Freud's Illusion: New Approaches to Intractable Issues

In his later theological work The Future of an Illusion, Freud (1927/1961) makes provocative suggestions about the psychological significance of religious ideas. Freud begins by analyzing their meaning in the lives of particular individuals. He then extrapolates to a critique of their effect on human civilization. Religion originally evolved in order to explain difficult concepts such as death and fate. It quickly outgrew its purely theological dimensions and became a social regulator by coercing compliance with a set of cultural norms.

The purpose of this article is not to evaluate whether Freud was right, that is, if religion in fact is an illusion. Rather, using concepts derived from current work in analytical theology, it examines the internal logic of Freud's analysis and some of the assumptions he made to reach this conclusion. Despite his theoretical insights, much of Freud's reasoning is invalid and many of his premises are questionable. Freud adopts assertions without explaining them and does not offer much in the way of deductive or inferential support for his argument. This article advocates an epistemological approach to understanding Freud's use of terms such as “wishes” and “illusions.” Adopting this perspective uncovers tacit presuppositions underlying his theory about the origins of religious belief and its relationship to culture and society, and clarifies the conceptual links holding it together.     

GRADIVA: FREUD,FETISHISM, AND POMPEIAN FANTASY

This paper is a critical reconsideration of Freud's analysis (1907) of Wilhelm Jensen's novella Gradiva: A Pompeian Fantasy (1903). Freud's interest was aroused by the parallels between Jensen's presentation of dreams and Freud's model of dream formation just published in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). Freud also acclaims Jensen's presentation of the formation and “cure” of his protagonist's delusion about a marble bas‐relief of a woman walking. This paper argues for the centrality of the phenomenon of fetishism, briefly considered but excluded from Freud's analysis. The fantasy of Gradiva as “the necessary conditions for loving” (Freud 1910, pp. 165–166) is also a key thesis of the essay, which makes use of the newly translated Freud–Jensen correspondence contained in this article's Appendix.     

“AFTER THE EVENT”: FREUD'S UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINS

This essay aims to revise Freud's theory of the uncanny by rereading his own essay of that name along with the key material Freud drew on in formulating his theory: E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story “The Sandman” (1816a) and Ernst Jentsch's essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906a). While arguing, initially, both that Jentsch's work is fundamentally misconstrued by Freud and that it offers a better account of what happens in Hoffmann's story, the essay moves beyond Jentsch's account to offer a more philosophically oriented theory of the uncanny, one more in line with Freud's ideas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a).     

Engaging with the unknown: How Judaism enabled Freud's psychological discoveries

A large literature has formed around the question of how Freud's Jewishness and/or Judaism influenced his psychological discoveries and development of psychoanalytic theory and methods. The article organizes the literature into several core theses but brings new clarity and insight by applying two essential criteria to demonstrate an impact of Judaism on Freud's thinking: direct content and historical timing. First, there should be evidence that Freud incorporated actual content from Jewish sources, and second, this incorporation must have occurred during the most crucial period of Freud's early discovery, conceptualization, and development of psychoanalysis, roughly 1893–1910. Thus, for example, Bakan's well-known theory that Freud studied Kabbala is completely negated by the absence of any evidence in the required time period. Part I reviews the literature on the influence of Freud's ethnic/cultural Jewish identity. Part II introduces the Judaic sacred literature, explores Freud's education in Judaism and Hebrew, and presents evidence that Freud had the motive, means, and resources to discover and draw from the “Dream Segment” of the Talmud—along with the traditional Judaic methods and techniques of textual exegesis. Freud then applied these same Judaic word-centered interpretive methods—used for revealing an invisible God—to revealing an invisible Unconscious in four successive books in 1900, 1901, and 1905.     

The patient's private construction of meaning and canons of science: Freud's case studies noch einmal1

Starting from Freud's classical case studies, the author highlights the tension between the psychoanalytical starting point in the subject's own meaning construction and the claims of the professional expert to objectivity, privileged knowledge and interpretative precedence. Psychoanalytic investigation of subjective phenomena came into existence parallel with Freud's magnifi cent project to furnish ‘a psychology that shall be a natural science’. The privileged knowledge of the specialist was substituted by the explicit intention to listen to the individual's own stories and private explanatory constructions. In order to investigate the territory of the unconscious, Freud had to develop various strategies for uncovering and correcting errors, and for testing clinically anchored hypotheses. However, Freud regularly failed to follow his own intentions. The thesis the author presents here is that departures from the explicit ambition to follow the subject's own meaning construction, and departures from the scientifi c attitude, easy to trace in Freud's case studies, accompany each other. These departures have had far‐reaching consequences for the present status of the psychoanalytic knowledge.     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Hidden in Plain Sight: Freud's Jewish Identity Revisited

Using a contextualizing, integrative approach, the author looks at aspects of Freud's life and the multiple levels of influence in terms of his theories. While keeping a broad overview of the historical and cultural life for Jews in 19th-century Europe, including the effects of anti-Semitism, emancipation, and the enlightenment movement, the author intertwines Freud's parents' lives and personalities as they played out in Freud's own development and in his theories. The author believes that Freud formed a particular repression linking Jewishness, passivity, femininity, and religion while elevating in his theories masculinity, activity, science, and atheism. The author specifically focuses on Freud's theories of the Unconscious and the oedipal complex as particularly representative of a split between his own Jewish home and the German high culture he was educated within. Drawing on literature within psychoanalysis and the disciplines of Jewish studies and broad cultural history, the author concludes that Freud's rejection of certain parts of his own life are embedded within his theory when considered from a multiply-layered point of view.     

FREUD'S LETTERS TO FLIESS: FROM SEDUCTION TO SEXUAL BIOLOGY, FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY TO A CLINICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The author describes the development of Freud's theory of neurosis from 1892 onwards, starting with his distinction between the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses and his discovery of a specific, sexual aetiology for both, until which point it remained limited to pathology. The problem of the aetiology of perversion, however, confronted him with a paradox within the theory of seduction: how can an infantile sexual pleasure produce unpleasure when it is remembered at the time of puberty? This problem could not be solved within the framework of the seduction theory because the asexuality of childhood was essential to this theory. For an answer Freud had to turn to biology. He considered that the transformation of an infantile pleasure into unpleasure presupposed an organic repression of non‐genital sexual pleasure. This hypothesis of organic repression radically changed the anthropological claim of Freud's theory. As long as he was looking for a specific aetiology of neurosis and perversion, Freud's theory remained restricted to pathology. However, when he introduced infantile sexuality and its organic repression as universal organic processes, the strict distinction between normality and pathology could not be maintained. The author concludes that by turning to sexual biology, Freud transformed psychopathology into a clinical anthropology.     

THE BIRTH OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FROM THE SPIRIT OF TECHNIQUE1

The author aims to demonstrate, through a textual analysis of Freud's work, how the creation of psychoanalysis as a plausible set of understandings of the human mind has a methodological origin that has sometimes been overlooked: in the Greek concept of techne. Freud, an acknowledged pupil of Brentano, was well versed in Aristotelian rhetoric, and selected this instrument of investigation, dependent on language, from the outset of his efforts to describe, understand and treat the world of the unconscious mind. Working in the tradition of techne Freud actually rehabilitated ‘guessing’ (zu erraten) ‐ although it became a largely overlooked concept in Freud's work ‐ and so sought to place conjectural reason as the definitive form of knowledge for the investigation and treatment of the mind. This explains why the 1895 ‘Project’ could not succeed and why technique became irreplaceable as the via regia in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. Its model is founded in Aristotelian rhetoric, whose conception of language was first rediscovered by Nietzsche and was used therapeutically by Freud. Freud's view is apparent in his 1923 definition of psychoanalysis which is compared to the current IPA definition, a definition which, the author suggests, gives a misleading prominence to ‘theory’ and which shows how far a questionable rationality has removed conjectural reason from the field, to its detriment. From this point of view it is argued that the ‘precious conjunction’ (Freud) between investigation and treatment has been abandoned, and the concept of historical truth and its significance for psychoanalysis obscured.     

The problem of real trauma and the future of psychoanalysis

Abstract

Contemporary psychoanalysis emphasizes the role of “real” trauma, as it is well shown by recent sociological and theoretical developments (such as Kohut's Self psychology, object relation theory, renewed interest in Ferenczi's and Sullivan's contributions, etc.). To understand more clearly these developments, the author traces again the steps laid down by Freud in building the psychoanalytic edifice. The renewed interest in the environment, in real traumas, and in the vicissitudes of object relations could be a “paradigm change” in psychoanalysis: a return to Freud's original seduction theory. This development is seen as related to the difficulties of Freud's drive theory.     

Structural Determinist Aspects of Depression in Freud's “Mourning and Melancholia”

This article examines Freud's theory of depression based on his paper “Mourning and Melancholia” from the structural determinist paradigm. The reality of depression lies in the underlying structure of the mind in which Freud's libidinal drives and topographical structure of mind bring forth conflicts in relation to an object. Freud delves into the fundamental causes of depression and points out that loss of object, regression of libido into the ego, and ambivalence cause hidden conflicts, which manifest themselves as depressive symptoms and feelings. William Styron's Darkness Visible is used to illustrate its relevance to the structural determinist aspects of Freud's psychoanalytic theory of depression.     

The Oedipus complex: A confrontation at the central cross‐roads of psychoanalysis

The theory of the Oedipus complex as Freud formulated it rests on the following pillars: the child's characteristic sexual and aggressive impulses concerning the parents, phallic monism, and the castration complex. This paper reviews the context in which Freud discovered the Oedipus complex, as well as Freud's theory. It then examines the proposals of later authors whose general Oedipal theories differ from Freud's in an attempt to point out both their possible correlations and confrontations with Freud. It includes Klein's pre‐genital Oedipal theory, Lacan's structuralist reinterpretation, Bion's reconception of the complex under the knowledge vertex, Green's generalized triangulation theory, Meltzer's notions of the aesthetic object and sexual mental states, and Chasseguet‐Smirgel's archaic Oedipal matrix     

Gender and Transference

Despite an early interest, Freud explicitly rejected philosophy, because of its “speculative” character. He struggled with balancing the intellectual appeal of philosophy with the certainty he hoped to find in positivist science. Putting aside the scientific status of Freud's work, the author re-examines Freud's attitude towards philosophy. Failing to recognize the assumptions of his investigations, Freud segregated psychoanalysis from philosophy on the charge that philosophers equated mind with consciousness, putatively propounded unfounded speculations, and assumed false conclusions about comprehensiveness. However, Freud never completely abandoned his initial philosophical proclivities. His own contributions to cultural history, social philosophy, notions of personal identity, and the humanistic thrust of psychoanalysis, demonstrate that he continued to address his earliest interests in philosophical questions. The author elucidates the philosophical complexity of psychoanalysis and concludes that a reconsideration of Freud's self-appraisal of his intellectual commitments is warranted.     

The unconscious

A discussion of the unconscious leads naturally to Freud and to a theory on subjectivity we may designate as de-centred. The unconscious reminds us that not only do we not know ourselves. In the core of our subjectivity, we have to acknowledge the notion of otherness. Re-reading Freud's text, The Unconscious, from 1915, the current author emphasises the character and function of the unconscious as radically different from what we know about conscious processes. This allows for the concept of the preconscious, which the author links to Winnicott's intermediary area and Green's tertiary processes. Taking as point of departure Freud's differentiation of word presentation and thing presentation, the author points to Freud's introduction of the term thing-cathexies of the object as designating the primal psychic representation. The Freudian perspective is broadened, encompassing the notion of otherness as discussed by Laplanche and Aulagnier. Concluding the paper, the author draws some implications for psychoanalytic technique, focusing especially on transference.     

Meaning and object in Freud's theory of language

This article sets out to challenge the interpretation of Freud's views on the origins of the meaning of language according to which meaning always originates from an act of naming. In Freud's terms, word‐presentations would originally denote object‐ or thing‐presentations and gain meaning through this reference. This interpretation claims that this view was already expressed in Freud's On Aphasia (1891) and influenced all his later theory of language. To oppose this claim, three conceptions proposed by Freud are discussed that strongly suggest the participation of language in the construction of the field of objects: a metapsychological hypothesis (the concepts of word‐, thing‐, and object‐presentation), the explanation of a psychopathological phenomenon (the genesis of a fetishistic object‐choice), and a concept concerning the foundations of the psychoanalytic method of dream interpretation (secondary elaboration). As a conclusion, it is argued that Freud's early views in On Aphasia (1891) can be alternatively understood such as to allow for a different view of language and its relationship with objects.     

WITHSTANDING TRAUMA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMMA ECKSTEIN'S CIRCUMCISION TO FREUD'S IRMA DREAM

The author considers the medical rationale for Wilhelm Fliess's operation on Emma Eckstein's nose in February 1895 and interprets the possible role that this played in Freud's dream of Irma's injection five months later. The author's main argument is that Emma likely endured female castration as a child and that she therefore experienced the surgery to her nose in 1895 as a retraumatization of her childhood trauma. The author further argues that Freud's unconscious identification with Emma, which broke through in his dream of Irma's injection with resistances and apotropaic defenses, served to accentuate his own “masculine protest”. The understanding brought to light by the present interpretation of Freud's Irma dream, when coupled with our previous knowledge of Freud, allows us to better grasp the unconscious logic and origins of psychoanalysis itself. 1     

On ‘the fear of death’ as the primary anxiety: How and why Klein differs from Freud

It is well known that Melanie Klein held the view that ‘fear of death’ is the primary source of anxiety and that her position is explicitly opposed to that of Sigmund Freud, who maintained that that fear cannot in any way or form be a source of anxiety. In a previous article on Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Blass, 2013), the author argued that, counter to what is commonly portrayed in the literature, Freud's considerations for rejecting the fear of death as a source of anxiety were based on relational and experiential factors that are usually associated with Kleinian psychoanalysis. In light of this affinity of Freud with Klein a question arises as to the actual source of their differences in this context. The present paper offers an answer to this question. The author first presents some of her earlier findings on what led Freud to reject the fear of death as a source of anxiety and then turns to investigate Klein's considerations for accepting it. This takes us beyond her explicit statements on this matter and sheds new light on the relationship of her views regarding death and anxiety and those of Freud. In turn this deepens the understanding of the relationship of Freud and Klein's conceptualizations of the psyche and its internal object relations, pointing to both surprising common ground and foundational differences.     

Freud's view of hysteria in light of modern trauma research

Freud's earliest notion of the aetiology of hysterical symptoms was based on his hypothesis on the importance of trauma dissociation, upon which he began to construct his first theory of neurosis. Soon, his conception of trauma narrowed to apply only to sexual trauma, and later only to childhood experiences of sexual abuse by the father. He substituted these earliest variations on a theory of neurosis with the libido theory due to his discovery of infantile sexuality, the poor treatment results he had with hysteric patients, the frequency of hysteria symptoms, the difficulties he had in distinguishing between his patients' internal and external realities and the ambiguous nature of the reasons behind the patients' problems, presumably due to repression. Recent trauma research, however, has rediscovered trauma dissociation, which is separate from repression. This has led to a new theoretical understanding of trauma-originated dynamics and the development of corresponding treatment interventions. In this paper, the author analyzes the development of Freud's conceptions of hysteria in the social-clinical cultural context of his period, as well as the reasons which led Freud to abandon the notion that trauma dissociation was an underlying cause of hysteria symptoms.     

The brunhilde fantasy freud's countertransference in the analysis of elma

Abstract

The authors start from the hypothesis that there existed a “blind-spot” in Freud's countertransference in his analysis of Elma, an ex-patient of Sandor Ferenczi. In their search for support for this idea, they review the correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi contemporary to Elma's treatment in addition to works by Freud on theory and technique. They believe to have found therein several facts which support the above idea: for instance, the diagnosis of “dementia praecox” that Freud formulated in his first interview with the patient; and some of the vicissitudes of the treatment, in particular, the circumstances which determined its termination. The Brunhilde fantasy, which Freud attributes to Elma in a letter to Ferenczi, enables them to penetrate further the possible relationship between this “blind-spot” and details of Freud's life and childhood as revealed in his self-analysis.