The functional theory of counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactuals are thoughts about alternatives to past events, that is, thoughts of what might have been. This article provides an updated account of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that such thoughts are best explained in terms of their role in behavior regulation and performance improvement. The article reviews a wide range of cognitive experiments indicating that counterfactual thoughts may influence behavior by either of two routes: a content-specific pathway (which involves specific informational effects on behavioral intentions, which then influence behavior) and a content-neutral pathway (which involves indirect effects via affect, mind-sets, or motivation). The functional theory is particularly useful in organizing recent findings regarding counterfactual thinking and mental health. The article concludes by considering the connections to other theoretical conceptions, especially recent advances in goal cognition.     

ANTECEDENT INFLUENCES ON BEHAVIOR DISORDERS

The influence of antecedent events on behavior disorders has been relatively understudied by applied behavior analysts. This lack of research may be due to a focus on consequences as determinants of behavior and a historical disagreement on a conceptual framework for describing and interpreting antecedent variables. We suggest that antecedent influences can be described using terms derived from basic behavioral principles and that their functional properties can be adequately interpreted as discriminative and establishing operations. A set of studies on assessment and treatment of behavior disorders was selected for review based on their relevance to the topic of antecedent events. These studies were categorized as focusing on assessment of antecedent events, antecedent treatments for behavior disorders maintained by either positive or negative reinforcement, and special cases of antecedent events in behavior disorders. Some directions for future research on antecedent influences in the analysis and treatment of behavior disorders are discussed.     

Self-handicapping, excuse making, and counterfactual thinking: consequences for self-esteem and future motivation

Researchers interested in counterfactual thinking have often found that upward counterfactual thoughts lead to increased motivation to improve in the future, although at the cost of increased negative affect. The present studies suggest that because upward counterfactual thoughts indicate reasons for a poor performance, they can also serve as excuses. In this case, upward counterfactual thoughts should result in more positive self-esteem and reduced future motivation. Five studies demonstrated these effects in the context of self-handicapping. First, upward counterfactual thinking was increased in the presence of a self-handicap. Second, upward counterfactual thoughts indicating the presence of a self-handicap protected self-esteem following failure. Finally, upward counterfactual thoughts that protect self-esteem reduced preparation for a subsequent performance as well as performance itself. These findings suggest that the consequences of upward counterfactuals for affect and motivation are moderated by the goals of the individual as well as the content of the thoughts.     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

公正敏感性的研究现状与展望

公正敏感性是一种独立的、稳定的人格特质, 体现为个体知觉不公正的难易程度以及对知觉到的不公正所作出的反应的强烈程度。它包含受害者敏感性、观察者敏感性、得益者敏感性、犯过者敏感性四个成分, 主要使用量表法进行测量。公正敏感性是公正问题中的一个重要视角, 与亲社会行为、反社会行为密切相关, 对认知过程也有一定影响。目前的研究主要集中于公正敏感性对结果变量的影响, 今后的研究应该进一步探讨公正敏感性的影响因素。     

Attribution theories of lay epistemology?

Different attribution theories differ from each other less by their relation to different epistemic problems than by their taking account of different goals to which causal attributions can be functional. The process of causal attribution is influenced by the goals to which causal attributions are functional. A second criteria for differentiating attributions theories is that they proceed from different information bases.     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.     

Counterfactual thinking facilitates behavioral intentions

People often ponder what might have been, and these counterfactual inferences have been linked to behavior regulation. Counterfactuals may enhance performance by either a content-specific pathway (via shift in behavioral intentions) and/or a content-neutral pathway (via mindsets or motivation). Three experiments provided new specification of the content-specific pathway. A sequential priming paradigm revealed that counterfactual judgments facilitated RTs to complete behavioral intention judgments relative to control judgments and to a no-judgment baseline (Experiment 1). This facilitation effect was found only for intention judgments that matched the information content of the counterfactual (Experiment 2) and only for intention judgments as opposed to a different judgment that nevertheless focused on the same information content (Experiment 3). These findings clarify the content-specific pathway by which counterfactuals influence behavior.     

Empirical Guidance for Time-Window Sequential Analysis of Single Cases

Time-window sequential analyses test whether a target behavior occurs within a temporal window (e.g., within 2 seconds) after an antecedent behavior more than is expected by chance. This type of question is common when we need to know how one person or event may immediately affect another event or person in the natural environment. Theoretically, the significance of sequential associations from time-window analysis can be tested on the single subject level (Bakeman & Quera, 1995). The present Monte Carlo study was conducted to test the Type I error rates and the difference in sequential associations derived from four methods of time-window sequential analysis. The four methods vary according to whether they analyze the duration of antecedent and target behaviors. The results indicate that time-window sequential analysis method is generally valid. The results were most accurate when antecedent duration and target onset was analyzed. Although analyzing duration of the antecedent did affect the results, the effect size for the difference in results due to presence or absence of measuring duration of the antecedent was extremely small. Time-window analysis results appear unaffected by the decision to analyze the duration of the target event.     

Proximal and Distal Defense: A New Perspective on Unconscious Motivation

Death-related thoughts produce different effects on thought and behavior when they are in current focal attention and when they are on the fringes of consciousness. When such thoughts are conscious, people attempt to either remove them from consciousness or push death into the distant future by distorting their beliefs to logically imply that they have many remaining years to live. When such thoughts are highly accessible but outside current focal attention, people increase efforts to view themselves as persons of value living in a meaningful universe. In this way, awareness of the inevitability of death produces diverse effects on human thought and behavior that bear little obvious resemblance to the problem of death.     

Whatever is willed will be: a temporal asymmetry in attributions to will

Why do people neglect or underweight their past failures when thinking about their prospects of future success? One reason may be that people think of the past and future as guided by different causal forces. In seven studies, the authors demonstrate that people hold asymmetric beliefs about the impact of an individual's will on past versus future events. People consider the will to be a more potent determinant of future events than events that happened in the past. This asymmetry holds between- and within-subjects, and generalizes beyond undergraduate populations. The authors contend that this asymmetry contributes to the tendency for people to remain confident about their future performance in domains in which they have largely failed in the past. This research thus contributes to a growing body of literature exploring how thoughts about events in the past differ from thoughts about the same events set in the future.     

Behavioral Telehealth Consultation with Families of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

In this study, desktop video teleconferencing was used to facilitate behavioral consultation at a distance with three parents of school‐age children with autism spectrum disorders. Parents were supported via desktop video teleconferencing as they conducted functional analyses and learned to implement an antecedent manipulation strategy, functional communication training, and a consequence‐based strategy. Parents then conducted a brief multi‐element treatment comparison to evaluate the preliminary effectiveness of each intervention strategy on their child's challenging behavior. The results of this study provide additional support to previous research suggesting that a telehealth model of behavioral consultation may be an effective way to assist parents of children with autism spectrum disorders address challenging behavior that disrupts family routines. Suggestions for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Game of Inches: Spontaneous Use of Counterfactuals by Broadcasters During Major League Baseball Playoffs1

We tested whether counterfactuals are made spontaneously outside of the laboratory by coding sportscasters’ online verbalizations during 1998 and 1999 Major League Baseball (MLB) playoff broadcasts, and we assessed whether naturally occurring game features relating to closeness (score closeness, series closeness, game end, and playoff end) delineated some conditions under which counterfactuals were more likely. Sportscasters made counterfactuals quite frequently during these MLB playoff games. In addition, sportscasters uttered greater numbers of counterfactuals as games progressed from early to late innings, which was particularly true when scores were close. Counterfactuals were also uttered in greater numbers with closer scores when series were tied than when one team had a lead. Results are discussed in terms of spontaneous counterfactuals, closeness as an antecedent, and the ecological validity of such thoughts.     

Counterfactual thinking and decision making

Recent research on counterfactual thinking is discussed in terms of its implications for decision making. Against a backdrop of the functional benefits of counterfactual thinking, two distinct types of bias, one liberal and one conservative, are discussed. Counterfactuals may cause decision makers to become liberally biased (i.e., capricious) in terms of tactics, but conservatively biased (i.e., rigid) in terms of long-term strategy. That is, counterfactuals may lead to short-term corrective changes that are needless and costly, but they may also lead to long-term overconfidence, blinding the decision maker to possible beneficial strategic adjustments. Recent research on counterfactual thinking, which is inherently multidisciplinary, is reviewed in light of a theoretical structure that posits two mechanisms by which counterfactual effects occur: contrast effects and causal inferences.     

上司地位知觉对下属默契的影响——反馈寻求行为和观点采择的作用

下属默契指的是下属与上司间不经言传而暗相投合的状态,它能潜移默化地提升下属绩效。因此,探讨下属默契的产生原因,对组织有着重要意义。鉴于此,本文以目标动机模型为理论基础,探讨了上司地位知觉对下属默契的影响及其内部机制。通过对186名企业员工的调查分析发现,上司地位知觉对下属默契有显著的正向影响;反馈寻求行为在此过程中起部分中介作用;此外,下属的观点采择能力调节了反馈寻求行为与下属默契间的正向关系。     

Counterfactual potency

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed.     

Subjectivity and environmentalism

The main thesis of this paper is that the most cogent demands of subjectivity, at least with respect to questions concerning the contents of our thoughts, can be accommodated within an objectivist framework. I begin with two theses: (1) Subjectivity: I can know (the contents of) my own thoughts without appeal to any knowledge of features external to my mind; (2) Environmentalism: (The contents of) my thoughts are determined by features external to my mind, at least in this sense: without causal and/or social interaction between my internal states and various external features, these internal states would not have the particular contents they have and therefore would not be the mental states they are. Section I proceeds by elucidating various lines of environmentalism, an overtly objectivist thesis. Section II considers and refutes one purported environmentalist challenge to subjectivity, namely, that, according to it, thoughts are not in the head. Section III discusses a central subjectivist thesis, namely, thoughts do not admit of an appearance/reality distinction. Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, two environmentalists, seem to endorse such a distinction. It is argued that the two most reasonable routes of escape open to them require a retreat from environmentalism. This leaves us with an apparent dilemma: reject either subjectivity or environmentalism Section IV defends environmentalism. Section V considers and criticizes a maneuver Donald Davidson makes to preserve first‐person authority over thought‐contents. Section VI concludes with a brief defense of environmentalism which rests largely on rejecting a deeply entrenched epistemic model about how we access our own thoughts. It is argued that it is this bad epistemic model and not subjectivity per se, which has created whatever tension there appears to be between subjectivity and environmentalism.