Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses for multiple populations

The software package Bain can be used for the evaluation of informative hypotheses with respect to the parameters of a wide range of statistical models. For pairs of hypotheses the support in the data is quantified using the approximate adjusted fractional Bayes factor (BF). Currently, the data have to come from one population or have to consist of samples of equal size obtained from multiple populations. If samples of unequal size are obtained from multiple populations, the BF can be shown to be inconsistent. This paper examines how the approach implemented in Bain can be generalized such that multiple-population data can properly be processed. The resulting multiple-population approximate adjusted fractional Bayes factor is implemented in the R package Bain.     

Automatic Bayes Factors for Testing Equality- and Inequality-Constrained Hypotheses on Variances

In comparing characteristics of independent populations, researchers frequently expect a certain structure of the population variances. These expectations can be formulated as hypotheses with equality and/or inequality constraints on the variances. In this article, we consider the Bayes factor for testing such (in)equality-constrained hypotheses on variances. Application of Bayes factors requires specification of a prior under every hypothesis to be tested. However, specifying subjective priors for variances based on prior information is a difficult task. We therefore consider so-called automatic or default Bayes factors. These methods avoid the need for the user to specify priors by using information from the sample data. We present three automatic Bayes factors for testing variances. The first is a Bayes factor with equal priors on all variances, where the priors are specified automatically using a small share of the information in the sample data. The second is the fractional Bayes factor, where a fraction of the likelihood is used for automatic prior specification. The third is an adjustment of the fractional Bayes factor such that the parsimony of inequality-constrained hypotheses is properly taken into account. The Bayes factors are evaluated by investigating different properties such as information consistency and large sample consistency. Based on this evaluation, it is concluded that the adjusted fractional Bayes factor is generally recommendable for testing equality- and inequality-constrained hypotheses on variances.     

Bayesian model selection of informative hypotheses for repeated measurements

When analyzing repeated measurements data, researchers often have expectations about the relations between the measurement means. The expectations can often be formalized using equality and inequality constraints between (i) the measurement means over time, (ii) the measurement means between groups, (iii) the means adjusted for time-invariant covariates, and (iv) the means adjusted for time-varying covariates. The result is a set of informative hypotheses. In this paper, the Bayes factor is used to determine which hypothesis receives most support from the data. A pivotal element in the Bayesian framework is the specification of the prior. To avoid subjective prior specification, training data in combination with restrictions on the measurement means are used to obtain so-called constrained posterior priors. A simulation study and an empirical example from developmental psychology show that this prior results in Bayes factors with desirable properties.     

Bayes factors for testing inequality constrained hypotheses: Issues with prior specification

Several issues are discussed when testing inequality constrained hypotheses using a Bayesian approach. First, the complexity (or size) of the inequality constrained parameter spaces can be ignored. This is the case when using the posterior probability that the inequality constraints of a hypothesis hold, Bayes factors based on non‐informative improper priors, and partial Bayes factors based on posterior priors. Second, the Bayes factor may not be invariant for linear one‐to‐one transformations of the data. This can be observed when using balanced priors which are centred on the boundary of the constrained parameter space with a diagonal covariance structure. Third, the information paradox can be observed. When testing inequality constrained hypotheses, the information paradox occurs when the Bayes factor of an inequality constrained hypothesis against its complement converges to a constant as the evidence for the first hypothesis accumulates while keeping the sample size fixed. This paradox occurs when using Zellner's g prior as a result of too much prior shrinkage. Therefore, two new methods are proposed that avoid these issues. First, partial Bayes factors are proposed based on transformed minimal training samples. These training samples result in posterior priors that are centred on the boundary of the constrained parameter space with the same covariance structure as in the sample. Second, a g prior approach is proposed by letting g go to infinity. This is possible because the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox is not an issue when testing inequality constrained hypotheses. A simulation study indicated that the Bayes factor based on this g prior approach converges fastest to the true inequality constrained hypothesis.     

All for one or some for all? Evaluating informative hypotheses using multiple <Emphasis Type="Italic">N</Emphasis> = 1 studies

Analyses are mostly executed at the population level, whereas in many applications the interest is on the individual level instead of the population level. In this paper, multiple N =?1 experiments are considered, where participants perform multiple trials with a dichotomous outcome in various conditions. Expectations with respect to the performance of participants can be translated into so-called informative hypotheses. These hypotheses can be evaluated for each participant separately using Bayes factors. A Bayes factor expresses the relative evidence for two hypotheses based on the data of one individual. This paper proposes to “average” these individual Bayes factors in the gP-BF, the average relative evidence. The gP-BF can be used to determine whether one hypothesis is preferred over another for all individuals under investigation. This measure provides insight into whether the relative preference of a hypothesis from a pre-defined set is homogeneous over individuals. Two additional measures are proposed to support the interpretation of the gP-BF: the evidence rate (ER), the proportion of individual Bayes factors that support the same hypothesis as the gP-BF, and the stability rate (SR), the proportion of individual Bayes factors that express a stronger support than the gP-BF. These three statistics can be used to determine the relative support in the data for the informative hypotheses entertained. Software is available that can be used to execute the approach proposed in this paper and to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes with respect to the number of participants and within condition replications.     

The frequentist implications of optional stopping on Bayesian hypothesis tests

Null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is the most commonly used statistical methodology in psychology. The probability of achieving a value as extreme or more extreme than the statistic obtained from the data is evaluated, and if it is low enough, the null hypothesis is rejected. However, because common experimental practice often clashes with the assumptions underlying NHST, these calculated probabilities are often incorrect. Most commonly, experimenters use tests that assume that sample sizes are fixed in advance of data collection but then use the data to determine when to stop; in the limit, experimenters can use data monitoring to guarantee that the null hypothesis will be rejected. Bayesian hypothesis testing (BHT) provides a solution to these ills because the stopping rule used is irrelevant to the calculation of a Bayes factor. In addition, there are strong mathematical guarantees on the frequentist properties of BHT that are comforting for researchers concerned that stopping rules could influence the Bayes factors produced. Here, we show that these guaranteed bounds have limited scope and often do not apply in psychological research. Specifically, we quantitatively demonstrate the impact of optional stopping on the resulting Bayes factors in two common situations: (1) when the truth is a combination of the hypotheses, such as in a heterogeneous population, and (2) when a hypothesis is composite—taking multiple parameter values—such as the alternative hypothesis in a t-test. We found that, for these situations, while the Bayesian interpretation remains correct regardless of the stopping rule used, the choice of stopping rule can, in some situations, greatly increase the chance of experimenters finding evidence in the direction they desire. We suggest ways to control these frequentist implications of stopping rules on BHT.     

贝叶斯因子及其在JASP中的实现

统计推断在科学研究中起到关键作用, 然而当前科研中最常用的经典统计方法——零假设检验(Null hypothesis significance test, NHST)却因难以理解而被部分研究者误用或滥用。有研究者提出使用贝叶斯因子(Bayes factor)作为一种替代和(或)补充的统计方法。贝叶斯因子是贝叶斯统计中用来进行模型比较和假设检验的重要方法, 其可以解读为对零假设H₀或者备择假设H₁的支持程度。其与NHST相比有如下优势：同时考虑H₀和H₁并可以用来支持H₀、不“严重”地倾向于反对H₀、可以监控证据强度的变化以及不受抽样计划的影响。目前, 贝叶斯因子能够很便捷地通过开放的统计软件JASP实现, 本文以贝叶斯t检验进行示范。贝叶斯因子的使用对心理学研究者来说具有重要的意义, 但使用时需要注意先验分布选择的合理性以及保持数据分析过程的透明与公开。     

Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis

Progress in science often comes from discovering invariances in relationships among variables; these invariances often correspond to null hypotheses. As is commonly known, it is not possible to state evidence for the null hypothesis in conventional significance testing. Here we highlight a Bayes factor alternative to the conventional t test that will allow researchers to express preference for either the null hypothesis or the alternative. The Bayes factor has a natural and straightforward interpretation, is based on reasonable assumptions, and has better properties than other methods of inference that have been advocated in the psychological literature. To facilitate use of the Bayes factor, we provide an easy-to-use, Web-based program that performs the necessary calculations.     

Prior sensitivity in theory testing: An apologia for the Bayes factor

A commonly voiced concern with the Bayes factor is that, unlike many other Bayesian and non-Bayesian quantitative measures of model evaluation, it is highly sensitive to the parameter prior. This paper argues that, when dealing with psychological models that are quantitatively instantiated theories, being sensitive to the prior is an attractive feature of a model evaluation measure. This assertion follows from the observation that in psychological models parameters are not completely unknown, but correspond to psychological variables about which theory often exists. This theory can be formally captured in the prior range and prior distribution of the parameters, indicating which parameter values are allowed, likely, unlikely and forbidden. Because the prior is a vehicle for expressing psychological theory, it should, like the model equation, be considered as an integral part of the model. It is argued that the combined practice of building models using informative priors, and evaluating models using prior sensitive measures advances knowledge.     

Bayes factor approaches for testing interval null hypotheses

Psychological theories are statements of constraint. The role of hypothesis testing in psychology is to test whether specific theoretical constraints hold in data. Bayesian statistics is well suited to the task of finding supporting evidence for constraint, because it allows for comparing evidence for 2 hypotheses against each another. One issue in hypothesis testing is that constraints may hold only approximately rather than exactly, and the reason for small deviations may be trivial or uninteresting. In the large-sample limit, these uninteresting, small deviations lead to the rejection of a useful constraint. In this article, we develop several Bayes factor 1-sample tests for the assessment of approximate equality and ordinal constraints. In these tests, the null hypothesis covers a small interval of non-0 but negligible effect sizes around 0. These Bayes factors are alternatives to previously developed Bayes factors, which do not allow for interval null hypotheses, and may especially prove useful to researchers who use statistical equivalence testing. To facilitate adoption of these Bayes factor tests, we provide easy-to-use software.     

Using MCMC chain outputs to efficiently estimate Bayes factors

One of the most important methodological problems in psychological research is assessing the reasonableness of null models, which typically constrain a parameter to a specific value such as zero. Bayes factor has been recently advocated in the statistical and psychological literature as a principled means of measuring the evidence in data for various models, including those where parameters are set to specific values. Yet, it is rarely adopted in substantive research, perhaps because of the difficulties in computation. Fortunately, for this problem, the Savage–Dickey density ratio (Dickey & Lientz, 1970) provides a conceptually simple approach to computing Bayes factor. Here, we review methods for computing the Savage–Dickey density ratio, and highlight an improved method, originally suggested by Gelfand and Smith (1990) and advocated by Chib (1995), that outperforms those currently discussed in the psychological literature. The improved method is based on conditional quantities, which may be integrated by Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling to estimate Bayes factors. These conditional quantities efficiently utilize all the information in the MCMC chains, leading to accurate estimation of Bayes factors. We demonstrate the method by computing Bayes factors in one-sample and one-way designs, and show how it may be implemented in WinBUGS.     

Bayes factors for the linear ballistic accumulator model of decision-making

Evidence accumulation models of decision-making have led to advances in several different areas of psychology. These models provide a way to integrate response time and accuracy data, and to describe performance in terms of latent cognitive processes. Testing important psychological hypotheses using cognitive models requires a method to make inferences about different versions of the models which assume different parameters to cause observed effects. The task of model-based inference using noisy data is difficult, and has proven especially problematic with current model selection methods based on parameter estimation. We provide a method for computing Bayes factors through Monte-Carlo integration for the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008), a widely used evidence accumulation model. Bayes factors are used frequently for inference with simpler statistical models, and they do not require parameter estimation. In order to overcome the computational burden of estimating Bayes factors via brute force integration, we exploit general purpose graphical processing units; we provide free code for this. This approach allows estimation of Bayes factors via Monte-Carlo integration within a practical time frame. We demonstrate the method using both simulated and real data. We investigate the stability of the Monte-Carlo approximation, and the LBA’s inferential properties, in simulation studies.     

A Bayes factor meta-analysis of Bem’s ESP claim

In recent years, statisticians and psychologists have provided the critique that p-values do not capture the evidence afforded by data and are, consequently, ill suited for analysis in scientific endeavors. The issue is particular salient in the assessment of the recent evidence provided for ESP by Bem (2011) in the mainstream Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 426-432, 2011) have provided an alternative Bayes factor assessment of Bem's data, but their assessment was limited to examining each experiment in isolation. We show here that the variant of the Bayes factor employed by Wagenmakers et al. is inappropriate for making assessments across multiple experiments, and cannot be used to gain an accurate assessment of the total evidence in Bem's data. We develop a meta-analytic Bayes factor that describes how researchers should update their prior beliefs about the odds of hypotheses in light of data across several experiments. We find that the evidence that people can feel the future with neutral and erotic stimuli to be slight, with Bayes factors of 3.23 and 1.57, respectively. There is some evidence, however, for the hypothesis that people can feel the future with emotionally valenced nonerotic stimuli, with a Bayes factor of about 40. Although this value is certainly noteworthy, we believe it is orders of magnitude lower than what is required to overcome appropriate skepticism of ESP.     

Reply to Rouder (2014): Good frequentist properties raise confidence

Established psychological results have been called into question by demonstrations that statistical significance is easy to achieve, even in the absence of an effect. One often-warned-against practice, choosing when to stop the experiment on the basis of the results, is guaranteed to produce significant results. In response to these demonstrations, Bayes factors have been proposed as an antidote to this practice, because they are invariant with respect to how an experiment was stopped. Should researchers only care about the resulting Bayes factor, without concern for how it was produced? Yu, Sprenger, Thomas, and Dougherty (2014) and Sanborn and Hills (2014) demonstrated that Bayes factors are sometimes strongly influenced by the stopping rules used. However, Rouder (2014) has provided a compelling demonstration that despite this influence, the evidence supplied by Bayes factors remains correct. Here we address why the ability to influence Bayes factors should still matter to researchers, despite the correctness of the evidence. We argue that good frequentist properties mean that results will more often agree with researchers’ statistical intuitions, and good frequentist properties control the number of studies that will later be refuted. Both help raise confidence in psychological results.     

Bayesian inference for psychology,part IV: parameter estimation and Bayes factors

In the psychological literature, there are two seemingly different approaches to inference: that from estimation of posterior intervals and that from Bayes factors. We provide an overview of each method and show that a salient difference is the choice of models. The two approaches as commonly practiced can be unified with a certain model specification, now popular in the statistics literature, called spike-and-slab priors. A spike-and-slab prior is a mixture of a null model, the spike, with an effect model, the slab. The estimate of the effect size here is a function of the Bayes factor, showing that estimation and model comparison can be unified. The salient difference is that common Bayes factor approaches provide for privileged consideration of theoretically useful parameter values, such as the value corresponding to the null hypothesis, while estimation approaches do not. Both approaches, either privileging the null or not, are useful depending on the goals of the analyst.     

An introduction to Bayesian model selection for evaluating informative hypotheses

Most researchers have specific expectations concerning their research questions. These may be derived from theory, empirical evidence, or both. Yet despite these expectations, most investigators still use null hypothesis testing to evaluate their data, that is, when analysing their data they ignore the expectations they have. In the present article, Bayesian model selection is presented as a means to evaluate the expectations researchers have, that is, to evaluate so called informative hypotheses. Although the methodology to do this has been described in previous articles, these are rather technical and havemainly been published in statistical journals. The main objective of thepresent article is to provide a basic introduction to the evaluation of informative hypotheses using Bayesian model selection. Moreover, what is new in comparison to previous publications on this topic is that we provide guidelines on how to interpret the results. Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses is illustrated using an example concerning psychosocial functioning and the interplay between personality and support from family.     

A tutorial on Bayes factor estimation with the product space method

The Bayes factor is an intuitive and principled model selection tool from Bayesian statistics. The Bayes factor quantifies the relative likelihood of the observed data under two competing models, and as such, it measures the evidence that the data provides for one model versus the other. Unfortunately, computation of the Bayes factor often requires sampling-based procedures that are not trivial to implement. In this tutorial, we explain and illustrate the use of one such procedure, known as the product space method (Carlin & Chib, 1995). This is a transdimensional Markov chain Monte Carlo method requiring the construction of a “supermodel” encompassing the models under consideration. A model index measures the proportion of times that either model is visited to account for the observed data. This proportion can then be transformed to yield a Bayes factor. We discuss the theory behind the product space method and illustrate, by means of applied examples from psychological research, how the method can be implemented in practice.     

Mousetrap: An integrated,open-source mouse-tracking package

Mouse-tracking – the analysis of mouse movements in computerized experiments – is becoming increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. Mouse movements are taken as an indicator of commitment to or conflict between choice options during the decision process. Using mouse-tracking, researchers have gained insight into the temporal development of cognitive processes across a growing number of psychological domains. In the current article, we present software that offers easy and convenient means of recording and analyzing mouse movements in computerized laboratory experiments. In particular, we introduce and demonstrate the mousetrap plugin that adds mouse-tracking to OpenSesame, a popular general-purpose graphical experiment builder. By integrating with this existing experimental software, mousetrap allows for the creation of mouse-tracking studies through a graphical interface, without requiring programming skills. Thus, researchers can benefit from the core features of a validated software package and the many extensions available for it (e.g., the integration with auxiliary hardware such as eye-tracking, or the support of interactive experiments). In addition, the recorded data can be imported directly into the statistical programming language R using the mousetrap package, which greatly facilitates analysis. Mousetrap is cross-platform, open-source and available free of charge from https://github.com/pascalkieslich/mousetrap-os.     

Bayes factor design analysis: Planning for compelling evidence

A sizeable literature exists on the use of frequentist power analysis in the null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) paradigm to facilitate the design of informative experiments. In contrast, there is almost no literature that discusses the design of experiments when Bayes factors (BFs) are used as a measure of evidence. Here we explore Bayes Factor Design Analysis (BFDA) as a useful tool to design studies for maximum efficiency and informativeness. We elaborate on three possible BF designs, (a) a fixed-n design, (b) an open-ended Sequential Bayes Factor (SBF) design, where researchers can test after each participant and can stop data collection whenever there is strong evidence for either \(\mathcal {H}_{1}\) or \(\mathcal {H}_{0}\), and (c) a modified SBF design that defines a maximal sample size where data collection is stopped regardless of the current state of evidence. We demonstrate how the properties of each design (i.e., expected strength of evidence, expected sample size, expected probability of misleading evidence, expected probability of weak evidence) can be evaluated using Monte Carlo simulations and equip researchers with the necessary information to compute their own Bayesian design analyses.