understand how individuals’ senses of competence are cultivated, scholars have primarily focused on situational factors such as job autonomy and supervisor support. Against this backdrop, we propose that individuals can work as active agents and enhance their sense of competence by initiating actions that aim to master the environment. We adopt the behavioral concordance model and propose that people higher in proactive personality are more likely to engage in proactive behavior that elevates their senses of competence over time. We further propose that such behavioral concordance contributes to boosting a sense of competence is more prominent among those with higher proactive personality. Our predictions are supported by data from 172 employees and their direct supervisors in China, after controlling for the effect of job autonomy and supervisor support for autonomy. Specifically, only those higher in proactive personality engaged in more proactive behavior and increased their sense of competence over time. This study highlights both a self-initiated and a behavioral perspective on understanding the development of a sense of competence.     

Depression, nondepression, and cognitive illusions: reply to Schwartz

In his comment, Schwartz argued that the Alloy and Abramson findings call into question the hypothesized causal link between learned helplessness and depression. Schwartz's contention is based on his interpretation of the Alloy and Abramson findings as showing that nondepressives cannot detect noncontingency. Although we argue that Schwartz has misinterpreted our data, we agree with his general contention that nondepressives may be relatively invulnerable to depression. We discuss the implications of our data for the learned helplessness theory as well as for other cognitive theories of depression. In addition, we evaluate Schwartz's intriguing motivational account of depressive accuracy in judging response-outcome contingencies. Finally, in response to Schwartz's question of whether nondepressives' errors in judging contingency are really errors at all, we suggest it is important to distinguish among error, irrationality, and maladaptiveness when discussing cognitive bias.     

How you can help,without making a difference

There are many cases in which people collectively cause some morally significant outcome (such as a harmful or beneficial outcome) but no individual act seems to make a difference. The problem in such cases is that it seems each person can argue, ‘it makes no difference whether or not I do X, so I have no reason to do it.’ The challenge is to say where this argument goes wrong. My approach begins from the observation that underlying the problem and motivating the typical responses to it is a standard, intuitive assumption. The assumption is that if an act will not make a difference with respect to an outcome, then it cannot play a significant, non-superfluous role in bringing that outcome about. In other words, helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference. I argue that the key to solving the problem is to reject this assumption. I develop an account of what it is to help to bring about an outcome, where this does not require making a difference, and I use this explain our reasons for action in the problem cases. This account also yields an error theory that explains why the standard assumption is so tempting, even though it is mistaken.     

Stand-Up Comedy,Authenticity, and Assertion

Stand-up comedy is often viewed in two contrary ways. In one view, comedians are hailed as providing genuine social insight and telling truths. In the other, comedians are seen as merely trying to entertain and not to be taken seriously. This tension raises a foundational question for the aesthetics of stand-up: Do stand-up comedians perform genuine assertions in their performances? This article considers this question in the light of several theories of assertion. We conclude that comedians on stage do not count as making genuine assertions—rather, much like actors on a stage, they merely pretend to perform speech acts. However, due to norms of authenticity that govern stand-up comedy, performers can nonetheless succeed in conveying genuine insights. Thus, our account accommodates both the seemingly incompatible aspects of our ordinary appreciation of stand-up comedy and points toward deeper philosophical understanding of stand-up comedy as a unique art form.     

绩效、能力、职位对组织分配公平观的影响

旨在探索基于组织分配公平的认知评价和决策行为的影响因素,为此提出了不公平阈限的概念,即在追求公平和谋求自我利益的动机权衡中,个体为了追求公平而愿意放弃的最高限度的个人利益。采用最后通牒博弈和独裁者博弈的二阶段实验范式,样本量为60。结果发现,工作绩效、工作能力均对个体的不公平阈限有显著的影响;对于公平判断和基于公平的回应行为,工作绩效起着首要作用,工作能力的影响次之,再次是对方的提议数额的影响。第一阶段对方提议的分配方案对被试越有利,则第二阶段被试的回应行为越有利于对方。排除能力差别的作用之后,职位差别并未引起不公平阈限的显著差异。根据研究结果,总结出分配公平的三项原则：绩效原则、能力原则和互惠原则