BIBLICAL AND THEISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALISM

Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides (I) properly functioning cognitive faculties in (II) an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with (III) a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I–III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable (I). Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs in humans (III). Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment (II). Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism.     

Reliabilism,Proper Function,and Serendipitous Malfunction

Alvin Plantinga's externalist analysis of epistemic warrant centres on the proper function of the relevant belief‐forming mechanism, where proper function is fixed relative to the design plan of the organism in question. He has set this analysis against reliabilism, the other leading externalist contender for the analysis of warrant. Though Plantinga's discussion advances the field of epistemology in a number of important ways, his treatment of warrant is limited by his assumption of creationism in his understanding of design and function. Further, analyses of epistemic warrant focusing on function over reliability either fail at handling problem cases reliabilism can handle, or fail to improve on problem cases for reliabilism. Thus no proper functionalist analysis like Plantinga's can supersede a well‐constructed reliabilist analysis.     

Mothers' beliefs and children's long-term cognitive change: A developmental task interpretation

A longitudinal study was used to explore the following hypotheses concerning the relation between mothers' beliefs, their use of high distancing utterances and children's cognitive development: (1) beliefs moderate the impact of high-distancing utterances on children's development, and (2) beliefs reflect mothers' normative expectations that motivate themselves and their children to try to satisfy them. The participants consisted of 34 children and their mothers and teachers. Results for the motherchild dialogues indicated that the distancing–cognitive performance relationship was strongest for children whose mothers had the most positive beliefs. In addition, mothers' beliefs about a 4-year-old child were more strongly related to children's cognitive performance at ages 6 and 10 than to cognitive performance at age 4. Characteristics of both verbal parent–child and verbal teacher–child interactions at age 4 supported a developmental task interpretation of these findings.     

A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism

Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's structurally similar argument. If Street succeeds in debunking normative realism, I argue, then she also succeeds in debunking atheism. But atheism is a suppressed premise of the Darwinian Dilemma as well as a commitment of almost all normative anti‐realists. If Street's argument entails theism, then the Darwinian Dilemma is internally incoherent and should be abandoned by almost everyone. 1     

How misinformation taints our belief system: A focus on belief updating and relational reasoning

This commentary complements Stanley et al.'s (2022) target article by concentrating on the process of false belief construction and its associated cognitive mechanisms. It also concurs with the target article that a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which consumers revise their truth judgments in view of new evidence is needed. Specifically, this essay develops two main dimensions: the first about what we know from the actual construction of truth judgments; the second about what we know from the cognitive mechanisms by which truth judgments are constructed. Particularly on this second dimension, I develop the idea that relational reasoning is key to understanding how individuals integrate new information within their internal belief systems. These two dimensions are both process-minded, yet one is about how beliefs evolve over time, whereas the other is about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie belief construction. Overall, an understanding of these two elements is crucial to finding behavioral interventions that may curb the spread of misinformation.     

Sources of Managers' Knowledge of Organizational Capabilities

In order to compete successfully in an industry, managers in organizations need to learn about emerging best practices and to implement them in their units. An essential part of this learning process is the development of an understanding of the current capabilities of the organization by its managers. We addressed the question of how managers' assessments of their organization's capabilities, which we call organizational self-knowledge, are affected by their exposure to relational and nonrelational sources of information. We developed hypotheses about the relationship between managers' exposure to different “learning channels” for both their individual depth of understanding of specific areas of practice and for their assessments of their organization's capabilities, which together contribute to organizational self-knowledge. We tested these hypotheses through a survey of 128 store managers in the retail food industry. The results showed that exposure to internal sources of information, both relational and nonrelational, as well as to external relational sources of information, is positively related to self-knowledge. Interestingly, the monitoring of external nonrelational sources of information was found to have no bearing on managers' assessments of their organization's capabilities. Our results counter common-sense beliefs and prior research that suggest that external nonrelational sources of information are an important input in assessing and building organizational capabilities.     

Beliefs About Emotion: Links to Emotion Regulation,Well-Being,and Psychological Distress

People differ in their implicit beliefs about emotions. Some believe emotions are fixed (entity theorists), whereas others believe that everyone can learn to change their emotions (incremental theorists). We extend the prior literature by demonstrating (a) entity beliefs are associated with lower well-being and increased psychological distress, (b) people's beliefs about their own emotions explain greater unique variance than their beliefs about emotions in general, and (3) implicit beliefs are linked with well-being/distress via cognitive reappraisal. These results suggest people's implicit beliefs—particularly about their own emotions—may predispose them toward emotion regulation strategies that have important consequences for psychological health.     

Distorsions cognitives et pratique de jeu de hasard et d’argent : état de la question

Cognitive distorsions are inherent to any gambling situation whatever the level of commitment of the gambler. Irrational beliefs lead the subject to overestimate his share of control over the game's outcome to the detriment of chance. Knowing the objective probability to win and having good numeric capacities of reasoning does not prevent the gamblers from developing these false beliefs. According to the concept of double switching proposed by Ladouceur and Sévigny (2005), irrational beliefs would coexist with objective knowledges on the game and would bustle in situation of gambling. The progress and the outcome of the game influence the development and the maintenance of cognitive distorsions, which influences the subject's practice of gambling. Pathological gambling, repeated and persistent gambling behavior, is characterized in particular by the presence of cognitive distortions, leading the subject to maintain, even to increase his gambling practice. Indeed, if cognitive distorsions are present in any situation of gambling, it seems nevertheless that it is more frequent and more intense in problem and pathological gamblers. Cognitive distorsions, in particular illusion of control, thus lead to a more important practice of gambling and a financial risk-taking, favoring the installation and the preservation of problem gambling. Certain factors seem to influence cognitive distorsions. There is a gender effect: women would present fewer irrational beliefs than men. Depression, anxiety and stress would also favor the development of these beliefs in situation of gambling. Several methods exist to estimate cognitive distorsions in gamblers. The first researches are based on assessment made by others (observation and analysis of gambler's verbalizations). Afterward, several self-report scales were created. At the moment, none of these scales has been validated in French language. The identification of gambling related cognitive distortions permit to elaborate adapted modes of treatment. So, the cognitive therapy suggests identifying and restructuring the beliefs to bring the subject to change his gambling behavior. In spite of the current knowledge on cognitive distorsions, certain questions remain open, in particular about the implication of theses beliefs in games implying a part of strategy, in which the subject has effectively a certain control over the game.     

The folk psychology of souls

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.     

Am I Abnormal? Relative Rank and Social Norm Effects in Judgments of Anxiety and Depression Symptom Severity

Overdetection and underdetection of depression and anxiety in primary care are common and may partly reflect individuals' misperceptions of the severity of symptoms they experience. Here, we explore how people's judgments about the severity of their own symptoms are influenced by their beliefs about the distribution of symptoms experienced by the rest of the population. We apply the rank‐based decision by sampling cognitive model of judgment to symptom severity. The model proposes that judgments depend on the relative rank of an item within a mental sample of comparable items. It is predicted that judgments of symptom severity will be context dependent and more specifically that an individual's judgments will be invalid to the extent that the individual has inaccurate beliefs about the relevant social context. Two studies found that participants' assessments of symptom severity were rank based. Study 1 elicited participants' beliefs about the social distribution of symptoms and found that participants' judgments of whether they were depressed or anxious were mainly predicted not by their symptoms' objective severity but rather by where participants ranked the severity of their symptoms in comparison with the believed symptoms of others. Study 2 varied symptom distributions experimentally and again found relative rank effects as predicted. It is concluded that the real‐world application of contextual models of judgment requires investigation of individual differences in participants' background beliefs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Cognitive Demands of Friendship

Recently, some philosophers have argued that friendship demands that we have positive beliefs about our friends even when such beliefs go against the evidence. Call this the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship. I consider both motivations and worries for the doxastic account before developing a new account: the attentional account. According to it, friendship places demands on how we direct our attention. I argue that the attentional account accommodates the considerations that motivate the doxastic account and weathers the worries that trouble it. Along the way, I question the assumption that friendship's cognitive demands center on positivity.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Filling in the Gaps: False Memories and Partisan Bias

While cognitive psychologists have learned a great deal about people's propensity for constructing and acting on false memories, the connection between false memories and politics remains understudied. If partisan bias guides the adoption of beliefs and colors one's interpretation of new events and information, so too might it prove powerful enough to fabricate memories of political circumstances. Across two studies, we first distinguish false memories from false beliefs and expressive responses; false political memories appear to be genuine and subject to partisan bias. We also examine the political and psychological correlates of false memories. Nearly a third of respondents reported remembering a fabricated or factually altered political event, with many going so far as to convey the circumstances under which they “heard about” the event. False-memory recall is correlated with the strength of partisan attachments, interest in politics, and participation, as well as narcissism, conspiratorial thinking, and cognitive ability.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

Beyond the purely cognitive: Belief systems,social cognitions,and metacognitions as driving forces in intellectual performance

This study explores the way that belief systems, interactions with social or experimental environments, and skills at the “control” level in decision-making shape people's behavior as they solve problems. It is argued that problem-solvers' beliefs (not necessarily consciously held) about what is useful in mathematics may determine the set of “cognitive resources” at their disposal as they do mathematics. Such beliefs may, for example, render inaccessible to them large bodies of information that are stored in long-term memory and that are easily retrieved in other circumstances. In other cases, individuals' reactions to an experimental setting (fear of failure, or the desire to “look mathematical” while being videotaped) may induce behavior that is almost pathological—and at the same time, so consistent that it can be modeled. In general, such “environmental” factors establish the context within which individuals access and utilize the information potentially at their disposal. Protocols illustrating these points are presented and discussed. A model based on an axiomatization of students' beliefs about plane geometry is outlined, and is shown to correspond closely to their problem-solving performance. A framework is offered for analyzing problem-solving performance at three qualitatively different levels: access to cognitive resources stored in LTM, executive or control decision-making, and belief systems.     

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

The relationship of maternal beliefs about sex typing to maternal and young children's behavior

Possible links between maternal beliefs about children's sex-typed behavior and familial characteristics, mothers' interactions with their young children, and children's cognitive functioning were explored. One hundred and thirty-two mothers and their two-year-olds were seen; familial social class, birth order, and child gender were selection-criterion variables. Sex-typed beliefs were assessed by asking mothers to rate a number of qualities and interests as to whether or not each was more likely to occur in or be characteristic of boys or of girls, or was equally likely to be characteristic of boys and girls. Mothers rated qualities for two different age periods—toddlerhood and middle childhood. Mothers and toddlers were observed in a free play setting for 20 min. Responsivity and type of behavior emitted were assessed. The Bayley Scale of Infant Intelligence was given at 24 months. The findings were as follows: First, gender and social class were related to maternal beliefs about sex-typed characteristics. Second, maternal sex-typed beliefs were negatively related to active toy play and distal interaction, with this relationship significant for daughters but not sons. Third, daughters of low sex-typed mothers were more responsive and more likely to seek comfort than daughters of high sex-typed mothers. Fourth, daughters of mothers who had strong sex-typed beliefs had lower IQ scores at 24 months than did daughters of mothers with beliefs less strong; this relationship was not found for sons. Research on cross-sex behavior and enhanced cognitive functioning was reviewed as it relates to these findings.