The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds

Abstract

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most natural' in that sense is always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose.     

Natural law and politics

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Natural and Ethical Normativity

In this paper, I argue that ethical normativity can be grounded in the natural normativity of organisms without being reducible to it. Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot both offer forms of neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism; I argue that both accounts have gaps that point toward the need for a constructive virtue ethics grounded in natural normativity. Similarly, Korsgaard's constructivist ethics ignores the ongoing relevance of natural norms in human ethical life. I thus offer an account according to which the self‐shaping activity of human organisms supplements and transforms natural normativity, giving rise to ethical norms. Such an account grounds human ethical distinctiveness in rationality without excluding nonrational humans from the ethical community. In the final section of the paper, I argue that ethical standards can be discovered (or hidden) through human activities, thus allowing for gradual progression (or regression) in ethical knowledge, both on individual and cultural levels.     

Induction and Natural Necessities

Some philosophers who believe that there are necessary connections in nature take it that an advantage of their commitment is that the problem of induction is solved. This paper aims to offer a comprehensive refutation of the arguments necessitarians use to show that if natural necessities are posited, then there is no problem of induction. In section 2, two models of natural necessity are presented. The “Contingent Natural Necessity” section examines David Armstrong’s explanationist ‘solution’ to the problem of induction. The “Natural Necessity and IBE” section looks in detail into the claim that natural necessity is the best explanation of observed regularity. The “Dispositional Essentialism to the Rescue?” section moves on to Brian Ellis’s dispositional essentialist ‘solution’. The “Sankey’s Helping Hand” section examines Howard Sankey’s attempt to blend dispositional essentialism and explanationism.     

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I‐II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue‐based interpretation.     

Natural sampling and base-rate neglect

Using an analogue of the lawyer-and-engineer item (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), we compared conditions in which base rates were either presented as percentages (A), or frequencies (B), to conditions in which the natural sampling process was described additionally (C) or was directly experienced (D). We expected the likelihood of base-rate utilization to increase as the presentation approaches the process of natural sampling. Accordingly, results showed that the contingency of judgments on base rates systematically increased across conditions A to D. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Natural concepts and generalization classes

The results of an experiment performed by Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) show that pigeons possess concepts that are not based on common elements. The conclusion they draw from these results is that these concepts are largely determined by genetic factors. In the present paper it is argued that, at least for some of the concepts, the conclusion is incorrect. These concepts-called here uncommon generalization classes-were acquired by the pigeons as a consequence of certain experiences through which they went during the experiment. The discussion will also suggest the fruitfulness of replacing the vague and misleading notion of concept by the more adequate notion of generalization class.     

Authority and Natural Kind Essence

If natural kinds have microstructural essences they have them independently of rules for the application of kind terms. This suggests that what those rules are should make no difference to the essences being discoverable. I present two thought-experiments that suggest otherwise, however. Each shows an authority’s application of rules creates the appearance of there being kind essences; absent those rules, the appearance vanishes. This suggests natural kind essences are not independent of authority-sanctioned rules.