Effect of repetition on grammaticality judgments under objective and subjective self-awareness conditions

Three experiments were performed to investigate the differential effect of repeated presentation of sentences on judgments of grammaticality under the two mental states of objective and subjective self-awareness. In Experiment 1, 22 students judged the relative grammaticality of sentences twice, receiving a repetition treatment between the two judgments. During the repetition phase, they were exposed to a repeated presentation of sentences. The findings showed that repetition makes a judgment criterion more stringent on judgments after repetition than on those before repetition for the subjectively self-aware subjects, while it does not influence the judgments for the objectively self-aware subjects. Experiment 2 was run using a revised procedure with 26 students. The findings showed the expected, interaction, such that the repetition makes a criterion stringent for the subjectively self-aware subjects while it makes the criterion lenient for the objectively self-aware subjects. Experiment 3 examined with 12 students whether the finding for the latter subjects could be explained, by divided attention theory in a concurrent task condition. The findings showed no change of judgment criterion. These findings indicate that repeated exposure to the sentences exerts differential effects on grammaticality judgments dependent on whether the subjects are objectively or subjectively self-aware.     

A crosslinguistic study of grammaticality judgments in Broca's aphasia

Crosslinguistic studies of sentence comprehension and production in Broca's aphasia have yielded two complementary findings: (1) grammatical morphology appears to be more impaired than word order principles in every language studied, but (2) the degree to which grammatical morphology is retained by aphasic patients depends upon the "strength" or importance of those morphemes in the patient's premorbid language. In an earlier study comparing violations of word order and agreement, we found that English-speaking Broca's aphasics showed greater sensitivity to errors of ordering than to errors of agreement, providing further evidence for the selective vulnerability of morphology. However, because English is a rigid word order language with a relatively weak inflectional system, it could be argued that word order is resilient to brain damage because it is the strongest source of information in this language. The present study compared the performance of English-speaking Broca's aphasics and normal controls with their Italian counterparts in the same grammaticality judgment experiment. Four predictions relating to our previous work were confirmed. (1) Italian aphasics, like their English-speaking counterparts, showed general preservation of grammatical knowledge and (2) they were able to use this knowledge in an "on-line" fashion. (3) Within each language, Broca's aphasics showed greater impairment in their ability to recognize errors of morphological selection (i.e., agreement) compared with errors made by moving the same words to an incorrect position downstream. Nevertheless (4), crosslinguistic differences observed in previous studies of comprehension and production were also observed in this grammaticality judgment task: a processing advantage for agreement errors in Italian normals and aphasics, and a processing advantage for ordering errors in English normals and aphasics.     

The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities

Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed.     

Counting eliminates the repetition effect in judgments of temporal duration.

College student subjects estimated the duration of time intervals (8–54 sec) by counting or not (N=35 per group). Counting eliminated the repetition effect (a decline in the magnitude of estimations across trials), and resulted in a truncation of the psychophysical function. The former result was interpreted as contrary to Treisman's (1963) model. The latter result was attributed to the effortfulness of counting, which was established in a subsequent experiment.     

Grammatical gender and linguistic relativity: A systematic review

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Many languages assign nouns to a grammatical gender class, such that “bed” might be assigned masculine gender in one language (e.g., Italian) but...     

The repetition effect in judgments of temporal duration across minutes, days, and months.

Three experiments assessed the stability of the repetition effect in time judgment. In Experiment 1, subjects (N = 18) produced intervals ranging from 8 to 31 sec in a two-phase procedure with a five min rest between phases. In Experiment 2, subjects (N = 20) made verbal estimates of intervals ranging from 8 to 20 sec with a 48-hour delay between phases. Experiment 3 involved daily productions by three subjects of intervals ranging from 8 to 54 sec over several months. The slope of the psychophysical function increased across phases in Experimental 1, declined (as expected for estimation) across days in Experiment 2, and increased across months in Experiment 3. It was concluded that the repetition effect is relatively permanent and thus more similar to habituation than to sensory adaptation.     

Order in Spanish colour words: Evidence against linguistic relativity

The hypothesis that the Berlin and Kay (1969) colour sequence would be replicated in Spanish colour‐word usage has been corroborated on 131,028 colour words from a representative corpus (N = 188,975,000). The observed sequence of white, black, red, green, blue, yellow, grey and brown is highly consistent diachronically (through current and contemporary Spanish), synchronically (through various countries) and with the expected order. Considering the divergence of Spanish vocabularies among geographical areas in the last centuries, the almost total agreement did not have a high prior probability under hypotheses of culturally arbitrary colour vocabularies. It is difficult to see how linguistic relativity could adequately account for such a robust result. The use of ordinal statistics and non‐reactive measures to study cultural products constrained by epigenetic rules, such as colour vocabularies, is presented as an exercise of methodological consilience.     

The effect of repetition on iconic memory

The present experiment examined the influence of repetition on iconic memory using the Sperling (1960) procedure. It was assumed that the whole-report procedure would estimate only information available from a somewhat more permanent memory system than the icon, while the partial report would estimate both that information and the information available in the icon. The difference between the whole and partial report was assumed to measure information available only in the icon. Across a series of 160 displays one particular display occurred half the time (80 repetitions). The results indicated that the repetition influenced recall from the more permanent memory system assessed by whole report, but had no influence on the information available from the icon (partial report minus whole report).     

Methodological problems in cross-cultural studies of linguistic relativity

Bloom (1981) tested a weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (i.e., "Language affects thinking though it does not determine thinking") in a series of cross-cultural experiments. According to Bloom, Chinese lacks two linguistic devices that are present in English and supposed to be critical in performing theoretical thinking. It was found that the Chinese subjects were outperformed by American counterparts in all the tests designed to assess the ability of theoretical thinking. The results were taken as evidence for the weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. A methodological consideration has revealed, however, that all of his experiments except one are uninterpretable because of the lack of necessary control conditions. In addition, three experiments in the present study have demonstrated that the findings in Bloom's sole interpretable experiment were artifacts due to a methodological flaw. Further theoretical considerations reveal the inadequacy of Bloom's basic methodology and the limitation in the effects of linguistic relativity that may be possible at least theoretically.     

Investigating linguistic relativity through bilingualism: the case of grammatical gender

The authors investigated linguistic relativity effects by examining the semantic effects of grammatical gender (present in Italian but absent in English) in fluent bilingual speakers as compared with monolingual speakers. In an error-induction experiment, they used responses by monolingual speakers to establish a baseline for bilingual speakers and show that gender affects the semantic substitution errors made by monolingual Italian speakers compared with monolingual English speakers. They then showed that Italian-English bilingual speakers behave like monolingual English speakers when the task is in English and like monolingual Italian speakers when the task is in Italian, hence exhibiting appropriate semantic representations for each language. These results show that for bilingual speakers there is intraspeaker relativity in semantic representations and, therefore, that gender does not have a conceptual, nonlinguistic effect. The results also have implications for models of bilingual semantic memory and processing.     

On the speed of intuition: Intuitive judgments of semantic coherence under different response deadlines

Intuition is the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory but not consciously retrieved. We investigated one central feature of intuitive judgments--namely, their speed. Participants judged whether or not three clue words were coherent in the sense that they were weakly associated with a common fourth concept. To restrict the time available for conscious deliberation of possible solution words, participants had to synchronize their judgments with a response signal appearing at different lags after the clue words. In two experiments, participants discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance, even when they did not consciously retrieve the solution word and the lag between clue words and response signal was as short as 1.5 sec. Results indicate that intuitive judgments can indeed be made very fast and without extended conscious deliberation. Possible mechanisms underlying intuitive judgments are discussed.     

The effect of testing procedure on remember-know judgments

Remember-know (R-K) judgments are commonly used to assess conscious recollection of the study episode during recognition. We varied whether participants judged items as R, K, or new (one-step) or first made an old-new judgment and then made the R-K judgment (two-step). The one-step group had a higher R hit rate and K false alarm rate than did the two-step group. In addition, the K responses of the one-step group did not reliably discriminate between old and new items. When a “guess” response category was available, both groups were able to discriminate old and new items using the K response; however, K responses remained more accurate in the two-step condition. R responses appeared to be relatively immune to the effects of testing procedure when the guess category was provided. This suggests that, under some conditions, the R label can reliably indicate a distinct form of recognition memory, suggesting that allowing participants to use a guess response may help them to confine their R-K judgments to confidently recognized items. When participants are not given the option of making a guess response, they may use the R-K distinction to indicate the trace strength of the memory.     

Re-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: reply to Boroditsky (2001)

Six unsuccessful attempts at replicating a key finding in the linguistic relativity literature [Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43, 1-22] are reported. In addition to these empirical issues in replicating the original finding, theoretical issues present in the original report are discussed. In sum, we conclude that Boroditsky (2001) provides no support for the Whorfian hypothesis.     

The effect of repetition and similarity on sequence learning

Repetition is a pervasive feature of children’s environments, and may be an important contributor to learning such complex sequential structures as language. Endress, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Mehler (2007) found that repeated tone sequences were learned more easily than sequences containing ordinal relations, but there have been no direct comparisons of repeating sequences versus sequences that contain similar, but not identical, stimuli. In Experiment 1, we compared learning from repeating tone sequences to learning from tones that varied in similarity, and confirmed that repetition is a special case for learning. In Experiment 2 we showed that the learning distinction between repeated and similar elements is not affected by whether similarity is variable. We conclude by indicating that repetition provides an important constraint on learning, and we discuss the extent to which such constraints are consistent with general-purpose statistical learning mechanisms.     

The effect of repetition on search through active memory

Short lists of digits, some of which contained repeated items, were searched in memory. Repeated items were recognized faster than non-repeated items. Search times for non-repeated items in lists with a repeat were slightly faster than those for lists of the same length in which no items were repeated. A serial position effect was found such that items at either the beginning or end of the memory list were responded to faster than items in the middle of the list. Neither the repeated digit effect nor the serial position effect support serial exhaustive search. An empirical equation was found by which response time is predicted by the log proportion of items in a memory list that match the test stimulus. These results are compatible with the notions of neural pathway activation and trace strength.     

Information repetition in evaluative judgments: Easy to monitor,hard to control

The sampling approach [Fiedler, K. (2000a). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107(4), 659–676.] attributes judgment biases to the information given in a sample. Because people usually do not monitor the constraints of samples and do not control their judgments accordingly, systematic judgment biases occur. Three experiments demonstrate this for an obvious sampling constraint, the emptiness of merely repeated information. When evaluating stock market shares, participants did not correct for the repetition of positive or negative information about a share. Although original and repeated information was reliably distinguished in estimates of occurrence (successful monitoring), preferences were misled by mere repetition of success and failure reports (unsuccessful control). This effect could even override a share’s actual success rate. Explicit instructions to ignore repetitions provided no remedy; however, a cognitive load manipulation reduced repetition’s undue influence. Possible reasons for and benefits of this lack of direct metacognitive control are discussed.     

The effect of local kinematic changes on anticipation judgments

Skilled tennis players rely on a more global than local perceptual strategy when anticipating an opponent’s shot direction in tennis (Williams, Huys, Cañal-Bruland, & Hagemann, 2009). Global perceptual strategy refers to the pick-up of dynamic information across different body areas rather than from a single source such as the arm or racket. We extend previous work by examining the spatiotemporal characteristics of visual information pick-up when anticipating shot direction in tennis. We perturbed information from various body locations by interchanging the dynamics of selected areas with those from strokes played to the opposite side of the court. In addition, we presented each manipulation under four different temporal occlusion conditions (from 240 ms prior to racket-ball contact) to examine the time course of information extraction. Skilled tennis players outperformed less skilled counterparts in predicting shot direction, even at early phases of the opponent’s motion. Moreover, skilled players showed significant decrements in performance when the arms and racket were perturbed, highlighting the relevance of distal information when anticipating opponents’ intentions.     

The effect of repetition on the perception of single letters

Single letters were presented for from one to five flashes, with S required to report what he saw after each flash. The clarity of the letter increased sharply with repetition. Since the letters were no larger than one-third of a degree in size, clarity could not have been increased by S making different fixations from flash to flash and combining them into a total percept. Nor was S guessing, since this could be ruled out by other indicators. Thus, it was concluded that repetition of the stimulus can have a direct effect on the clarity of a S’s percept of that stimulus.     

The repetition effect in time judgments is not a function of the intensity of the stimulus defining the interval: implications for an arousal theory

College students (N = 17 per group) estimated the durations of time intervals ranging from 8 to 20 sec. Intervals were defined by tones of 35, 55, and 75 db for each of three groups. The estimates of all groups declined across trials, but the degree of decline did not differ as a function of stimulus intensity. These data call into question the view that the repetition effect is attributable to a decrement in general arousal.