RESPONSE TO ROTTSCHAEFER,BECKLEY, AND KONNER

Abstract. All three articles properly locate my work as interactive between the sciences on the one hand and theology and ethics on the other. They disagree on whether tradition, science, or experience “trumps” the others when they conflict; Beckley shows the importance of tradition, which is slighted by the other two. Comments on each article indicate where further discussion is needed and where I have learned from the authors or agree with them.     

Total Recall: Treating Chronic Mental Illness as a Memory

The ideas outlined in this paper developed from three separate strands of my work as a therapist treating older people. Firstly, I was concerned with reducing the number of patients not benefiting from therapy. In keeping with Pinquart et al.'s (Am J Psychiatry 163:1493–1501, 2006) recent meta-analytic survey concerning the use of psychotherapy and medication, 50% of the depressed patients treated by my team failed to respond adequately. Secondly, the ideas grew out of my attempts to determine why different therapies with older people have often been shown to have equivocal beneficial impacts (Davies and Collerton, J Ment Health 6:335–344, 1997). Thirdly, I was interested in integrating the relevant neuropsychological features, particularly memory, into my therapeutic work. These three strands have led me to propose a pan-theoretical model of distress based on memory functioning and existing information processing perspectives (Teasdale and Barnard, Affect, cognition and change: Remodelling depressive thought, 1993; Power and Dalgleish, Behav Cogn Psychother, 27:129–142, 1996).     

HEIDEGGER AND THE APPROPRIATION OF METAPHYSICS

Heidegger's deconstruction of the history of Western metaphysics has been a major influence behind poststructural critiques of modernity as well as more apologetic attempts to maintain a dialogue with historical sources, such as Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. This bifurcation has intensified the ambiguity of Heidegger's project: was it an attempt to relinquish philosophical ties to the past or a call for a fundamental reinterpretation of them? In this article I argue the latter, focusing my analysis on Heidegger's notions of appropriation and historicity. On the one hand, appropriation is the hermeneutical event by which ontology is reinfused into a reading of historical sources. On the other hand, historicity is the self‐reflexive historical involvement by which we become aware of what contemporary, philosophical conditions necessitate this reengagement. In the end, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics arises from this self‐reflexivity. It deconstructs the prevailing misunderstandings of philosophical sources in order to allow for reinterpretation at a revivified ontological level constantly in view of the question of being.     

Effet Pygmalion en milieu organisationnel : une analyse de ses mécanismes explicatifs,effets principaux et conditions d’influence

The elusiveness of the Pygmalion effect is both fascinating and frustrating. It is probably why an important leadership phenomenon was for so long neglected by the research. Meta-analyzes identified on the Pygmalion effect in organizational environment show relatively robust effects, confirming the existence of this phenomenon. The aim of this article is to revisit the literature on the Pygmalion effect to better understand this phenomenon. Through research in the field of education and those of organizational sciences, it was possible to draw a portrait of the state of the research of the Pygmalion effect in the workplace. On the one hand, this article identifies leadership and self-efficacy as explanatory mechanisms of the Pygmalion effect. On the other hand, the text also discusses conditions that diminish or amplify this phenomenon by dividing them into three categories: (a) employee characteristics, (b) supervisor characteristics, and (c) work context.     

Is there a profession of engineering?

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis.     

Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics

This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account information about each others’ beliefs may greatly influence the accuracy and speed with which the scientific community as a whole approximates the truth. On the other hand, social epistemologists concerned with peer disagreement have so far neglected the question of how practices of responding to disagreements with peers fare with respect to the goal of approximating the truth. Again, work on opinion dynamics shows that this may be a mistake, and that how we ought to respond to disagreements with our peers may depend on the specific purposes of our investigations.     

Reflections for Clinical Pastoral Education Students in Psychiatric Settings

This article focuses on Donald Capps’s books on mental illness. In doing so I highlight three key insights from Capps that I have applied in my own ministry with persons with mental illness in various psychiatric hospitals. These insights, together with my own experience as a chaplain, lead to three practical lessons for clinical pastoral education students in psychiatric settings. I provide some context for my interest in mental illness and my friendship with Capps, as well as some background regarding how Capps’s writings on mental illness fit with certain broader themes in his own work as a pastoral theologian. This essay is personal throughout.     

Cultural tensions in strategic marital therapy

Whether the elements of a good marital relationship are universal is the question addressed in this case study of therapy with a couple who were culturally different from the therapist. The conflicts between the therapeutic strategies, which were based on a strategic therapy model, and the customs of the couple from a foreign culture, made it difficult to evaluate whether the therapist was on target with interventions. On one hand, therapists need to guard against being misled into believing that customs are cultural imperatives which never can be changed. On the other hand, they need to be aware of the impact and possible ramifications of challenging long-held, culturally-based beliefs and behaviors. The following case study details the dilemmas faced by a therapist working with an Asian-Indian couple who presented themselves as being bound by their cultural background and heritage.Grateful acknowledgement is made by the author to Etienne Phipps, PhD, whose comments give direction and substance to all my work.     

Heidegger on Assertion,Method and Metaphysics

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.     

Experiential Learning

SUMMARY

The following article is about three things: my impressions of Virginia Satir's work, my personal experience of her, and the profound connection between the work of Virginia Satir and Dr. Eugene T. Gendlin's Focusing work.

My attraction to both of these great teachers is not surprising. They both share a type of wisdom which in metaphysics is often described as “intelligence lovingly applied.”

In this article I hope to convey what I see as an organic and compatible overlap between Satir and Gendlin which will hopefully be useful to the readers of this publication.     

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CHILDREN'S STRATEGY CHOICE PROCEDURES

This article presents conclusions that have emerged from my recent work on how children choose strategies on familiar tasks such as arithmetic, time-telling, and spelling. Among these conclusions are that children use diverse strategies on many tasks; that ignoring this diversity of strategies can lead to seriously flawed cognitive models; that children's pattern of strategy choices have considerable adaptive value; that children's strategy choices do not always reflect the operation of metacognitive processes; that associative knowledge directs at least some strategy choices; that among the factors that influence the development of strategy choices are the difficulty of executing backup strategies, the impact of related problems and operations, and the frequency of problem presentation; and that individual differences in both knowledge and cognitive style influence strategy choices.     

Hegel,grandfather of disjunctivism

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism.     

The use of event‐related potentials in the study of early cognitive development

The article by Guillaume Thierry is a welcome one, alerting the field to the exciting ways in which event‐related potentials (ERPs) can be used to study cognitive development. It is also timely: there is great interest in the brain sciences, and in how neuroscience can be applied to cognitive development and indeed to education. In my view, however, the article is perhaps too cautious. It does not seem necessary to delay the use of ERPs in cognitive work until all in the field have agreed on the sound characterization of ERP components. It should be possible for further characterization to proceed hand‐in‐hand with data gathering on applied questions. In fact, as partly noted by Thierry, in the auditory domain well‐characterized ERP components are already available, even for infants (e.g. Cheour et al., 1997; Leppänen and Lyytinen, 1997). Furthermore, it is of developmental interest to study older children as well as infants. If ERPs are seen as a tool to complement existing behavioural investigations, rather than as a stand‐alone method to be used independently, then auditory ERPs can certainly be used in current cognitive‐developmental work. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shared emotions

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about “straightforward sharing” is argued to be of secondary importance.     

The Protean Therapist

SUMMARY

The subject of the following article is the protean journey therapists make as they adapt to changing situations and challenges in their own lives and the ultimate impact it has on their clinical work with patients. I have used the example of my own life, in which certain critical events have transformed me from a person with a rather ordinary perspective to someone who has come to appreciate the fragile nature of life with its rich tapestry of complicated ties and patterns. I have tried to demonstrate that significant events in my life and my personal development over the past thirty years have furthered my appreciation and treatment of my patients. I have also come to recognize that my patients' particular journeys, on which I have accompanied them, have similarly contributed to and enriched my life in myriad ways.     

In search and proof of human beings, not machines

My intentions are twofold in this autobiographical account. On one hand, I hope to present empirical and theoretical evidence for a freely willing human being. On the other, I carefully record the developing stages I lived through to cement my confidence in the image of humanity I would like my readers to accept. I have, in my career development, worked hard to redefine psychological terminology, defend traditional scientific practices, and provide support for all those colleagues who can no longer stand the mechanistic characterization that so many psychology departments insist on. I have spent over 40 years pursuing such goals. It is not likely that I will ever give up my quest for what I take to be a genuine humanity.     

Deception and truth detection when analyzing nonverbal and verbal cues

In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.     

Reply to Psarros: Popper and Chemistry

In this article I reply to criticism of my published work by N. Psarros (Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 28: 297–305,1997). I show that I had already answered the first criticism in my published work and not overlooked his supposed refutation. However I offer a plausible argument which he could have used to strengthen his claim. Psarros cites my work on Hopkins in his opening paragraph, but then makes no further reference to it in the text. I indicated to Psarros verbally at Ilkley 1994 (and reiterate the message here) that Hopkins' work on Vitamins is the exemplar of a Popperian historical episode and must require addressing by the opponents of critical rationalism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Bearing Witness in Israel/Palestine: Finding My Voice

This article traces my evolution as a political activist in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict over the past decade, and describes the ways my activism has become integrated into my professional life. I discuss my journeys in Israel/Palestine with delegations of the Compassionate Listening Project, highlighting disturbing stories of injustice and abuse and inspiring stories of interfaith cooperation and nonviolent peace work. My focus is on the emotional impact of becoming the bearer of stories of unbearable human experience that I felt compelled to bring back and share. I reveal my struggles with continuing to speak and write publically about the injustice that I witnessed. In the course of standing up to both internal and external attacks on bearing witness, I have discovered a stronger therapeutic voice with my patients as well.     

Oppy,infinity, and the neoclassical concept of God

In this article I concentrate on three issues. First, Graham Oppy’s treatment of the relationship between the concept of infinity and Zeno’s paradoxes lay bare several porblems that must be dealt with if the concept of infinity is to do any intellectual work in philosophy of religion. Here I will expand on some insightful remarks by Oppy in an effort ot adequately respond to these problems. Second, I will do the same regarding Oppy’s treatment of Kant’s first antinomy in the first critique, which deals in part with the question of whether the world had a beginning in time or if time extends infinitely into the past. And third, my examination of these two issues will inform what I have to say regarding a key topic in philosophy of religion: the question regarding the proper relationship between the infinite and the finite in the concept of God.