Living and Loving Cybernetics

How we learn to interpret our experiences influences the sorts of experiences we seek. In other words, habits of mind become habits of action. Cybernetics, as a way of thinking, changes how we act. My testimony demonstrates that the appeal of cybernetics remains strong today, for those who are lucky enough to stumble across its beauty, as I was. Cybernetics contributed to the theoretical foundation and conceptualization of my dissertation, and it positively influences my teaching, whether I am teaching cybernetics explicitly or not. While I am fortunate to be able to integrate cybernetics in my work, what delights me most is living it in my every day.     

情境模型研究中的分离与整合

情境模型概念出现后,有关情境模型研究重点解决以下两大问题：其一,情境模型不是课文基础表征;其二,情境模型具有多维结构。前者表现为情境模型与课文基础表征的分离研究,后者表现为情境模型从单维向多维的整合研究。在此基础上,研究者进一步统合情境模型研究,初步考察情境模型的实质问题。基于情境模型研究的分离与整合的趋势,情境模型的未来研究将进一步发展研究范式,深入探讨“情境模型是什么”与“情境模型的加工机制是怎么样”等问题。     

The clinical language of Sándor Ferenczi: Introductory and methodological considerations

Abstract

Reflecting in the present paper on the legitimacy of a work to collect together the ideas, concepts, and terms of Sándor Ferenczi, the author will explore, through a series of questions and answers, the following points: why it is so clear-cut that Ferenczi should be included in the company of those great psychoanalytic authors who might be deemed entitled to such a study; whether Ferenczi possessed his own language, and if this was the case, when and how he acquired it; what we mean when we refer to Ferenczi’s idiomatic language, and how we can profitably identify this language and bring it into focus; how, in practice, such a text should be organized; what its audience and function would be; and how it would be used by readers and students of Ferenczi.     

Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are central to this paper. In the second section, I will show that implicit-bias research raises questions about people’s capacities to exercise (these specific understandings of) free will. In the third section, I will consider how an individual may overcome these failures and argue that the individual ability for self-regulation is significantly limited. One could stop here and conclude that free will is a limited capacity. But I argue that this conclusion would be too hastily drawn. I will instead continue to ask what would be required for free will. By discussing how failures of free will are due to social structures and may be therefore repaired by changing social structures in section 4, I will arrive at an alternative conclusion about the capacity for free will in section 5.     

Index to Volume 125

The purpose of the present study was to integrate some current theories of text comprehension with the body of work on metacomprehension, and especially the calibration of comprehension monitoring. This article explores some important methodological and conceptual issues, inspired by current theories in the text comprehension literature, which suggest that the nature of the texts used for metacomprehension studies may be a critical, and currently unrecognized, factor that should be considered. First, we need to re-examine what we mean by "comprehension," and how we should measure it. There are important differences between memory for text and comprehension of text that need to be considered. Second, to fully deal with these concerns, we need to pay more attention to the kinds of expository text that are being used, the different ways in which readers may understand these texts, and how readers may interpret the concept of "understanding" as they make their judgments.     

A capacity theory of comprehension: individual differences in working memory.

A theory of the way working memory capacity constrains comprehension is proposed. The theory proposes that both processing and storage are mediated by activation and that the total amount of activation available in working memory varies among individuals. Individual differences in working memory capacity for language can account for qualitative and quantitative differences among college-age adults in several aspects of language comprehension. One aspect is syntactic modularity: The larger capacity of some individuals permits interaction among syntactic and pragmatic information, so that their syntactic processes are not informationally encapsulated. Another aspect is syntactic ambiguity: The larger capacity of some individuals permits them to maintain multiple interpretations. The theory is instantiated as a production system model in which the amount of activation available to the model affects how it adapts to the transient computational and storage demands that occur in comprehension.     

Doing what one meant to do

When I engage in some routine activity, it will usually be the case that I mean or intend the present move to be followed by others. What does ‘meaning’ the later moves consist in? How do I know, when I come to perform them, that they were what I meant? Problems familiar from Wittgenstein's and Kripke's discussions of linguistic meaning arise here. Normally, I will not think of the later moves. But, even if I do, there are reasons to deny that thinking of them can constitute what it is to mean to perform them. I argue that the problem can be solved, in the case of routine action, by the notion that our behavioural routines are guided by what I callmodest agent memory. It will help explain both how wecan have future moves ‘in mind’ and how we can be in a position to avow the fact.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Reasonable Hope: Construct, Clinical Applications, and Supports

To read this article's abstract in both Spanish and Mandarin Chinese, please visit the article's full-text page on Wiley InterScience ( http://interscience.wiley.com/journal/famp ).
Hope may be the most laden shorthand term of all time. Everyone wants it; few know how to articulate what it is. Although family therapists frequently work to restore hope with hopeless families, they have contributed little to the abundant literature on hope. I present a new conceptualization of hope—reasonable hope—that reflects how family therapists think and practice. By subscribing to reasonable hope, clinicians enhance their ability to offer accompaniment and bear witness to clients. I describe clinical practices that, informed by reasonable hope, also facilitate its cocreation. Finally, I suggest supports for clinicians who practice reasonable hope.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

Coping with the Angry Patient

This patient is enacting two chronic maladaptive patterns. In one he alternates between the role of victim and abuser while inducing the therapist to play the counterrole. He tries to master the abuse he suffered passively as a child by becoming abusive with the therapist and having her experience what it feels like to be mistreated. My effort would be to interpret this pattern even while acknowledging and absorbing some degree of his anger. In a second pattern he acts like an angry, demanding child in an effort to extract nurturance and special treatment from the therapist. I would help him explore this posture in terms of his deprived background and its maladaptiveness in his current life. Finally, I present vignettes from my own practice to demonstrate how I work with patients' anger when it is expressed indirectly rather than in Mr. P's very direct manner.     

Predicting Divine Action

This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology – design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God – routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a decision-theoretic model for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to ‘skeptical theism’.     

How does a word become a message? An illustration on a developmental time-scale

Recent changes in views on cognition underscore its embodied, situated and distributed character. These changes are compatible with the conceptual framework of ecological psychology. However for ecological psychology to propose explanations for a broad range of cognitive phenomena, including language, it needs an account of how to link the dynamics of coupling between the organism and the environment with the apparent symbolicity of informational structures. In this paper it is proposed that a theory of information in biological systems, advocated by Howard Pattee, may help forge this link. By treating informational structures as constraints on dynamics this approach helps to identify which processes, in which systems and on what time-scales are needed for structures to ‘become messages’. I will illustrate how these processes might work on developmental time-scale in the domain of language, building on the work by Edward Reed (1995, 1996) and extending it using the view of linguistic structures as constraints.     

言语工作记忆、句子理解与句法依存关系加工

言语工作记忆在句子理解中作用的机制和性质,是当前认知神经科学研究的一个中心课题。文章首先回顾了与支撑语言理解的工作记忆资源的性质有关的理论争论和实验证据,然后回顾了填充语-空位依存关系加工这一能够揭示言语工作记忆与句子理解之间关系的重要领域,最后简要展望了今后应该进一步研究的几个问题     

Is there None Left to Say Anything?

Abstract. Remarks made by Lutheran leaders in Africa indicate that the churches have not been responding to the crisis of the HIV/AIDS pandemic sufficiently. In this essay I ask how the churches would be better prepared to act and also, more broadly, how the churches act to begin with. The dialogue between religion and science can assist us with both tasks as we consider the challenge of HIV/AIDS as a focus for this dialogue. First, analysis by social scientists can uncover what problems face any effort to motivate churches to act—and, for that matter, any individual member of a church group. I argue, further, that we can discover the difficulties associated with producing action by religious communities by looking not at abstract theological ideas but by investigating the way those ideas are conveyed in worship. I explore the worship patterns of Lutherans to show what sort of view is actually produced by the week‐to‐week messages of liturgical texts. I contend that a different approach both to worship and to action can be produced by reconsidering our views of reality as seen through the eyes of contemporary science.     

Between Predication And Silence: Augustine On How (Not) To Speak Of God

Throughout his corpus (both theological and pastoral), Augustine grapples with the challenge of how (not) to speak of that which exceeds and resists conceptualization. The one who would speak of God is confronted, it seems, by a double-bind: either one reduces God's transcendence to the immanence of language and concepts, or one remains silent. Even to call God 'inexpressible', he remarks in De doctrina christiana , is to predicate something of God and thus make some claim to comprehension. 'This battle of words', he continues, 'should be avoided by keeping silent' (DC 1.6.6). Augustine thus seems to privilege and apophatic strategy. But this is not his last word on the matter. Indeed upon the heels of this passage he carefully notes: ' And yet , while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him, he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising [ laude ] him with our words.' My goal in this essay is to consider Augustine's laudatory strategy of 'praise' as a non-objectifying discourse concerning transcendence which navigates the straits between kataphatic theological positivism and apophatic silence. This will be taken up against the horizon of contemporary discussions of transcendence and phenomenology, particularly in the work of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

THE AMBIGUITY OF MORAL EXCELLENCE: A Response to Aaron Stalnaker's “Virtue as Mastery”

This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non‐Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross‐culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them.     

The Social N400 effect: how the presence of other listeners affects language comprehension

During conversation, it is necessary to keep track of what others can and cannot understand. Previous research has focused largely on understanding the time course along which knowledge about interlocutors influences language comprehension/production rather than the cognitive process by which interlocutors take each other’s perspective. In addition, most work has looked at the effects of knowledge about a speaker on a listener’s comprehension, and not on the possible effects of other listeners on a participant’s comprehension process. In the current study, we introduce a novel joint comprehension paradigm that addresses the cognitive processes underlying perspective taking during language comprehension. Specifically, we show that participants who understand a language stimulus, but are simultaneously aware that someone sitting next to them does not understand the same stimulus, show an electrophysiological marker of semantic integration difficulty (i.e., an N400-effect). Crucially, in a second group of participants, we demonstrate that presenting exactly the same sentences to the participant alone (i.e. without a co-listener) results in no N400-effect. Our results suggest that (1) information about co-listeners as well as the speaker affect language comprehension, and (2) the cognitive process by which we understand what others comprehend mirrors our own language comprehension processes.