Subjective aspects of cognitive control at different stages of processing

Although research on cognitive control has addressed the effects that different forms of cognitive interference have on behavior and the activities of certain brain regions, until recently, the effects of interference on subjective experience have not been addressed. We demonstrate that, at the level of the individual trial, participants can reliably introspect the subjective aspects (e.g., perceptions of difficulty, competition, and control) of responding in interference paradigms. Similar subjective effects were obtained for both expressed and unexpressed (subvocalized) actions. Few participants discerned the source of these effects. These basic findings illuminate aspects of cognitive control and cognitive effort. In addition, these data have implications for the study of response interference in affect and self-control, and they begin to address theories regarding the function of consciousness.     

Influence of dysphoria on positive and negative cognitive reactivity to daily mood fluctuations

We used an experience sampling design to investigate the influence of dysphoria on positive and negative cognitive reactivity. Participants recorded their thoughts and mood four times per day on PDA devices for one week. We hypothesized that those higher in dysphoria would demonstrate a greater increase in negative thinking in response to negative mood, and a weaker increase in positive cognitions in response to positive mood. These hypotheses were largely supported. For those participants who reported higher initial dysphoria, there was a stronger association between negative mood and thinking and a weaker link between positive mood and thinking. Regression analyses indicated that positive and negative cognitive reactivity were independently related to dysphoria, suggesting that they represent distinct processes. Our results highlight the importance of understanding levels of both negative and positive cognitive reactivity and underscore the benefits of assessing mood and cognition with repeated measurements in "real-time," in order to better understand the antecedent effects of mood on thinking.     

The influence of sad mood on cognition

Neuroimaging has identified an overlapping network of brain regions whose activity is modulated by mood and cognition. Studies of depressed individuals have shown changes in perception, attention, memory, and executive functions. This suggests that mood has a pervasive effect on cognition. Direct evidence of the effect of sad mood on cognition is surprisingly limited, however. Published studies have generally addressed a single cognitive ability per study because the fleeting nature of laboratory-induced mood precludes extended testing, and robust findings are limited to mood effects on memory for emotional stimuli. In this study, sad mood was induced and prolonged, enabling the effects of mood to be assessed for an array of abilities, including those that share neural substrates with sad mood and those affected by depression. Sad mood affected memory for emotional words and facial emotion recognition, but not the other processes measured, with a significant nonuniformity of effect over tasks. These results are consistent with circumscribed effects of sad mood on certain emotion-related cognitive processes, but not on cognition more generally.     

The influence of induced mood on music preference

The purpose of this study was to clarify the impact of different self-centered moods on music preference without listening to music. Participants’ affective state (sad vs. happy vs. neutral) were experimentally manipulated through the mood induction procedure, and then their preferences for music were ascertained through self-reports. To understand participants’ internal motivations for their choices, we also asked them to indicate how appropriate he/she felt it would be to select the different music types as well as why they made such choices. Results suggested that participants in a sad mood were inclined to listen to sad (and slow) music, those in a happy mood preferred to listen to happy (and fast) music, and those in a neutral mood did not consistently prefer to listen to neutral music. In addition, participants were averse to sad music when they were in a happy or neutral mood; while they showed no aversion to happy music when they were in a sad mood. In conclusion, individuals select valence-consistent music when they are in an autobiographical memory-induced mood state.     

The influence of personality on induced depressive mood

An experimental group (n = 40) of normal female undergraduates underwent a Velten type of depressive mood-induction procedure (DMIP) and was compared with a control group (n = 40) which underwent a neutral mood-induction procedure (NMIP). Ss were selected on the basis of scores on the EPI to give a composition in each group of 10 neurotic introverts (NI), 10 neurotic extraverts (NE), 10 stable introverts (SI) and 10 stable extraverts (SE). Depressive mood was assessed before and after each MIP using a measure of psychomotor retardation (writing speed). An ANOVA applied to residualized change scores on the writing-speed measure showed that the DMIP produced a significantly greater depressive effect on mood than the NMIP and that neurotic Ss displayed a significantly greater degree of depressive deficit than stable Ss regardless of type of MIP undertaken. However, a significant interaction between neuroticism and type of MIP showed that neurotic Ss were especially prone to depressive deficits in the DMIP. No effects of extraversion/introversion on susceptibility to depressed mood were detected. The results are discussed in terms of Eysenck and Gray's theory of personality predisposition to depression and it is suggested that the Velten technique may have limitations for the induction of depressed mood.     

The influence of cognitive set on performance and arousal under different noise loads

Three groups of 12 subjects each performed a mental arithmetic task while exposed to continuous white noise in two experimental sessions. In Session I, each group was exposed to a different noise level [56, 72.5, or 85dB(A)], whereas in Session II all had the medium [72.5 dB(A)] intensity. Arithmetic performance deteriorated with increasing noise intensity in Session I, and in Session II each group retained its position relative to the other two groups. Thus, the higher the noise intensity in the first session, the poorer the performance in the second session. These results suggest that the motivation and energy mobilized in Session II were determined by the cognitive set adopted to meet the demands of Session I. Arousal level, as measured by adrenaline excretion and heart rate, was higher during both experimental sessions than in a control session. The rise in adrenaline output was of the same magnitude regardless of the intensity of the noise, which indicates that the subjects adjusted to the increase in total load by slowing down their performance rather than by raising their energy mobilization. Heart rate rose in response to changes in noise level in Session II relative to Session I, regardless of the direction of the change.     

The influence of focused-attention meditation states on the cognitive control of sequence learning

Cognitive control processes influence how motor sequence information is utilised and represented. Since cognitive control processes are shared amongst goal-oriented tasks, motor sequence learning and performance might be influenced by preceding cognitive tasks such as focused-attention meditation (FAM). Prior to a serial reaction time task (SRTT), participants completed either a single-session of FAM, a single-session of FAM followed by delay (FAM+) or no meditation (CONTROL). Relative to CONTROL, FAM benefitted performance in early, random-ordered blocks. However, across subsequent sequence learning blocks, FAM+ supported the highest levels of performance improvement resulting in superior performance at the end of the SRTT. Performance following FAM+ demonstrated greater reliance on embedded sequence structures than FAM. These findings illustrate that increased top-down control immediately after FAM biases the implementation of stimulus-based planning. Introduction of a delay following FAM relaxes top-down control allowing for implementation of response-based planning resulting in sequence learning benefits.     

Dissociable influences of reward motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control

It is becoming increasingly appreciated that affective and/or motivational influences contribute strongly to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. An unresolved question is whether emotional manipulations (i.e., direct induction of affectively valenced subjective experience) and motivational manipulations (e.g., delivery of performance-contingent rewards and punishments) have similar or distinct effects on cognitive control. Prior work has suggested that reward motivation can reliably enhance a proactive mode of cognitive control, whereas other evidence is suggestive that positive emotion improves cognitive flexibility, but reduces proactive control. However, a limitation of the prior research is that reward motivation and positive emotion have largely been studied independently. Here, we directly compared the effects of positive emotion and reward motivation on cognitive control with a tightly matched, within-subjects design, using the AX-continuous performance task paradigm, which allows for relative measurement of proactive versus reactive cognitive control. High-resolution pupillometry was employed as a secondary measure of cognitive dynamics during task performance. Robust increases in behavioral and pupillometric indices of proactive control were observed with reward motivation. The effects of positive emotion were much weaker, but if anything, also reflected enhancement of proactive control, a pattern that diverges from some prior findings. These results indicate that reward motivation has robust influences on cognitive control, while also highlighting the complexity and heterogeneity of positive-emotion effects. The findings are discussed in terms of potential neurobiological mechanisms.     

认知神经研究中的积极共情

积极共情指个体对他人积极情绪状态的理解和间接分享过程。虽然它与消极共情在产生过程中都依赖于镜像神经系统和心理理论系统的活动, 但是两者在产生难度上不同。对于积极共情情感如何在大脑中表征的, 不同的研究者观点各异：一些认为与消极共情一致, 都集中在脑岛及其相关脑区; 而另一些则认为是大脑的愉悦系统。关于积极共情影响因素的研究主要集中于共情主体和客体的关系方面。今后需要进一步了解积极共情在产生机制和情感表征上的特点, 拓展其影响因素的研究并展开对特质积极共情神经基础的探讨。     

The influence of mood on perceptions of social interactions

Interpreting our own and others' social behaviors is an important cognitive task in everyday life. Recent work in cognitive psychology suggests that temporary mood states may have a significant effect on the way information about common social events is processed. This study investigated how (a) a person's current mood, (b) the target of the judgments (self vs other), and (c) the characteristics of the social episode (formal-informal; intimate-nonintimate) influenced people's assessment of, and memory for, social behaviors. Subjects were videotaped while engaging in four different kinds of interactions with trained confederates. One day later subjects were hypnotized, and a happy, positive, or depressed, negative mood was induced. They then watched and rated their own and their partner's interactions on the videotape. Results showed strong mood influence on behavior assessments and recall memory, and significant effects due to target (self vs other) and the type of interaction episode. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for contemporary research on social cognition, and their relevance to cognitively based theories of social maladjustment and depression are considered.     

The influence of stimulus-set size on developmental changes in cognitive control and conflict adaptation

Cognitive control abilities substantially improve from early childhood to adulthood. The primary aim of this study was to examine the influence of stimulus-set size on developmental changes in cognitive control abilities such as task switching, interference control, and conflict adaptation. We assumed that a small stimulus set used in a task-switching paradigm would induce stronger task-stimulus priming that might increase the need for control, thereby amplifying age differences in cognitive control abilities. Therefore, we compared task-switching performance in a group of participants responding to a small stimulus-set (N=4) with a group responding to a large stimulus-set (N=96) in three age groups: kindergarten children (4.1-6.0 years of age), elementary school children (6.1-9.0 years of age), and young adults (21.0-28.0 years of age) on conflicting vs. non-conflicting trials (interference control) and following conflicting vs. non-conflicting trials (conflict adaptation). Results on the basis of error rates support the view that a small stimulus-set size during task switching (i.e., larger task-stimulus priming) increases the need for control as we found (a) worse conflict adaptation on task-repetition trials only for small but not for large set sizes and (b) larger interference costs under small than large set-size condition for elementary school children as compared with young adults. Kindergarten children were less sensitive to the set-size manipulation and showed major problems in interference control while being in a task-switching situation, even if no actual task switch was required, possibly reflecting their inability to represent complex higher-order task rules.     

The differential influences of positive affect,random reward,and performance-contingent reward on cognitive control

Growing evidence suggests that positive affect and reward have differential effects on cognitive control. So far, however, these effects have never been studied together. Here, the authors present one behavioral study investigating the influences of positive affect and reward (contingent and noncontingent) on proactive control. A modified version of the AX-continuous performance task, which has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to reward and affect manipulations, was used. In a first phase, two experimental groups received either neutral or positive affective pictures before every trial. In a second phase, the two halves of a given affect group additionally received, respectively, performance-contingent or random rewards. The results replicated the typical affect effect, in terms of reduced proactive control under positive as compared to neutral affect. Also, the typical reward effects associated with increased proactive control were replicated. Most interestingly, performance-contingent reward counteracted the positive affect effect, whereas random reward mirrored that effect. In sum, this study provides first evidence that performance-contingent reward, on the one hand, and positive affect and performance-noncontingent reward, on the other hand, have oppositional effects on cognitive control: Only performance-contingent reward showed a motivational effect in terms of a strategy shift toward increased proactive control, whereas positive affect alone and performance-noncontingent reward reduced proactive control. Moreover, the integrative design of this study revealed the vulnerability of positive affect effects to motivational manipulations. The results are discussed with respect to current neuroscientific theories of the effects of dopamine on affect, reward, and cognitive control.     

The influence of experimenter attitude on the performance of children of different cognitive ability levels

We investigated the influence of the experimenter's attitude on children's performance in a classification task. We chose 96 children (M age: 5 years, 9 months) on the basis of their performance in a spontaneous classification task. Forty-eight children made partial alignments on the basis of a link established from one object to the next (O-level group); 48 looked for objects having one common property (P-level group). The children had to perform a dichotomy task in two testing situations: one with a caring experimenter, and one with an indifferent experimenter. In the O-level group, the children's performance was superior when the experimenter was caring even though they did not seem to notice the difference between the two attitudes. P-level children clearly distinguished the experimenter attitudes, but their performance remained the same. To determine children's actual abilities accurately, researchers must take into account children's interactions with both objects and partners.     

The impact of positive mood and category importance on crossed categorization effects

Four studies examined the effect of positive versus neutral affect on preference among potential discussion partners who were members of two in-groups, two out-groups, or both an in-group and an out-group (crossed targets). The importance of targets' category memberships was manipulated by idiographically based selection. Positive affect elevated evaluation of crossed targets with a dominant (differentially important) in-group (Study 1). When categories were made equally important, positive affect had no impact (Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 presented crossed targets with both equally and differentially important group memberships and showed that differential category importance (dominance) is necessary for positive affect to influence judgments about them. These results are explained by the broadened categorization induced by positive affect.     

Sex differences in behavioral and cognitive aspects of decision control

Sex differences in three components of decision control were examined in a series of studies utilizing 4-, 9-, and 14-year-old subjects. These components were actual decision control behavior, the cognitive understanding of the masculine or feminine nature of decision control, and the self-perception of decision control skills. At the behavioral level, boys controlled more decision outcomes than girls, especially at the oldest age grouping. In the area of self-perception, girls were less likely to perceive themselves as decision controllers compared to their male counterparts in the oldest age grouping. As far as general attitudes were concerned, neither boys nor girls equated decision control with masculinity. Results are discussed in terms of the socialization of powerlessness in women.     

The influence of induced mood on the inhibition of emotional information

The ability to inhibit affective information plays a major role in efficient cognitive processing. In this study the effect of mood induction on inhibitory processing of emotional material was investigated. In Experiment 1, performance on a negative affective priming task (NAP) following negative and positive mood induction (MIP) was compared to a neutral mood condition. Results revealed that, as compared with the neutral mood condition, inhibitory function for affective material was unaffected by negative MIP. However, after the positive MIP, inhibitory processes were significantly impaired. In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the findings on positive affect and inhibition. The data concerning positive mood fit with the general findings that positive mood often leads to a “loose, flexible” processing mode. The null-finding concerning negative mood and inhibition is discussed in the light of research on inhibition in depression.     

The effects of adult aging and induced positive and negative mood on planning

Changes in executive functions have been found in older adults and also in young adults experiencing positive or negative mood states. The current study investigated the hypothesis that older adults would show greater executive function impairment following mood induction than young adults. Ninety-six participants (half aged 19-37, half aged 53-80) completed a neutral, positive, or negative mood induction procedure, followed by the Tower of London planning task. Significant interactions were found between age and mood such that older adults showed greater planning impairment than young adults in both the positive and negative mood conditions. Emotionally salient events occurring before testing may interfere with executive function in older adults.     

Separating sustained from transient aspects of cognitive control during thought suppression

Cognitive theories of how people regulate their thoughts have suggested the involvement of two control processes that occur over different time courses. These cognitive accounts parallel recent neural models of executive control, which suggest that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) mediates sustained changes in the allocation of control processes, whereas the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) relays a transient need for additional control. Combining these cognitive and neural models of control, we used recently developed analysis techniques to distinguish transient from sustained changes in brain activation while subjects attempted to suppress an unwanted thought. Results were consistent with both models: Dorsolateral PFC demonstrated sustained increases in activation during attempts at thought suppression, whereas bilateral ACC demonstrated transient increases associated with occurrences of unwanted thoughts. These data support proposals regarding the different contributions made by the PFC and ACC to executive control and provide initial neuroimaging support for dual-process models of how individuals regulate their thoughts.