A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals

Kant's view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that a suitably modified Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals and, in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised Kantian view, is neither a conditioned nor unconditioned good, but a final and nonderivative good that ought to be treated as an end‐in‐itself. However, this duty to promote animal welfare operates according to a broadly consequentialist logic that both accords well with our considered judgments about our duties to animals and explains differences between these duties and duties owed to rational agents.     

A Law of One's Own: Self‐Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism

Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.     

The Duty of Self‐Knowledge

Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction “Know Yourself” is the basis of all self‐regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self‐knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, notably, self‐deception (§2). Finding none of Kant’s solutions to the problem of self‐deception satisfactory, I conclude by defending a Kantian account of self‐knowledge based on his theory of conscience (§3).     

Embodied Attitude Change: A Self‐Validation Perspective

Our behavior can change what we like and dislike. Although it seems clear that we might like something more when we smile (versus frown), or when we nod our heads (versus shake), it is important to understand the processes responsible for these changes in evaluation. It might be that agreement behaviors such as smiling and nodding work as cue, make us think about everything in a positive light, or it might be that they encourage us not to think much about the information we receive. This review describes the basic processes underlying embodied change, highlighting the role of a recently discovered meta‐cognitive process (called self‐validation) by which bodily responses can validate or invalidate (instead of changing) our thoughts. This new mechanism can account for some already established outcomes in embodied persuasion (e.g., more persuasion with smiling than frowning), but by a different process than postulated previously (smiling increases confidence in thoughts), as well as for some new findings (e.g., more persuasion for low than high powerful postures; more self‐confidence when performing doubtful postures).     

Understanding Workaholics' Motivations: A Self‐Determination Perspective

In order to explain the diverging well‐being outcomes of workaholism, this study aimed to examine the motivational orientations that may fuel the two main components of workaholism (i.e. working excessively and working compulsively). Drawings on Self‐Determination Theory, both autonomous and controlled motivation were suggested to drive excessive work, which therefore was expected to relate positively to both well‐being (i.e. vigor) and ill‐health (i.e. exhaustion). Compulsive work, in contrast, was hypothesised to originate exclusively out of controlled motivation and therefore to only associate positively with ill‐being. Structural equation modeling in a heterogeneous sample of Belgian white‐collar workers (N= 370) confirmed that autonomous motivation associated positively with excessive work, which then related positively to vigor. Controlled motivation correlated positively with compulsive work, which therefore related positively with exhaustion. The hypothesised path from controlled motivation to exhaustion through excessive work was not corroborated. In general, the findings suggest that primarily compulsive work yields associations with ill‐being, since it may stem from a qualitatively inferior type of motivation.     

Self‐Enhancement in a Job Search Context

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of self‐enhancement in a job search context. Based on previous theoretical and empirical research on positive illusions and core self‐evaluations, we examined the relationships among core self‐evaluations, self‐enhancement, perceived job alternatives, and job search behaviors. Participants in two different studies were students attending a career fair at a university in the southwestern United States to look for a job. Results showed that self‐enhancement is positively related to preparatory job search and mediates the relationship between core self‐evaluations and perceived job alternatives. The implications of this study are discussed.     

Individual Differences in Self‐Enhancement and Self‐Protection Strategies: An Integrative Analysis

ABSTRACT Research has identified a large number of strategies that people use to self‐enhance or self‐protect. We aimed for an empirical integration of these strategies. Two studies used self‐report items to assess all commonly recognized self‐enhancement or self‐protection strategies. In Study 1 (N=345), exploratory factor analysis identified 4 reliable factors. In Study 2 (N=416), this model was validated using confirmatory factor analysis. The factors related differentially to the key personality variables of regulatory focus, self‐esteem, and narcissism. Expanding this integrative approach in the future can reveal a great deal about the structure and dynamics of self‐enhancement and self‐protection motivation.     

Effortless Self‐Control: A Novel Perspective on Response Conflict Strategies in Trait Self‐Control

Self‐control is of invaluable importance for well‐being. While previous research has focused on self‐control failure, we introduce a new perspective on self‐control, including the notion of effortless self‐control, and a focus on self‐control success rather than failure. We propose that effortless strategies of dealing with response conflict (i.e., competing behavioral tendencies) are what distinguishes successful self‐controllers from less successful ones. While people with high trait self‐control may recognize the potential for response conflict in self‐control dilemmas, they do not seem to subjectively experience this conflict as much as people with low self‐control. Two strategies may underlie this difference: avoidance of response conflict through adaptive, habitual behaviors, and the efficient downregulating of response conflict. These strategies as well as the role of response conflict are elaborated upon and discussed in the light of existing literature on self‐control.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

A Kantian Moral Duty for the Soon-to-be Demented to Commit Suicide

It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons.     

Exaggerated Positivity in Self‐Evaluation: A Social Neuroscience Approach to Reconciling the Role of Self‐esteem Protection and Cognitive Bias

Recent neuroscience research provides new insight into why people tend to view themselves through rose‐colored glasses and suggests a different approach for improving self‐insight. Rose‐colored glasses (sometimes referred to as positive illusions, positivity bias, self‐serving bias, self‐enhancement, or overconfidence) are a pervasive characteristic of self‐evaluation. While it is intuitive to think about rose‐colored glasses as a self‐esteem protection tactic, research has shown that people tend to exaggerate their positive attributes even when self‐esteem is not at stake. This raises questions about the relation of the exaggerated positivity used to protect self‐esteem to the exaggerated positivity seen in other circumstances. Are people using a consistent thought pattern to overemphasize their positive attributes which generalizes across situations regardless of whether self‐esteem is at stake? Or is there something different about the way people go about overemphasizing their positive attributes when coping with a threat to self‐esteem? Recent neuroscience research supports the latter: inducing the need for self‐esteem protection changes the neural profile underlying exaggerated positivity. When self‐esteem is threatened, exaggerated positivity in self‐evaluation engages orbitofrontal cortex and a functional network of increased basal ganglia activation and decreased middle frontal gyrus activation. In contrast, exaggerated positivity arising in the absence of self‐esteem threat tends to reduce orbitofrontal cortex activation and its functional connectivity with the temporal, occipital, and frontal lobes. This discovery suggests that not all rose‐colored glasses are created equally and, therefore, curtailing them may require different interventions depending on whether self‐esteem protection is their underlying driving force.     

Memory as a Self‐Protective Mechanism

The autobiographical memory literature has established that people remember poorly unpleasant, relative to pleasant, life events. We complemented this literature with a theoretical model – the mnemic neglect model – and an experimental paradigm that exerts tight control over the to‐be‐remembered material. Participants recall poorly self‐threatening feedback compared to self‐affirming or other‐relevant feedback – a phenomenon we labeled mnemic neglect. The phenomenon is motivational: it is in the service of self‐protection. The phenomenon is also flexible. Participants can switch from self‐protection (e.g. avoiding negative feedback) to an alternative goal (e.g. striving for feedback with improvement potential), when circumstances call for it such as when the feedback is provided by a close other rather than a stranger. Finally, self‐threatening feedback may be forgotten, but it is not lost: the mnemic neglect effect is not obtained in recognition recall.     

A Critical Test of Self‐Enhancement,Exposure, and Self‐Categorization Explanations for First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

The third‐person perception is the tendency for people to believe that others are more influenced by media content than themselves (W. P. Davison, 1983 ). The current study provides a critical test of self‐enhancement, exposure, and self‐categorization explanations for first‐ (i.e., self more influenced than others) and third‐person perceptions. Male and female participants (N = 323) judged the extent to which pornography elicited“aroused and excited” (i.e., male normative) versus“repulsed and offended” (i.e., female normative) reactions in themselves relative to average men and women. Men perceived an average woman to be more repulsed and offended by pornography than themselves, and women perceived an average man to be more aroused and excited than themselves (i.e., large third‐person perceptions). Further, men perceived themselves to be more aroused and excited by pornography than an average woman (independent of the degree to which pornography was judged as antisocial), and women perceived themselves to be more repulsed and offended than an average man (i.e., large first‐person perceptions). There were relatively small effects for same sex comparisons independent of norm. The pattern and magnitude of first‐ and third‐person perceptions are consistent with self‐categorization theory, irreconcilable with the exposure hypothesis, and difficult to reconcile with the self‐enhancement explanation.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.