The evolution and psychology of self-deception

In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.     

认认知模糊程度和动机强度对有意识和无意识自我欺骗的影响

三个实验分别探讨了无意识和有意识自我欺骗存在的可能性, 以及认知模糊程度与动机强度对两种自我欺骗的影响。实验1的结果发现, 自我欺骗存在无意识和有意识两种形式; 实验2的结果发现, 随着认知模糊程度的降低, 无意识自我欺骗人数明显减少, 而有意识自我欺骗人数显著增加; 实验3的结果发现, 随着动机强度的增加, 有意识自我欺骗人数显著增多, 无意识自我欺骗人数并无显著变化。结果提示, 自我欺骗具有现实存在性, 且有两种不同形式; 两种形式自我欺骗具有不同的产生机制。     

自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

自我欺骗实证研究述评

自我欺骗的施骗者和受骗者都是自我。这个特殊性导致自我欺骗的定义、类型、研究范式和机制等存在着争议。在系统梳理自我欺骗相关实证研究的基础上,比较了自我欺骗不同的定义和不同的研究范式,提出了两种新的自我欺骗分类方法,探析了自我欺骗的心理机制,以期为后续研究提供借鉴和参考。     

自我欺骗：通过欺骗自己更好地欺骗他人

心理学的研究几乎都把自欺看作一种个体特质, 主要探讨自欺对个体自身的作用。而在进化的理论框架中, 自欺是一种人际交往的策略, 目的是为了更好地欺骗其他个体。由于直接欺骗有可能被对方识破, 个体把自己欺骗之后就可以“诚实地”向对方传递错误信息而不被察觉。这就把自欺定义为人际间而非个体内的概念。本文系统地阐述人际间自欺的概念和思路, 并为之在心理学的研究中提出一套理论假设和研究方法。在理论上, 由于难以区别通过自欺的欺骗和直接的欺骗, 本文提出一系列假设和条件来证明自欺的存在, 这些条件包括欺骗双方的地位高低、道德高低、和人数多寡。因为自欺是用来应付高欺骗探测压力的, 上述条件可以反映被骗对象的欺骗探测能力的高低。在方法上, 本文提出采用两次回忆的方式来展现自欺, 第一次回忆时欺骗动机存在, 个体在诚实的状态下提供较少真实信息, 第二次回忆时欺骗动机消失, 个体可以提供较多真实信息, 通过比较两次回忆内容的差异来验证自欺的存在。这一操作方法突破了个体间自欺因缺乏操作定义而无法进行心理学研究的屏障, 为人们探讨人际间自欺提供了一条可行途径。     

大学生作弊:是道德自我欺骗吗?

以往关于考试作弊的研究大都着眼于相关因素,还很缺乏对主体意识结构的分析。本研究以自我欺骗为理论框架,以大学生为被试,通过一个行为实验及与实验有关问题的分析,从意识与潜意识两个层面对大学生的作弊行为进行了探究。结果表明研究样本的31.63%的大学生的作弊属于道德自我欺骗,即作弊时意识与潜意识持有一个相互矛盾的错误信念,具体说就是,在意识里并没有意识到作弊是不道德的,但同时在潜意识里却认为它是不道德的。     

Approaching self-deception: How Robert Audi and I part company

This article explores fundamental differences between Robert Audi’s position on self-deception and mine. Although we both depart from a model of self-deception that is straightforwardly based on stereotypical interpersonal deception, we differ in how we do that. An important difference between us might be partly explained by a difference in how we understand the kind of deceiving that is most relevant to self-deception.     

Persistence of Belief Change in the Face of Deception: The Effect of Factual Stories Revealed to Be False

Readers typically respond with anger and derogation when they discover that an author has engaged in intentional deception (representing a false story as true). Does this negative response to the author also cause individuals to correct beliefs that may have been changed by the discredited story? In this experiment (N = 160), the alleged truth status of a narrative was manipulated. In one condition, the narrative was presented as fictional (a socially accepted form of untruth). The remaining three conditions initially presented the story as factual. Participants in two of these conditions were informed after reading the story that it was inaccurate due to a) accidental error or b) intentional deception. The story changed attitudes from a no-story control in all conditions. Although readers derogated a deceptive author, they did not correct their attitudes even in the intentional and accidental error conditions. A measure of the parts of the story that the participants rejected (false note circling), suggests that participants were motivated to correct for inaccuracies, but were not able to do so effectively.     

Are self-deceivers enhancing positive affect or denying negative affect? Toward an understanding of implicit affective processes

Self-deception is an important construct in social, personality, and clinical literatures. Although historical and clinical views of self-deception have regarded it as defensive in nature and operation, modern views of this individual difference variable instead highlight its apparent benefits to subjective mental health. The present four studies reinforce the latter view by showing that self-deception predicts positive priming effects, but not negative priming effects, in reaction time tasks sensitive to individual differences in affective priming. In all studies, individuals higher in self-deception displayed stronger positive priming effects, defined in terms of facilitation with two positive stimuli in a consecutive sequence, but self-deception did not predict negative priming effects in the same tasks. Importantly, these effects occurred both in tasks that called for the retrieval of self-knowledge (Study 1) and those that did not (Studies 2–4). This broad pattern supports substantive views of self-deception rather than views narrowly focused on self-presentation processes. Implications for understanding self-deception are discussed.     

Self-deception and discrepancies in self-evaluation

Self-deception is an intricate psychological construct, grounded in relatively little empirical evidence as an individual difference variable. The present research offers a direct test of one of the central scales of self-deception—the Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE) scale—by comparing explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), participants (N = 150) reported about their implicit self-evaluation. These ratings were compared to explicit self-reports about self-evaluation. Results showed that higher self-deception was associated with a larger discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-evaluations. Specifically, higher self-deception was associated with a more positive explicit self-evaluation but with a more negative implicit self-evaluation. These findings offer one of the first direct tests of the SDE, supporting its viability.     

Dimensions of deception in personality assessment: the example of the MMPI-2

The topic of deception in personality assessment is discussed along a number of dimensions relevant to clinical practice. The dimensions described are consistency versus accuracy of item endorsement, simulation versus dissimulation, genetic versus specific deception, crude versus sophisticated deception, intentional versus nonintentional deception, self-deception versus impression management, and selectivity versus inclusiveness, as these may be encountered using the revised version of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. The emphasis is placed on deceptive strategies as operations as distinct from the traditional categories of response style such as social desirability. Directions for future research are indicated.     

Dimensions of Deception in Personality Assessment: The Example of the MMPI-2

The topic of deception in personality assessment is discussed along a number of dimensions relevant to clinical practice. The dimensions described are consistency versus accuracy of item endorsement, simulation versus dissimulation, genetic versus specific deception, crude versus sophisticated deception, intentional versus nonintentional deception, self-deception versus impression management, and selectivity versus inclusiveness, as these may be encountered using the revised version of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. The emphasis is placed on deceptive strategies as operations as distinct from the traditional categories of response style such as social desirability. Directions for future research are indicated.     

Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping.First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

反馈对自我欺骗的影响：来自ERP的证据

本研究主要探讨反馈类型和反馈效价对自我欺骗的影响。实验1采用前瞻范式探究不同效价的模糊反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相比于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在积极模糊反馈的条件下显著地提高测试2第二阶段的预测分数(自我欺骗的程度加重)。实验2探究不同效价的精确反馈对自我欺骗的影响, 结果发现, 相对于无答案提示组, 有答案提示组的被试在消极精确反馈条件下显著地降低测试2第二阶段的预测分数。实验3采用ERP技术探究反馈类型和反馈效价影响自我欺骗的内在机制, 结果发现, 模糊反馈条件下的自我欺骗诱发较大的P2成分、诱发较小的N1和N400成分; 以及发现自我欺骗在额区的效应较大。总之, 这些研究结果表明可能积极反馈促进个体的自我欺骗产生, 消极反馈削弱个体自我欺骗的产生; 积极模糊反馈能够进一步促进了个体自我欺骗的产生。这些研究结果还表明自我欺骗产生的背后机制可能是自我膨胀。     

Why inference to the best explanation doesn’t secure empirical grounds for mathematical platonism

Proponents of the explanatory indispensability argument for mathematical platonism maintain that claims about mathematical entities play an essential explanatory role in some of our best scientific explanations. They infer that the existence of mathematical entities is supported by way of inference to the best explanation from empirical phenomena and therefore that there are the same sort of empirical grounds for believing in mathematical entities as there are for believing in concrete unobservables such as quarks. I object that this inference depends on a false view of how abductive considerations mediate the transfer of empirical support. More specifically, I argue that even if inference to the best explanation is cogent, and claims about mathematical entities play an essential explanatory role in some of our best scientific explanations, it doesn’t follow that the empirical phenomena that license those explanations also provide empirical support for the claim that mathematical entities exist.

     

Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate

According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q 51:76–82, 2001, Noûs 36:249–275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531–553, 2010). In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief. Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable.     

The Product of Self-Deception

I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception.

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.